State & Local Intel in the GWOT

[Jedburgh]

RAND just published another good product:

State and Local Intelligence in the War on Terrorism

Most discussion of information sharing in the war on terrorism has concentrated on the federal government. Yet, state and local law enforcement agencies (LEAs) may be uniquely positioned to augment federal intelligence capabilities by virtue of their presence in nearly every American community, their knowledge of local individuals and groups, and their use of intelligence to combat crime. How widespread is counterterrorism intelligence activity among state and local LEAs, and how is this activity managed? What are those state and local authorities doing differently since 9/11 in collecting and processing information? How are courts and other oversight bodies guiding that process? And what might an “ideal” division of labor among the various levels of government look like?

[sgmgrumpy]

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...123000238.html

Frustrated by poor federal cooperation, U.S. states and cities are building their own network of intelligence centers led by police to help detect and disrupt terrorist plots.

The new "fusion centers" are now operating in 37 states, including Virginia and Maryland, and another covers the Washington area, according to the Department of Homeland Security. The centers, which have received $380 million in federal support since the 2001 terrorist attacks, pool and analyze information from local, state and federal law enforcement officials.

The emerging "network of networks" marks a new era of opportunity for law enforcement, according to U.S. officials and homeland security experts. Police are hungry for federal intelligence in an age of homegrown terrorism and more sophisticated crime. For their part, federal law enforcement officials could benefit from a potential army of tipsters -- the 700,000 local and state police officers across the country, as well as private security guards and others being courted by the centers.
But the emerging model of "intelligence-led policing" faces risks on all sides. The centers are popping up with little federal leadership and training, raising fears of overzealousness such as that associated with police "red squads" that spied on civil rights and peace activists decades ago. The centers also face practical obstacles that could limit their effectiveness, including a shortage of money, skilled analysts, and proven relationships with the FBI and Homeland Security.

Still, the centers are emerging as a key element in a sometimes chaotic new domestic intelligence infrastructure, which also includes homeland security units in local police forces and 103 FBI-led terrorism task forces, triple the number that existed before the Sept. 11 attacks.
Fusion centers are becoming "part of the landscape for local government," said the incoming D.C. police chief, Cathy Lanier. But she warned that police are navigating a new patchwork of state and federal privacy laws that govern the sharing, collection and storage of information. "We're in a very precarious position right now," she said. "If we lose community support, that is going to be a big deal for local law enforcement."

[Jedburgh]

...the centers are emerging as a key element in a sometimes chaotic new domestic intelligence infrastructure, which also includes homeland security units in local police forces and 103 FBI-led terrorism task forces, triple the number that existed before the Sept. 11 attacks...

Guidelines for Establishing and Operating Fusion Centers at the Local, State, Tribal, and Federal Level

FY 2007 Homeland Security Grant Program Supplemental Resource: Fusion Capability Planning Tool

[mikemac64]

We have a Fusion Ctr. here in MA, though no one can tell this street cop how to access or contribute to it. It is quite frustrating as at the street level, we get very little intel or tips.

[davidbfpo]

All too easy from this side of the Atlantic to say - the 'Need to Know' prevails, rather than the 'Need to Share'. No wonder the cop on the ground has been given little guidance on what to look for.

Dispite our experience of the 'Irish Troubles' for over thirty years, we too are struggling to find satisfactory guidance for the cop on the ground.

Davidbfpo
U.K.

[Jedburgh]

Info-sharing within the broad LE community has come a long way since 9/11 - but there are still significant obstacles to overcome before emerging capabilities can be leveraged and exploited by the average cop.

When I first began working with a county-level "joint" gang task force, it was very frustrating to realize that none of the individual city jurisdictions could communicate with each other - no 'net connectivity at all, and extremely limited comms otherwise. "Info sharing" was conducted the old-fashioned way - by physically going over to the other guy's office and comparing notes. Given the size of the county and the tempo of ops, this was a long way from being even minimally effective.

Now, any LEO can obtain access to systems like CyberCop, FPS Link Portal, LEO and their respective part of the RISS system. Each is a very useful resource in its own context, and provides information that your average city cop would have had an extremely hard time getting his hands in a timely fashion pre-9/11. However, none of these even begin to address the problem of rapid dissemination of tactical intelligence across jurisdictions.

