The Helmand Province (merged thread, not UK or USMC)

[davidbfpo]

A contrary review article by a Pashto lady, from Helmand and now a BBC reporter:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-27408292

[jcustis]

I've never liked the use of a number of open schools (even girls schools) as a metric for progress. I recognize that lady is not using it in the way a soldier or reconstructionist might, but it reads like oddly-placed hope.

Lose a teacher, receive a night letter or two, or get a visit from the local TB chief, and it all folds up.

I am not surprised the province still teeters.

[davidbfpo]

A headline that sadly was expected and no doubt is uncomfortable to officialdom and virtually all UK elected national politicians. It starts with:

Huge swathes of Helmand Province, the area of Afghanistan where hundreds of British soldiers were killed in eight years of bloody fighting, are once again in the hands of the Taliban, The districts of Now Zad, Musa Qala and Sangin have been overrun by insurgents after British troops withdrew to the security of Camp Bastion – the last remaining UK base in the province. The return of the Taliban to hundreds of square miles of territory which was previously liberated by British soldiers makes a mockery of Prime Minister David Cameron’s declaration of ‘mission accomplished’ in Afghanistan.

Link:http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/arti...#ixzz36h2BIwVO

There's also a short commentary by Lt.Col. Tootal, ex-Para, who took the first soldiers into Helmand in 2006 and I cite just one sentence:

Now the nation must ask whether our long campaign in the troubled country of Afghanistan has been worth it.

[davidbfpo]

A better report from Sangin in WSJ and here's a taster, citing Suliman Shah, Sangin's district governor:

The situation is bad...The territory seized by the Taliban hasn't been retaken, and the government hasn't made any steps forward. The Taliban will take control of more territory.

In Sangin, lightly equipped Afghan police, including village militia outfits known as Afghan Local Police, say they have borne the brunt of the insurgent onslaught.

Link:http://online.wsj.com/articles/afgha...ban-1404670052

Note the role of the ALP, who fight till the ammo runs out and are overrun (dying one assumes) and the casualty figures:

Afghan officials said 27 Afghan National Army soldiers have been killed and 80 wounded in the recent fighting, along with 81 police killed and 67 wounded. Local community leaders said more than 140 civilians have been killed or wounded in the crossfire, with the bulk of the casualties caused by roadside bombs.

[jcustis]

The Taliban won't need to take Kabul outright.

They only need to control the centers of illicit profit like Helmand, and then can afford to encircle Kabul and Kandahar like a python constricting around its prey.

[Bob's World]

"Clear-Hold-Build" is a fundamentally flawed concept.

It is like driving one's arm into a tub of water, and believing that the space their arm occupied will remain free of water once the arm is removed.

Until we get to a more intellectually honest appreciation about what insurgency is in general, and why insurgency exists in Afghanistan, we are unlikely to develop and adopt policies for foreign places that our military can actually enforce.

For the military, we defined this mission in the context of what we in the military do, and while that is a natural response of most institutions (USAID, State, DEA, and NGOs have done the same), it does not lead to an approach that is very helpful for Afghanistan getting to some degree of natural stability.

So long as the governance in Kabul (and at lower levels as well) is perceived as fundamentally illegitimate by many who live there (primarily those who had patronage power under the Taliban and now suffer under those who have it under the regime we put into power), there will be revolution.

So long as foreign forces occupy Helmand (and Afghan forces from the north operating in Helmand are perceived as being nearly as foreign as British and US forces operating there), there will be resistance.

This is natural. This is human nature. This is really not much about advancing some "Taliban" system of governance as the West envisions - but more about revolting against a system of governance the West imposed, and resisting those forces sent to enforce that il-formed policy decision.

[Bill Moore]

"Clear-Hold-Build" is a fundamentally flawed concept.

It is like driving one's arm into a tub of water, and believing that the space their arm occupied will remain free of water once the arm is removed.

Until we get to a more intellectually honest appreciation about what insurgency is in general, and why insurgency exists in Afghanistan, we are unlikely to develop and adopt policies for foreign places that our military can actually enforce.

For the military, we defined this mission in the context of what we in the military do, and while that is a natural response of most institutions (USAID, State, DEA, and NGOs have done the same), it does not lead to an approach that is very helpful for Afghanistan getting to some degree of natural stability.

So long as the governance in Kabul (and at lower levels as well) is perceived as fundamentally illegitimate by many who live there (primarily those who had patronage power under the Taliban and now suffer under those who have it under the regime we put into power), there will be revolution.

So long as foreign forces occupy Helmand (and Afghan forces from the north operating in Helmand are perceived as being nearly as foreign as British and US forces operating there), there will be resistance.

This is natural. This is human nature. This is really not much about advancing some "Taliban" system of governance as the West envisions - but more about revolting against a system of governance the West imposed, and resisting those forces sent to enforce that il-formed policy decision.

You're conflating issues, tactically clear and hold works, but to do it effectively like Chang did in China against Mao (until the Japanese intervened), the Brits did in Malaya, and French in Algeria, it can require a high degree of brutality, which runs against our moral grain. If it is going to be employed it must be done in a logical manner, not random acts of securing a village here and there, while insurgents have freedom of movement to maneuver around the village.

I'm not advocating a clear and hold approach, but in fact that is what we're attempting with the VSO program. We're currently in a long war of attrition, which in our case isn't sustainable politically and our adversaries know it.

I actually agree with your points, but at the end of the day they're irrelevant to the guys on the ground who have been asked to achieve objectives that will generate continued resistance as you correctly pointed out. Assuming we're going to have that resistance, and that those on the ground can't change the policy ends, we can at least discuss a better tactical approach, without it always delving into the policy realm. We're stuck with the policies we're given, or more accurately since we're both out of uniform now, our uniformed members are stuck with the policy ends they have been told to pursue using military force. From that optic what would you recommend to Battalion commanders and below?

[Bill Moore]

A better report from Sangin in WSJ and here's a taster, citing Suliman Shah, Sangin's district governor:

Link:http://online.wsj.com/articles/afgha...ban-1404670052

Note the role of the ALP, who fight till the ammo runs out and are overrun (dying one assumes) and the casualty figures:

David,

I don't have time to read the article now, but in my opinion I think we pushed a bad strategy in regards to relying the ALP to help stabilize the situation. It is an approach that can work only where the insurgents are unable to mass to achieve dominance over a local security force. Obviously the Taliban, partly or largely due to the safe haven in Pakistan, can mass forces in Helmand and other areas. Instead of using the oil spot strategy, which can work, we used the oil driblet strategy, and driblets are unable to defend themselves without U.S. advisors and firepower. If we actually cleared the area and was able to secure the broad area with the military, at least to the point the Taliban couldn't mass, the ALP could be useful in defending against small groups of infiltrators and tying the village to the national government. We're all about quick and short term effects, but terrible when it comes to pursuing longer term ends. A lot of my friends involved in the ALP/VSO effort believe it is a farce and the positive results are over hyped. I suspect the truth lies somewhere in the middle, and if we were capable of doing honest assessments instead of using assessments as a marketing tool to justify what we're currently doing, then we have changed course a little.