Army Officer Accuses Generals of 'Intellectual and Moral Failures'

[goesh]

Being neither fully enmeshed with the civilian world nor fully separate, those who bear arms will not and cannot be given the same Public ear when from within the ranks malfeasance is exposed and rears its ugly head. When guys like Yingling and Sanchez, ex post facto, start speaking out, the Public simply doesn't want to hear too much of it. To lend full ear is to entertain the possibility that the Nation can't be defended. It's that simple. In short, don't expect much support or sympathy from us and don't get too smug and prideful when the *(^&* politicians get on the band wagon over issues raised by guys like Sanchez and Yingling. Rummy fell on his sword a long time ago. How involved do you really want civilians to be in your lives? You need to ask yourselves that and keep the #### in the ranks where it has always belonged - deal with it and straighten it out.

[Norfolk]

When officers (and while at Leavenworth) get to the point where a number of them not only criticize both generals and politicians openly, but both raise the spectre of refusing to obey the orders of their superior officers and the civilian leadership, and then other officers not only debate, but begin to think about it, then it is clear that something is gravely wrong, not just a major problem. And when much the same thing has been going on over in Britain, with all ranks from Private straight up to the Chief of the Defence Staff criticizing their civilian leadership publicly, it is also clear that this is not an isolated case. This a critical issue that has been left fester for soem time now within the civilian-military relationship in the English-speaking world.

The stresses, strains, and overstretch of the military forces of much of the English-speaking world while both the civilian political and senior military leaderships are reaching, or have now reached, a perhaps critical point. The one officer who responded to strong suggestions that generals should have said "No" to the politicians by calling that a "coup d'etat" is taking it a little too far. A coup d'etat is when the troops physically overthrow or eject the lawful government or elements thereof. That is not what is going on here, or even being suggested. If a general resigns in protest against what are immoral, unlawful orders, that is not bucking the supremacy of the civil authority. It may even not be unlawfully defying civil authority for the generals to say "No" to an war that they believe to be immoral and unlawful.

The problem here though, is twofold. First of all, in concrete cases, where is the dividing line between moral, lawful rejection of an immoral, unlawful order, and insubordination and even mutiny? Second, and this is particualry pertinent in the present situation, is when civilian leaderships not only reject the military advice of the generals, but are seen to effectively expell those whose advice they reject, the civilian-military relationship is put under stress; when that already stressed relationship is subjected to the strains of an over-stretched military engaged in a prolonged and difficult war, and serious political divisions back home exacerbate the situation at almost every turn, it should not come as a surprise that a breach is developing between much of the officer corps on one side and the civilian leadership together with the generals who have acquiesced to that leadership on the other.

The civilian leadership and elements of the general officer ranks have brought this upon themselves and the rest of the military. But now the officer corps to an extent that it has probably never been, is politicized, angry, and many of them are no longer afraid to show it. It will be very interesting to see how this plays out over coming years.

[Cavguy]

When officers (and while at Leavenworth) get to the point where a number of them not only criticize both generals and politicians openly, but both raise the spectre of refusing to obey the orders of their superior officers and the civilian leadership, and then other officers not only debate, but begin to think about it, then it is clear that something is gravely wrong, not just a major problem. And when much the same thing has been going on over in Britain, with all ranks from Private straight up to the Chief of the Defence Staff criticizing their civilian leadership publicly, it is also clear that this is not an isolated case. This a critical issue that has been left fester for soem time now within the civilian-military relationship in the English-speaking world.
....

The civilian leadership and elements of the general officer ranks have brought this upon themselves and the rest of the military. But now the officer corps to an extent that it has probably never been, is politicized, angry, and many of them are no longer afraid to show it. It will be very interesting to see how this plays out over coming years.

First, I think the author of the story was being somewhat sensational in reporting what amounted to an academic BS session here at the college regarding the state of relations. I have never heard in uniform anyone seriously suggest a coup against the government.

Second, this same thing happened following Vietnam. I recalled this anecdote in a prior thread about a thrashing GEN Abrams received in the 1970's from disgruntled Fort Leavenworth Majors. (Most of whom became the officers who rebuilt the army in the 80's). I would say it is neither unprecedented or a risk to the republic.

