Gear / TTP List

**SWJED** · 04-29-2007

29 Washington Post commentary - Tom Ricks's Inbox.

Some of the most interesting accounts of the Iraq war have come in notes from young soldiers writing to comrades who are preparing to deploy to the country.

Here, Army Lt. Brendan Hagan, a resident of Arlington and a recent graduate of George Washington University, advises an ROTC buddy on what to bring with him (the letter has been edited slightly for space). Hagan is now a highly regarded infantry platoon leader with the 82nd Airborne Division, operating near the town of Samarra...

Here is the list - visit the link for an explanation of why each item or TTP has been included:

Desert ghillie suits or ghillie blankets
Spotter scopes or good binos
Always carry everything you might need in the vehicles
Always have all your night fighting equipment with you
Make sure all extra ammo for the crew-served weapon is NOT inside the crew compartment
Have fire blankets on all vehicles in a standard location
Be very careful when driving on dirt roads. Don't do it if you don't have too
When a vehicle does get disabled by an IED or mine, slow down and look for secondaries before you move up to aid
Don't be afraid to dismount
Whenever you talk to someone get their full name. There will always be three
One last thing to remember is to use your personnel that have been here before, but do not get sucked into the that's-not-how-we-did-it-last-time thing

**Ender** · 04-29-2007

I think this would be a great place to talk about the TTP's we employed for vehicle movements.

I was the point vehicle, point element in all of our movements. When we rolled as a platoon we had four trucks and when we rolled as a company we would have movements of 50+ vehicles going to or from Camp Fallujah. Let me tell you there is nothing more hair raising than leading your entire unit on a route that you may or may not have traveled on previously, may or may not be mined or IED laden and is always a threat.

My biggest fear was not that my vehicle would get hit but that I would miss the wires or signs that would get someone behind me hit. In my entire deployment with some skill and a considerable amount of help from Above we were only hit with one (ONE) IED and preemptively uncovered hundreds. The one that did hit our convoy destroyed some gear but was otherwise ineffectual. After examining the blast site it was determined, somewhat to my relief, that the concealment of the IED was so effective that it actually minimized the effectiveness of the blast.

Here are some of the methods we developed and employed over time. These are in no way comprehensive but certainly served to help us immensely and if they can do the same for someone else than that is great. (Bear in mind these were pre EFP days so I can not speak on the latest devices being employed.)

1. Our lead truck (my truck) was up-armored. The logic in the platoon was two fold. One, if a heavy truck can navigate the route anything behind it should be able to do so as well and as a corollary if your lead truck says the route is a "no go" then at least the column is not cut in half. The second was that since every trace vehicle "laces the tracks" of the vehicle in front of them the lead truck is the most likely to be hit by an emplaced mine. Having the armor was nice but it seriously impaired our observation skills and one of my initial inner dilemmas was whether or not the immediate safety of my team (buttoning up the windows etc...) was more important than being able to observe the IED signs and symbols. We had to have the heavy truck but we did not have to be blind so I decided that we would keep the windows down and all eyes (and sometimes heads, arms and ears) would be oriented in every direction.

2. We rolled everywhere SLOW. I have seen a lot of units who haul ass everywhere they go but I can not speak for the merits or liabilities of that tactic as it was one that was not preferred by Gunny or my Lt. (Which by extension, means I did not like it either!

) As I mentioned, I was not only point element for platoon sized movements but also company and battalion sized (when Bravo led) movements as well. A number of the tactics we designed were geared towards being a viable scout element for our bigger movements and consequently they have a very defensive yet proactive feel to them.

A considerable amount of study has been done by the LE community and the military that compares observation skills/ reaction times with speed while driving. We would all agree that at higher speeds our peripheral perception becomes severely diminished. It was because of this that we "slowed our roll" so to speak and I think that the record (one sloppy IED in 100+ that we FOUND) will speak for the merit of the tactic.

