Army Officer Accuses Generals of 'Intellectual and Moral Failures'

[SWJED]

27 April Washington Post - Army Officer Accuses Generals of 'Intellectual and Moral Failures' by Tom Ricks.

An active-duty Army officer is publishing a blistering attack on U.S. generals, saying they have botched the war in Iraq and misled Congress about the situation there.

"America's generals have repeated the mistakes of Vietnam in Iraq," charges Lt. Col. Paul Yingling, an Iraq veteran who is deputy commander of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. "The intellectual and moral failures . . . constitute a crisis in American generals."...

The article, "General Failure," is to be published today in Armed Forces Journal and is posted at http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/05/2635198. Its appearance signals the public emergence of a split inside the military between younger, mid-career officers and the top brass.

Many majors and lieutenant colonels have privately expressed anger and frustration with the performance of Gen. Tommy R. Franks, Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno and other top commanders in the war, calling them slow to grasp the realities of the war and overly optimistic in their assessments...

Armed Forces Journal - A Failure in Generalship by LTC Paul Yingling.

For the second time in a generation, the United States faces the prospect of defeat at the hands of an insurgency. In April 1975, the U.S. fled the Republic of Vietnam, abandoning our allies to their fate at the hands of North Vietnamese communists. In 2007, Iraq's grave and deteriorating condition offers diminishing hope for an American victory and portends risk of an even wider and more destructive regional war.

These debacles are not attributable to individual failures, but rather to a crisis in an entire institution: America's general officer corps. America's generals have failed to prepare our armed forces for war and advise civilian authorities on the application of force to achieve the aims of policy. The argument that follows consists of three elements. First, generals have a responsibility to society to provide policymakers with a correct estimate of strategic probabilities. Second, America's generals in Vietnam and Iraq failed to perform this responsibility. Third, remedying the crisis in American generalship requires the intervention of Congress...

Key Quote:

"As matters stand now, a private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war"...

[Ski]

Not a good sign to say the least. I suspect he will be cashiered at the worst, reprimanded or just left to die on the vine.

[milesce]

I'll be very curious to hear the opinions of the professionals on this board to this article. It's fascinating stuff, and it accurately reflects what I've been told repeatedly by the junior and midlevel officers I've talked to say, but being on the "outside" it's tough to know if these are widely held views.

[tequila]

Wow. Hard to believe LTC Yingling wants to stay on AD after this ... hard to imagine the fury he must be feeling to burn his career this way.

[Van]

That LTC Yingling would publish this says a lot of good things about his candor, integrity, and belief in selfless service. His is doing what Patton and Eisenhower lacked the fortitude to do in the '20s and '30s (Forging the Thunderbolt: History of the U.s. Army's Armored Forces, 1917-45, Mildred Hanson Gillie).

It also speaks volumes about his frustration and concern for the future of the country as well as the Army.

What also indictates a systemic problem in the Army is that the most likely response from the senior leadership will be to formally or informally punish him, rather than to consider the statements, decisions, and actions by the senior leaders that caused LTC Yingling to write his book and examine what led up to it. Easier to punish a whistle-blower than to fix what got the whistle blown.

This demonstrates that the senior leaders have not learned a fundemental lesson of the media age; when things go wrong, don't cover up, tell the story early, and tell it yourself. Failure to follow this maxim consistently leads to scandal and public embarrassment.

To be completely fair, I haven't read the book (but will) and I don't know LTC Yingling or if there were circumstances that might have caused him to write from 'less than pure' motives (passed over for promotion, black marks in his record - not saying there are, but that I don't know).

[RTK]

To be completely fair, I haven't read the book (but will) and I don't know LTC Yingling or if there were circumstances that might have caused him to write from 'less than pure' motives (passed over for promotion, black marks in his record - not saying there are, but that I don't know).

I know the man and that is not the case. LTC Yingling maybe one of the smartest individuals I've ever worked around or with. A BN command selectee and SAMS graduate, LTC Yingling is without a doubt one of a handful of officers I would follow anywhere.

