Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
There has been much discussion since the 1990s on asymmetric warfare and its various meanings and implications. One glaring asymmetry is unmanned and semi-autonomous, or fully autonomous air, maritime, and land military / paramilitary / terrorist vessels/vehicles. Of course, it the asymmetry will be temporary, as everyone who seeks to remain relevant in current and future conflicts will adapt and they'll become the new norm. Despite their economic and technological advances, some advanced countries with deep military cultural biases may actually fall behind their competitors due to their propensity to cling to their comfort zone.

https://www.defenseone.com/technolog...ssiles/152650/

China Shows Off Self-Steering Boat that Fires Missiles

Since ISIS, China, Russia, Israel, and other state and non-state actors are increasingly employing this unmanned vehicles with varying degrees of autonomy, where is the asymmetry? Its in the tactics and economics.

First, a new technology is not an effective innovation until it is exercised and becomes part of our doctrine, or at least can feasibly be employed by a unit in the field. A few visionaries experimenting with new technologies at DARPA and like labs does not equate to a viable combat capability as of yet. It is an innovation when tactical commanders are willing and know how to employ it in their overall scheme of maneuver.

Point two, the Navy has a deep cultural bias for manned ships, and the Air Force has a cultural bias for manned aircraft. The disruption to the current force structure and associated personnel management from recruiting to promotions will be substantial. Based on this, the legacy force will resist change by all bureaucratic means possible.

Third point is economic, which in fact could compel U.S. political leadership to force the military to change quicker with a new Act that would be as transforming as the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. I have no idea how much it cost to make an armed autonomous vessel that is "good enough" to effective swarm a U.S. manned vessel and destroy it. I'll assume $2 million, and the cost will be reduced over time as the technology is more widely available. It will cost much less if you simply pack the vessel with explosives and not rely on missiles. A U.S. Frigate costs approximately $340 million, a destroyer $1.5 billion, and an aircraft carrier over $10 billion. It probably wouldn't take more than 20 drones to overcome one ship so $40 million or so to destroy a vessel that is 10 to 6,000 times more expensive. This doesn't even take into account the cost of losing several hundred to several thousand sailors.

Who will adapt first? A non-state actor or nation that can't match an adversary's conventional military over match, or the state actor with the current overwhelming conventional advantage?
Great post.

When teaching introduction to innovation applied to the military, one maxim I use is “it’s not innovation until it’s implemented”: https://www.cove.org.au/adaptation/a...vation-maxims/

Ultimately, I believe the answer to your question of who will adapt first will be answered thru further questions:

1) which org is most accepting of many small failings?
2) which org is most receptive to new institutional learning?
3) which org is most willing to deploy “good enough” today and continuously iterate towards excellence tomorrow?
4) which org is most likely to incorporate the scientific method, velocity of decision making, and perpetual iteration as core behaviours, habits, culture, and doctrine.

The disposability of decisive military advantage is accelerating towards the life expectancy of Zero Day exploits.