Syria in 2018-2019

[Azor]

https://www.almasdarnews.com/article...-from-lebanon/

The US has denied involvement...

[AdamG]

WASHINGTON - The likelihood of a military strike against Syria after a suspected chemical weapons attack increased Sunday as President Donald Trump said there would be a "big price to pay" and officials in France vowed the country would "do its duty" in responding.

France called for an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council on Monday to discuss the weekend attack, and eight other nations joined in the request, including the United States and Britain.

https://www.mysanantonio.com/news/ar...l-12815978.php

[Azor]

From the Jewish News Syndicate: https://www.jns.org/analysis-latest-...ranian-threat/

(April 9, 2018 / JNS) The recent missile strike on a military airbase deep in the central Syrian desert looks like the latest installment in a long-standing Israeli campaign to police its red lines against highly dangerous developments to its north.

Usually, such strikes are driven by incoming intelligence of threatening activity underway in Syria—activity that breaches Jerusalem’s ban on Iran from constructing military bases in Syria, from setting up weapons factories there and from using Syria as a transit zone for the trafficking of advanced arms to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Iran is keen to cash in on its heavy investment and bloody involvement on behalf of the survival of Syrian President Bashar Assad’s regime. That means attempting to expand the Iranian military presence on Syrian soil. Israel is determined to stop this at all costs.

By chance or not, the strike also comes amid fallout from the Syrian government’s use of chemical weapons against rebel-held areas over the weekend, leading to warnings from President Donald Trump of likely military strikes in retaliation.

Nevertheless, the precise reason that triggered the latest strike remains unknown and can probably only be found in classified intelligence reports.

What is clear, however, is that over the past several years, Israel has reportedly carried out a series of strikes targeting the Iranian-led axis in Syria. If left unchecked, Iran would flood Syria with Shi’a militia groups and terrorist organizations, arm them with rockets and missiles, and set up terrorist cells. It would convert southern Syria into a new launch pad for attacks against Israel.

Iran’s Quds Force, the elite overseas unit, and Hezbollah use Syria to manufacture and smuggle precision-guided ballistic missiles, heavy rockets, advanced surface-to-air missiles and surface-to-sea missiles. Israel has reportedly disrupted these activities on a regular basis.

Lebanon is already a well-established Iranian rocket base, filled to the brim with 120,000 rockets embedded in 200 Shi’a Lebanese villages. All of these projectiles are pointed at Israel. Under Iran’s plans, Syria, too, would become a major threat.

The military base reportedly struck in the latest attack, known as “T4,” has a history. In early February, Israeli fighter jets destroyed an Iranian drone control cabin that was stationed there, after Iranian operators sitting in it flew a drone into Israeli airspace. It’s likely that the Iranian operators were killed in that attack.

According to reports that emerged on Monday, Iranian military personnel were killed in Monday’s strike as well. That would seem to indicate that whatever was going on at the T4 airbase—hundreds of kilometers from the Israeli border—constituted a serious security threat to Israel, and that Iran has again tested the waters, seeing how far it can go in building up its military presence before provoking an Israeli response.

This dangerous pattern looks set to continue. Each incident represents a potential escalation point that can spiral into a wider conflict between Israel and the radical Shi’a axis that is taking over much of the Middle East.

The Russian complication

What makes this situation more tense is the fact that Russia acts as the air force of the Shi’a axis in Syria. Russian airpower helped turn the tide of the war in Assad’s favor, a fact that has probably given the Syrian dictator the confidence to unleash the horrors of chemical warfare on Sunni areas and make a mockery of the international community in the process.

Russia has, through its waves of airstrikes in Syria, gained a warm-water port at Syria’s Tartus naval base, and it has an airbase at Hmeimim on the Syrian coastline. It has moved advanced air-defense batteries to Syria. Moscow has used its intervention to position itself as a superpower actor in the Middle East. Meanwhile, the United States has decreased its influence in Syria to a bare minimum.

Israel seeks no conflict with Russia, but is unwilling to ignore the activities of Moscow’s allies—something Israel has communicated to Russia repeatedly.

The Russians have so far been able to help de-escalate the situation by convincing their radical and dubious allies to tone down their responses to Israel’s self-defense actions. The Iranian axis may not have needed much convincing; it remains fundamentally deterred by Israel’s vast firepower and intelligence capabilities. Iran is keen on consolidating its control of Syria at this stage, rather than opening a new active front against Israel right now, which would risk its entire Syrian project. But if it succeeds in its goal of converting Syria into a new base of hostility towards Israel, there can be no doubt that sooner or later, it would activate this front.

These events put Russia’s project in Syria at risk, and this poses a complication. Any full-scale conflict that erupts would place the Assad regime in existential threat, and Russia could see its investment go down the drain.

Statements released by Moscow on Monday indicate Russian displeasure at Israel’s alleged actions.

Yet Israel has responded that it will not blink when it comes to defending its security.

