Army Officer Accuses Generals of 'Intellectual and Moral Failures'

[120mm]

I've come to the conclusion that competence in generalship is a coincidence, independent of professional development. And, amazingly, I am becoming more and more at peace with that. There just isn't a "system" that can possibly reliably produce generals. There will always remain those who do and do not "get it".

If there were one thing I could change in the current crop of generals, I would remove their dependence on Powerpoint Briefings, the current trend toward "entitlement" vis-a-vis bennies and staff, and make them more "responsible" for everything within their AO and AI.

[Tom Odom]

Although I don't care for his often neo-con like thinking, Boot has some valid points (in my opinion of course) in this one:

Los Angeles Times
May 31, 2007

Fire The Incompetents, Find The Pattons

Our armed forces need to do a better job of punishing failure while rewarding those who succeed on the battlefield.

By Max Boot

THE NAVY IS ON a tear. Last week, for the sixth time in six weeks, a skipper was relieved of command. The latest to get the sack was Cmdr. E.J. McClure of the guided missile destroyer Arleigh Burke, which had a "soft grounding" while heading back to port in the well-charted waters off Norfolk, Va.

These firings have sparked debate in military circles, with some critics from the other services charging that the Navy is guilty of a "zero defect" mentality that would have robbed it of such distinguished leaders as Adm. Chester Nimitz, the World War II hero who grounded his first command in 1908. But even if the Navy is going, so to speak, overboard, there is a good case to be made that the ground-combat arms go too far in the other direction by not holding their commanders responsible for a lack of results.

This was the essence of a complaint made recently by Army Lt. Col. Paul Yingling, who wrote in the Armed Forces Journal that "a private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war."

Ed. by SWC Admin - LA Times link, unfortunately requires a sign up to view.

[wm]

Although I don't care for his often neo-con like thinking, Boot has some valid points (in my opinion of course) in this one:

In the original excerpt that Tom posted, I thought that Boot might be on the right track. But his article self destructs when he calls for more leaders like George Patton and Curtis LeMay. Those are the kind of guys we need to execute what we used to call high intensity conflicts. However, we are not faced with that type of engagement in a counter-insurgency (or what we used to call low intensity conflict). Grant did a fine job orchestrating victories on the battlefields of the Civil War. But, as a President managing Reconstruction, he was about as successful as the CPA in Iraq. Alexander the Great's operational and tactical skills produced a huge empire before he was 30, but it fell apart almost immediately after his death.

I view Boot's article as like El Toro Ferdinand's horns. A point here; a point there; an awful lot of bull in between. I guess Hegel never had to deal with Neo-Cons in his understanding of the inevitable progress of the dialectic.

[Tom Odom]

WM

Good points all, especially the neo-con dialectic gap. I agree that Patton and LeMay are not the guys for today. I figure Max was looking for a couple of icons his average reader might actually relate to.

Where I think Max scored points was in his assessment that we have forgotten or seemigly abandoned the standard of success must have a measure of accountability.

Best

Tom

[wm]

Where I think Max scored points was in his assessment that we have forgotten or seemigly abandoned the standard of success must have a measure of accountability.

I agree that his call for accountability is a strength of Boot's piece (even though he gets sidetracked on what I consider the petty criminal foibles of the Steeles and Karpinski). However, I submit that his closing quotation from Viscount Slim somewhat misses the mark. Accountability is a two way street--up the chain and down the chain. It is a false dichotomy to say we must choose between the mission and the welfare of the troops. Part of every mission is the welfare of the troops. We cannot fail to seize the objective because we value our soldiers' lives more. But we also cannot choose a path to victory that squanders those lives, especially when we can successfully reach the objective by a means that puts fewer of our troops at risk. I suspect that Boot's understanding of success stops with the radio message "Objective taken. Mission accomplished. Out." The numbers of toe tags, body bags, medevac flights, and limb prosthetic devices required probably do not figure into his calculations of success.

[sullygoarmy]

WM

Good points all, especially the neo-con dialectic gap. I agree that Patton and LeMay are not the guys for today. I figure Max was looking for a couple of icons his average reader might actually relate to.

