I figure I might as well share the concept while I hammer out the remaining details. I intend to set up a quick website or forum in the near future to help facilitate play testing. If anyone is interested in helping develop the project (or just play testing for the fun of it), please PM me.
Anyway, The Long War: Afghanistan 2001 - 2016 is a strategic simulation of the War in Afghanistan allowing players to control the US (and NATO/ISAF), GIRoA, or the Taliban (and its affiliated networks). Players must pursue distinct victory conditions by the end of 2016 while contending with the complexities of a protracted small war in a fourth world state. The game board will depict Afghanistan's 34 provinces, four of its major cities, eight Pakistani border provinces, and AFG's northern and western neighbors. Each province has a terrain, weather, stability, and development modifier.
Turns represent six months of time, starting in Fall 2001 and ending in Fall 2016. There are fixed events tied to some turns, such as US Presidential Elections, that affect game rules for that turn.
Each side has a respective opinion rating measured 0 - 100 that is at the core of the player's objectives. Not only are they tied to victory conditions, but the rating also affects the number of available actions in a turn as well as how many cards that can be drawn at the end of a turn. There is also a fourth rating to measure international interest in the conflict.
Each side also has unique rules, policies, cards, and units. Policies are overarching strategies that affect which cards are available (i.e. counter-terrorism vs counter-insurgency). Because each card also has a condition that must be met (often tied to the type of unit in a province), there is a direct connection between policy decisions, force structure, and tactical/operational decisions. Policies can be changed at will but at considerable cost to oneself, or under specific conditions at no cost (i.e. after an election for a US player).
During a turn, a player may conduct a certain amount of actions. These actions may be with a specific unit (each unit has its own mission type, and mobility and survivability ratings), which have minimal affects on the big picture, or with an operational card, which represent tactical and operational decisions (such as a "Night Raid") and have a slightly larger impact. However, besides their immediate effects, cards also have counter-actions and unintended consequences. Counter-actions are designated operational cards in another player's deck that can be played out of turn in immediate response to a played card (both operational and strategic). Counter-actions can be played until players decide to quit using them or until the card hand is exhausted. Cards can also have unintended consequences, which is determined by a die roll and have a negative impact on either the player himself or another player. For example, the "Night Raid" card might be effective in removing Taliban pieces from the board, but it also reduces GIRoA legitimacy. Legitimacy is further damaged if "civilian casualties" occur. The playing of the card can prompt the GIRoA player to use the "Denounce Civilian Casualties" card as a counter-action, which repairs GIRoA legitimacy to some extent but at the cost of US domestic opinion.
Players can also play one strategic card during a turn, which has a greater impact on the game or even game mechanics. It may significantly improve ratings across the board, or it might suspend the use of another player's advantage. These reflect larger political decisions that shape the battlefield on its edges. The US can play a "Political Pressure on Pakistan" card to reduce Taliban unit survivability across the board in Pakistani provinces (making them more vulnerable to some US operational cards). Like operational cards, these too have a counteraction and unintended consequence. But they are more severe -- the UI to the US card mentioned above is the low-risk of prompting a military coup that jealously guards its sovereignty, resulting in the revocation of the US in using some cards.
Lastly, victory conditions are "complex". That is, they are not necessarily dependent on the success or failure of the other players, which can result in any combination of players "winning", or none winning at all. For example, the US and GIRoA share a common victory condition in measuring GIRoA legitimacy, but the necessary number is different, giving some space for tension (and exploitation by a shrewd Taliban player).
There are a host of other details, such as US force caps and deployment schedules and Taliban key leaders, but I'll leave that for later in the conversation. The intent is to capture the complexity of decision-making, with its constant change in opportunities and dangers, while trying to stay focused on the light at the end of the tunnel and keeping the other players at arms length. The US could crush the Taliban militarily, but at what cost to GIRoA? And what would it cost and how long would it take for the US to shift policies? Can GIRoA afford to forgo development to focus on security and stability? And what strategy can the Taliban implement to exploit the narrow but deep differences in its two adversaries?
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