"Petraeus / Nagl / Kilcullen approach to counter-insurgency is antiquated/misguided"

[Rank amateur]

I hope Robb is wrong. His statement "Further, the relative modernity of Iraq features vectors of cross-connection that undermine any and all attempts at clearing/holding territory (the core of the Petraeus plan)." doesn't make a lot of sense to me. How does that physically prevent clearing territory? Perhaps someone else can translate what he is saying for me.

I don't think he's saying you can't clear territory: just that clearing territory doesn't work like it used to. Here's an example off the top of my head. Kicking Philippine rebels off an island and holding the village might work because the villagers lose all communication with their leaders. (Holding territory destroys command and control.)

That's not true anymore. Occupying Sadr City won't do any good because Sadr can pick up a cell phone and order attacks whenever he wants attacks. Killing Sadr doesn't do any good, because people can post his old anti US speeches on the Internet. Holding territory no longer denies command and control to the insurgents.

To use an Iraq example. Holding territory in Ramadi didn't work. Cutting a deal with local sheiks did. Occupying Afghanistan just forced Al Qaeda to the net and terrorist attacks have increased.

[RTK]

I don't think he's saying you can't clear territory: just that clearing territory doesn't work like it used to. Here's an example off the top of my head. Kicking Philippine rebels off an island and holding the village might work because the villagers lose all communication with their leaders. (Holding territory destroys command and control.)

That's not true anymore. Occupying Sadr City won't do any good because Sadr can pick up a cell phone and order attacks whenever he wants attacks. Killing Sadr doesn't do any good, because people can post his old anti US speeches on the Internet. Holding territory no longer denies command and control to the insurgents.

To use an Iraq example. Holding territory in Ramadi didn't work. Cutting a deal with local sheiks did. Occupying Afghanistan just forced Al Qaeda to the net and terrorist attacks have increased.

This is becoming a conversation I have with my tactics students regularly.

Out of FM 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics (All definitions are US Army definitions, as opposed to NATO or DoD):

Clear - A tactical mission task that requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance in an assigned area.

Hold - To maintain or retain possession by force, as a position or an area.

Holding and Clearing are two different tactical tasks and missions. By themselves (by doctrine) you're not going to accomplish what you mentioned above in tasking units with clearing and holding. However...

Isolate – A tactical mission task that requires a unit to seal off—both physically and psychologically—an enemy from his sources of support, deny an enemy freedom of movement, and prevent an enemy unit from having contact with other enemy forces.

Suffice it to say, with technology are you ever going to truely isolate an insurgent in a free society? Probably not without infringing pretty heavily on the rights of the populace. What else is there?

Control - A tactical mission task that requires the commander to maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy.

Contain – To stop, hold, or surround the forces of the enemy or to cause the
enemy to center activity on a given front and to prevent the withdrawal of any part of the enemy’s force for use elsewhere.

Occupy – A tactical mission task that involves a force moving into an area so that it can control the entire area. Both the force’s movement to and occupation of the area occur without enemy opposition.

Seize – A tactical mission task that involves taking possession of a designated area using overwhelming force.

Secure - A tactical mission task that involves preventing a unit, facility, or geographical location from being damaged or destroyed as a result of enemy action.

So here's the question. Out of the above options, which is the most feasible and which is least? Why? Additionally, what is the purpose of the task? Even better (looking for the prospective planners out there) put it into task, purpose, method, effect format. You might win a chance to serve on a Corps staff if your answer is good enough.

[Rank amateur]

tactics: the branch of military science dealing with detailed maneuvers to achieve objectives set by strategy

What's the objective? Seriously. It's not obvious to me.

[Mark O'Neill]

You might win a chance to serve on a Corps staff if your answer is good enough.

Hey RTK,

I thought we were trying to encourage folks to post.....

[RTK]

tactics: the branch of military science dealing with detailed maneuvers to achieve objectives set by strategy

What's the objective? Seriously. It's not obvious to me.

In short, it's to win.

As per National Strategy for Victory in Iraq published November 2005. This has not changed.

Victory in Iraq is Defined in Stages
• Short term, Iraq is making steady progress in fighting terrorists, meeting political milestones, building democratic institutions, and standing up security forces.
• Medium term, Iraq is in the lead defeating terrorists and providing its own security, with a fully constitutional government in place, and on its way to achieving its economic potential.
• Longer term, Iraq is peaceful, united, stable, and secure, well integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism.