[Steve Blair]

He's echoing some of the things that Don Vandergriff has said (both on and off AD) regarding the Army personnel system. This is also the kind of thing you used to see in the old Army& Navy Journal. IMO it's long overdue.

[MASON]

Yingling is looking with candor at the system that produces our military hierarchy. A system which focuses its officers to work for the fit rep and awards required for advancement with a known short rotation schedule.--- And at the High end with an obvious retirement bail out on or near the top philosophy ( Did IKe, Patton, Halsey, Bradley retire while the war continued?) It is only due to the multiple war rotations that this comes to light (only so many sugar coats can improve the taste of dry desert cake)

Ironiclly the first few responses to this very post confirm the pervasive mentality in the DOD that the subordinate will pay for speaking the truth.

"Proceedings" did a great peice on this topic a few years ago called Between Schilla and Carbdis --Odeseuss's Monsters on right and left---The Machine that directs an individual to WAR and the Enemy found there. Their conclusion --Few messengers to congress or the Pentagon will get wine from the table most get vinegar but that is why US Officers take an Oath to defend the Constitution as Primary allegance and obeying superior officers comes second or third if people are looking at the unlawful orders thing.

If Yingling does get parked it only confirms part of his point.

[SWJED]

14 July USA Today commentary - General Failure by Ralph Peters.

There is only one test for a generation of generals: Did the men with stars on their shoulders win or lose their war? No matter the mitigating circumstances and political restrictions military leaders face, there is no "gentleman's C" in warfare. The course is pass-fail.

Despite including many fine combat commanders, our military leadership could fail in Iraq, defeated by terrorists, rough-hewn insurgents and shabby militiamen who understood America's limitations better than the generals did.

The generals point out that they don't control the strategic decisions, that all they can do is to follow orders, that then-secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wouldn't listen to anyone, that Congress undercut the military, that the media's behavior has been pernicious, and that Iraq's political leaders have failed their country.

Each claim is true. Even so, as the Army taught me, "The maximum effective range of an excuse is zero meters." Our generals must shoulder their share of the blame for the mess in Iraq.

Our current system of selecting generals produces George Pattons in bulk. But it hasn't produced another George Marshall, the general who had the ethical force to disagree — respectfully — with his president when victory was at stake...

[MikeGreene]

I ran across this counterpoint to LTC Yingling's commentary on the AFJI website.

It's entitled "The 20/20 Hindsight Gift" by LTC John Mauk.

A brief excerpt that kind of shows the tone of the rebuttal:

Yingling knows and apparently ignores that our military trains for both unconventional and conventional warfare. He now appears to enjoy unimpaired hindsight and preaches the merits of counterinsurgency as though he experienced a bolt of bright light from the heavens on the road to Damascus.

Not that I'm an expert in linguistics or anything, but this just sounds flip and condescending. I agree with his call for a cultural change, but it's kind of lost on me because of the chosen method of refuting LTC Yingling's commentary. That being said, I didn't agree with some of LTC Yingling's recommendations, and am still on the fence about some of his assertions. But when you couple this with the recent discussions around COL McMaster's non-selection, the conspiracy theorist in me comes out. Dissent is not welcome, is it?

So what is the "right" way to challenge the Sacred Cows that need to be grilled? How do you push for change with a giant hammer hanging over your head?

Not that I plan on leaving until they drag me out, but I can certainly understand why so many may be looking for the door.

Regards,

Mike.

Major, MAARNG

[Ken White]

"Yingling knows and apparently ignores that our military trains for both unconventional and conventional warfare. He now appears to enjoy unimpaired hindsight and preaches the merits of counterinsurgency as though he experienced a bolt of bright light from the heavens on the road to Damascus. The reality is that before the war, the services operated as we do now, in a resource-constrained world that forces each to make difficult strategic choices about the scope and types of training they undertake. The Army balances our mix of conventional and unconventional training based on consideration of frequent threat assessments and the limitations of our resources. Before Sept. 11, our leadership was rightly focused on the most likely national threats and the difficult task of positioning our forces to counter them. The slowness with which we transitioned to the unconventional environment we now find ourselves in is purely the result of having to shift operational gears in the middle of a fight."

