Army Officer Accuses Generals of 'Intellectual and Moral Failures'

[DavidPB4]

Marc,

"1. Publications, in academia, are not in and of themselves as sign of intellectual discipline. Rather, they are a sign of communications skills whereby the author is able to "match" their article to the sub-cultural expectations and requirements (the genre[s]) of the publication venue."

I agree. But I think the discipline of writing clearly and well can still be a benefit if it is more than just parroting jargon.

"2. The publication process relies on "peer review", but peer review, in all too many cases, comes to be a measure of how close the author's position is to that of the people doing the reviews. This is something that Thos. Kuhn pointed out in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions when he was talking about the operation of "normal science". One of the observations he made is of especial importance to an analysis of the military, and that is that only a single discipline" has ever managed to hold two mutually contradictory paradigms - physics (particle theory and quantum mechanics). Since we are seeing a conflict between two paradigms, State vs. State and COIN, we can all learn a lot from how physics, as an institution, has managed to hold these two."

The issue I think is not the existence of different paradigms but whether particular paradigms are correctly applied. In the military sphere, state vs. state conflict and counterinsurgency are really two different answers to two different problems, not different answers to the same problem. Conventional war is appropriate where the problem is to isolate an insurgent battlespace. Counterinsurgency is appropriate where the need is to separate a civilian population from insurgents. There is only a conflict when we try to use conventional war to defeat insurgents, or internal counterinsurgency to deal with a threat that persists because of external reinforcements and sanctuaries.

"I also think that it is important for the military to learn more about the so-called "civilian" areas. I use the term "so-called" advisedly: the military already overlaps the civilian population in a number of professions (e.g. engineering, medicine, etc.) and, to my mind, can only benefit from a further overlap if for no other reason, and here are other reasons, that the military is being required to take on more varied tasks."

I'm glad the military has the skills to do so many things. But I don't think the military should assume more civilian roles by default. We need to strengthen the civilian side of the relationship.

"Now, within a State vs. State conflict...the adjustments tend to be minimal. In a COIN setting, however, the adjustments can be huge. This is one of the reasons why an article like COL Pat Lang's "How to Work with Tribesman" is so good - it outlines the how (a set of generic rules) as well as the what (for a specific time-space locus)."

If the larger aspects of a counterinsurgency are aligned properly, then insights such as those in the Lang paper are excellent guides for the level of relations directly with tribesmen. But the value of COIN skills depends on first getting the larger picture right, eg. isolating the battlefield, and having sufficient troops so that improvement in any one sector of an insurgent country can be sustained. It is when we sub-optimize by trying to get the mid-level things right while the high-level things are wrong that we run aground.

"I will just make one observation: liberal democracies elect their leaders and none of them have ability tests for anything except getting elected."

Yes, but I think voters do look for knowledge and experience on some level, and civilians who advise elected officials especially could benefit from better education in strategic and military matters. The problem is that those who provide this education need to do a better job of formulating what to teach.

[DavidPB4]

Shek and Tom Odom,

"Thanks for the response. As I was checking out the book today, I was having a hard time finding where COL Summers didn't downgrade COIN for US forces. He specifically states that COIN, as an internal problem, should have been assigned to Vietnamese forces. In doing so, I think he portrays that not only should the US not have adopted COIN as a primary mission (although Krepinevich takes this conclusion to task), but that it shouldn't have even been a secondary mission - it should be sourced to local troops."

I stand corrected on this point. My understanding of Summers was based on pages 169-172 of the paperback edition of On Strategy (1982). He does not in fact argue that the US should have done both conventional war and counterinsurgency; he argues that the latter was for the South Vietnamese to do. But his main point was that only if the North was sealed off from the South was counterinsurgency in the South really possible, and that is what I took from his book.

"An officer could take a year of classes at the Army War College/Naval War College/Air War College/etc., and take the exact same classes at a top tier university, and while it may be a wash in terms of the overall quality of faculty and material presented, the experiences will be completely different. Surrounded by fellow military peers at the war colleges, one's views may not be challenged, and drastically different and competing view points may or may not be introduced. However, at a civilian university, the officer will be exposed to many different and varying viewpoints. Furthermore, these conversations will continue outside of the classroom."

I would agree from my experience as a grad student in history at a state university in Texas, where there were a couple of Army captains in my adviser's seminar during my time there. I don't think they took classes in which they would have had to argue with for example post-modernists. But in our seminar they benefited from getting into the subject matter of things like decolonization, getting criticism of their writing, and interacting with the foreign students as well as with us, including outside class. And there were certainly a multitude of views. I should note that the benefit went in both directions too.