Additionally, people usually introduce themselves to add to their credibility, show us what experiences they bring to the table, and fill out their profile before starting the dull roar. Take this guy for example and the thread that ended his career here.

[Rank amateur]

My bad. I thought my user name said it all. I have no relevant experience. I'm just interested in military tactics and strategy. (So I'm even less qualified than an Air Force guy) I've been browsing and only jumped in when I thought I could answer a question. Then I got asked a question.

Thanks for responding to my question. If anyone is interested in my opinion I guess I would agree with the antiquated/misguided premise. I don't believe that capture and hold automatically leads to:

"meeting political milestones, building democratic institutions, and standing up security forces."

At least at the national level. And even in Ramadi it seems to me that a political deal was reached with the sheiks first, who encouraged their followers to build up the security forces and if the locals didn't do the capturing, they did the holding.

I'd suggest that task, purpose, method, effect looked something like this. Task: negotiate. Purpose: establish non hostile local militias. Method: giving local leaders what they want. Effect: denying AlQaeda sanctuary and safe haven.

So Petraeus definitely deserves kudos for being creative and flexible, but it does suggest to me that the critical tasks need to be given to the generals and the politicians.

[slapout9]

RTK, If you can talk about it? I read about Talafar and after they constructed a berm around the city they set up check points and screened the population as they were coming out to temporary shelter and then US forces entered to do the final clearing. After that the population was allowed to return. I thought that was a fantastic idea, most people think of check points as screening people coming in to an area, which you should do of course but screening people coming out is like working a crime secen where you seal it off and then interview witnesses as they are leaving, more than one person has been caught this way and at the least you can get alot of leads.

Which leads me to this question. Should we have a new doctrinal term called Separating for COIN ops. Seems to me the tactical objective is often not so much clearing and holding as it is separating the insurgents from innocent population. My 2 cents anyway.

[Rob Thornton]

From Rank Amateur:

That's not true anymore. Occupying Sadr City won't do any good because Sadr can pick up a cell phone and order attacks whenever he wants attacks. Killing Sadr doesn't do any good, because people can post his old anti US speeches on the Internet. Holding territory no longer denies command and control to the insurgents.

Well, its a reasonable question, based on reasonable observations. However, I don't think its as simple as it would appear. I'd also say that Sadr City is not a location that typifies the rest of Iraq. Even there though, its about creating the conditions where alternatives can be born. Its not just about clearing and holding physical terrain to secure the people who live there, or even physically isolating the leadership that opposes stability, however these are a part of it. Its about fostering the conditions that make the painfully slow process of political, social, and economic integration/reconciliation possible. I think MNFI understands this, and have been very frank in their assessment as to how long this is going to take, the resources its going to consume, and the obstacles that lay ahead. However, I thik they ave been equally on the mark in identifying the cost of doing it wrong or the danger of leaving it unstable and how that would works against our vital interests in the region.

To use an Iraq example, Holding territory in Ramadi didn't work. Cutting a deal with local sheiks did. Occupying Afghanistan just forced Al Qaeda to the net and terrorist attacks have increased.

Really two parts here. The first speaks to political integration, and generating capacity. It may be an interim solution, or it may be a long term one - hard to tell. However, it is an improvement. Although it'd be great to have a strong enough Iraqi central government to meet the needs of the people across Iraq, we're probably a ways off from that. In the mean time, the sheiks provide a tried means of providing a form of government/influence to reach those ungoverned spaces. They are also a means to help the central government build security force capacity - which also contributes toward the security goal. Hopefully as it evolves, the central government, and the more isolated and remote form offered by the sheiks will be integrated. Again, I believe MNFI understands this, and is helping to put the PRTs, etc that will build the bridge.

The second part

(Occupying Afghanistan just forced Al Qaeda to the net and terrorist attacks have increased

) may be a bad cause and effect relationship. If the stated goal of AQ was to re-create a caliphate (Google Al Qaeda strategy) then you can equally infer that they would have increased their attack anyway, but on their schedule, and on terrain more accommodating to their goals. I think you can build an argument either way, but that is the danger with that type of thesis.

meeting political milestones, building democratic institutions, and standing up security forces."
At least at the national level. And even in Ramadi it seems to me that a political deal was reached with the sheiks first, who encouraged their followers to build up the security forces and if the locals didn't do the capturing, they did the holding.
I'd suggest that task, purpose, method, effect looked something like this. Task: negotiate. Purpose: establish non hostile local militias. Method: giving local leaders what they want. Effect: denying Al Qaeda sanctuary and safe haven.
So Petraeus definitely deserves kudos for being creative and flexible, but it does suggest to me that the critical tasks need to be given to the generals and the politicians.

