The Helmand Province (merged thread, not UK or USMC)

[davidbfpo]

A better report from Sangin in WSJ and here's a taster, citing Suliman Shah, Sangin's district governor:

The situation is bad...The territory seized by the Taliban hasn't been retaken, and the government hasn't made any steps forward. The Taliban will take control of more territory.

In Sangin, lightly equipped Afghan police, including village militia outfits known as Afghan Local Police, say they have borne the brunt of the insurgent onslaught.

Link:http://online.wsj.com/articles/afgha...ban-1404670052

Note the role of the ALP, who fight till the ammo runs out and are overrun (dying one assumes) and the casualty figures:

Afghan officials said 27 Afghan National Army soldiers have been killed and 80 wounded in the recent fighting, along with 81 police killed and 67 wounded. Local community leaders said more than 140 civilians have been killed or wounded in the crossfire, with the bulk of the casualties caused by roadside bombs.

[jcustis]

The Taliban won't need to take Kabul outright.

They only need to control the centers of illicit profit like Helmand, and then can afford to encircle Kabul and Kandahar like a python constricting around its prey.

[Bob's World]

"Clear-Hold-Build" is a fundamentally flawed concept.

It is like driving one's arm into a tub of water, and believing that the space their arm occupied will remain free of water once the arm is removed.

Until we get to a more intellectually honest appreciation about what insurgency is in general, and why insurgency exists in Afghanistan, we are unlikely to develop and adopt policies for foreign places that our military can actually enforce.

For the military, we defined this mission in the context of what we in the military do, and while that is a natural response of most institutions (USAID, State, DEA, and NGOs have done the same), it does not lead to an approach that is very helpful for Afghanistan getting to some degree of natural stability.

So long as the governance in Kabul (and at lower levels as well) is perceived as fundamentally illegitimate by many who live there (primarily those who had patronage power under the Taliban and now suffer under those who have it under the regime we put into power), there will be revolution.

So long as foreign forces occupy Helmand (and Afghan forces from the north operating in Helmand are perceived as being nearly as foreign as British and US forces operating there), there will be resistance.

This is natural. This is human nature. This is really not much about advancing some "Taliban" system of governance as the West envisions - but more about revolting against a system of governance the West imposed, and resisting those forces sent to enforce that il-formed policy decision.

[Bill Moore]

"Clear-Hold-Build" is a fundamentally flawed concept.

It is like driving one's arm into a tub of water, and believing that the space their arm occupied will remain free of water once the arm is removed.

Until we get to a more intellectually honest appreciation about what insurgency is in general, and why insurgency exists in Afghanistan, we are unlikely to develop and adopt policies for foreign places that our military can actually enforce.

For the military, we defined this mission in the context of what we in the military do, and while that is a natural response of most institutions (USAID, State, DEA, and NGOs have done the same), it does not lead to an approach that is very helpful for Afghanistan getting to some degree of natural stability.

So long as the governance in Kabul (and at lower levels as well) is perceived as fundamentally illegitimate by many who live there (primarily those who had patronage power under the Taliban and now suffer under those who have it under the regime we put into power), there will be revolution.

So long as foreign forces occupy Helmand (and Afghan forces from the north operating in Helmand are perceived as being nearly as foreign as British and US forces operating there), there will be resistance.

This is natural. This is human nature. This is really not much about advancing some "Taliban" system of governance as the West envisions - but more about revolting against a system of governance the West imposed, and resisting those forces sent to enforce that il-formed policy decision.

You're conflating issues, tactically clear and hold works, but to do it effectively like Chang did in China against Mao (until the Japanese intervened), the Brits did in Malaya, and French in Algeria, it can require a high degree of brutality, which runs against our moral grain. If it is going to be employed it must be done in a logical manner, not random acts of securing a village here and there, while insurgents have freedom of movement to maneuver around the village.

I'm not advocating a clear and hold approach, but in fact that is what we're attempting with the VSO program. We're currently in a long war of attrition, which in our case isn't sustainable politically and our adversaries know it.

I actually agree with your points, but at the end of the day they're irrelevant to the guys on the ground who have been asked to achieve objectives that will generate continued resistance as you correctly pointed out. Assuming we're going to have that resistance, and that those on the ground can't change the policy ends, we can at least discuss a better tactical approach, without it always delving into the policy realm. We're stuck with the policies we're given, or more accurately since we're both out of uniform now, our uniformed members are stuck with the policy ends they have been told to pursue using military force. From that optic what would you recommend to Battalion commanders and below?

[Bob's World]

"...ours is but to do and die"? Ultimately Bill, you are right, at some point the military has to simply do the best they can to enforce the policy decisions of our civilian leadership.

But this does not somehow validate the stupidity of the frontal assaults of the Somme; nor the stupidity of Clear-Hold-Build in Helmand.