Where I think Max scored points was in his assessment that we have forgotten or seemigly abandoned the standard of success must have a measure of accountability.

Best

Tom

Couldn't agree more Tom. I'm pretty sure Boot realized that a Patton or LeMay in a COIN environment wouldn't be a great fit, especially if you read his book, "The Savage Wars of Peace". He seems to be one of the few newspaper writers that has a much better understanding of a COIN fight than most. On that note, I suspect that he was looking for some easily recognized leaders people could relate to.

His main point, and one that I wholeheartedly agree with, is there needs to be more accountability up the chain. WM, I suspect there is a lot more accountability down the chain than up. I've personally know about a dozen company/junior field grade officers either relieved or quietly put out of the Army because of (non-UCMJ) issues. However, how rare is it to see the removal of an O-6 or higher due to a failure to accomplish their mission? We have a military culture where no one wants to do the harder right and tell someone they are NOT a good officer and would be better off finding a new career path. Its not mean or vindictive, just honest. No one wants to hear it and no one wants to say it. As a result, you have a system that keeps advancing people up the chain that never should have made it past 1LT.

Of course I probably fall into that category as well. I can't tell you how many mistakes/stupid decisions I made as a LT/CPT only to have good leaders a) explain how jacked up I was and why, b) set down a path for improvement, c) and hold me accountable to improvement. I have no doubt that had I not improved I'd be sitting somewhere in a civilian suit right now, versus wearing my ACUs. I tried to follow that same model as a company grade leader with my LTs. All officers are leaders, even if not in a leadership job. As leaders, we need to be brutally honest with our subordinates and superiors. We owe it to the troops we lead. Sucess needs to be graded on more than completion of a command, your PT test scores and who your wife sings with in the post church choir (mine doesn't sing so I guess I'm screwed!).

[wm]

WM, I suspect there is a lot more accountability down the chain than up.

Accountability encompasses much more than being the fall guy for mistakes. I probably should have explained the sense in which I used the term. I think it squares with LTC Yingling's call for a 360 degree eval of leaders. For me, leaders must be accountable to their superiors for making an argument about how best to accomplish their mission and then for doing what those superiors order to the best of their abilities. This is accountability up the chain. Leaders must also be accountable to their subordinates--that is, they must do their best to take good care of those subordinates and treat them with the dignity and respect each deserves. This is accountability down the chain. An effective use of the MDMP takes both into acount. Part of the requirement to respond to the superior's proposed plan with a mission analysis and arguing for alternative courses of actions to accomplish that mission is the requirement to "do right" by one's subordinates.

With that 20-20 hindsight that blesses most of us, I suspect 'accountability' may have been the wrong word choice. Perhaps 'loyalty' better captures what I was trying convey by my comments.

[mmx1]

AF LtCol Brian Hanley penned an affirmative response in July's Proceedings

Now Hear This: Send the Best and Brightest

In his recent Armed Forces Journal essay, “A Failure in Generalship,” U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling delivers a closely argued rebuke to what he sees as the intellectual and moral poverty of senior military leaders.

Combat is predominantly a physical activity. The strategy that gives combat a purpose—what precisely is the better peace we seek, and have we the means to achieve it?—is a purely intellectual pursuit. The summit of the military officer’s calling is, or should be, to serve as a strategic adviser to civilian authority. Colonel Yingling rightly calls attention to our neglect of this aspect of our profession. His assertion that Congress should initiate reforms on how we educate officers for senior command is worth further examination. Restructure the senior war colleges and their admission criteria and we will have taken a big step toward correcting the problem that Colonel Yingling has illuminated.

Have there been other responses in professional journals?

[MASON]

Accountability in fast combat rotation schedules (2 months, 4 months , 6 months 9 months 12 months out to 15 months after extension) amounts to a snap shot and there are some stand outs at either end but with only low intensity conflict it all looks level.

The Navy only dumps when metal gets bent just like the non combat Air Force.

Senior evaluators have little experience with the problem too as the few with combat experience had it in junior grades.