Well, I know its Joint doctrine, but I still have issues with effects based planning - its a cause and effect thing where attributing success or failure to a cause that involves the messy world of people and emotions (or will) can potentially lead you down the wrong road.

However, as an end-state you have laid out some pieces and parts well I think. I'd say though that I'm not sure you want to make the fulfillment of one contingent on the other. If you get a "two-fer" well that is great.

So Petraeus definitely deserves kudos for being creative and flexible, but it does suggest to me that the critical tasks need to be given to the generals and the politicians.

You'll need to qualify this one for me - I think what you may be getting at is the linkage between operational art, strategy and policy. I think we'd all agree here that we need better synchronization. However, it is an evolving process. The policy ends are not going to be described as "tasks", they are going to be more generalized - like "facilitate the establishment of a secure, economically and politically viable Iraq that contributes to regional stability and is integrated into the global economy ". The strategy that promotes those policy ends is going to be more specific as it starts to marry "ways" and "means" with the ends. The operational art as defined by Colin Gray is:

"the skill with which forces are maneuvered so that they are well positioned for tactical advantage. But it refers also the ability to know when to accept or decline combat, with a view toward advancing campaign wide goals. Operational Art uses the threat and actuality of battle to win a campaign"

.

I think MNFI has taken that definition and adjusted it to the current campaign goals to realize strategic objectives and policy goals.

Ultimately, and probably everyone agrees, that the ultimate political end in this case rests firmly on the will of Iraq to integrate and provide reconciliation for its fractured society. We can however help provide Iraq the means to do so by helping the Iraqi government gain security and by providing the conditions that facilitate stability.

Rank Amateur, your questions are worth while, and I'd encourage you to contribute more. It would be nice though to get a sense of who you are in order to promote dialogue and better understand the context of your postings. I hope you continue to read and post, make thoughtful observations that contribute to all of us better understanding the topics we discuss.

Best regards, Rob

[RTK]

RTK, If you can talk about it? I read about Talafar and after they constructed a berm around the city they set up check points and screened the population as they were coming out to temporary shelter and then US forces entered to do the final clearing. After that the population was allowed to return. I thought that was a fantastic idea, most people think of check points as screening people coming in to an area, which you should do of course but screening people coming out is like working a crime secen where you seal it off and then interview witnesses as they are leaving, more than one person has been caught this way and at the least you can get alot of leads.

Which leads me to this question. Should we have a new doctrinal term called Separating for COIN ops. Seems to me the tactical objective is often not so much clearing and holding as it is separating the insurgents from innocent population. My 2 cents anyway.

Done correctly its almost like a census through the checkpoints.

I'd almost buy "sequester" if the definition was clear enough.

[slapout9]

RTK,sequester is exactly what I had in mind. Juries and witnesses are sequestered all the time not just for their physical security but to prevent them from hearing adverse information (enemy propaganda) which would definitely be important in COIN ops. Yea, I really like that...when you become a general I guess you can get that taken care of

[Rank amateur]

Rank Amateur, your questions are worth while, and I'd encourage you to contribute more. It would be nice though to get a sense of who you are in order to promote dialogue and better understand the context of your postings. I hope you continue to read and post, make thoughtful observations that contribute to all of us better understanding the topics we discuss.

Best regards, Rob

Thanks. Really, I'm just a guy who is interested in the military strategies and tactics. I read Sun Tzu, know The Powell doctrine, learned about about Kursk and Cannae from TV. I know that "Tactics is when you attack from the front, strategy from the sides" is a joke. In case there's any doubt, I'm cheering for the same side as you. I found this forum while surfing the net trying to learn more. Honestly, I just wanted to answer a question. Now, I'm hooked and want to see if I could converse intelligently with the pros. I'm glad you think I should contribute more.

In retrospect, being one of the few to support the Robb point of view, without an introduction, is probably not the best way to fit in, but I'm sure that everyone realizes that just because you adopt the enemy position in a war game doesn't mean you're a bad guy.

My comments are strictly about doctrine. A strong doctrine can withstand a strong attack. I'm not married to any particular doctrine. My career, and my life, don't depend on any particular doctrine being successful. I just find it fascinating.

