Somalia (land & sea) 2018 onwards

[davidbfpo]

Jason Burke, from The Guardian and SME on terrorism, has this article 'Somali citizens count cost of surge in US airstrikes under Trump', which reports on the human cost of more aerial attacks, mainly by the USA.
Link:https://www.theguardian.com/world/20...es-under-trump

There is an element of balance as he does refer to the 500 dead in an IED attack in Mogadishu in October '17.

I would speculate that the strikes are very lethal, even if a civilian survives the strike will their injuries and the lack of medical help mean within days they die.

[davidbfpo]

Two articles on Somalia.

The first is an interview with a PhD research student, Christopher Azalone, who I recall hearing explain his work and study time in parts of Somalia:

Expert on jihadi-insurgent groups Christopher Anzalone talks about the recent activity and future of the jihadist group Al-Shabaab.

Link:https://sustainablesecurity.org/2018...pher-anzalone/

The second is a six page report based on anonymous interviews of European and UK staff who have served in Somalia; the author is not an admirer of 'remote warfare'. I expect few would disagree, PR staff aside, with part of her conclusion:

Long-term prospects for security in Somalia aren’t looking particularly promising. This is not least because there remain real concerns about the viability – and the acceptability – of the SNA as a long-term security provider in the country. As one soldier remarked, the Somali National Army are “just another militia, albeit an apparently legitimate militia”. When they run out of ammunition, there are no procedures in place to resupply them. In many cases, there are no funds to pay them either.

Link:https://remotecontrolproject.org/wp-...ia-FINAL-2.pdf

[davidbfpo]

In this SWJ article are some details and insight into the Somalia National Army, so I cite that part in total:

Clan politics and corruption dominate an operational environment in which most western-aligned powers are trying to either improve security and stability, fight terror, or a combination of the two. Any time expensive vehicles purchased by the US State Department were being moved for the Somalis it was amazing how many people showed up to see “what was happening.” When it comes to equipment given from foreign governments to Somalia many in the Somali Army have trouble understanding the difference between “for me” versus “for my army.” The Somali military, like its government, is newly established and immature in its development. Somalia’s conventional force, the Somali National Army (SNA), exists but the health, discipline, and organization of its force varies greatly. For example, when trying to muster a group of 80 SNA soldiers for training Somali military coordinators were not sure where some soldiers were coming from and if they were even in the military.
Many SNA soldiers have received training from foreign militaries. SNA soldiers that have received formal basic military training, either at home or abroad, are not anywhere near the majority of the force. Generally speaking, the SNA requires foreign military assistance to be combat ready.
Furthermore, the Huawiye tribe dominates the military forces while the Darod tribe dominates the government. This creates external and internal conflict within the military. There is some disdain towards the government due to clan differences. There is also disdain towards Darod officers in the military. During our mission I chose to discontinue an officer’s only small-group training program because SNA leadership would only send Huawiye officers to the class despite there clearly being capable officers from other clans.
The SNA is not the only military force in Somalia. “Elite” Danab force are a subset of the Somali military in which the United States has invested heavily in compared to the rank and file SNA. While the Danab see themselves as the Somali version of special forces, a more accurate assessment of them would be better equipped SNA soldiers. However, one notable difference is that Danab units integrate members of all clans into their ranks. Another component of Somali military forces are the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA). Conflict between these different military organizations can often be as violent as their clashes with Al Shabab. There are multiple instances of NISA getting into firefights with Danab.[v] While deployed, my team was able to hear the gunfire between the two by a checkpoint near Mogadishu’s airport.

Link:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art...ers-in-somalia

There is a comprehensive, if dated Wiki:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Somali_Armed_Forces

[davidbfpo]

A CTC report which in summary says:

al-Shabaab has deployed at least 216 suicide attackers who carried out a total of 155 suicide bombing attacks, killing at least 595 and as many as 2,218 people. Their data indicates that al-Shabaab’s suicide attacks are highly targeted, aimed at degrading the Somali state and members of the international community (United Nations, African Union, or African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)) that are combating it. Unlike certain other terrorist groups, al-Shabaab’s suicide attacks tend to attempt to avoid targeting non-combatant civilians, and thus do not seem to be undertaken simply to engender shock and awe.

Link:https://ctc.usma.edu/targeted-terror...rs-al-shabaab/

[davidbfpo]

The UAE has fallen out with Somalia:

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has stopped supporting Somalia's army, including training its soldiers and paying their salaries, after a diplomatic fall-out between the two nations.The government in Mogadishu has been angered by Emirati plans to train security forces in the breakaway region of Somaliland and four days ago told the UAE that they no longer needed its help. Since 2014, the Gulf state has been involved in training hundreds of troops from Somalia's army. The UAE says it has been paying the salaries of 2,407 soldiers and has built three training centres and a hospital.

Link (rolling news item and entry timed 9.04:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/world-africa-43781532?

[davidbfpo]

Beyond the title this article by a reporter based in country is a glimpse into the Somali insurgency:

U.S. Africa Command now has more than 500 U.S. military personnel in Somalia, according to a spokeswoman, a dramatic increase from 2016, when AFRICOM only acknowledged 50 American troops on the ground.....And since January 2017, U.S. forces have conducted at least 48 airstrikes in Somalia, compared to 14 in 2016 and 11 in 2015
Today, U.S. operators are training the Somali National Army’s special forces known as Danab and the Somali National Intelligence Security (NISA) known as Gaashaan and Waran... Waran has grown to over 300 agents, while Gaashaan now counts roughly 400...The U.S. has similarly expanded the ranks of Danab into several battalions operating across the country. Somali officials told VICE News that Danab is now composed of several battalions..

Link:https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/...-blown-us-war?

[davidbfpo]

Once more charcoal is a cash source for Al-Shabaab and others I would add. Plus that much vaunted weapon, an international conference in Mogadishu. The main export port ebing Kismayo, which reportedly has an ANISOM garrison, who IIRC were accused of having a role in the trade.
Link:https://epukaugaidi.com/2018/05/08/u...b-cash-points/