Having officers go to civilian universities for master's degrees is good for both civilians and the military, and officers with the ambition and ability should go on for doctorates. I would even have officers serve as visiting faculty to give courses to civilian students on a country or war that they know a lot about. My concern is that more broadly educated officers cannot take the place of civilians who have a better understanding of military affairs and larger strategy. And while it is impressive to have an Army capable of a vigorous internal debate about itself, I hope civilians do not conclude that the difficulties in Iraq and elsewhere have been the result of a purely intra-military set of problems.

[Shek]

Shek,

That is my recollection of Summers in a debate with Krepnevich at CGSC in 1989.

Tom

Tom,

That must have been a very interesting debate to see. I've never heard either man speak, but given the fundamentally opposed positions, I could see sparks flying.

Shek

[Rob Thornton]

Most of this thread focuses on the implication of the GO's and LTC Yingling's motivations and prospects for the future (personally I empathize with the idea that his motivations were done in the best interest of the Army - those of you who truly care about something can understand.) As a man with something to lose - that which he cares deeply about - his need to share his thoughts outweighed any concerns about self preservation. This is what we'd call leadership by example.

I think LTC Yingling's writings can also serve as a catalyst to serious debate on our own organizational & command structure we require in the decade(s) ahead vs. soley a critique of the last four years. He makes a lot of good points that we'd be wise to apply towards our understanding of the fight as it is now at a critical time (given politics), and how best to prepare for the years to come. We may get a break in the future (although I would not count on it), but I don't think it will last long.

I think it'd be a great idea to ask LTC Yingling to the blog or the discussion board to discuss not his recent writtings, but to expand on the idea he touched on about where his train up will focus, and how those ideas might challenge some of the fundamental notions we have about our military.
Regards all, Rob

[Tom Odom]

Tom,

That must have been a very interesting debate to see. I've never heard either man speak, but given the fundamentally opposed positions, I could see sparks flying.

Shek

It was a different time. Andy K was like me at the time, a Major, who had written a book. Harry Summers was well Harry Summers and he knew it. Andy presented his arguments and Harry presented Harry, as seen on 60 Minutes and a number of other shows using the conversation with Giap to set the tone. I am sure that today the debate would look much differently.

I felt at the time that Andy won on message and Harry won on theatrics.

Tom

[marct]

Hi David,

"1. Publications, in academia, are not in and of themselves as sign of intellectual discipline."

I agree. But I think the discipline of writing clearly and well can still be a benefit if it is more than just parroting jargon.

Oh, I totally agree with that. I spend a lot of time trying to teach people how to write clearly in academic contexts. One of the key problems I have found since I have been teaching in Interdisciplinary Studies, is the variance in both specialized jargon and in assumed models of reality (the logic behind conceptual inter linkages) is so large between disciplines that even if the writing may be clear, the text will not communicate well to certain audiences.

So, it strikes me that we are talking about several different skills here:

1. the ability to communicate, which is composed of
   1. the ability to gauge an audience, and
   2. the ability to write for that audience
2. the ability to "think" clearly, which may or may not be defined as "thinking" in the "normal science" manner (i.e. pre-defined though sequences).

On this second point, which is where we took off from in he first place, aka "intellectual discipline", there are, to my mind, three distinctly differing forms of "thought":

1. "approved", "disciplinary", or "normal science" type thought - i.e. the type of thinking and "practice" that one learns in any discipline;
2. "cross" disciplinary thought, which usually involves taking types of thinking or practice from one discipline and applying them to another discipline (Organizational Culture is an example of his); and
3. "inter" (or, possibly, "trans") disciplinary thought that moves beyond "normal science" boundaries to create unified theories or perceptions.

Now, it strikes me that having military officers attending civilian universities would encourage the development of #1. In order to get the full advantage of #2, however, they would have to be enrolled in disciplines that would be considered as "non-traditional" for the military (which, BTW, up until a couple of years ago included Anthropology). Getting #3 is much harder,and would probably require a type of schooling that is pretty rare along with a "talent" for thinking unconventionally.

"2. The publication process relies on "peer review", but peer review, in all too many cases, comes to be a measure of how close the author's position is to that of the people doing the reviews."

The issue I think is not the existence of different paradigms but whether particular paradigms are correctly applied. In the military sphere, state vs. state conflict and counterinsurgency are really two different answers to two different problems, not different answers to the same problem.

Actually, David, I'm going to disagree with you here - I think that it is a single "problem space", how best to apply force to achieve policy objectives. As such, the State vs State and COIN are not paradigms in reality only in perception - actually closer to "schools" in the Kuhnian sense.