[Rank amateur]

RTK, Should we have a new doctrinal term called Separating for COIN ops. Seems to me the tactical objective is often not so much clearing and holding as it is separating the insurgents from innocent population.

This seems to me to be a brilliant suggestion. The asymmetric guys can only operate in certain types of terrain: jungles, mountains, hidden amongst the population or a combination. Separating them from the population would make them easy to defeat. I think, however, that Robb's point is that this isn't as easy to do as it used to be.

I'd split the insurgents into two camps. Al Qeada can be isolated from the Iraqi population. It happened in Ramadi. But I don't think that isolating all insurgents will be easy. In fact, in Ramadi I don't think there was any separation. The entire population just switched sides: insurgents and innocent civilians.

I believe that one of the key assumptions of COIN is that "holding" American troops will be able to observe, communicate, determine who's an insurgent and then isolate the insurgents.

I guess most of the guys who are implementing COIN are too busy to post here, but I don't know if a high degree of isolation is even tactically possible. I don't know if the facilities and procedures are in place to isolate insurgents.

(These are serious questions. I don't know because I've never served. Some of you will know, because you've been there.)

Are captured insurgents kept imprisoned, or released by friends? When a US solider suspects that an Iraqi soldier or policeman is working with insurgents, is the Iraqi always arrested. When an Iraqi politician is suspected of working with insurgents is he arrested? If an Iman is suspected of working with insurgents, is he arrested?

[Rank amateur]

The second part ) may be a bad cause and effect relationship. If the stated goal of AQ was to re-create a caliphate (Google Al Qaeda strategy) then you can equally infer that they would have increased their attack anyway, but on their schedule, and on terrain more accommodating to their goals.

True. I'd say that in Afghanistan clear and hold diminished the enemy's capabilities but didn't eliminate them and didn't lead to a political settlement. Those Al Qaeda guys, however, are nuts. I don't think anyone can have a political settlement with them. I was just trying to show that the tactics don't automatically lead to settlement. There are other factors that can be decisive.

From Rank Amateur:You'll need to qualify this one for me - I think what you may be getting at is the linkage between operational art, strategy and policy. I think we'd all agree here that we need better synchronization.

I just meant that Petraeus isn't married to doctrine. He'll cut a deal with former insurgents, even if all the spin doctors in Washington insist "We don't negotiate with terrorists." In my opinion, that's excellent.

We can however help provide Iraq the means to do so by helping the Iraqi government gain security and by providing the conditions that facilitate stability.

This is an assumption. No one can prove it right or wrong. We can only offer opinions. I understand that people have very strong opinions, because they are risking their lives based on this assumption.

So I offer my opinion with a lot less at stake than many here, but if I were to ask you if a military tactic was going to be successful, you'd probably answer "It depends on a number of factors, including terrain." Assuming that tactics which worked in the dessert will work in a jungle is a mistake. They may or may not work. It depends whether or not the terrain is decisive.

I'd say that Robb's point is that assuming counter insurgency tactics which produced favorable political results in the Philippines will produce favorable political results in Iraq is a mistake because the Iraqi political landscape is different.

Will the political climate be decisive? No one can say for sure, but I can offer lots of evidence that it will be: little movement on the benchmarks, parliament taking August off, sectarian violence, Malaki and Ahmadenijad holding hands etc.

[Rob Thornton]

RA,
You have quite a few questions - Many are addressed in depth in some of the different forums on the site. The reason I bring it up is that the people who start a thread and may be the SME (subject matter expert) on a question, might be monitoring those topics more closely - so you might get an answer faster, or a more complete one.

With regards to this thread, observations that are under the umbrella of the thread starter are probably good to go as long as they are professional (not as in military professional, but in the general sense of the word). I don't think the folks who participate here view any topic as being so absolute we are unwilling to entertain disagreement, but we also expect there to be a certain degree of logic underpinning an argument.

You'd actually be surprised who posts here and how quickly info from the field comes in. I expect we will continue to get better at this.

Its good to have cilvilian interest and participation (IMO). I often grumble that only a small percentage of the nation is at war. For the first time in a long while I'm actually living amongst the average American - I think up until recently I may have forgotten I'm part of America's Army, and that America is very diverse - more so then I probably thought. So having civilian participation on the site may serve to educate the public and provide the context for the general content the media provides. The SWJ Blog and the SWC have gotten a good deal of exposure as of late, there are probably many more watching then I thought.