An obvious answer is Go to War and Stay in Theatre Until It Is DONE rotating on and off line but always in theatre. I know very draconian and WW2 like. I realize this answer is likely as unpalatable to the volunteer force as the draft is to the public but I have not seen a better answer yet. If we are all in this thing 10-14 years or we leave and soon have to return for years things may become palatable we do not even fathom yet.

[Tacitus]

I am all for the civilian leadership of the military in so far as they tell us which wars to fight. But I have a problem with someone who has little or no practical military experience and a partisan agenda telling us how to fight those wars or who is best suited to lead us when we do. SFC W

This sounds alot like the sort of thing that Union General George McClellan vented at President Abraham Lincoln. Who is this pipsqueak civilian Lincoln telling me how to run a war? He didn't like Lincoln telling him "how to fight the war", namely to get moving.

It turned out that Lincoln had a better understanding of what it would take to win the war than alot of the generals. He just had to keep firing them until he found some who could get it done (Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, etc.) The inital crop just wasn't cutting it.

I just always bristle a little bit when I hear this "leave the war to us, the professionals" line. That is not a proven strategy for success, any more than completely disregarding the advice of the generals. Wisdom and good judgment are not predestined by God almighty to automatically reside in a man wearing some stars, or a man sitting behind a desk in the oval office.

[Uboat509]

I just always bristle a little bit when I hear this "leave the war to us, the professionals" line. That is not a proven strategy for success, any more than completely disregarding the advice of the generals. Wisdom and good judgment are not predestined by God almighty to automatically reside in a man wearing some stars, or a man sitting behind a desk in the oval office.

The battlefield is no place for partisan agendas. I have a HUGE problem with interference by politicians, most of whom have no practical military experience. Wisdom and good judgment are not predestined by God almighty to automatically reside in a man who has the initials MD after his name but that is still who I am going to see when I am sick. A doctor can most certainly be wrong but he is still more likely to be right than someone who has little or no medical training. Part of the reason we are where we are now is because the political leadership refused to admit that the strategy we were using was not working, and quashed any military member who said otherwise. There are few absolutes in life, a politician can be military genius and a general can be a political hack but that is probably not where you want to put your money.

SFC W

[Steve Blair]

The battlefield is no place for partisan agendas. I have a HUGE problem with interference by politicians, most of whom have no practical military experience. Wisdom and good judgment are not predestined by God almighty to automatically reside in a man who has the initials MD after his name but that is still who I am going to see when I am sick. A doctor can most certainly be wrong but he is still more likely to be right than someone who has little or no medical training. Part of the reason we are where we are now is because the political leadership refused to admit that the strategy we were using was not working, and quashed any military member who said otherwise. There are few absolutes in life, a politician can be military genius and a general can be a political hack but that is probably not where you want to put your money.

SFC W

But you saw a fair number of partisan agendas within the higher military ranks in Vietnam, and they sure slipped onto the battlefield. Westmoreland's vision of the war was incorrect in many ways, but that was allowed to stand. The military fought most of JFK's ideas regarding unconventional warfare.

Personally, I am deeply suspicious of anyone on either side (political or military) claiming to have the one true answer. We'll have to see how the current generation of captains and field-grades grow up, but it's worth remembering that many of our general officers have precious little battlefield experience...but that's also not a guarantee of success or failure. Many of the Vietnam-era generals had combat experience in Korea or even World War II and many of them misread that situation as well.

Experience is one thing...it's another thing completely to be able to understand and apply that experience. Grant was good at that...McClellan was not. And Grant was considered the failure before the war.

[Tom Odom]

Personally, I am deeply suspicious of anyone on either side (political or military) claiming to have the one true answer.

Ditto here. See Eric Hoffer for further explanation.

Tom

[Lastdingo]

Experience is one thing...it's another thing completely to be able to understand and apply that experience. Grant was good at that...McClellan was not. And Grant was considered the failure before the war.

I believe it#s OK nto to foresee enought o do everything right from the beginning of a new kind of conflict.

Burt it's not tolerable when generals repeat mistakes that were already done in comparable, earlier conflicts. This happens today - they had enough time to learn and to adapt, but many still seem to fail.
It's tie to fire generals - not only in those armies that are engaged in Iraq, but also in other NATO armies as well. It should be possible to find a lot of duds in the general ranks.

