Wargaming Small Wars (merged thread)

[SWJED]

This Colonel seems to be a prepossessing person.

By the way, is there any department within the DoD which would be in charge of selecting and training officers publicly expressing themselves about current issues and else; so as to treat the Army's image with care, I mean?

...he is retired so he is his own person, he is highly respected within and out of DoD, he has served from Vietnam through Iraq to inlude Somalia, Sri Lanka and Lebanon, and he is a colleague and a friend of mine. I'd do some homework before attacking the person and not the message. Message - fair game - personal attacks - off limits here. Thank you.

[Rob Thornton]

By the way, is there any department within the DoD which would be in charge of selecting and training officers publicly expressing themselves about current issues and else; so as to treat the Army's image with care, I mean?

Dominique, I'm afraid I don't understand your question. Although the institution that is the Army could be considered an entity, we tend to view the U.S. Army as the people who serve in it. This may be very different from other states (the nation types) in which an Army or other military branch might have had been its own sort of political body. Since around the late 1700s , we've had the same constitution, albeit with a few ammendments. I think we're a culture apart in that regard - meaning the circumstances of that have created some uniqueness to our military culture. That is why the chiefs are sworn to give their best military advice to the government and not just a sole branch, and also why we take oath to the Constitution, and not a party or sitting president (although he is in our chain of command).

OK - that was the long answer. The short answer is no, and I think if we did adopt a sort of political education we'd quickly move to the shallow end of the gene pool and drown in blue blood.

Hope that helps - Regards, Rob

[Dominique R. Poirier]

I am sorry if you felt offended in some way by my comment, and I sincerely regret it.

It intended to be a critic, as you rightly assumed; but on the form, not the content which I do not question at all, indeed.

It all comes from my professional experience in communication, a middle in which one uses to be highly sensitive about the form which exerts tremendous influence upon image.
This applies to politics and to public services too and, as in the realm of communication for private companies, this factor is as much influential as the content of the discourse.
In the history of politics, many very good candidates lost just because they lacked and neglected training and experience in public speeches before a camera.

However, I do not regret my remark since I consider that it is of no service not to warn when such problem occurs; quite on the contrary.

I have once read somewhere that Napoleon 1st would have said (I quote in substance from recollection): “Never warn an enemy who he is doing a mistake.”

Sincerely,

[pvebber]

Any of you folks going to the MORS Wargaming and Analysis conference next week?

[Steve Blair]

I should be so lucky....

[Rob Thornton]

Rex, that is a very cool web site and idea! I don't think I've heard of anything like it before done like you have it laid out.

Shek might be interested in this for one of his classes. I can see good utility for this across the PME - I like it because the numbers of people almost guarantee complexity and the problems with getting people to accommodate other views. It could be about brokering peace, dealing with a HN bureaucracy, getting tribes to work together, etc. Doing it over a full week allows people to come around - or at least to better understand each other's position. Do an AAR (a "what did we learn") at the end of it about each other, ourselves and the process and you have some "how" to learn about people and their interests stuff going on.

You should consider doing a paper on this for the SWJ - and discuss how the process evolves.

Best, Rob

[Rank amateur]

Rex, I have three questions, which I couldn't find answers to on the website, though I may have just missed the correct links.

1. Are the students more likely to reach agreement under lots of pressure, or if someone comes in and relieves the pressure?
   
2. Are they more likely to come to agreement if there's no fighting, or if they've bloodied each other a little?
   
3. What can we learn from these experiments? (Feel free to point me to someone's thesis. There's no reason you should do all the work.)

[jcustis]

To add to what Rob said, this looks like an excellent and rich simulation that would have a lot of relevance for NGOs that are deploying teams to a mission environment. Have you seen any such interest from that quarter?

I'm involved in training delivered by the Humanitarain Distance Learning Center out of Australia (Security Management), and something like this would make for a great practical exercise among students who are on the long study track towards certification.

That has to be a huge effort. