Army Officer Accuses Generals of 'Intellectual and Moral Failures'

[Steve Blair]

In closing, I'd just like to say that the real issue, as far as I am concerned, has nothing to do with all this legalese. Instead, we need to consider what is the morally right thing to do. I applaud LTC Yingling for having the moral courage to publish his thoughts.

I agree 100%. Now if we could only get MAJ Vandergriff to comment on his ideas for changing the personnel system...

As I've said before, it's also good to see AFJ going back to its roots and running articles like LTC Yingling's. Good discussion in print is always helpful, and if nothing else can stimulate others to think and hopefully write.

[VinceC]

The Insurrection Acts date to the Civil War. Even with Posse Comitatus, the President has always had authority to use federal forces to uphold U.S. law if civilian law-enforcement officials are unable or unwilling to uphold the law. Under the Insurrection Acts, the President must issue a "cease and desist" order, usually via presidential proclamation, then may deploy federal troops if that order is not followed. In practice, this is how Eisenhower deployed elements of U.S. Army airborne forces to force the desegregation of schools in the late 1950s. It is not complicated and does not require a general declaration of martial law.

[Uboat509]

Call me cynical if you like but I don't think that increased congressional oversite is the answer to ANY problem. Every issue is viewed though a number of partisan filiters and the decisions are made based on what is best for the party rather than what is best for the country. How many sh*t sandwiches has the military had to swallow because they were made in a powerful congressman's district? I am all for the civilian leadership of the military in so far as they tell us which wars to fight. But I have a problem with someone who has little or no practical military experience and a partisan agenda telling us how to fight those wars or who is best suited to lead us when we do.

SFC W

[Old Eagle]

I'm with Uboat on this one. I thoroughly enjoyed Paul's article. I think that it will spark healthy debate, as it has here. I disagree, however, with the prescription of more congressional interferrence in DoD. Already, the workload of congressionally mandated reports, many that nobody reads, is abusive. I was in the bureaucratic process that forwarded promotion lists to congress for advice and consent in the days after Tailhook. Their intrusive micrimanaging of the promotion process served no one well, and trashed the careers of several great officers. Some oversight.

[NDD]

Well, at the risk of over-stating the obvious, the problem is a 900-pound guerrilla (get it? ) and the Colonel has addressed but part of it. He stayed in his lane and didn't go off on a tangent.

Sir,
Being an old SF soldier, I loved the article. I disagree about your proposed solutions, but can't offer anything better without hurting myself thinking.

As has been said, I salute your for your integrity. Would there were 1,000 such. In each division.

Sorry I've been gone so long, anybody miss me?

[Culpeper]

Well, at the risk of over-stating the obvious, the problem is a 900-pound guerrilla (get it? ) and the Colonel has addressed but part of it. He stayed in his lane and didn't go off on a tangent.

Sir,
Being an old SF soldier, I loved the article. I disagree about your proposed solutions, but can't offer anything better without hurting myself thinking.

As has been said, I salute your for your integrity. Would there were 1,000 such. In each division.

Sorry I've been gone so long, anybody miss me?

Yeah, where have you been?

[SWJED]

Sorry I've been gone so long, anybody miss me?

... welcome back.

[NDD]

Many thanks. Working hard, trying to do the right thing. Looks like things are going well...

[Tom Odom]

Many thanks. Working hard, trying to do the right thing. Looks like things are going well...

Sorry I've been gone so long, anybody miss me?

I did now that you're back...

Welcome back!

Tom

[Sargent]

"....don’t train on finding the enemy; train on finding your friends and they will help you find your enemy."

As was pointed out to me recently, the Coalition forces in Fallujah had hit or found over 50 IEDs in a period of a month/six weeks -- for the local population the number was zero. Obviously they have info, and obviously they are not passing it along. They don't trust the Coalition forces or the Iraqis being trained up... yet. Whether they ever will is another question. That outcome seems in serious doubt as now, in a move similar to the one that killed the CAP in Vietnam, the advisory/transition mission is being squashed in favor of the "security" mission -- read that as the let's kill a lot of insurgents plan.