[Tacitus]

Greetings U-509,

I am by no means defending the competency of the civilian management of this war. Far from it. Our republic is founded on the idea of civilian control of the military. If war is the continuation of politics by other means, I’m not sure how you would go about removing politics from the conflict. Politics here, abroad, in the Pentagon, in foreign capitals, you name it. The fighting is not an end in itself, there is some sort of ultimate political objective being sought, and men will naturally disagree on that.

If you have a problem with this kind of civilian interference, then I guess you have to fault Madison, Hamilton, Washington and the rest of the Founding Fathers who set this system up. Short of a military coup, I’m not sure how this would be altered.

So what should the generals do, given civilian supremacy in our republic? If the military leadership feels their considered judgment is being ignored, and they can’t in good conscience carry out a policy they have no confidence in, then if they want to make a statement I suggest the joint chiefs resign en masse explaining their actions in a letter to the American people.

I guess that is the sort of moral leadership that Colonels Yingling and McMaster (at least in Viet Nam) feel is missing. Instead, I guess generals on active service think “you deal with the political masters you have, not the ones you’d like to have,” and blame it on the politicians later if things go south. Sounds like a political calculation on the generals’ part to me, so they can’t claim to be as pure as Caesar’s wife when the branches of our government engage in their own political activities.

This is a frustrating war for many reasons. But it is a little self-serving for our military to just blame our problems on civilian interference. You'd think after losing a guerilla war in Viet Nam, our military would have given alot of thought about how to deal with this kind of war in the future. That doesn't appear to have happened. Most military reforms come after losing wars. If Viet Nam didn't get the military's attention about guerilla war, I'm really not so sure Iraq will, either.

[Uboat509]

I'm not saying that there are not problems within the military. On the contrary I deal with the frustration every day of dealing with commands that do not understand the situation on the ground. I am fully aware of the problems within our own military. I just believe that there are no problems within our military that cannot be exacerbated by partisan meddling.

So what should the generals do, given civilian supremacy in our republic? If the military leadership feels their considered judgment is being ignored, and they can’t in good conscience carry out a policy they have no confidence in, then if they want to make a statement I suggest the joint chiefs resign en masse explaining their actions in a letter to the American people.

I have always felt that this was a strawman argument. Has this ever worked? Look what has happened to Shinseki. Granted he was not resigning in protest, but he was speaking out against policy he had no confidence in and he was publicly vilified for it. The same has happened pretty much any time in recent history that I can think of that an officer spoke out like that. This whole concept is built around the idea that John Q Public will see the resignation and realize that only the most dire of situations could make a professional like that resign. It never works that way. Whoever resigns will find themselves now on the outside vilified by whichever party they spoke out against and largely unable to effect things, at least not they way they could have had they remained. And they will be replaced by someone who is more amenable to the policy who will then explain to John Q Public how their predecessor was wrong and nothing will change. In that situation I feel it is better that they remain and try to change the things that they can change rather than resign and become largely irrelevant.

Keep this in mind. Most of our fellow Americans have never served a day in their lives in the military. Many don’t even know anyone who has. Let’s say a general does resign in protest. He will give his reasons why and the policy makers he resigned in protest of will give their reasons why he is wrong and John Q Public will have no idea which argument is more plausible precisely because they have not served. They simply do not have the knowledge to make an informed decison.


SFC W

[Bill Moore]

I think the heart of the problem isn't so much incompetence, but rather our political and military culture. While not wanting to sound disloyal, I think our concept of loyality in politics and the military is putting our nation at risk. Would we be where we're at in Iraq if dissenting opinions and rational debate were allowed, and better yet encouraged? The same could be said about Vietnam.

Unfortunately, our political system is partisan to the extreme, even in the time of war. This led to wise independents and democrats being left out of the planning and decision making process to some degree, and in the extreme case left competent democrats and independents out of Bremer's organization, where political reliability was valued more than competence. It made us look like a corrupt third world nation. I imagine JFK and LBJ demonstrated similiar behavior.

