Key US Army Ranks Begin to Thin

[Tom Odom]

Evenn though I'm on the outside looking in, I think there would be a lot of brakes applied by the SF community, because FID is one of its staples, right. Even if they may have swung to the direct action end of things of late, its still another ricebowl that would require some superb leadership to push through.

That maybe but I have seen no evidence so far. Rather to the contrary, a number of SF folks given "Big Thumbs Up" because this bowl of rice is too big for them to do more than nibble at along the edge.

Tom

[sullygoarmy]

Good point Tom. The SF community didn't want to touch the Iraqi advisor mission with a 10 foot pole. Its one thing to be training indig forces in a guerilla type mission. Its a whole nother ball game to try and recreate a functioning army with all its rank, structure, logistics, systems, etc. If I were SF, I wouldn't want that mission either! Hence the reason you see a big shift in SF guys over to DA missions. Some SF units worked with the more "special" Iraqi units but that was only for a limited time. When you are talking about standing up an 11 division army, there is not enough special operators in the entire force to do that...its a tall order.

Personally, I'd love to have enough SF to be the trainers, advisors and mentors for every SFA mission out there. That would keep tankers like myself back on the big boys. However, the reality shows and history proves that when trying to build large scale armies, you need to dip into the conventional force to do it. Rather than recreate the wheel over and over again (KMAG in Korea, CORDS in Vietnam, etc) why not train up some of our active conventional force to be advisors? If you want to build up either indig guerrillas or SF units, use the SF teams. For a conventional army with all its systems and support elements, you'll need we non-special folks.

Phil, additionally there are alot of activities going on the GWOT which do not fit into a conventional FID definition. FID doesn't involve working with border units, customs folks, police units, etc. We are pushing the term Security Force Assistance which our approved definition is: "All actions taken in concert with partner nations to generate, employ, sustain and transition the security forces of those nations in support of theater or regional security cooperation effots, plans, campaigns and operations."

FID is defined as: Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The focus of all U.S. FID efforts is to support the HN’s program of internal defense and development (IDAD). IDAD is ideally a preemptive strategy; however, if an insurgency, illicit drug, terrorist, or other threat develops, IDAD becomes an active strategy to combat that threat.

SFA differs from FID in that FID only deals with internal threats. SFA deals with internal and external threats as they are often connected, and SFA focuses on the same security forces that deal with both types of threats. SA (Security Assistance) while a part of FID, could also be focused exclusively at external threats.

That's just a bit from our SFA Planners Guide that we are working on here at JCISFA. In terms of numbers, we have somewhere in the ballpark of 5K working the advisor piece in Iraq. Using that as a guesstimate planning factor, I'd look at building up an Advisor Corps consisting of about 2000 Officers and 3000 NCOs. We don't need to limit it to the Army as well. Everyone knows there are Marines, Air Force and (gulp) even some Navy TTs out there alone and unafraid doing their best to train our newfound friends. 5000 personnel out of DOD is a fairly small investment for some long term advisor skills and experience. Like we see over and over again, this stuff ain't new to the U.S. Military!

[Stan]

Sully,
You hit on some very good if not old and sore points (with me anyway). These soldiers were all around us, in some real inhospitable places, not being promoted, remotely recognized and worse, not being used where they would be most helpful. It's no wonder why most of 'them' following the 20 mark got out. Sadly, few would recognize those needs/talents til they were gone.

Additionally, I agree we need to build up an "Advisor Corps" of selected officers and NCOs, screened for their abilities to build rapport, adapt to different cultures and to be self-sufficient in a fluid environment.

why not train up some of our active conventional force to be advisors? If you want to build up either indig guerrillas or SF units, use the SF teams. For a conventional army with all its systems and support elements, you'll need we non-special folks.

Well said !

[jcustis]

MSOCs and FMTU may be Marines, but they are SOCOM forces. I doubt that they will operate in direct support of, or with, other USMC forces. There may be bleed over in skills/knowledge when FMTU Marines go back to USMC operating forces, but FMTU will be built and trained to fulfill SOCOM missions. That is good for SOCOM and generally good for the nation, but, bottom-line, it is force structure that the Marine Corps no longer owns.

An excellent point I had actually meant to add.