The real point is that the bad guys stay abreast of LE capabilities and they exploit these comms gaps and manning issues. (Manning issues - in CA the cost of living has resulted in many jurisdictions being significantly understrength, and attempts to concentrate manpower in hotspots and during critical time periods only results in constant catch-up as the bad guys displace)

[AZACTIC]

I was glad to see that the article in the Fire Chief magazine was quoted in this forum. I have worked in the AcTIC (Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center) since it's inception, and can tell you that we are very proud of what we have built out here. With all of the AZ links to 9-11, we had to get much better at communicating between all agencies, and we had to do it fast. (AZ is cited 59 separate times in the 9-11 Commission report)

We have been operational since 2004, and continue to make improvements to our system. I am saddened to see some of the other posts about the lack of information getting out to the line level officers, from other centers around the country. With the federal agencies and all the state and local agencies all in one building it makes information sharing very simple and easy. Sometimes we in law enforcement make information sharing too difficult a task than what it has to be... we put up barriers where they don't need to be between levels of government and other agencies.

As mentioned in the Fire Chief magazine, our Center also includes a very close knit partnership with the states Fire Agencies. I ask the states that don't have close ties with their fire agencies, is where is all your information coming from then? Partnering with the Fire agencies and Private Security increases your "eyes & ears" out in the State and builds your protective lines and levels of security around your state.

I can't think of too many things that other states come to AZ for to learn how to do things right... and we aren't saying that we have all the correct answers, but we know we have a great program out here, and we continue to evaluate what is working and what doesn't and we change from there. Our citizens in AZ expect it from us, and we are doing everything we can to keep AZ Safe.

[Jedburgh]

CRS, 6 Jul 07: Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress

...Fusion centers are state-created entities largely financed and staffed by the states, and there is no one “model” for how a center should be structured. State and local law enforcement and criminal intelligence seem to be at the core of many of the centers. Although many of the centers initially had purely counterterrorism goals, for numerous reasons, they have increasingly gravitated toward an all-crimes and even broader all-hazards approach. While many of the centers have prevention of attacks as a high priority, little “true fusion,” or analysis of disparate data sources, identification of intelligence gaps, and pro-active collection of intelligence against those gaps which could contribute to prevention is occurring. Some centers are collocated with local offices of federal entities, yet in the absence of a functioning intelligence cycle process, collocation alone does not constitute fusion.

The federal role in supporting fusion centers consists largely of providing financial assistance, the majority of which has flowed through the Homeland Security Grant Program; sponsoring security clearances; providing human resources; producing some fusion center guidance and training; and providing congressional authorization and appropriation of national foreign intelligence program resources, as well as oversight hearings. This report includes over 30 options for congressional consideration to clarify and potentially enhance the federal government’s relationship with fusion centers. One of the central options is the potential drafting of a formal national fusion center strategy that would outline, among other elements, the federal government’s clear expectations of fusion centers, its position on sustainment funding, metrics for assessing fusion center performance, and definition of what constitutes a “mature” fusion center. This report will be updated....

[ntstlkr]

Cheers All,
Having stumbled upon this site a little while back I've been reading the threads with great interest, but this one in particular stood out as I reflect upon my own experience and observations.

A little background on yours truly. I currently work in ICE, within DHS, as part of a multi-agency "Task Force", for want of a better term, primarily in the counternarcotics/human trafficking/CT fields, doing case coordination/deconfliction between agencies and analysis of TIII information. I've only been working in the LE field since 1998 (back when ICE was US Customs), previous to that I was in the Army since the mid-80s (with all the appropriate campaign ribbons and deployments etc). Although it's going on nearly a decade, I find my mindset still revolves around military terms and methodology (for better or worse).

This is the context that I place the title of my post in. For all that the LE community has a large number (not absolute and no numbers on specific ratios) of current/prior service personnel, I find that at least one thing has not been carried over from our collective time in uniform. Purple. In military terms, purple is more than a color, it's a mindset, backed by doctrine and continuous review of practices. Surely Joint Operations has come along way since the Goldwaters-Nochols Act of '86. It's execution is not perfect by any means, and there remains, even at this date two decades later, plenty of inter-service rivalries/redundencies which need to be addressed. But the US Military of the 21st Century is far and above a more cohesive fighting machine than the one I was a part of when my unit moved out to the GDP in West Germany (when there was a West Germany). Or even when, a few years later, we hit the big sandbox in Saudi Arabia and crossed into Iraq the first time. By the time I made it to Sarajevo with IFOR, Joint Operations had probably gone from a grudging exception to something a little more approaching the norm. And it continues to this day.