It’s also hard to ignore the fact that the alleged Israeli strike came hours after a horrendous chemical massacre was carried out, once again, by the Assad regime against a rebel-held area. Scenes of men, women and children murdered through the use chemical-weapons agents have once again flooded the world, with an ally of Iran and Russia—the Assad regime—again committing a ghastly crime against humanity.

As a result, it cannot be ruled out that the latest attack also served as an Israeli signal of intolerance to the usage of chemical weapons in the region.

Whatever triggered the strike, one thing seems certain: Iran will continue to test Israel’s lines, and Israel will continue to enforce them.

[davidbfpo]

Or you can try this by a Forum member, published several days ago now and only just discovered.
Link:http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the...4647?page=show

[CrowBat]

Some rather amusing political/security commentary here: https://twitter.com/NeilPHauer/statu...50969680396288

Fairly significant news: Israel did not warn Russia before it struck Syrian airbase yesterday. The airbase hit (T4) had previously served as a major Russian operating base, until just a few months ago.

The first is 'nothing new', the second is 'nonsense'.

The Russians did make some use of T-4, but only back in 2015-2016. They aren't around that base already since it was nearly overrun by the Daesh, in December 2016.

Seems Tel Aviv does not trust Moscow.

Since when does Israel trust anybody?

Israel has clearly not been pleased with Russia's inability or unwillingness to restrain Iranian ops in Syria. Russia's Sept 2017 assurance that it would not allow Iran/Hezbollah to threaten Israel has been followed instead by enhanced IRGC drone presence.

This is also nonsense.

What should the Russians do to 'restrain' the IRGC, PLEASE?

They can barely keep Assad in power.

In February, the Israeli Air Force hit T4 airbase hard after Iran sent a drone from there into Israeli airspace. By some estimates (which :?: ), IAF destroyed 50% :?: Syria's air defences as it struck four Iranian and eight Syrian sites, with Russia inactive.

If 4 SAM-sites are '50% of the Assad air defence', then yes (for details, see the link posted by David, above).

Israel's barely even talking to Russians at this point, who are losing control of situation.

Nah... really? Russians are 'losing control of situation'...?

Oh, and BTW: since when are the Russians 'in control' of the 'situation' in Syria, actually...?

But, sigh, that's a 'serious commentator' in our days. Well, after reading this, all I can conclude is that there's absolutely nothing new on this planet. I'm back to my 'historical' research and lurking...

[Azor]

What say you to the contention that 2 Israeli fighters fired 8 missiles (Popeyes or Delilahs?), of which 3-5 were shot down by Syrian air defenses?

[Azor]

From Babak Taghvaee (https://twitter.com/BabakTaghvaee/st...85568260804608):

• Russia has asked Iran to provide the Russian Air Force with access to the IRIAF's 3rd Tactical Fighter Base in Hamedan to deploy heavy bombers and tankers, and to use it as a refueling base for fighter jets deployed over Syria
• Earlier in August 2016, the RuAF was permitted to deploy 8 Su-34 fighters and 4 Tu-22M3 bombers Hamedan, but after the Russians deliberately leaked pictures of their bombers in the base, Iran forced them to leave
• It is possible that Iran will refuse Russia access to Hamedan, but may offer the 5th Tactical Fighter Base at Omidiyeh again
• The motivation behind Russia's request is concern that Russian aircraft may need to evacuate Hmeimim Air Base in the event of US-led airstrikes on Syria
• This information comes from a "valid" source in the IRIAF, according to Taghvaee

[CrowBat]

What say you to the contention that 2 Israeli fighters fired 8 missiles (Popeyes or Delilahs?), of which 3-5 were shot down by Syrian air defenses?

Except 'for PR purposes', there are always at least two, more likely four times more Israeli aircraft involved in every such operation. That's that way already since the Battle of Saunu, in November 1966.

I've got no idea who launched this nonsense about 'two F-15Is', but at least eight were involved.

And re. Taghvaee: check any translation of the Iranian Constitution you can get. Basing of foreign military in Iran is strictly prohibited, so also (quote), 'in peace'. The IRGC did attempt to ignore that paragraph back in 2016, and still: when Majlis (Iranian Parliament) began to protest, the Russians had to be kicked out.

Now, Omidiyeh - former TFB.5 of the IRAF, near Agha Jari - was meanwhile taken over by the IRGC. That's contrary to TFB.3 (near Hamedan), which remains an IRIAF base, and where the Russians landed back in August 2016. Means: the IRGC might try it basing the Russians at one of its own bases in the future.

However, that's not changing anything about the Iranian constitution: such an action would be a gross violation of fundamental Iranian laws.

And re. his claims about 'maintenance hangars' at T-4: actually one of hangars was used to store one Su-24MK that was out of service since quite early during the war, and few helicopters. No 'maintenance' there was undertaken, while everything that was inside was destroyed. And, funny that he's mentioning 'SyAAF's 819th Fighter Squadron': when I published that designation in an article about the SyAAF, in AirForces Monthly Feb/2017, he wrote to the editor that no such unit exists.