While you may not have ever served, it does not mean you can't be useful to your country. You may have a very useful background and experience set - I'd encourage you to look around the site and speak from your strong suit so to speak. Speaking from your experience set will provide us a different context, one hopefully that will benefit us all.

Well, back on topic I suppose. Feel free to PM or email me if you have any questions. I've been hanging around here benefitting from the site since August of last year when I was still deployed.

[Rob Thornton]

I'll try and get to a few of these

but if I were to ask you if a military tactic was going to be successful, you'd probably answer "It depends on a number of factors, including terrain." Assuming that tactics which worked in the dessert will work in a jungle is a mistake. They may or may not work. It depends whether or not the terrain is decisive.

I'd say that Robb's point is that assuming counter insurgency tactics which produced favorable political results in the Philippines will produce favorable political results in Iraq is a mistake because the Iraqi political landscape is different.

Its a fairly good observation for a rank amateur. However, I don't think anyone is importing tactics or strategy on a 1:1 basis. They might be looking for historical similiarities that can be used to provide general direction, but I'd say that most of us realize there are no cookie cutter solutions where people are concerned. However, there are some things social organizations have in common, and those things can be used for a point of departure. Someone once said there are no original good ideas. I'd even argue that while something looks nothing alike on the surface, there are often more things in common then you might think at first glance. Keep in mind that the analogy to historical examples is often used as a vehicle to discuss something by giving it relevance, context and placing it in time.

Will the political climate be decisive? No one can say for sure, but I can offer lots of evidence that it will be: little movement on the benchmarks, parliament taking August off, sectarian violence, Malaki and Ahmadenijad holding hands etc.

Without a doubt true political reconcilliation and integration among any diverse and fractured society that has been brutalized the way Iraq has is going to proceed slowly. When you consider the depth of fears and hatreds generated by years of brutality, deprivation and war, you can understand why it will take a long time. Knowing quite a few Iraqis, I know the wisest of them also believe it will take time. Our own American culture is one of progression towards the desired object. We see life differently then a good chunk of the rest of the world based on desire to see things in terms of problems with solutions vs. some things just being a condition that will have to change slowly. Even our interpretation of Malaki and Ahmadenijad holding hands is more simple then the Iraqis see it. They have the problem of the historical, economic, political and religious ties to a "stonger" neighbor that they are going to have to continue to deal and live with long after we are gone - which could be reasonably short if policy changes. We have a mixed history on that subject.

We have long term vital interests in the region that go beyond just our own resource consumption, but extend to the long term global economy and a host of other security interests we must consider. Many have argued for a quick solution, but solutions of that type rarely address the long term problems, their causes and often create as many problems (some worse) then they might solve ratehr then achieving the long term solutions we need.

A strong doctrine can withstand a strong attack. I'm not married to any particular doctrine. My career, and my life, don't depend on any particular doctrine being successful.

I'll agree with that. However, doctrine in this case is descriptive, not prescriptive. For other services this is not the case, but for the Army its a trueism whether we confess to it or not

Are captured insurgents kept imprisoned, or released by friends? When a US solider suspects that an Iraqi soldier or policeman is working with insurgents, is the Iraqi always arrested. When an Iraqi politician is suspected of working with insurgents is he arrested? If an Iman is suspected of working with insurgents, is he arrested?

No, not always, sometimes, yes, maybe. Consider our own wonderful criminal justice system and you instantly see the scope of the problem. One thing I learned by working with Iraqi forces was to consider our own system in all of its pros and cons. A war that is waged in and amongst people is the most complicated. Lots more grey then black and white. I can tell you there are no absolute rules in regards to the questions you ask.

Hope that helps, Regards, Rob

[RTK]

RTK,sequester is exactly what I had in mind. Juries and witnesses are sequestered all the time not just for their physical security but to prevent them from hearing adverse information (enemy propaganda) which would definitely be important in COIN ops. Yea, I really like that...when you become a general I guess you can get that taken care of

I guess, after thinking it over more, sequester in that sense is the tactical task of Isolate. As I said earlier, I don't know if that's physically feasible given the nature of technology without the infringement upon the civil rights of the populace over a long period of time. It could be done, but I think you'd do more to disenfranchise the unintended affected populace.