Faced with a glaring inability to operate together and several operational failures/almost failures (Desert One, Grenada, etc), some members of Congress, at least (one of the few times that political body has done anything worthwhile some would say), recognized the fact that confronted with an enemy that numerically outmatches us, and in some cases technologically as well, our only recourse in order to win when fighting against such a foe would be to fight harder, faster, and smarter than what the enemy was capable of responding to. We could no longer afford to allow the interservice rivalries and self hindering practices we indulged ourselves with to get in the way of the most fundamental aspect of military operations: finding and destroying the enemy.

Sure, as I've said, there always remains room for improvement. But noone even questions the existance of Joint Operations nor the basic principles involved in it's Doctrine, even if debate occurs regarding it's execution.

In a few short monthes it will be 6 years since 9/11. That one day provided the impetus for the LE community to undergo the same shift in focus and practice that the Military underwent after Desert One and Grenada. Yes, the Department of Homeland Security was created to bring all the disparate LE agencies which should have been working together beforehand under one roof and central direction. But creating a new department and org charts alone does not create "jointness". In the military context at least, which is the lens through which I still judge effectiveness.

We still wrangle over enforcement jurisdiction and keep investigative information from each other. There is constant in-fighting over case information disclosure and operational details that should be shared between impacted departments, determining who is going to "lead" the investigation, and so on. And this is in a unit that, I have to admit, is actually one that's better than most at "sharing" information. If anything it's exactly what the unit was created to address.

So the question is why, after all this time, is the concept of Joint Operations still foreign to LE? I have my own ideas about that and what to do about it but I'd ask the readers of the forum what they think about the idea/issue.

For all that Intelligence needed a reform after the events of 9/11, I would forward that Intelligence Reform will be ineffective without basic LE Reform. That LE Intelligence Operations will never reach their full potential for effectiveness until LE itself has undergone a sea change.

Sorry for the long and drawn out rant but any thoughts?

[sgmgrumpy]

Crime info trumps terror data at fusion centers


http://www.washingtontechnology.com/...topic=homeland

Anti-terrorism information-sharing and analysis is taking a back seat to criminal intelligence at the more than 40 state intelligence fusion centers, according to a new report from the Congressional Research Service.

State governors created the centers, and the Homeland Security Department provides part of the funding. Their purpose is to fuse federal, state and local intelligence against terrorism, but CRS found the fusion centers have gravitated more toward collecting and analyzing criminal intelligence and all-hazards intelligence. The service found few indications that the centers have been making efforts to become aware of terrorist plans and foil attacks.

[ntstlkr]

Crime info trumps terror data at fusion centers :confused

Cheers SGM,

This is an interesting article but, in itself, not very suprising nor, when you think about it, should be.

For all that terrorism and terrorism related activity is ongoing 24/7, when compared to the more common concerns of drug and human trafficking it becomes obvious where the ratio of effort will slide. This isn't to say that the CT function gets shelved, but that to be perfectly honest, terrorism isn't the only game in town nor is it the only thing that threatens national security. For every terrorist (home grown or import) there's a thousand drug dealers, traffickers, and those who trade humans as commodities. And that's just here in the good 'ol US of A.

The number of CT related investigations being pursued by an individual state or even a group of states could probably be counted in one hand. Two at most. The number of narcotics, money laundering, and human trafficking (the red headed step child of the bunch) can number in the hundreds easily within one state alone.

Other factors include the limited resources a state or group of states may have to bring in collecting intelligence on any potential terrorist group and, if such a group gets noticed, whether the matter automatically brings federal attention (and usurption) in the process. It would be hard to imagine the FBI, upon being notified of a possible terrorist cell operating in Nashville say, not wanting to become a part of the investigation. Much less taking the lead should the presence and activities of the cell become confirmed.