To my mind, saying that they are two different problems is a dangerously flawed, albeit institutionally supported () viewpoint. I can't think of a single major war in the past 3 centuries that has not had at least a component of asymmetric warfare where COIN style operations would not be better than "Conventional" operations and vice versa.

"I also think that it is important for the military to learn more about the so-called "civilian" areas."

I'm glad the military has the skills to do so many things. But I don't think the military should assume more civilian roles by default. We need to strengthen the civilian side of the relationship.

I agree that the civilian side definitely needs to be strengthened. Should the military assume more civilian roles? I would honestly prefer not but, having said that, I want to make two points. First, the military often has to assume these roles because the civilian side cannot. Second, even if the civilian side does fulfill all of their roles, the military side should have people who are able to "interface" or "translate" between them - think of the "Sales Engineer" as an exemlar "profession".

If the larger aspects of a counterinsurgency are aligned properly, then insights such as those in the Lang paper are excellent guides for the level of relations directly with tribesmen. But the value of COIN skills depends on first getting the larger picture right, eg. isolating the battlefield, and having sufficient troops so that improvement in any one sector of an insurgent country can be sustained. It is when we sub-optimize by trying to get the mid-level things right while the high-level things are wrong that we run aground.

Again, I agree with you, but I think that this is moving over into the "civilian" side of things, at least to some degree. Who ecided the initial force levels for OIF? We could probably argue about specifics until the cows come home, but I think we can both agree that it was pretty much a joint civilian-military "decision". The military has much more "control" over these "mid-level" things than it does over the "high level" ones <shrug>.

"I will just make one observation: liberal democracies elect their leaders and none of them have ability tests for anything except getting elected."

Yes, but I think voters do look for knowledge and experience on some level, and civilians who advise elected officials especially could benefit from better education in strategic and military matters. The problem is that those who provide this education need to do a better job of formulating what to teach.

You may be correct about the voting public, although I have my doubts. Certainly the advisors role could do with more education of military matters - personally, I would be in favour of reinstating the Roman cursus honourum, but I doubt that will happen .

I would, however, like you to expand on your last comment. Speaking as one of those people who provides a civilian education, what would you have me teach?

Marc

[Jimbo]

Civilian schools vs military schools.

Bottom Line: Faculty Dilution

In the US there is no equivalent of Kings college in London. The issue you run into, is that with such a large collegiate eductaion base, where do the experts come from. The military run schools are the best manner to collect the best talent available for the faculty. Evne with the umpteen different DoD run schools out there, there are issues with dillution of the talent base as far as faculty availability. Often the civlian faculty experts are on loan, fellowships or visiting faculty. This enables some experts to bwe available to both demographics. In the US this problem is manifested in higher eductaion in various academic programs and how many quality instructors you can get. I am a historian by training, and I know where the stronger military history programs are. However, that does not mean that for certain niches there are better programs. For example, when I was at West Point, Duke and Ohio State were the two big general purpose miliatry history graduate programs that the military history guys went to, with Texas A&M coming on strong late in my time at USMA. However, the Napoleonic guys were starting to come out of Florida State because there was some expertise at that school in that area. Texas Tech made a decison to have the Viet Nam studies program, and many faculty were coming from there. Universities will look for a niche that is not filled, and usually attempt to develop something that will fill it if they see the long term financial viability of the program. That is just in history, the fine arts have the same problem, so my question is where do you go? The current fellowship program that military offers is a good program for senior level officers to either go to the war college, or go to certain civillian institutuions and get war college credit. As the son of an academic and an educator, I think the system the US militayr has isn't bad, now whetehr or not people utilize it is another question, and it is one based on individual choices not systemic ones.

[sullygoarmy]

I think Rob hit the nail on the head. As a SAMS grad, LTC Yingling did what we want good officers to do: lead by example and generate a healthy discussion. This how we a) gain a better understanding of ourselves (know yourself) and b) look at ways to better our organization for the welfare of our soldiers (seek self improvement). I'd like to think that our SAMS guys will pose more questions to generate discussions among peers, superiors and subordinates alike.

I think we need to make sure the discussion stays "healthy". How many people/officers do you know that looked at the title and said either "That's Crap" or "He's done" without ever reading it, considering his points, or trying to understand his viewpoint. A healthy dicussion will not get anyone fired, lose the war, or is immoral, illegal or fattening.

