I agree that the U.S. and its allies won in South Korea. We successfully defended South Korea from a small insurgency, then a major conventional invasion, and preserved its sovereignty. We then helped develop its economy into one of the most successful in the world. South Korea's transition to democracy in 1987, though largely accomplished without U.S. support, completed a near-total victory for South Korea and the U.S. in both moral and military terms.
tequila, thanks for responding. Firstly, you are correct in pointing out that the U.S. achieved successes in Central American proxy wars, but these were just that: proxy wars and not true tests of national resolve on the order of larger conflicts. Enemies of the U.S. recognize this. Secondly, the U.S. also achieved some success in Desert Storm, but the enemy in that conflict was not decisively defeated and remained a problem for years afterward. One can argue that Desert Storm achieved its stated objectives, but perhaps the objectives were too limited for what really needed to done: permanently end the threat to U.S. interests in the region from that regime (oil, security). The Desert Storm campaign failed to do this or perhaps was not designed to do this. One can argue that it should have been in light of what the U.S. is experiencing now.
In many ways, the Cold War did turn out pretty well for the U.S., but that again was a different sort of conflict. There still remains unresolved business from the Cold War, so perhaps it will not turn out as well as we believe. How the U.S. handled certain conflicts during the Cold War certainly exposed its weaknesses to others--weaknesses U.S. enemies are now exploiting.
You are also correct in pointing out that every great power has suffered defeat since Alexander. I did not say that great powers have never lost a war or suffered defeats; what I mean is that it is never good for great powers to lose. You seem to indicate that losing is no big deal because when great powers in the past suffered defeat, it did not spell the end of them (at least immediately). Funny about Great Britain, especially in light of their recent humiliations at the hands of Iran.
I think it is a big deal whenever a great power loses (or is widely perceived to have lost), especially today because defeats are so amplified by modern media. If a great or greater power does not win convincingly, it has lost (Israel v. Hezbollah). After enough defeats, great powers cease to have the ability to successfully defend their interests and protect their people. I meant to point out that defeats can have tremendous detrimental consequences in the future--consequences that might not be readily apparent now. Because the U.S. did not decisively defeat the communists in North Korea, it has been plagued by a hostile regime for another generation. Now this regime has or potentially has the capability to do great harm to us or our allies either directly or by sharing powerful military technology with others hostile to our interests and way of life.
My definition of "winning" in Korea: total and lasting defeat of communist forces up to the Yalu River. Doing this very likely would have required some action against neighboring states supporting our enemies there (China). If we had to fortify that area, so be it. Better to fortify there than at the 38th Parallel like we are doing now. You may be right that such action might have brought Stalin and Mao closer; or the U.S. might have been able to sign a peace agreement of some sort from a position of victory and strength.
I wonder about the implications of not achieving victory in Korea were for Vietnam and future conflicts, if any. When great powers are seen as vulnerable, others are inspired to attack them and their interests. Had the U.S. won decisively in Korea and thereby made clear that it would not tolerate the spread of communism in SE Asia (and what would happen to those who tried), it might have given others (the Viet Minh) pause. We might have been able to achieve some sort of different relationship with the Viet Minh or whoever came to power in Vietnam.
I can't prove this as it is only a theory and something I put up for discussion. I could be wrong, but I would like to know what others think the implications were and are. I also wanted to see if anyone knew of any writing or research I could reference to learn more about the consequences of Korea in relation to Vietnam and future conflicts.
Lastly regarding Taiwan, I do not think the U.S. track record bodes well should Taiwan really need to be protected. I do not believe the U.S. would go to war with China to preserve Taiwan, especially if it turns out that it does not have the resolve to defeat the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, just like it did not have the resolve to win in Vietnam and Korea. If the world perceives the U.S. lacks resolve, it cannot enforce peace like it has in many parts of the world for the last 60 years, because of how decisively it and the Allies won WWII.
In terms of historical analysis, you are leading with your conclusion rather than surveying the literature or sources to determine what your conclusions should be. This technique was also used in recent "Feith-based intelligence analysis."I can't prove this as it is only a theory and something I put up for discussion. I could be wrong, but I would like to know what others think the implications were and are. I also wanted to see if anyone knew of any writing or research I could reference to learn more about the consequences of Korea in relation to Vietnam and future conflicts.
Like the others I see your definition of victory as essentially one dimensional, centered on destruction of the enemy rather than defeat of the enemy. It is also quite limited in duration, especially since you are essentially taking Korea out of the Cold War continuim and tacking in some sort of causal relationship with Vietnam. Meanwhile there were conflicts elsewhere that shaped the thinking concerning the Vietnam conflict, Cuba being one and the Congo being another.
