Army Officer Accuses Generals of 'Intellectual and Moral Failures'

[Rob Thornton]

From Ken:

He's correct about only one thing IMO, getting Congress involved is not a good idea...

Part of me wonders about that though - how involved do we want the policy makers involved in strategic direction?

If the military had prepared for only the most dangerous threat vs. the most likely, are there other reason besides defense industry lobbyist and competition for program $$s?

Could it have something to do with a lack of coherent foreign policy that is reflective of 21st century threats? How do we translate and ensure that the guidance is codified in the QDR and various strategic documents?

Without the Executive and Legislative branches getting involved, are we letting them off the hook for their responsibility in the process?

I heard today that services are going to have to start laying out roles and missions to OSD - that would seem to me to be the opportunity for an ugly dialouge, but one we need to have in order to move forward. I'd also say that left to ourselves, large scale change (such as how we define our mission) will happen more slowly and more reluctantly as we weigh risk against existing documents and our interpretation of them.

This is not to say that we should be told "how", but I do think we need a better left and right on "what" that sets us up to be resourced, provides direction for DOTLMPF issues and otherwise supported.

Good article in Foreign Affairs here entitled Grand Strategy for a Divided America by Charles A. Kupchan and Peter L. Trubowitz
From Foreign Affairs, July/August 2007 that speaks to the quest for a 21st Century American foreign policy.

[Ken White]

Ken,

You are correct and too charitable. The paragraph you copied is pure bovine excreta... I countered that one should never say never when it comes to warfare.

... I am reminded that some folks would do well to get a peep hole implanted in their navels...

Best
Tom

(is that a word... ) which I frequently use as a cover for my irritability -- your bovine comment is, of course, right on the money and led to said irritability; I walked outside for a bit before I came in to write my short missive.

The article reminded of me of the apology for the Eagle Claw foul ups that some USAF guy wrote in the Naval Institute Proceedings back in '81 or so. Apologies are a way to delay fixing a problem, IMO...

Speaking of navels, there was this Belgique Stewardi I met in Tehran...

[SWJED]

I heard today that services are going to have to start laying out roles and missions to OSD - that would seem to me to be the opportunity for an ugly dialouge, but one we need to have in order to move forward. I'd also say that left to ourselves, large scale change (such as how we define our mission) will happen more slowly and more reluctantly as we weigh risk against existing documents and our interpretation of them.

HASC announced Roles and Missions panel last Wednesday. I'm sure as the panel plugs along and services circle the wagons we will have a lot to discuss here at the Council. As a Marine I get very nervous when people start with the 3 Air Forces and 2 Armies talk...

On edit: Started a Roles and Missions thread so as not to derail this one.

[Ken White]

From Ken:


Part of me wonders about that though - how involved do we want the policy makers involved in strategic direction?

If the military had prepared for only the most dangerous threat vs. the most likely, are there other reason besides defense industry lobbyist and competition for program $$s?

Could it have something to do with a lack of coherent foreign policy that is reflective of 21st century threats? How do we translate and ensure that the guidance is codified in the QDR and various strategic documents?

Without the Executive and Legislative branches getting involved, are we letting them off the hook for their responsibility in the process?

I heard today that services are going to have to start laying out roles and missions to OSD - that would seem to me to be the opportunity for an ugly dialouge, but one we need to have in order to move forward. I'd also say that left to ourselves, large scale change (such as how we define our mission) will happen more slowly and more reluctantly as we weigh risk against existing documents and our interpretation of them.

This is not to say that we should be told "how", but I do think we need a better left and right on "what" that sets us up to be resourced, provides direction for DOTLMPF issues and otherwise supported.

Good article in Foreign Affairs here entitled Grand Strategy for a Divided America by Charles A. Kupchan and Peter L. Trubowitz
From Foreign Affairs, July/August 2007 that speaks to the quest for a 21st Century American foreign policy.

Little bit of a Progressive tilt but that's to be expected. Not much to quarrel with in their five proposals. I would posit that the Second idea will on occasion require a military component and, at least in the SOF arena, we aren't there yet and the inherent caution of senior military leaders is probably likely to impede employment even if we get the capability.