Yes, trust in the officer corps is strained and many are angry on what they perceived was a mismanaged war. The officer trust gap was well documented before 9/11 with several leadership surveys and had built up in the 90s "zero defect" army. The events of 9/11 allowed the army a "hall pass" on resolving the cultural and institutional issues due to heightened patriotism and service drive. Our senior leadership issues in OEF/OIF are directly related to the causes identified in the studies from 2001. Micromanaging, careerism, work hours, deployments, bad leaders promoted, etc.

Now that the debate is beginning on "Who lost Iraq", all the chickens are coming home to roost, captains are fleeing the army (a senior officer told me 66% of the 2002 West Point class had submitted resignations at the end of their obligation this year), and someone is to blame. The army has tried a band aid through bribery with bonuses and grad school, but has thus far failed to entertain addressing the structural issues causing the exodus.

Bottom line, the Army's problems with trust and morale really began following Desert Storm, and the effect culturally of the 90's drawdown.

[selil]

First, I think the author of the story was being somewhat sensational in reporting what amounted to an academic BS session here at the college regarding the state of relations. I have never heard in uniform anyone seriously suggest a coup against the government.

Actually a really good read about military relations, something I've been suggesting a few colleagues read it.

The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012, CHARLES J. DUNLAP, JR., LINK

[Ken White]

The same sorts of discussions took place during Korea and Viet Nam -- as well as afterward. At all ranks. Not new with the Brits either -- or with Canadians. During Korea, we had 42 RM Cdo attached for a while and were adjacent to the Black Watch and visited 2 RCR. Soldiers gripe. Even about their own Army to others, given a little alcoholic easing of natural tension and reticence.

Amazing number of senior folks were unhappy about the firing of MacArthur (though not all of 'em ). Many were unhappy that Eisenhower ran on the end the war ticket. Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon -- as well as the senior leadership -- were all routinely denigrated during Viet Nam. There were those who complained about the cessation of Desert Strom in 1991 and you wouldn't believe some of the things said about the senior leadership and the Prez in the 1990s.

Foolishness and incompetence in high places has always been a favorite topic. Regrettably, too often deservedly so.

Nor have I ever heard any serious discussion about coups and refusal of orders. Civilian control is hard wired. So, in the US, is not resigning -- that's as much due to the depth of the bench as anything. If one resigns in protest, one knows the system will simply keep appointing replacements until it finds someone to do whats wanted. Plus, there's the ego trip of getting the job, no matter how unappealing, finished and the belief that one can do it better than some second or third choice -- and with less damage to the institution than said incompetent might inflict...

The departure by resignation of massive numbers of Officers at the earliest possible date during a war is also not new. Wives get upset, Captains and some Majors leave -- also happened during Korea and Viet Nam.

There's no news -- or anything to be concerned about there...

[Norfolk]

First, I think the author of the story was being somewhat sensational in reporting...[]...here at the college regarding the state of relations. I have never heard in uniform anyone seriously suggest a coup against the government.

Second, this same thing happened following Vietnam. I recalled this anecdote in a prior thread about a thrashing GEN Abrams received in the 1970's from disgruntled Fort Leavenworth Majors. (Most of whom became the officers who rebuilt the army in the 80's). I would say it is neither unprecedented or a risk to the republic.

Yes, trust in the officer corps is strained and many are angry on what they perceived was a mismanaged war. The officer trust gap was well documented before 9/11 with several leadership surveys and had built up in the 90s "zero defect" army. The events of 9/11 allowed the army a "hall pass" on resolving the cultural and institutional issues due to heightened patriotism and service drive. Our senior leadership issues in OEF/OIF are directly related to the causes identified in the studies from 2001. Micromanaging, careerism, work hours, deployments, bad leaders promoted, etc.

Now that the debate is beginning on "Who lost Iraq", all the chickens are coming home to roost, captains are fleeing the army (a senior officer told me 66% of the 2002 West Point class had submitted resignations at the end of their obligation this year), and someone is to blame. The army has tried a band aid through bribery with bonuses and grad school, but has thus far failed to entertain addressing the structural issues causing the exodus.

Bottom line, the Army's problems with trust and morale really began following Desert Storm, and the effect culturally of the 90's drawdown.

The first problem though, is that the war is very unlikely to end anytime soon, along with all the stresses and strains that that imposes. Secondly, as so many of the junior officers leave, they take their training and experience with them, and that's hard to replace; it also means that those who stay are either dedicated and hard-core (good), or alternatively mediocre (bad) - perhaps resulting in a sharper split within the officer corps between doers and posers. Third, even though the new SecDef appears to be a good man, he's gone in a year-and-a-half, and there's no guarantees that a new incoming Administration and SecDef are going to be any better than Gates' recent predecessors were; depending upon who forms the new Administration in 2009, civil-military relations may end up heading south again.