[Shek]

Civilian schools vs military schools.
Bottom Line: Faculty Dilution

Jimbo,

I think that your conclusion will very much depend on the particular concentration/major you're looking for. As someone who wanted a blend of IR, strategic studies, and economics, I doubt that the war college or the artist formerly known as CGSC could replicate the caliber of faculty that I had at SAIS, to include both tenured and adjunct professors. Also, I've now got classmates who are working DIA, CIA, State, DOD, NGOs, a network that I think is a great benefit that the various military colleges would be hard pressed to replicate. Now, my experience may also be just as unique as yours was (but on the other side of the spectrum), but I think the experience beyond the classroom may be one of the biggest positives of civilian schooling.

I am not advocating that we ditch our field grade officer education system, but I do think that we should supplement it much more than we do currently.

[Tom Odom]

the artist formerly known as CGSC

That made me laugh and also made me sad for lack of a better word...

I see much of what Yingling discussed as issues parallel to the emasculation of CGSC

Still there are some signs of returning life; CSI has in the past couple of years started producing excellent products again.

And please don't take offense those who still fight the fight to open minds, meaning those folks who still teach at CGSC/ILE

Best

tom

[DavidPB4]

Marc,

"Getting #3 is much harder,and would probably require a type of schooling that is pretty rare along with a "talent" for thinking unconventionally."

The way you would do this is by teaching how to recognize situations in which more radical thinking is required.

"I can't think of a single major war in the past 3 centuries that has not had at least a component of asymmetric warfare where COIN style operations would not be better than "Conventional" operations and vice versa."

Sorry to be unclear. By different paradigms for different problems, I meant to include wars in which both conventional and unconventional operations were involved as different aspects. The need is to match conventional war with the conventional aspect and unconventional operations with the asymmetric aspect.

"Who decided the initial force levels for OIF? We could probably argue about specifics until the cows come home, but I think we can both agree that it was pretty much a joint civilian-military "decision"."

Yes and it is for this reason that we need better performance on the civilian side.

"I would, however, like you to expand on your last comment. Speaking as one of those people who provides a civilian education, what would you have me teach?"

I am a researcher (history of engineering), not a teacher. But if I taught I would focus on teaching students how to recognize situations in which normal thinking is no longer appropriate. This can best be done through the study of historical examples.

[Old Eagle]

1. Each educational experience fulfills multiple roles. Some classroom, some socialization. Meeting and keeping in touch with peers from various walks of life is important to being effective; it creates an automatic networking system.

2. Trade schools but particularly in DC offer huge insights that are unavailable in schoolbook courses filled with students fresh out of undergrad, looking for a coupla extra letters behind their names. I used my GI Bill to study in both DC and Boston in "mid-career" programs, and I wouldn't have traded the experience for anything.

3. There is a culture in the military, unhealthy to my way of thinking, that denigrates education, military or civilian. The Army is pretty good about playing up PME, but I have actually heard officers from sister Services bragging about their avoidance of resident PME in order to spend more time in the cockpit/bridge.

4. Yingling is right in saying that we have to broaden the educational base of our GOs. At the GO level, tactical talent won't get you very far.

[Shek]

And please don't take offense those who still fight the fight to open minds, meaning those folks who still teach at CGSC/ILE

Best

tom

Tom,

Thanks for mentioning that, as my intent is certainly not to try and imply that faculty who teach at our military colleges are somehow substandard. Heck, probably my favorite book on OIF thus far has been Ahmed Hashim's book, http://www.amazon.com/Insurgency-Cou...8040894&sr=8-1, published a year ago.

As I stated before, I think the inherent advantage of civilian schooling is that it takes the military officer out of his/her home turf and immerses them into a "foreign" culture. It took me a semester to deprogram myself from using acronyms every possible sentence and to see that PowerPoint is usually an inept tool at portraying complex issues, and that it can skew decision making. So, while I still have mad PowerPoint skills, I can proudly state that I avoid it at every possible opportunity. However, I'm not sure how long that will last once I'm actually back on somebody's staff

Shek

[slapout9]

I will jump in here with a somewhat different perspective that I was very nearly involved in. During the early 1980's the CIA was short in it's HUMINT capabilities due to the massive cuts in the 70's. Because of this they decided to "WAIVE" the college degree requirement and recruit detectives from Florida and New York cities that spoke Spanish. The program was apparently very successful. The point being it's not the quantity of education but the quality. The number of degrees a person has or even if he has one, doesn't mean they are necessarily more qualified. It is the special type of education that often determines a persons competence. It goes to what Kilcullen said "Talent is more important than rank." My 2 cents.

[marct]

"Getting #3 is much harder,and would probably require a type of schooling that is pretty rare along with a "talent" for thinking unconventionally."

The way you would do this is by teaching how to recognize situations in which more radical thinking is required.

Hmmm, that would get you the recognition hat such a type of thinking is required, but it wouldn't produce the thinking. A recognition might be enough...