As to your questions, IMO:

The policy makers have to be involved in strategic (in the broad sense) direction it would seem to me. They need to be involved to an extent in strategic execution because of the financial and fiscal aspects but they, once the plan is approved, should not be involved in the strategic military effort. Unfortunately, they probably will be ...

I'd add that they will be involved in that final effort as well as in Opertaional -- and possibly even Tactical -- matters unless the Service get their acts together a little better...

There are a number of other reasons but the two you cite are, IMO, the big pair. Other factors are tradition (in the "we've always done it this way" mode), caution (combination of very excessive emphasis on force protection and the 'not invented here' syndrome), an emphasis on the technical rather than the people side of every program (caused by your two big items plus a reluctance to trust subordinates, a legacy of Robert Strange McNamara, either a man so brilliant the rest of couldn't keep up or the USSR's highest placed mole, not sure which), the parochial battles between conventional and SOF, branches and arms as well inter service competitions and a dysfunctional personnel management system among others. We really need to get back to trusting each other. I find it strange that I was more trusted as an 18 year old Corporal in the Marines in 1950 than I was as a fairly senior DAC in 1990. We have GOT to bring that trust back; that and a tolerance for human screwups.

The lack of a coherent foreign policy is a function, I think, of the fact that most shakers and movers, in uniform and not, are cold war relics and they long for that very artificial period of phony 'peace.' There is also the fact that a lot of mediocrity rises to the top in our nominally meritocratic system and for the 1991-2001 period, a lot of "Gee, what do we do now" floundering was going on.

Foreign policy problems are compounded by the politicization of both State and the Intel community, the more bitter political divisiveness nationwide that started in the 60s and the increasing tilt toward Progressive values nationally (worldwide, actually) as well as a perfectly normal and understandable desire for peace and tranquility. That desire of course is opposed to the reality that it's an unkind world out there and the majority of it doesn't wish us well (only a minority are for harm, but a lot like to see the Big Guy stumble...). Those factors are likely to get worse before they get better. The QDR and other documants are going to have to do what DoD and its predecessors did for years outside the 1947-1991 (+ or - 10 years) period of reasonable coherence -- flounder and cope. That, frankly, is the least of my worries...

Those two branches of Government both have to be involved in the sense I think you mean; I only meant that excessive (read: hardly any) Congressional involvement in military personnel polices and promotions is not, IMO, desirable.

I agree that the layout of roles and missions is long overdue; there will be a lot of gamesmanship and turf protection involved but Gates has a window of opportunity and my sensing is that he's level headed and he has no parochial axe to grind; Rumsfeld's Navy and aviator background did not do the Army any favors. I hope for the best. Also hope for the best on the HASC Committee on Roles and Missions. It is overdue and, hopefully, it will clobber Goldwater-Nichols...

Good comments, Rob. Thanks.

[dusty]

Regarding the exodus of the company grade officers from the active Army, I'd like to offer a bottom-up viewpoint. I work with 4 Captains who have each mentioned they will most likely be leaving after our next deployment. We all have at least one deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan - I'll leave the list of qualifications at that, though I will mention two were selected to attend SF's selection course, but were told by the BN that they couldn't be spared. The disconnect between company grade officers and say, 05's and above, is enormous. Anything done at the BDE level is inherently viewed as the COL shooting for his star by the guys down at my level. Several mentioned the catalyst was a cancelled four day, we were recalled (the entire BDE) to undergo safety training such as how to properly light a BBQ pit, proper procedures for typhoons and the like due to the death of two soldiers on pass. No one really cared about the four day, but the consensus was the commander was just performing a knee jerk CYA action. I know that many of you gentlemen are looking from the top down, and I wanted to speak up for the LT and CPT viewpoint. The empty promises (more time with families while you're CONUS) and apparent lack of common sense, have not gone unnoticed.

[Ken White]

Our recurring failure to absorb and process lessons is, to say the least, distressing. That same comment could've been written by a company grade officer during both Viet Nam and Korea (the latter to a lesser extent).