Yeah, I very much agree that the tone of the article was a little shrill, but it didn't help that one of the officers compared the criticism of the civilian and senior military leaderships by other officers as something that might be considered a coup if suggestions of refusing to carry possibly immoral and unlawful orders were in fact carried out under certain circumstances.

If the incoming administration, whoever that might be, doesn't carry on along Gates' lines, there's going to be real trouble in the future, at the very least another "Hollow Army" situation.

[Norfolk]

The same sorts of discussions took place during Korea and Viet Nam -- as well as afterward. At all ranks. Not new with the Brits either -- or with Canadians. During Korea, we had 42 RM Cdo attached for a while and were adjacent to the Black Watch and visited 2 RCR. Soldiers gripe. Even about their own Army to others, given a little alcoholic easing of natural tension and reticence. There's no news -- or anything to be concerned about there...

Good to hear then; but I still wonder a little, especially come 2009.

Ken, my uncle fought in Korea, and was a Bren Gunner in 2 RCR.

[Ken White]

Actually a really good read about military relations, something I've been suggesting a few colleagues read it.

The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012, CHARLES J. DUNLAP, JR., LINK

and the logic of that essay by Dunlap...

He's slick and a smart guy no question -- and here, from your link, is his bottom line:

"Resist unification of the services not only on operational grounds, but also because unification would be inimical to the checks and balances that underpin democratic government. Slow the pace of fiscally driven consolidation so that the impact on less quantifiable aspects of military effectiveness can be scrutinized."

Smart guy with a strong agenda.

He's also still at it; LINK.

[selil]

We can debate the utility and the logic of that essay by Dunlap...

I've found that it's a great discussion topic generator. It's got a lot of meat in it.

[Ken White]

I've found that it's a great discussion topic generator.

Does indeed have some good thoughts in it.

It's got a lot of meat in it.

Also has some potatoes -- and turnips -- in it...

[Cavguy]

The same sorts of discussions took place during Korea and Viet Nam -- as well as afterward. At all ranks. Not new with the Brits either -- or with Canadians. During Korea, we had 42 RM Cdo attached for a while and were adjacent to the Black Watch and visited 2 RCR. Soldiers gripe. Even about their own Army to others, given a little alcoholic easing of natural tension and reticence.

......

The departure by resignation of massive numbers of Officers at the earliest possible date during a war is also not new. Wives get upset, Captains and some Majors leave -- also happened during Korea and Viet Nam.

There's no news -- or anything to be concerned about there...

Here is where we part ways - I think there is a great deal to be concerned about, but the sky will not fall.

Just because it happened before doesn't make it right. I don't think anyone wants a repeat of the 70's army or what I read about the Eisenhower Army post-Korea. It took both forces over ten years to recover culturally from those wars.

We have serious, developed problems in our officer culture and leadership that is turning off many excellent junior officers from staying in the army. The problem is real and is self perpetuating as most of those promoted believe the system worked and those who left are whiners or losers.

Read this and this - written seven years ago. The comments, with the exception of the "peacekeeping" issues, are all still valid and applicable today. 9/11 resulted in many officers desiring to stay in and serve - and didn't get the army to address the serious culture problems stemming from the 90s drawdown. I think the criticism of the generals by Yingling and others is a direct result of a generation of leaders built in the "zero defect, perfect QTB" 90's Army.

The Army, and the Republic, will survive regardless. But just because it will go on doesn't mean that the status quo is acceptable or desirable.

[Ken White]

Here is where we part ways - I think there is a great deal to be concerned about, but the sky will not fall.

Just because it happened before doesn't make it right. I don't think anyone wants a repeat of the 70's army or what I read about the Eisenhower Army post-Korea. It took both forces over ten years to recover culturally from those wars.

Culturally is the good news -- you wouldn't believe what happened to training during those periods...

You had to be there to really savor the problems. I was for both periods and it wasn't cool.

A large part of the problem centers around the Army's World War II mentality and the care and feeding of Generals. Then and now...

We have serious, developed problems in our officer culture and leadership that is turning off many excellent junior officers from staying in the army. The problem is real and is self perpetuating as most of those promoted believe the system worked and those who left are whiners or losers.

