What are you currently reading in 2018

[Backwards Observer]

The Kingdom of the Wicked by Anthony Burgess


Structured Analytic Techniques For Intelligence Analysis by Richards J Heuer Jr, Randolph H Pherson (2d attempt)

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[Bill Moore]

https://www.amazon.com/Churchills-Mi...+warfare&psc=1

Churchill's Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare by Giles Milton

A superb book on the history of SOE's sabotage campaign against the Nazis during WWII.

"She had been hired to work for a top-secret Whitehall department known as Section D. The "D" stood for destruction and Grand and his staff had been tasked with conceiving a wholly new form of warfare. In the event of conflict with Hitler's Nazis, a small band of specially trained agents was to be dropped behind enemy lines in order to engage in murder, sabotage and subversion."

The goal was to destroy the infrastructure that supported Hitler's war machine, and they did a superb job of it. A great narrative that integrates the value of detailed intelligence on targets that only human intelligence can provide; the story of technology development that enabled the sabotage at a strategic level; and the unparalleled value of highly fit, intelligent, and dedicated operators committed to the defeat of Hitler who knowingly volunteered for missions that were likely suicide missions.

Those in U.S. Special Forces, at least the older breed, will recognize that the SOE is clearly the father of many our tactics, techniques, and procedures when it comes to guerrilla warfare, subversion, and sabotage. They invented the Limpet mine (also used with great effect against factories, trains, etc.) and the shape charge, among others weapons still in use today.

Operations covered in detail include sabotaging Hitler's effort to obtain heavy water from Norway to develop the atomic bomb, the destruction of the Peugeot factory (and many other factories), destroying the rail and communications systems in France delaying the movement of a potentially decisive SS armor division to the beaches of Normandy for days, destroying the world's largest dry dock at St. Nazaire (which also neutralized Germany's largest battleship), and many more. The story of how the various weapons were developed is fascinating also, and how many of the weapons designed by Section D were also employed by British and U.S. conventional forces, and one firing device was used to solve the problem for detonating the second atom bomb dropped on Japan, while another weapons was employed by the U.S. navy to destroy several Japanese submarines.

In comparison to the British Bomber Command, the SOE effort proved to be much more efficacious. Gubbin was the key leader of the effort, and his saboteurs "crippled niney Nazi-run factories - factories essential to Hitler's war machine - and put them completely out of action 'with a total load of explosives that was less than that carried by one light bomber'."

[davidbfpo]

Bill,

I have not read this book, but know Giles Milton is an excellent writer and I vividly recall Nathaniel's Nutmeg.
Link:https://www.amazon.com/Nathaniels-Nu...iel%27s+nutmeg

Puzzled the book claims the 1942 raid on St. Nazaire, as this was a commando raid using an old destroyer packed with explosives to demolish the dry dock gate. Wiki says:

The SOE were approached to see if its agents could destroy the dock gates. They decided that the mission was beyond their capabilities because the weight of explosives required would have needed too many agents to carry them.

Link:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/St_Nazaire_Raid

SOE rightly can be praised for the innovations it conjured up, but it was not all glorious and their Dutch operation was activity "turned" by the Germans. See:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Englandspiel

[Bill Moore]

David,

High risk missions are just that, they're high risk, meaning there is a good possibility things will go wrong. UK SOF seems to adapt that reality more than risk adverse U.S. military leaders. As the SAS motto states, "who dares wins," but it doesn't mean you always win.

Regarding the St. Nazaire attack was conceived and planned by the SOE. They trained the commandos involved in the mission, designed the bomb and firing devise for the ship, and developed the deception plan to get the ship into the slot. Amazingly there was only one night of the year they could do this based on tides, full moon, etc. Unfortunately the deception plan backfired, the odd flying pattern of the UK bombers intended to make the Germans look left instead of right, actually heightened their alertness. This resulted the British destroy being detected and engaged before it reached it target. Several commandos were killed in the final assault to get the ship next to the target 4 minutes later than planned. They crashed into caisson, and then flooded the stern of ship so the Germans couldn't tow her away.

The saboteurs then attacked the pump house, which was essential for filling and emptying the dock of water. Without the pumps the dock was useless. That part of the mission was a success, but most of the commandos were now killed, wounded, or soon to be captured. There was great concern that the firing mechanism that was set to trigger the large bomb in the ship failed, but a couple hours after it was scheduled to blow it did so with enough force to create a tidal wave that generated additional damage. The dock remained inoperable for over a decade. Obviously the mission came at great cost to the commandos, but they achieved a strategic impact.

Of course, some will claim using a conventional ship packed with explosives to destroy a target isn't a true special operation, but I beg to differ. This mission depended upon unorthodox tactics, specially trained and equipped men willing to accept the risk, precise target intelligence, and so forth.

[davidbfpo]

This is a 2012 book (340 pgs) borrowed from a specialist library two months ago and finally finished. 'Terrorism and Counter-Intelligence' by Brian W. Mobley, ex-CIA analyst and RAND political scientist, is certainly interesting and possibly a rare published work on the subject. The four groups looked at in detail are: the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), Fatah and Black September, Al-Qaida (AQ) and the Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG).

Alas it is marred by some serious factual mistakes and the lack of editing, so some sentences reappear a few pages apart. Northern Ireland and PIRA is something I know a little; the author refers to Captain Robert Nairac kidnapped by PIRA and his body being recovered, when it has not been (pg.56).
Link to Amazon USA, with eight reviews:https://www.amazon.com/Terrorism-Cou...pe=all_reviews

It would have been valuable to look at groups who were successful for a long time; ETA in Spain and November 17 in Greece come to mind.

Oddly his PhD, on which the book is based, is freely available (403 pgs):https://repository.library.georgetow...pdf?sequence=1

[Backwards Observer]

Hold Everything Dear by John Berger


21 Lessons for the 21st Century by Yuval Noah Harari

[Tasmanian Devil]

Salafi-Jihadism: The History Of An Idea by Shiraz Maher. Penguin Books 2017.

Maher’s book is a good introduction into the historical development of "Salafi-Jihadism", and offers a valuable overview of the current ideas focused around this subject.

The book is a careful and scholarly discussion of Salafi-Jihadism, well written and informative. Addressing the topic from a historical, theological, and legal viewpoint it is not meant for a casual read, although written with the general reader in mind, and, because of this, some might find it heavy going. For those of us, who are not specialist Arabic linguists, considerable application is required in understanding the many Arabic words which, though similarly spelt, have different meanings.

All in all I found it an extremely enlightening book, and a very worthwhile read (I am on my third reading and am still finding something new). With his excellent understanding of Salafi-Jihadism Maher’s indepth discussion, explanation, and erudite analysis, provide an admirable insight into a complex belief. Unlike many others, Maher tells us what Jihadists actually think. I particularly liked his arguments against the perceptions, held by many in the West, politicians, military, and the general public alike, that Salafi-Jihadists are irrational. He is emphatic that this is not so, and that Salafi actions are quite clearly based on a specific interpretation of the Qur’an.