Same syndrome precisely, times may be a bit different but our inability to learn from our mistakes is mind boggling.

All us old guys can say is, "Hang in there, it'll pass." Always does -- but that makes it no easier to accept, I know.

The disconnect between senior Field Grades and Company Grades has existed more often than it has not, it's not total but in my observation, it's been entirely too common. I understand why it's there but do not understand why the system does nothing to fix it.

Goes back to that inability to trust I mentioned among other things. Most Lieutenants can command companies and many a PSG has led a platoon quite well but fear of failure intrudes...

Dumbb -- with two 'b's...

[wm]

Goes back to that inability to trust I mentioned among other things. Most Lieutenants can command companies and many a PSG has led a platoon quite well but fear of failure intrudes...

Dumbb -- with two 'b's...

I do not want to disagree, but you might want to consider that it is hard for senior leaders to trust/forgive the youthful mistakes of their subordinates when even more senior leaders are in their knickers because political leaders and legislators are pushing for answers to questions asked by E3s, E4s, or their relatives, whose continued support is the basis of said politicians re-electability.
In this vein, I remember having to respond, as a 2LT, to a Presidential inquiry that managed to come down through the entire chain of command (a few 4-stars, a 3-star, 2-star, etc) because one of my PFC's wrote to ask the POTUS why she could not be joint domiciled with her Navy husband half way around the world. Needless to say, she never chose to ask why at my level before firing off her letter to President Carter.

Today's members of Generation M are probably even more likely to jump the chain than my young troops were in 1977. (In fact, I think Gen M attitudes and values have much to do with the bloggers' issues about clamping down on such. But that is grist for a different thread.)

Additionally, the state of technology is now such that the most senior leadership can (and sometimes does)get up close and personal with everything a squad or fire team leader does or fails to do.

Is it any wonder that almost everyone in the chain is engaged in micromanagement? Not to say that this right, only that a lot of folks out there may seem to feel it is necessary for survival.

[Ken White]

Spent way too much time dealing with it.

I understand the why -- I just rabidly disagree with the philosophy. I have seen it over the past 58 years, 45 of 'em employed and the last 12 retired but alert and with one or two serving sons during the time. It didn't get heavy until Viet Nam, been downhill ever since. The LTCs who got there in 68 found out they had a lot of 2LTs and SGTs, great kids, do anything but didn't know much and required detailed instructions. "Engineering success" as a minor in Military Science got its start.

I can also sympathize with your time wasting letter from on high; seen a few of those -- the best one involved explaining why a Red Star Cluster was fired at a beach resort by a mildly inebriated troopy who didn't believe the outdoor waiter was serving him promptly. I did get to respond that "EM has been advised that the possession while off duty and the discharge of pyrotechnics in a civilian jurisdiction is a violation of the UCMJ and State Law. Appropriate disciplinary action will be taken." I told him not to be stupid again and I thought that was appropriate; know what? He didn't ever do that again.

The chain needs to be jumped on occasion. I agree these kids today are probably more prone to do that but if the chain of command functions decently and the troops aren't afraid to ask questions, a lot of that can be precluded. The attitude too prevalent in the Army that Privates (or, even worse some places, Lieutenants) aren't paid to think is abysmally stupid and needs to go. Drill Sergeants should get a decompression and retraining period before going back to a TOE unit.

The state of technology is indeed awesome and possesses that capability. However, there's a solution to that sort of stuff and the Troops will find it. For example, at one time, Satellite link digital cameras were issued to the LRS Companies so that images could be sent back for analysis. When the troops discovered that said images caused a bunch of really dumb questions from some analyst or his boss back in the rear, an amazing number of those probably expensive cameras were lost on jumps...

I found out at age 18 that a radio had an on-off switch and I never hesitated to use it. Bad Batteries are such a pain.

Still, I have seen a number of commanders, perhaps 20% of all I've known, over those years who did not succumb (or successfully sidestepped) all the factors you cite and the others that we both know. The micromanagement you cite has always existed in every Army, nature of the beast. However, it was minimal in ours before about 1962. The introduction of the USR had a great many unintended consequences.