[slapout9]

RTK, It does come close to isolate except isolate sounds like prison while sequester is meant to be protection but you still have all the fringe benefits of home plus room service. It does violate your rights which is why it is only allowed in special situations. You bring up a the key point I think which is time, people don't mind being in a "golden cage" for awhile but there is a limit to what they will accept before you start to irritate them. And there is the culture thing again, I have no idea how this would be taken in other parts of the world.

Also if it was conveyed to them at the start that it was only meant to be temporary and they would all go home as soon as it was safe it might take some of the edge off of it.
You might even set up a competing safe city and have it a voluntary program. Try and woo them away from the insurgents. Again just thinking out loud.

[RTK]

This seems to me to be a brilliant suggestion. The asymmetric guys can only operate in certain types of terrain: jungles, mountains, hidden amongst the population or a combination. Separating them from the population would make them easy to defeat. I think, however, that Robb's point is that this isn't as easy to do as it used to be.

The issue is this: Insrugents have the ability to hide in plain sight as they look and act like the peaceful populace until it's time to act. All insurgencies have four parts; the Cadre, Leadership, Mass Base, and Combatants. Members can ebb and flow between differeing catagories from time to time.It's easy to jump between the mass base and combatants. Blending in above that is more difficult. Though I concur that seperating them from the population does make them easy to defeat, I disagree with Robb (who has no practical experience in this realm) in that it's not as easy to do as it used to be. I don't think it was ever easy. If it was, there wouldn't be a problem still.

I'd split the insurgents into two camps. Al Qeada can be isolated from the Iraqi population. It happened in Ramadi. But I don't think that isolating all insurgents will be easy. In fact, in Ramadi I don't think there was any separation. The entire population just switched sides: insurgents and innocent civilians.

It's not that they switched sides, it's that they naturally transited from active support to passive support to no support. At a point the local leaders of central Al Anbar became sick and tired of being sick and tired.

But here's the issue: Al Qaeda cannot be isolated from the population in the strictest sense of the term. Recall the definition I posted a few days ago.

Isolate – A tactical mission task that requires a unit to seal off—both physically and psychologically—an enemy from his sources of support, deny an enemy freedom of movement, and prevent an enemy unit from having contact with other enemy forces.

Utterly impossible in the settings you describe if you take into consideration the rest of the objectives in the short, medium, and longer term. If building democratic institutions is a short term goal sustained and nested into medium and longer term goals, then it's imperitive to avoid sealing off a populace - both physically and psychologically - for the sake of security for any more than a few weeks at a time.

I believe that one of the key assumptions of COIN is that "holding" American troops will be able to observe, communicate, determine who's an insurgent and then isolate the insurgents.

It's deeper than that. The embedding process of a unit into a village or city is more than just the tangible benefits of "being there." It has a lot to do with the rapport built with the local populace. Relationships breed trust which leads to intelligence resulting in bad guys off the street. Many fail to remember or understand that relationships and trust are not synonymous. We've taken that for granted too many times.

Another analogy is the relationship of a local business to the community. Sure Walmart is going to get customers and pretty good prices, but the Mom and Pop store that knows you when you walk in and already knows what you're going to order before you grab it off the shelf is not going to go out of business. That locally embedded unit is the Mom and Pop store (if they do it right). The more we, as a military, act like Walmart, though we'll get some bad guys, we're not going to get what we're looking for - the loyal and dedicated repeat customers.

I guess most of the guys who are implementing COIN are too busy to post here, but I don't know if a high degree of isolation is even tactically possible. I don't know if the facilities and procedures are in place to isolate insurgents.

It's not that you can't, it's that the second and third order effects of doing so outweigh and overshadow the benefits.

Are captured insurgents kept imprisoned, or released by friends? When a US solider suspects that an Iraqi soldier or policeman is working with insurgents, is the Iraqi always arrested. When an Iraqi politician is suspected of working with insurgents is he arrested? If an Iman is suspected of working with insurgents, is he arrested?

Too many current TTPs could be discussed here. This isn't the right forum. I'll say this though. Even police departments in the United States have dirt bags they let go just to see what other fish they bring in.

[carl]

RTK and Slapout9:

It sounds as if you are coming close to the Strategic Hamlet Program from VN.

[RTK]

RTK and Slapout9:

It sounds as if you are coming close to the Strategic Hamlet Program from VN.

Not really. I'm not about displacing civilians if I can help it for the same reasons that SHP failed in the first place. People tend to become more sympathetic to the system that isn't oppressing them as much as the other system.