"I can't think of a single major war in the past 3 centuries that has not had at least a component of asymmetric warfare where COIN style operations would not be better than "Conventional" operations and vice versa."

Sorry to be unclear. By different paradigms for different problems, I meant to include wars in which both conventional and unconventional operations were involved as different aspects. The need is to match conventional war with the conventional aspect and unconventional operations with the asymmetric aspect.

Ah, much clearer - thank you. I think it would be also useful to change the terminology so that "conventional" and "asymmetric" are poles rather than separate categories. That would probably allow for a faster recognition of which type of approach, and in what proportions, would be best in any given situation.

"Who decided the initial force levels for OIF? We could probably argue about specifics until the cows come home, but I think we can both agree that it was pretty much a joint civilian-military "decision"."

Yes and it is for this reason that we need better performance on the civilian side.

I agree totally, although I will continue to think that the military side also needs to pick up more as well .

"I would, however, like you to expand on your last comment. Speaking as one of those people who provides a civilian education, what would you have me teach?"

I am a researcher (history of engineering), not a teacher. But if I taught I would focus on teaching students how to recognize situations in which normal thinking is no longer appropriate. This can best be done through the study of historical examples.

I do that right now in a course I'm teaching, although I focus more on epistemology, and I would agree that it is probably the best solution. My experience with trying to teach that, however, is mixed. I find that, all to often, students thinking has been cannalized into "normal science" modes of thought, and there is a serious lack of historical (and religious/philosophical) knowledge. I can make a dent but only rarely do I manage to get a Jamesian "A HA!" experience out of them . I keep trying...

Marc

[slapout9]

I posted this on another thread awhile back but I think it has bearing on this discussion. It was the address delivered to the 1974 graduating class of the USMA at West Point. It was given by Ayn Rand and the title is "Philosophy Who Needs It?" She was once asked by a reporter why she choose to study Philosophy? Her reply was "Because it is the fundamental force that moves the world." A link to the address is posted below.

http://fare.tunes.org/liberty/library/pwni.html

Isn't this what a General needs to know more than anything else?

[marct]

Isn't this what a General needs to more than anything else?

In short, yes.

Thanks, Slap - that was a great read and it will be going on my classes reading list.

Marc

[Merv Benson]

I think this thread has drifted enough to ask this question. Can someone tell me what is taught at the US Marine Corps University and who is eligible to attend?

[jcustis]

I think this thread has drifted enough to ask this question. Can someone tell me what is taught at the US Marine Corps University and who is eligible to attend?

Uhhh...Marine Corps stuff...


It's late, but tomorrow I'll try to describe my Amphibious Warfare Class (and the last before the transition).

[selil]

I’ve been watching the topic wobble a bit and to Marct I would mention an excellent book for his undergraduates (and anybody else who’s interested) called “The Craft of Research”. It discusses many of the issues we’re holding here to the light of day. Research and writing for journals is a learned process. Simple principles as the structure of an academic paper are difficult to grasp until you get that scathing review back in the mail.

As an academic I truly believe in science and as an avid reader and student of Thomas Kuhn, John Dewey, and Karl Popper I look to science for process and structure in my research. We often talk about science as a “thing” when it is actually a process. We put a framework around the structure of how we do this thing called science and how we report that work to a body of peers so it is accepted as science. Science isn’t test tubes, or capacitors it is dialog.

In any way attempting to rate the military colleges with civilian counterparts is to forget the most important aspect of the United States Military Academy, The Naval Academy or The Air Farce (<- intentional!) Academy. My University has the mission to provide the finest engineers and scientists on the planet. My students go on to work for many of the TLA’s agencies in the belt and nation. The military academies produce O1’s. They produce basic lieutenants for front line command on day one. My graduates go to work on day one in their discipline or profession. A military academy graduate won’t see their discipline or profession for four to six years. I kind of like it that way.

Many of my professors when I was getting my masters in computer science were from the Air Force Academy. They were retired O6’s and O5’s with 20+ years that had done in many cases two or more tours at Colorado Springs. They all had advanced degrees (doctorates) and were dedicated professionals. Why weren’t they teaching at the Academy as retired officers? My only clue is that they weren’t needed.

There are systemic issues that plague the dust coated ivory halls of academia. I had dinner on Sunday night with a young guy who is a former Army drill sergeant (E-6), and here he is finishing an intense interdisciplinary masters degree program and nobody returns his phone calls for jobs. He is in a program called scholarship for service that is intense to get into, they pay for him to attend school, and he’s been vetted already for any level of “clandestine” service. This gives a good look into the intense disconnect between the military, government, academia, and the rest of the world. Even when things should be working they often go astray.