https://ia601607.us.archive.org/2/it...g09PhD_A1a.pdf

DISORDER OVER DESIGN: STRATEGY, BUREAUCRACY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. POLITICAL WARFARE IN EUROPE, 1945-1950

This study explores factors behind the development of a covert political warfare capability by the United States government from 1945-1950. Specifically, it examines the place of political warfare within U.S. policy and bureaucracy towards Europe and the Soviet Union. Political warfare was defined expansively to comprise psychological, political, economic and paramilitary actions.
The central hypothesis is that disorder prevailed over design as a political warfare programme was developed against the Soviet bloc. Institutional conflicts overshadowed a unified national approach, while coordination between departments and agencies hampered effective implementation. Furthermore, the position of political warfare within broader U.S. foreign policy remained ambiguous and problematic. Washington failed to formulate a workable, unified strategy towards the east integrating political warfare. This undermined the fundamental American objective in the early Cold War to retract Soviet power peacefully from Eastern Europe. A legacy of strategic incoherence beyond 1950 resulted.
No surprise to anyone working national security issues over the past 50 plus years that disorder prevailed over design. While we often lament our whole of government approach/synergy, I often think that ironically it may provide a competitive advantage in the realm of great power competition. Our adversaries think we have a coordinated whole of government approach, and in response to this belief a couple of Chinese officers wrote Unrestricted Warfare and GEN Gerasimov wrote about how the West was waging war using the Arab Spring as an illustration of gray zone competition. Our adversaries believe we innovated a new form of warfare and we believe they did. You have to love the finger pointing, but regardless of who is right, this form of competition/warfare isn't new, but like any other form of war its character evolves.

The document contains quite a bit of the history of bureaucratic infighting over what agency should own psychological during peacetime, especially State's effort to keep the CIA and the Military out of this arena. Kenan made an argument that still resonates today, which is the formation of new organizations do little more than result in educating those in the organization in a particular skill, and these new organizations tend to focus more on shaping policy than implementing existing policy. Much of what we do and struggle with today seems brand new to many, but it closely rhymes with the echos from the past.