Post 1962, in Viet Nam a number of commanders were noted for doing squad Leader stuff, too frequently from circling helicopters. I had two Brigade Commanders, one per tour. The first left standing orders in the TOC to be awakened if all three Battalions were in heavy contact and he refused to accept from or make a radio call to anyone below a Battalion CO or S3. Two of the three Battalion commanders were similarly inclined and operated the same way. Bde Cdr in the second tour was equally trusting and hands off.

Everyone doesn't succumb to the disease. All the system has to do is pick those for advancement. Instead, it seems to try, too often, to force those guys out and pick the birds at the water glass types.

I've known a number of senior people who wanted someone they knew (even if the guy was marginally competent) in critical positions, known some who had an entourage they took with them from job to job. Those entourage people were generally in the "do whatever the Boss wants" mode as opposed to the "Do what's right mode." Been my observation and experience that if you're good, you can do what's right and convince the Boss that it is right (or is his idea; deviousness never hurts...). The difference between those two types, also in my observation, is very simple. Lack of, or possession of, self confidence.

The point is of course, that it need not be as we both know it too often is. It is that way due to a systemic problem -- and Congress is at the head of that chain that can be remediated. All that's required is the self confidence to select tough,smart people for promotion, trust people, let them do their jobs and take the flak when subordinates screw up as they're prone to do on occasion. That works. Works even today in good units (and all units are not created equal, anymore than are all commanders or any other kinds of people)

Oh, and to get Congress to back off? Easy. As one of my favorite gen-gens used to say, "This is an easy life, all you have to do is know your job, do your job and be fair." I submit that if the Army did its job better -- or all the Services did theirs; all have the same sorts of flaws -- and stopped trying to tap dance to Congress that, dumb as I think they are, they'd probably back off a bit.

For today, Nah, it's no wonder -- but it flat isn't right. It needs to be fixed.

[Armchairguy]

I read one post and think, "He's got a good point". Then I read a point counter to the first and say the same thing. This site is excellent. As a civilian with absolutely no credentials other than as someone who played wargames with his brother for 20 years and gobbled up books on warfare, I find it pretty neat to be able to learn from and talk with people who know their stuff.

It would be great if we had some generals in here as well. From what I've seen this would be a great way for them to get some good ideas, to get the pulse of their subordinates, and to get into some lively discussion without the (I expect) usual bull. If there aren't any standing generals around maybe we could convince some retired ones to join in.

Somewhat earlier in the discussion there was a lot said about improving education for officers. I think it would be equally useful to give the enlisted ranks a chance at languages and other courses. One thing that has come up in science articles as a way to keep peoples minds flexible is to keep them using their minds in a variety of ways (use it or lose it). This might even have the benefit of making the armed forces a more attractive career choice. That together with more pay (did I hear a cheer?) would attract more people who would otherwise turn to the private sector. Another benefit might be to have a larger number of officer candidates coming out of the ranks.

Anyway, I'm kind of meandering now, so I'll quit.

[SWJED]

... so you can read this:

Challenging the Generals by Fred Kaplan

On Aug. 1, Gen. Richard Cody, the United States Army’s vice chief of staff, flew to the sprawling base at Fort Knox, Ky., to talk with the officers enrolled in the Captains Career Course. These are the Army’s elite junior officers. Of the 127 captains taking the five-week course, 119 had served one or two tours of duty in Iraq or Afghanistan, mainly as lieutenants. Nearly all would soon be going back as company commanders. A captain named Matt Wignall, who recently spent 16 months in Iraq with a Stryker brigade combat team, asked Cody, the Army’s second-highest-ranking general, what he thought of a recent article by Lt. Col. Paul Yingling titled “A Failure in Generalship.” The article, a scathing indictment that circulated far and wide, including in Iraq, accused the Army’s generals of lacking “professional character,” “creative intelligence” and “moral courage.”...

[Rank amateur]

Regime change was accomplished quickly. Only after that, did problems arise. Powell prevented mission creep in the first Gulf War. It can be done. I think the military, and the country, misses Powell.