Read this and this - written seven years ago. The comments, with the exception of the "peacekeeping" issues, are all still valid and applicable today. 9/11 resulted in many officers desiring to stay in and serve - and didn't get the army to address the serious culture problems stemming from the 90s drawdown. I think the criticism of the generals by Yingling and others is a direct result of a generation of leaders built in the "zero defect, perfect QTB" 90's Army.

Vandergriff has some good ideas. I don't agree with him on all counts but that's okay. There are others with good ideas and I totally agree that the care and feeding of all ranks in the Army is long due for a major overhaul. A crunch is going to develop as we slowly disengage large numbers from Iraq and find that our abysmal personnel system, up or out promotions and DOPMA have created big problems -- and that the large number of potential SSGs in the combat arms due to the high reenlistment rates is more than an ankle biter...

I think it goes a little deeper. A lot is predicated on a mobilization base and the perceived need to have too many officers for the structure to be prepared to rapidly expand if required. That's a valid concern and we've always tried to do it on the sly because Congress will not tolerate it openly.

More is predicated on the way we fund and staff Federal organisms. The personnel bureaucracy was large, understandably, at the end of WW II -- and it has zealously and successfully fought to remain oversized since. all those people need work and if there is none, they'll create some...

Battalion Commanders in Viet Nam post 1967 learned they had instant NCOs and LTs who would do anything you asked but they didn't know much and thus a cult of micromanagement developed. Those LTCs were your 90s Generals -- they "trained" their successors, the current crop, the same way.

Add to that, as one of my favorite LTGs once told me, he was mediocre and "all Generals are mediocre -- if you're really good, your contemporaries will kill you on the way up because you're too much competition."

Lot of impactors on the problem, many more than we could address in a day...

The Army, and the Republic, will survive regardless. But just because it will go on doesn't mean that the status quo is acceptable or desirable.

What are we going to do to address the problem of senior leadership that insists on business as usual and a personnel bureaucracy that exists to aggrandize itself?

My comment that there is nothing to be concerned about is based on part of your last; "The Army and the Republic will survive regardless."

The remainder of that paragraph "But just because it will go on doesn't mean that the status quo is acceptable or desirable." is totally and very sadly true but IMO this is one of those problems that falls into the "It is best to leap a chasm in a single jump" as opposed to taking small bites of the elephant. I do not see anyone capable of making that leap up top...

Sadly.

[Fred III]

I am sorry, but I am a newcomer to this thread, so I have not read everything posted. It is an extremely interesting debate, but I am not so sure there is a solution. The problem you seek to redress is self-perpetuating and self-fulfilling, and unlike other problems we have tackled-- and solved-- in the country, i.e., segregation, this is thornier from the solution point of view, primarily because I think this is truly institutionalized.

In Vietnam we had some smoke-bringers, men who really were generals, but I think, by and far, most were more concerned with the air-conditioning in their trailers and the color-content of their briefing charts than the tactics of how to win that war. I often wonder why we have "stars" briefing the news media; I always thought some reserve captain might do a better job. The political mouthpieces could always explain away some junior officer's faux pas easier than if it were uttered by a general. We tend to believe "generals."

To me, the corporate mentality of today's army bears the brunt of the responsibility here. Corporations love cover-ups and I'm not sure I see the efficacy of an advanced degree from Harvard in the military power-structure. I never knew some of these schools were such bastions of military studies. Or is this just a ploy to prepare senior officers for the after-life of corporate pelf? Don't get me wrong, I am a monumentally huge supporter of all things educational, it's just that I would like to see it pointed more in the direction we need to march than to the narrow perspective of someone's self-aggrandizement.

As I said, we had some fine generals in, and coming out of, Vietnam, but with only 1 or 2 exceptions, I heard very little more of them and those exceptions survived probably because of the army's post-Vietnam catharsis, when everyone was scrambling. They got Hackworth; they got Vann (... that'll teach the rabble!), and they'll get Yingling, McMasters, and Nagl, as well. (I think there is also a one- or two-star who may be on that hit-list, but his name escapes me.) So to me, there is very little, if any difference between what you are going through now and what I-- or I should say, we-- went through in the sixties and seventies. There is no solution and the myth is perpetuated by the issuance of a new medal. Some of these guys wear more medals for doing less, that the uniform looks like a Soviet commissar's. "And I got this for not missing a day of..." Some guy pops off a shot in Africa and we all switch the patch to the right sleeve and issue another ribbon. Then the New York Times gets ahold of it, and wow! the war hero returns. In the meantime, our boys die, and the self-fulfilling prophecy goes on. Do they pin the campaign ribbon on the parents' flag? Does someone tell them the purple heart comes before the Botswana Service Award when they hang the trophy box on the wall?