As for Gulf War 1, that conflict was limited and was done so deliberately--at least until the end when the White House issued calls for rebellion and did not back them up. There were significant reasons for not crossing into Iraq; if you have any doubt as to their validity, look at events today.
Tom
Let us not confuse winning the war with winning the peace. The Allies' WWII experience is an example of winning the war and then winning the peace as well, largely because of the Marshall Plan. Compare this with WWI where the Entente won the war but lost the peace miserably. The American Civil War is another example of won war and lost peace. I submit that Desert Storm is another war that was won while the peace was not.
When wars are fought, they should be done so with the objective of establishing a better state of peace. In too many the wars, the victors have not followed this precept with the result being a resumption of fighting after a short breathing spell to recover enough to begin again.
Thanks Tom. In response I would like to clarify by saying my definition of victory is not based solely on destruction. I think, tough, that to defeat one's enemy in war, force and destruction are critical components. How does one defeat an enemy in armed conflict without in some way actually destroying or threatening to destroy his ability to wage war and/or what is dear to him? Of course there are other elements of national power that come into play and other strategies, but the capability to destroy (sometimes used, sometimes only threatened) is of supreme importance. It forces peace. I very much agree with wm's point about winning the peace to ensure victory endures. A nation must use every means at its disposal to achieve victory based on correctly defined objectives.
I don't think I am engaging in Feith-based intelligence analysis by simply raising the point, asking what others think, and whether there is analysis and literature out there to offer evidence for or against the "conclusion"…I'm trying to get on the right track and perhaps have an interesting discussion in the meantime. I do however think America's current enemies have drawn their own conclusions about instances where the U.S. lacked resolve…
There were indeed good reasons not to have started the war in Iraq, as we can see today. But had the U.S. had the will to wage the war “properly” from the beginning and been [more] successful, perhaps the bad reasons would not now be so emphasized? Iraq will certainly be a mistake if the United States is not successful or largely perceived to have failed. If the U.S. is able to achieve something close to its original policy goal of a friendly, stable Iraqi leadership and society with some form of thriving representative government, then it is less likely that Iraq will be deemed a mistake. Some may argue this was never possible, but I believe that the full military, diplomatic, political, industrial, etc. might of the United States, if effectively employed, would have resulted in a different situation than what we are facing today (and of course a willingness to correct mistakes, adapt, etc.). The U.S. must avoid getting into conflicts it does not have the will to win.
The U.S. did indeed achieve all the successes in the South that you all mentioned…for now. But the war between the Koreas is still not over; there is no final victor as of yet. North Korea still presents the ROK, the U.S., and the region with significant challenges; there is still the potential for more war. The U.S., the ROK, and others make what are tantamount to extortion payments…this is not victory. A case can be made that these challenges are a possible result of not having decisively defeated the North Koreans 55 years ago.
I know General Westmoreland believed that the U.S. "held the line" against communism for ten years and that Vietnam was a demonstration of U.S. resolve to fight communism. This may very well be, but Vietnam was also a demonstration of the limits of U.S. resolve. In this way the war was a failure.
Looking at CR's arguments
Thank you for leaving what I consider a controversial post. I agree with Tom Odom's comments. As much as I wish we decisively defeated N. Korea, the political situation was not in favor of escalating a land war in Asia. As a democracy, political consideration is paramount in war decision making. Public support waned for the Korean War after stalemate persisted beginning in the spring of '51. Our war-weary citizens would not have stood for a large war in Asia only six years after WWII peace was concluded.
Vietnam was a reaction to a number of different things, including Kennedy's impotence regarding the construction of the Berlin Wall and the disastrous Bay of Pigs operation. Mao's Revolutionary War concept also resonated outside China, with its implementation by Ho Chi Minh and Giap during the war in Indochina.
Losing a war is not necessarily detrimonious to a superpower. Hell, the Brits lost during the "Great Game" in Central Asia but it hardly affected their power. The "win" in the Boer War was less than decisive. The Russians may have lost the Russo-Japanese War, but they continued to influence world affairs for the next 100 years.
What is necessary to remember is losing in Iraq is not the end of the world for the U.S. I feel it might actually suit our strategic goals. The first, keeping extremists divided and fighting amongst themselves in a country far away from our own, siphoning their energy. Two, if the situation escalated into a regional war, Syria and Iran would have to engage. Their involvement would aid our goals-weakening their state governments through fiscal and human loss. Third, if chaos broke out in the Middle East, might the U.S. not have a reason to intervene in the region to "protect our interests?" Our interests would be oil fields and oil production. Who knows where we might cordon off and control.
Real politik is not naivete; it is based on fact and a sense of what public support for military operations might be.
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