Surprisingly, Kilcullen's response lays out a security plan without responding to the key reason of why he writes his response was needed in the first place: information operations by al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). The failure to get on message, and promote the advantages, emphasize the short-life span, and highlight other successful elements of the wall cannot be blamed on AQI but on the continued failure of the US to internalize what AQI has:
knowledge of the value of information. Or, Information Dominance to use language befitting a field manual ...
Pardon my ignorance, but have the walls of Ameriya and Ghazaliya come down? Has there been a reiteration that they will, a vocal expression of their success, and demonstration of their value? How have we differentiated past, present, and future structures from images that resonate negatively with locals and allies, such as walls in Ireland and Palestine?
Kilcullen's justifications are sound, but the tactic is still incomplete. Missing is the full spectrum participation of non-uniformed responses from State, USAID, etc. Community development is more than temporal security and creating bonds of communication, which Kilcullen alludes to in the success of previous temporary cordons. We must exercise the full force of USG, with all of its many departments and tremendous expertise, to demonstrate our real resolve, if there is one. The walled off communities should become role models of sorts, incentivising others to want the same peace and security and prosperity.
Where is the broader IO, public affairs, public diplomacy that emphasizes the
new goals of the mission: stability and government legitimacy (new in the sense of a smart strategy to actually accomplish them)? Ambassador Crocker says one thing, local supporting media says another (without clarification), military spokesmen say another, and other media outlets something else. Where are the talking points? Where is the linkage being promoted in this war over information to prevent negative manipulation by friends (unintentionally) and foes alike?
After reading Kilcullen's response, I agree with him on the value of the walls. However, I still feel the tactical solution of deploying the walls is woefully and dangerously incomplete in both depth and breadth that may be beyond the capabilities of General Petraeus, Kilcullen, McMaster, etc. These shortfalls are seemingly inherent in everything we do in Iraq. Where is State? Where are the Arab and Iraqi experts? They won't come? And why is that? What is being done to fix that? Where is the IO and public diplomacy that speaks not their language but their culture?
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