The fusion centers, at least from the federal perspective, are little more than middle men. They coordinate info sharing and leads during the initial phases of an investigation, but they would subsequently be subsumed should the case actually trip to something substantive.

In the mean time, they are rather expensive (and knowing that no government program, whether state or federal, is beyond the bureaucratic intertia to keep growing, expand services, increase funding etc) to keep around to JUST work CT issues. Especially when there is so much else that can use the effort. As a FC manager, I'd probably be selling my programs ability to coordinate investigations, case information, etc for all it's worth to the drug enforcment community. Likewise, those "FCs" like EPIC and NDIC and so on have done the same in reverse.

The question should be can CT inspired fusion centers retain their focus while working these other adjunct areas? Will they forget their primary purpose for being?

[selil]

I just sat through a discussion of fusion centers and a utter lack of analysts. At the state level I heard a lot of grumbling that the FBI says analysis is done "THIS" way, and the CIA says it is done "THIS" way, and the states looking for training and standards are left going... Railroad tracks never meet except in the distance and that is an illusion. Interesting stuff coming out of DHS with no dog in the hunt they are creating standardized analyst training.

[relative autonomy]

Here is a good article about the DSH Intelligence Fusion Centers, which the FBI is actively involved in. i know in some states the FBI office physically houses the fusion center and it is principally staffed by the FBI.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...123000238.html

i think this is where a lot of good intelligence comes from.

[Erick]

i think this is where a lot of good intelligence comes from.

It may be disseminated from these, the RTTACs, and others. However, good intel comes from the guys & gals out on the ground, talking to the people. That applies a lot in a whole bunch of places.

[JeffC]

You've probably seen the recent NY Times article about the lack of terrorism focus by Fusion Centers. I think that's taking far too narrow a view at how these centers should be doing their work, or even what the scope of that work should be.

The CRS report on Fusion Centers issued this past summer suggests that a broad, all-hazards approach may be best. This seems like a no-brainer to me. What, do you imagine, are the disadvantages to a broader focus that encompasses fighting terrorism and crime?

[selil]

With the new National Response Framework they are going to have to adopt it. The days of terrorism only being a mission is gone. (sorry for the drive by but there are some interesting things in the NRF).

[JeffC]

With the new National Response Framework they are going to have to adopt it. The days of terrorism only being a mission is gone. (sorry for the drive by but there are some interesting things in the NRF).

Is the NRF going back for revisions after the public draft was so ill-received?

[selil]

Is the NRF going back for revisions after the public draft was so ill-received?

My understanding is that they have already started the revisions, but it is really fait acompli. I was kind of disheartened at the lack of detail. I'm worried to that the NRF and NIMS don't really match up so you have a incident command system that doesn't meet up with the strategic coordination system. My understanding is that the military doesn't do joint coordination any better either and yet they are held up as the great model. There is a lot of distance between bullets and boots and the Fusion centers have never done the firefighters that much good. The can but they haven't.

[slapout9]

What, do you imagine, are the disadvantages to a broader focus that encompasses fighting terrorism and crime?

None. It is how it should be and how it was really meant to be. The concept of NCIC (National Crime Information Center) which was the first attempt to computerize and share all information across state lines could have been upgraded and expanded for a lot less money. It is like COIN the best stuff is the old stuff. But if you call it new you get better funding. IMHO

[Jedburgh]

You've probably seen the recent NY Times article about the lack of terrorism focus by Fusion Centers. I think that's taking far too narrow a view at how these centers should be doing their work, or even what the scope of that work should be.

That article spun the GAO report in manner consciously chosen to grab readers for the paper. That's what they do. That's also why I tend to ignore news articles about such reports and actually read the damn thing myself.

Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers

Why GAO Did This Study

In general, a fusion center is a collaborative effort to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity. Recognizing that fusion centers are a mechanism for information sharing, the federal government—including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), which has primary responsibility for governmentwide information sharing and is located in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence—is taking steps to partner with fusion centers.

In response to your request, GAO examined (1) the status and characteristics of fusion centers and (2) to what extent federal efforts help alleviate challenges the centers identified. GAO reviewed center-related documents and conducted interviews with officials from DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE, and conducted semistructured interviews with 58 state and local fusion centers. The results are not generalizable to the universe of fusion centers. Data are not available on the total number of local fusion centers.