For a general to criticize a public policy, it is like self-immolation. If he does it before Congress-- as may be required-- or privately, in the Pentagon's inner sanctum, he is relegated to early retirement (Taguba), or worse, the DOD sneer (Shinseki). But if he kowtows to the party line and says all is right with the mufti warlords (Franks, Meyers), he reaps the Medal of Freedom, or some such bauble. Damned if you do, damned if you don't. Do we call it morals? Do we call it ethics? No... we call it reprisal, we call it survival, and maybe we can come back and fight another day... . And here I am defending the "flag" office (O-7 to O-10-ville), that public corporation running the army. Can C&GS or the War College issue an advanced degree that the universities of this country won't sniggle at? I don't know; I've been out of the loop for too long.

And I guess the problem I have is that some how, some way, even after 67 years of being stunned by this nonsense, I still care. I walked away from 10 years in the service, but left without my heart. I feel sorry for all of you-- that ain't pity, gentlemen; it's respect and admiration and the hopes you can get it right where my friends and I failed.

My hat's off to the Big Three (Yingling, McMasters, and Nagl), just like it was off to gutsy Hackworth and brilliant John Paul Vann. But until the institution-- the "corporation"-- recognizes its inherent problem, cabals to deal with it, you'll be having this conversation in your rocking chairs on your palm computers.

Sorry for butting in.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[goesh]

This discourse nudges the ranks to clean up and shape up but no good ever comes from civilians meddling too much in military affairs

[Fred III]

This discourse nudges the ranks to clean up and shape up but no good ever comes from civilians meddling too much in military affairs

Boy, oh boy! is that ever the truth. The key, however, is your phrase, "too much."

Best wishes,
Fred.

[Ken White]

...
. . .
And I guess the problem I have is that some how, some way, even after 67 years of being stunned by this nonsense, I still care. I walked away from 10 years in the service, but left without my heart. I feel sorry for all of you-- that ain't pity, gentlemen; it's respect and admiration and the hopes you can get it right where my friends and I failed.

... But until the institution-- the "corporation"-- recognizes its inherent problem, cabals to deal with it, you'll be having this conversation in your rocking chairs on your palm computers.
...

Best wishes,
Fred.

I can agree with all that, including the parts I eliminated to save space -- well, maybe a reservation on Hackworth who was in the same Brigade and for whom I once ran a mission while OpCon to his Battalion; I am not an admirer -- I strongly agree with your last paragraph quoted above.

Goesh says:

This discourse nudges the ranks to clean up and shape up but no good ever comes from civilians meddling too much in military affairs

Very true. Most of the commenters on this thread are military and fortunately, being a Navy junior and with 45 years of millinery and silly-villian service and now comfortably retarded; all except for about two years between the Corps and the Army of my 76+ years living on guvmint checks, as my kids say, I can't even spell silly-villian...

Seriously, you're right. More importantly, so is Fred -- the institution is going to have to un-bureaucrat-ize themselves; Congress won't (will in fact actively if inadvertently try to increase the bureaucracy *) and most civilians wouldn't know where to start.

* Congress for the most part doesn't care about the Armed Forces but most of them do NOT want a truly effective and really competent force; they're afraid of such a monster. Penalty of living in a Democracy -- but we get a lot of payback and I'm not sure we want too significant a change...

[Steve Blair]

And of course that goes back to the eternal debate: how much is too much?

And I frankly don't trust the institution to un-bureaucratize itself...there's no real incentive from their perspective to do so. And remember, the big drive for that sort of thing started under Eisenhower and accelerated with the business management theory of leadership (a good deal of which came from him and Marshall). I wouldn't say that Congress is afraid of an effective military...most of them wouldn't know what that was. What does scare most of them (and the rats - both civilian and former military - that inhabit the personnel and procurement systems) is an efficient and smaller military. Too many gravy trains go away with that.

[Tom Odom]

And of course that goes back to the eternal debate: how much is too much?