That's one the nicest apologias for strategic planning incompetence I've ever seen.

I do believe that, prior to 11 Sep 01, it had been obvious for ten years at an absolute minimum that countering insurgency was likely to be the Army's lot, like it or not. I'd really say that was true for over 20 years but I'm feeling charitable this morning...

He's correct that the Army does train for both unconventional and conventional warfare -- today. He's almost certainly aware that was not the case prior to 2003 for by far and away the vast majority of the Army.

Mediocre try, no cigar. He's correct about only one thing IMO, getting Congress involved is not a good idea...

[Tom Odom]

That's one the nicest apologias for strategic planning incompetence I've ever seen.

I do believe that, prior to 11 Sep 01, it had been obvious for ten years at an absolute minimum that countering insurgency was likely to be the Army's lot, like it or not. I'd really say that was true for over 20 years but I'm feeling charitable this morning...

He's correct that the Army does train for both unconventional and conventional warfare -- today. He's almost certainly aware that was not the case prior to 2003 for by far and away the vast majority of the Army.

Ken,

You are correct and too charitable. The paragraph you copied is pure bovine excreta. I had a thesis advisor speak on future wars in 1989 and he talked of small wars, distant from the public eye, and heavy on COIN. Certain CGSC classmates of mine thought COIN was unthinkable even as guys like Kalev Sepp were hip deep in El Salvador. Dan Bolger and I as Majors in 1992 debated via Parameters on whether large scale armor battles would ever occur. He offered they were as extinct as the 21st Lancers at Omdurman in 1898. I countered that one should never say never when it comes to warfare.

The author would have been somewhat correct if he had said the US military had concentrated on the most dangerous threats prior to 9-11. I say somewhat because an unforeseen (or ignored) threat can be more dangerous than one you prepared for. I am reminded that some folks would do well to get a peep hole implanted in their navels...


Best

Tom

[Rob Thornton]

From Ken:

He's correct about only one thing IMO, getting Congress involved is not a good idea...

Part of me wonders about that though - how involved do we want the policy makers involved in strategic direction?

If the military had prepared for only the most dangerous threat vs. the most likely, are there other reason besides defense industry lobbyist and competition for program $$s?

Could it have something to do with a lack of coherent foreign policy that is reflective of 21st century threats? How do we translate and ensure that the guidance is codified in the QDR and various strategic documents?

Without the Executive and Legislative branches getting involved, are we letting them off the hook for their responsibility in the process?

I heard today that services are going to have to start laying out roles and missions to OSD - that would seem to me to be the opportunity for an ugly dialouge, but one we need to have in order to move forward. I'd also say that left to ourselves, large scale change (such as how we define our mission) will happen more slowly and more reluctantly as we weigh risk against existing documents and our interpretation of them.

This is not to say that we should be told "how", but I do think we need a better left and right on "what" that sets us up to be resourced, provides direction for DOTLMPF issues and otherwise supported.

Good article in Foreign Affairs here entitled Grand Strategy for a Divided America by Charles A. Kupchan and Peter L. Trubowitz
From Foreign Affairs, July/August 2007 that speaks to the quest for a 21st Century American foreign policy.

[Ken White]

Ken,

You are correct and too charitable. The paragraph you copied is pure bovine excreta... I countered that one should never say never when it comes to warfare.

... I am reminded that some folks would do well to get a peep hole implanted in their navels...

Best
Tom

(is that a word... ) which I frequently use as a cover for my irritability -- your bovine comment is, of course, right on the money and led to said irritability; I walked outside for a bit before I came in to write my short missive.

The article reminded of me of the apology for the Eagle Claw foul ups that some USAF guy wrote in the Naval Institute Proceedings back in '81 or so. Apologies are a way to delay fixing a problem, IMO...

Speaking of navels, there was this Belgique Stewardi I met in Tehran...