The Army's response may be faster, but it isn't fast enough. At the end of the day they're still planning on how to conduct EW, while our adversaries are conducting it and achieving effects. We were competitive in the EW realm at one time, but another negative impact of 17 years of low intensity warfare against relatively unsophisticated adversaries (though that is changing) is it resulted in neglect of some capabilities.

It wasn't exactly unknown that our adversaries were developing these capabilities. They advertised them in their strategic white papers much like we do. A few senior leaders have been unable to make the transition from the day to day tactical fight to being a strategic thinker that looks beyond the immediate and prepares the force for tomorrow. Obtaining balance between the immediate and the future is challenging, but senior leaders responsible for the future force shouldn't be overly focused on the tactical fight. The character of warfare has already changed, and will keep changing. What we're seeing now was not unforeseen. I anticipate the character of warfare will evolve ever quicker as more tools are available to wage it.

Another point of concern is with great power competition we will once see a surge in state sponsored terrorism. This implies states will provide select terrorists and other non-state actors (proxies) with limited higher end technology to impose costs on their competitors, while maintaining some degree of deniability.