As I recall Mao prevailed in China, as his tactics supported a valid strategy. Chang was run off of the continent.

In Malaya the British military tactics bought some time and space, but it was the British policy decisions to give up on dreams of restoring the Colony, giving up the political control once vested in the Colonial Office; working to extend political and economic opportunity beyond the Malays to the ethnic Indian and ethnic Chinese populations equally; and to help establish a new sovereign member of the Commonwealth that made those tactics stick. We did none of that in Vietnam. All tactics, no strategy. (kind of like a cowboy who is all hat and no cattle).

Likewise the French only suppressed insurgency and defeated insurgents for short periods of time in Algeria with their military approach to attempt to prop up improper and unchanging policy.

So, no, my points are not "irrelevant to the guys on the ground." Because the Generals are part of those guys; and while generals do not like to advise policy makers we cannot continue to give the generals sanctuary under that auspice from their responsibility to inform civilian leadership that no acceptable, suitable, feasible military solution exists to enforce what they are seeking to impose (coupled with suggestions of alternative policy approaches that history indicates may actually be supportable by our military action).

Even at Battalion level, commanders have a tremendous degree of latitude as to "how" they pursue the missions they are given. I saw Brian Petit do this every day in 2010 RC-South as we conducted the big push to clear Marjah and were preparing to do the same outside Kandahar. But you are right. We cannot fix this at the Battalion level. Our strategic failures are occurring much higher than those conducting tremendous tactical effort in support.

We need to stop reading history with rose colored glasses; and we need to stop giving our Flag-level commanders a pass for failing strategically simply because they are effective tacticians. In short, we need to change our military culture if we hope to be more successful in the strategic environment we live in today. Perhaps that will be done by the frustrated junior leaders coming off of today's battlefield for tomorrow; just as it was done by the frustrated junior leaders coming out of Vietnam.

[Bill Moore]

Mao would have likely been defeated if the Japanese didn't invade, but we will never know. I agree our strategy is deeply flawed, and the generals are partly partly to blame. On the other hand generals who addressed strategy flaws under both Clinton Bush administrations were not treated well. Not too long ago a civilian in OSD told 4 star he had no business developing strategy, his job was to implement it. It seems that the only time civilians want military input is after their strategy fails.

[Bob's World]

Bill,

This is the challenge of the current strategic environment. The problems the military is being sent out to "fix" or "defeat" are by and large NOT MILITARY PROBLEMS.

We are at a point in our strategic analysis where most communities, civilian and military alike, will admit that the strategic environment has fundamentally changed and continues to change at a nearly exponential rate. Then, in nearly the same breath, espouse some version of "therefore, business as usual - but I need more stuff if you want success."

We need to get to the point where we recognize that we must fundamentally change as well; and that we cannot simply use the military as some sort of "little Dutch Boy" to go stick our proverbial fingers into any number of proverbial dikes that are crumbling around us. It appears that the military can not only buy time and space for civilian leadership to succeed. We can buy time and space to allow it to fail as well. Did not the Roman Legions conduct a delaying action as the Barbarians made their way to Rome?

What we do today is not much different; and likely will end in similar fashion if we fail to shift from comfortably studying and applauding our tactics, and do not begin spending a great deal more time getting uncomfortable as we confront the realities of our policies and strategies.

I actually see a glimmer of hope in what I suspect is happening in Syria and Iraq. But then I may be assuming things that are not there, and giving credit where none is due - but I remain an optimist.

As to taking shots from civilians who feel like some individuals or aspects of the military are imposing on intellectual turf they arrogantly believe is uniquely theirs, I have two words. Moral Courage. We need more of it.

[Bill Moore]

A better report from Sangin in WSJ and here's a taster, citing Suliman Shah, Sangin's district governor:

Link:http://online.wsj.com/articles/afgha...ban-1404670052

Note the role of the ALP, who fight till the ammo runs out and are overrun (dying one assumes) and the casualty figures:

David,

I don't have time to read the article now, but in my opinion I think we pushed a bad strategy in regards to relying the ALP to help stabilize the situation. It is an approach that can work only where the insurgents are unable to mass to achieve dominance over a local security force. Obviously the Taliban, partly or largely due to the safe haven in Pakistan, can mass forces in Helmand and other areas. Instead of using the oil spot strategy, which can work, we used the oil driblet strategy, and driblets are unable to defend themselves without U.S. advisors and firepower. If we actually cleared the area and was able to secure the broad area with the military, at least to the point the Taliban couldn't mass, the ALP could be useful in defending against small groups of infiltrators and tying the village to the national government. We're all about quick and short term effects, but terrible when it comes to pursuing longer term ends. A lot of my friends involved in the ALP/VSO effort believe it is a farce and the positive results are over hyped. I suspect the truth lies somewhere in the middle, and if we were capable of doing honest assessments instead of using assessments as a marketing tool to justify what we're currently doing, then we have changed course a little.