[Ken White]

Actually, I suspect both were involved. Wrongly in my view; it would have been far easier then than it was in 2003. Same problems, just fewer of them. Mission creep avoided or mission failure incurred?

However, what occurred is history...

Powell and the other senior leaders of the Army from 1980 until 2004 -- and that includes Wesley Clark and Tommy Franks -- are with rare exceptions guilty of deliberately avoiding any effort to train units and commanders to deal with occupation, nation building and counterinsurgency. The so-called Powell doctrine was the Weinberger doctrine and it was and is a fallacious idea that was an attempt to sell a thought process designed to protect, not employ the institution.

In a sense, there's nothing wrong with that but situation dependent it can be -- and it was -- a trap. We put ourselves in a box in spite of all the indications post 1989 that the probability of a "big war" was remote.

To be sure there's plenty of blame for a slew of politicians as well but I suspect that the 1979-2001 period is going to be viewed by historians as one of little glory (with very few exceptions) reflected upon the US government and one that produced few "heroes" -- whatever a hero is with respect to senior leaders...

[Ski]

This thought process is alive and well in DC, I'm afraid to say. Not good at all.

The so-called Powell doctrine was the Weinberger doctrine and it was and is a fallacious idea that was an attempt to sell a thought process designed to protect, not employ the institution.

[Stevely]

Regime change was accomplished quickly. Only after that, did problems arise. Powell prevented mission creep in the first Gulf War. It can be done. I think the military, and the country, misses Powell.

Regime change means more than toppling a government, unless of course the desired change is to put anarchy where there was once order. God help us if senior leaders think "only after that" amounts to mission creep.

[Rank amateur]

e with rare exceptions guilty of deliberately avoiding any effort to train units and commanders to deal with occupation, nation building and counterinsurgency

I agree.

not employ the institution.

Some of the Iraqi troops who invaded Kuwait might disagree with the idea that Powell wasn't willing to deploy the institution.

[Ken White]

This thought process is alive and well in DC, I'm afraid to say. Not good at all.

serving up there. Maybe I'm wrong but I am sniffing a change at levels below echelons above reality.

We can always hope it'll percolate upwards...

The Vice Chief asking a room full of Captains what they thought about their Generals is good. My sensing is that he is sharper than some of his contemporaries so maybe he can get their attention.


Well said by Stevely, too...

[RTK]

Top U.S. Generals at Odds Over Iraq War Strategy

America's top military brass appeared at odds Friday over the course of the Iraq War as outgoing Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Peter Pace reportedly stood ready to recommend a major reduction next year in troop strength while a key ground commander warned that such a move would be "a giant step backwards."

Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch , who commands the central sector of Iraq, told reporters Friday via video link at the Pentagon that such a drawdown would cause the military to lose all the gains it has made since the beginning of the buildup earlier this year.

"In my battlespace right now, if soldiers were to leave, coalition soldiers were to leave — having fought for that terrain, having denied the enemy of their sanctuaries, what will happen is the enemy would come back," Lynch said.

This is interesting.

Perhaps this shows a shift in mindset and that LTC Yingling's article has had an impact on overt disagreement in the active force.

[Ken White]

those who hew to the protect the institution line as opposed to the "I've got a job to do" line...

We can but hope...

[jonSlack]

Full text of Fred Kaplan's article at Riley Professional Reading Group

[jonSlack]

NY Times - At an Army School for Officers, Blunt Talk About Iraq

Here at the intellectual center of the United States Army, two elite officers were deep in debate at lunch on a recent day over who bore more responsibility for mistakes in Iraq — the former defense secretary, Donald H. Rumsfeld, or the generals who acquiesced to him.

...

Much of the debate at Leavenworth has centered on a scathing article, “A Failure in Generalship,” written last May for Armed Forces Journal by Lt. Col. Paul Yingling, an Iraq veteran and deputy commander of the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment who holds a master’s degree in political science from the University of Chicago. “If the general remains silent while the statesman commits a nation to war with insufficient means, he shares culpability for the results,” Colonel Yingling wrote.