Mr. Rumfield said he encouraged intellectualy debate, but several articles and books apparently that were professionally researched seem to refute that. GEN Shinseki is a perfect example. He had the moral courage to offer a dissenting opinion that should have led to a rational debate, but instead his comment was casually dismissed, and Mr Rumfield did not attend a true hero's retirement, which obviously sent a message to the force. We could have had mass resignations of senior officers across the force, but what would that have accomplished? More talking heads on Fox and CNN? Would Rumfield have been fired? Unlikely, because President Bush is extremely "loyal" to his men. Wouldn't we all like to have a boss like that? However, at what cost to the nation?

I don't know this to be true, but I think we may have seen a different outcome at this point and time if the administration and the military welcomed and rationally debated the merits of a particular course of action strictly based on the merits of the projected outcome, instead of political advantage or perhaps ego. Imagine if we really had a political and interagency concensus on post war Iraq that was well thought out, and had branch plans and sequels?

Loyality within the military is a double edged sword. It is absolutely required for a disciplined unit, and for that special trust that is essential, but it unfortunately it can also have a corrupting influence when loyality to the boss (your career) supercedes loyality to the nation. Unfortunately, I don't think we'll find ways around social/organizational behavior challenge anytime soon, but maybe self awareness of it is a start.

[Ken White]

"Keep this in mind. Most of our fellow Americans have never served a day in their lives in the military. Many don’t even know anyone who has. Let’s say a general does resign in protest. He will give his reasons why and the policy makers he resigned in protest of will give their reasons why he is wrong and John Q Public will have no idea which argument is more plausible precisely because they have not served. They simply do not have the knowledge to make an informed decison."

Well said and totally true. I'd even say that the Pols will win that spin battle. Not to mention that he who resigns in protest will likely be replaced by someone of less competence who will go ahead and do what the political masters want anyway -- probably less well than the guy who fell on his sword. No easy choices.

It's an imperfect system, we're lucky that it works as well as it does in spite of all the impediments foisted upon it by an uncaring and unknowing public, a pathetic Congress which meddles in things it does not understand and the 10% of poor and marginal performers that exist in all grades from E1 to O10 (just as they do in all fields of civilian endeavor).

Will also add that in addition to the vast majority who have not served, there are some who served but didn't like it for a variety of reasons. That is perfectly understandable and certainly alright but some of them seem to want to carry a chip about it for a long time afterwards. What fascinates me is that some of them -- William Arkin comes to mind among others -- presume a few years service showed them all there is to know about the Green Machine. I've never understood either the chip or the presumed 'knowledge.'

But then, I'm old and slow, can no longer take two salt tablets and drive on...

Keep the faith.

[wm]

I heard, anecdotally, that everyone selected for 07 and 08 during FY04/05 went in for a personal interview with the SECDEF himself before they were nominated to Congress. If this anecdote is true, I believe that such an event was the first of its kind in the history of the American military.
It also makes one pause to reflect on the nature of the senior leadership we have been left with?

[Rob Thornton]

Interesting article in the WSJ today "Critiques of Iraq War reveal Rift among Army Officers" - converges multiple SWC topics into one article, but this seemed the best one to post it to.

Critiques of Iraq War Reveal Rifts Among Army Officers
By Greg Jaffe
Word Count: 2,075
Last December, Lt. Col. Paul Yingling attended a Purple Heart ceremony for soldiers injured in Iraq. As he watched the wounded troops collect their medals, the 41-year-old officer reflected on his two combat tours in Iraq.

He was frustrated at how slowly the Army had adjusted to the demands of guerrilla war, and ashamed he hadn't done more to push for change. By the end of the ceremony, he says, he could barely look the wounded troops in the eyes. Col. Yingling just had been chosen to lead a 540-soldier battalion. "I can't command like this," he recalls thinking.

He ...

You can also get to it in today's E-bird.

Also ref. in the same article are:

The creation of an Army Advisory Corps

Comments from USAF MG Dunlap

Future of COIN and Nation Building Like missions as core competencies

Civil Military Relations

Lots of other good stuff