And I frankly don't trust the institution to un-bureaucratize itself...there's no real incentive from their perspective to do so. And remember, the big drive for that sort of thing started under Eisenhower and accelerated with the business management theory of leadership (a good deal of which came from him and Marshall). I wouldn't say that Congress is afraid of an effective military...most of them wouldn't know what that was. What does scare most of them (and the rats - both civilian and former military - that inhabit the personnel and procurement systems) is an efficient and smaller military. Too many gravy trains go away with that.

I don't think any organization can do that without outside pressure, regardless of what it does. Military organizations thrive on tradition, history, doctrine, and TTPs--all of which breeds inertia. That intertia is compounded by success; the more successful--at least as it sees itself--the less likely an organization is to change. We trumpet our military prowess even as we talk change; we change little but it sure does cost an awful lot. Defeat or embarrassment tends to make us shake off the cob webs. Elihu Root's reforms after the Spanish-American War come to mind as an example.

Steve, I do believe that a significant portion of Congress is afraid of an effective military because they do not know what makes one effective. Then another group simply does not see an effective military as a necessity beyond using it as a campaign fund raising tool. The procurement rats of which you speak fall in that camp.

Best

Tom

[Steve Blair]

Steve, I do believe that a significant portion of Congress is afraid of an effective military because they do not know what makes one effective. Then another group simply does not see an effective military as a necessity beyond using it as a campaign fund raising tool. The procurement rats of which you speak fall in that camp.

Best

Tom

Very true on both counts, Tom, although I'd possibly contend that parts of Congress are afraid of an effective military because they're told it's a "bad thing," often by those same rats. I don't honestly know how many of them have their own opinion on the issue or simply echo what they're told by their own "experts." It's also interesting to consider that some of our "leadership by management" issues stem in part from Root's reforms.

Still, as you point out there is a need for outside pressure to enact reform in most cases.

[Fred III]

* Congress for the most part doesn't care about the Armed Forces but most of them do NOT want a truly effective and really competent force; they're afraid of such a monster. Penalty of living in a Democracy...

The problem with this comment is that it is correct. The bigger problem with it is every time I realize it, my eyes tear up.

You suffered through that long harrangue of mine, so bear with me for a quick story. Some time in the early eighties NYC decided it was time to stop throwing tomatoes at Vietnam vets, so the mayor threw a big bash. Some parade. I'd like to remember it as being more than a tack-on to a World Series victory, but I don't recall. By this time I was wearing a Wall Street suit, and the thanks be damned. I never could reconcile with the past. I arrived in Grand Central Station-- on my way to downtown-- on the day of the parade, and the place was crawling with vets. You could tell; they were the grungy ones in OD. I passed by a bunch of them... and stopped. I stood there for a moment and thought, I should go back to one group of about a dozen guys and say something to them. So ol' Freddy-boy here, turns and swings his Armani-clad butt into the jungle-fatigue group and introduces himself, the only officer in the throng. It was like old home week and I spent 15 or 20 minutes with them, none of whom I knew, none of whom I ever served with. But we had that bond... They asked me if I was going to march and I replied, No, this was for them. The country had thrown one-too-many tomatoes at me, some flung by my own brothers, my own family. This parade was for these men; they earned it, they deserved it, it was their final acceptance. This closed the door for them. What's the latest PC term? Closure. I don't have closure. I don't want it. I will never accept it, because if I do, I will accept the deaths of every one of those men in Vietnam and in Iraq, I will accept every cockamamie war we decide to fight for whatever stupid reason we can concoct. They marched; I walked away.

Show me the nukes, boys, then I'll fight. Show me! Don't tell me, show me. Otherwise, buzz off, we have no business policing the world's dirty laundry. If we need the oil, we'll pay. If I told you in 1999 gas would cost you $3 a gallon, you would have had a kitten. Yet here we are and there isn't a single thread on this site (that I know of) that is complaining about the price of oil. We always pay! We always will, and we'll survive. Do you want to give up your son's life so you can drop the price to $1.50? Not me.

I think many of the brainier generals know this and that's why you have some of the opposition you have. Someone on this site said he didn't respect retired generals who came out against the war in Iraq, but you know something, what else can they do? Serve out your time, get out, and raise hell. The flip side, the good thing, the thing that still gives me hope, is the 75% at 30 years. You ain't goin' any higher, fellows. And that extra star won't get you on the NYC subway. That's the guy I want to hear yelling. That's the guy who gives me hope. When the nonsense is over and we've buried our last mistake, that's the guy I want to hear from.

Best wishes,
Fred.