I wish someone would learn what real counterinsurgency was, because that's what this larger, global fight is about. We should have "hospital bombs" (an air-dropped hospital in a box with a telephone number to call for personnel, supplies, and assistance) not bunker busters, "subtlety and nuance" not "shock and awe." This is a battle for the great undecided -- the true believers will never change their minds, but they are irrelevant. What we need to do is make the context in which the insurgents (both in Iraq and elsewhere) operate utterly untenable. Making the locals happy -- wherever they are -- is how you do that. Making the locals trust you is the key.

As harsh as this is to say, the fact that so many fewer Americans are dying than Iraqis is a problem. I get to say that because I've got a loved one in the crosshairs as I type this. And if it meant changing the minds of one Iraqi family, I'd sacrifice him. Because that family would tell their relatives, and you'd start to see a snow-ball effect. The fact that so many (but certainly not all -- don't get me started on _that_) American troops are leading a life of luxury compared to the Iraqis is another huge problem. Unfortunately, you can't care more about your own people than the locals in an insurgency, not in this day and age. If Americans can't stomach that, then we need to stay out of these things.

At some point I'll share my completely unorthodox view of counterinsurgency.

[Tom Odom]

"....don’t train on finding the enemy; train on finding your friends and they will help you find your enemy."

As was pointed out to me recently, the Coalition forces in Fallujah had hit or found over 50 IEDs in a period of a month/six weeks -- for the local population the number was zero. Obviously they have info, and obviously they are not passing it along. They don't trust the Coalition forces or the Iraqis being trained up... yet. Whether they ever will is another question. That outcome seems in serious doubt as now, in a move similar to the one that killed the CAP in Vietnam, the advisory/transition mission is being squashed in favor of the "security" mission -- read that as the let's kill a lot of insurgents plan.

I wish someone would learn what real counterinsurgency was, because that's what this larger, global fight is about. We should have "hospital bombs" (an air-dropped hospital in a box with a telephone number to call for personnel, supplies, and assistance) not bunker busters, "subtlety and nuance" not "shock and awe." This is a battle for the great undecided -- the true believers will never change their minds, but they are irrelevant. What we need to do is make the context in which the insurgents (both in Iraq and elsewhere) operate utterly untenable. Making the locals happy -- wherever they are -- is how you do that. Making the locals trust you is the key.

As harsh as this is to say, the fact that so many fewer Americans are dying than Iraqis is a problem. I get to say that because I've got a loved one in the crosshairs as I type this. And if it meant changing the minds of one Iraqi family, I'd sacrifice him. Because that family would tell their relatives, and you'd start to see a snow-ball effect. The fact that so many (but certainly not all -- don't get me started on _that_) American troops are leading a life of luxury compared to the Iraqis is another huge problem. Unfortunately, you can't care more about your own people than the locals in an insurgency, not in this day and age. If Americans can't stomach that, then we need to stay out of these things.

At some point I'll share my completely unorthodox view of counterinsurgency.

Please do and soon! So far what you have to say is pretty damn good.

Tom

[slapout9]

Tom,Sargent,Better still fire the Generals and put some Strategic Sargent's in charge and we would Win!!

[Steve Blair]

Please do and soon! So far what you have to say is pretty damn good.

Tom

I second that call. Although I'd call it more common sense than unorthodox. Then again...common sense sure isn't that most of the time.

[jcustis]

I sense that another of the "1/3rd guys" has joined the ranks.

[Sargent]

I sense that another of the "1/3rd guys" has joined the ranks.

I don't know about the 1/3d guys, but I do have a theory I call The Rule of 4/6ths. It comes from a quote given by a Marine, wounded at Chosin. He was asked by a reporter (a lady, no less) what the most difficult part of the campaign was. In his drug induced haze he replied, "Getting 4 inches of [grocery store muzak] out of 6 inches of clothing" to urinate. [One thing I love about being a military historian is that I get to quote the profane -- we deal in such a harsh subject, it's only right that we get to have fun with something.] Anyway, it occurred to me as I read it that this was a pretty good metaphor for the battlefield -- that you'll only ever get 4/6ths of what you needed, and the art in war was in making up the difference so as to get the job done.

[Culpeper]

Chosin Reservoir was a cold motherf***er.

[SWJED]

From the U.S. Army Combined Arms Research Library - Generalship: Its Diseases and their Cure - A Study of the Personal Factor in Command by Major-General J.F.C. Fuller (1936).