By moving slower we were able to project a simultaneous sense of peace to the locals (it was much easier to stop and have a conversation or share the latest information at 5mph than 5omph) and menace to would be IED trigger men. One of the guys from another platoon said that we constantly looked like we were about to do a drive by and to the irhabi I am sure that is how it came off. (The locals and kids etc... knew better, they were getting smiles and "Salaams" and waves...) I know of the countless IED's we uncovered but I shudder to think of how many were spooked off by the watchful eyes of our gunners and A drivers.
By rolling slower and having optics up front we were able to stop well in advance of suspicious objects, dirt mounds etc... and glass the item/area without having to stop right on top of said item/area.
One obvious downside to this is that it took us much longer to get to certain points and we had to back plan and work our time tables accordingly. A know a couple commanders whose initial impatience at having to move so slow were quickly curbed when the slow, methodical approach would uncover 15 daisy chained IED's... my point, everyone learned to adapt to the Low Rider approach.

3. We took combat engineers with metal detectors as attachments with us on every patrol. I don't know how viable this is for everyone but it worked wonders with us. One of the seats in my truck was reserved for an engineer, no questions asked. Same thing with the rear truck and if we could get three 1371's then the third would go with either Gunny or the Lt. Having these guys was awesome. Over a period of time we started to work with the same teams and developed a rapport with them and they with us. If (while rolling slow) I, or my gunner, driver, the engineer or my ATL saw something (everyone was engaged in the observation process and stayed as such until we got back to base) we could easily alert the patrol, stop, dismount the platoon and push them out to the flanks** while I would observe the item of interest with my vehicle. If we thought the item was a potential threat I would punch in to the flank with my engineer (while four heavy guns and 40+ eyes covered my movements) and search for signs of lead wires, trigger devices, footprints, vehicle traffic etc... Only after clearing the side would I (and my little buddy) approach the suspicious item and when we did we would only do so from the EXACT angle that we thought the insurgent would approach it from. After coming on the item I would provide security (more like assurance... if he died he knew I was going with him) while he ran his detector over the area. If he got a hit we would IMMEDIATELY back off and scour the area before re approaching or calling EOD.

**By flanks I mean off of the roads and 15-20 meters into the side (terrain dependent- a ditch or canal would preclude this) where everyone would conduct "5 & 20's" The "5's" were the initial cursory searches of everything that was within 5 meters of their position and were geared for short halts. The "20's" were deeper searches or the area around them and often turned up weapons caches, wires, IEDS etc...

More on EOD (self help and otherwise) tomorrow... I am also considering putting some of the schematics for the tactics we employed down on Word/Paint diagrams if anyone is interested in seeing how we divided trucks, elements, roles etc... I have all of my notes from my last deployment and would be happy to diagram some of this out if it would help.

Ender

**SWJED** · 04-29-2007

Ender - thanks - would recommend any diagrams of TTP be exchanged via PM / e-mail with those you know are in an official capacity. Nice post though.

**120mm** · 04-30-2007

I've never seen the "go slow" method described so succinctly. Unfortunately, during my time, we rolled in 3-4 NTV "serials" which were armed primarily with 9mms, so "go slow" was not an option. We typically drove 60-70 mph and prayed for the best.

But that was then, this is now.

**sullygoarmy** · 04-30-2007

Originally Posted by 120mm

I've never seen the "go slow" method described so succinctly. Unfortunately, during my time, we rolled in 3-4 NTV "serials" which were armed primarily with 9mms, so "go slow" was not an option. We typically drove 60-70 mph and prayed for the best.

But that was then, this is now.

120mm, the good old/bad old days. Running around in a white pick up truck, no comms, and a mandress with sandals in a backpack as my "E+E" plan.

**Jimbo** · 04-30-2007

Well,

Mission and equipment dictate speed. If I am the terrain owner and I am conducting security patrols/MTC. Then I am going to lean on the slow side of the speed spectrum, but I would vary my speed based on what I was doing (going point A to point B at high speed) in order to keep the bad guys guessing. I you are not in a hardened vehicle, then speed is life. If I was just transiting an area, and had no organic responsibility in that area, then I attempted to transit it at the highest speed possible. Once again, speed varition being used to throw off triggermen. Different situations call for different tactics. I am glad to see that Tom Ricks has as in with the ROTC crowd. I guess he is trying to expand his ever shrinking circle of friends (sources).