GENERALSHIP

'For what art can surpass that of the general?--an art which deals not with dead matter but with living beings, who are subject to every impression of the moment, such as fear, precipitation, exhaustion--in short, to every human passion and excitement. The general has not only to reckon with unknown quantities, such as time, weather, accidents of all kinds, but he has before him one who seeks to disturb and frustrate his plans and labours in every way; and at the same time this man, upon whom all eyes are directed, feels upon his mind the weight of responsibility not only for the lives and honour of hundreds of thousands, but even for the welfare and existence of his country.'

A. von BOGUSLAWSKI

[Culpeper]

From the U.S. Army Combined Arms Research Library - Generalship: Its Diseases and their Cure - A Study of the Personal Factor in Command by Major-General J.F.C. Fuller (1936).

Some of my favorites:

Should the general consistently live outside the realm of danger, then, though he may show high moral courage in making decisions, by his never being called upon to breathe the atmosphere of danger his men are breathing, this lens will become blurred, and he will seldom experience the moral influences his men are experiencing. But it is the influence of his courage upon the hearts of his men in which the main deficit will exist. It is his personality which will suffer - his prestige.

Many Generals in the day of battle busy themselves in regulating the march ing of their troops, in hurrying aides-de-camp to and fro, in galloping about incessantly. They wish to do everything, and as a result do nothing.

These, then, are the three pillars of generalship--courage, creative intelligence and physical fitness; the attributes of youth rather than of middle age.

[Sargent]

LTC Yingling wrote: "I'm very worried about the communication gap between stars and bars, and I hope that my article does not make matters worse."

First, it's entirely refreshing to see the author of a serious piece join a public discussion thereof. Thanks.

Second, I doubt your piece could worsen what is an already gaping chasm.

When I read memoirs of the Revolutionary War, of such junior officers as Bloomfield (Citizen Soldier: Rev War Journal of Joseph Bloomfield) or Thacher (Military Journal of the Am Rev), what is remarkable is the easy social interaction between these fellows and the high ranking officers of the war. For example, these junior officers dined with general officers regularly, had easy and frequent social contact with them. This was a result of the social background the officer corps shared as a whole. However, over the course of American history, the social background for an officer became less relevant -- at the same time, the vertical hierarchization of the officer corps became more rigid. Besides those officers or personnel who might work on the general's staff, today there are very few officers who get the opportunity to interact with generals on a relaxed, social basis. Generals (and Colonels, to a certain extent) have become the rock stars of the military, and have increasingly isolated themselves from the rest of the officer corps. Have you ever tried to take a walk up the west side of the green at Fort McNair? You can't -- it's kept off limits by security guards. What sort of professional communication can we expect when there is a strong socio-cultural barrier between general officers and the rest of the officer corps? In my opinion, not much. And there is no way to solve the problem at this point without a serious effort at reach-down by the generals. However, as you've pointed out in your article (eg, the point about subordinate review), there is absolutely no imperative for the general officers to pursue such efforts, because it has no professional benefit to them.

The social aspects of military service are not given much consideration these days -- they're viewed as a nice to have, not a need to have. However, if this aspect of military service were reconsidered as a matter of utmost importance to inter-rank communications, you might begin to see an increase in General officers talking and listening to their subordinates. Until then, I fear the communications piece will not be much improved.

JSR

[120mm]

From my personal experience, I can tell you that even as I have grown in rank in the last 25 years, Generals, and even Colonels have become more and more withdrawn from contact. As a 2LT, I was sitting in a fuel blivet turned into a hot tub on Monteith Barracks in my skivvies, when a guy in civilian clothes stopped and asked me if the water felt as good as it looked. We chatted for about 15 minutes about various things and he left. Someone later asked me what General Tilelli had to say to me. Same thing with Donn Starry. I was Adjutant to a former subordinate of his, and he would call every couple of months, and chat with me for several minutes before asking to talk to "that slave-driving boss of yours".

Fast forward to the present, and as a MAJ(P), I see BGs and COLs who are surrounded by huge personal staffs, with multiple MAJs working in SGS. I can't even imagine talking to one of them, unless I was flipping slides, and is that really communicating?

Not to paint with too broad a brush, though, MG Wodjakowski lives like a monk and requires very little support, and GEN Petraeus talks to everybody. Even when they're taking a leak in the Leavenworth Club.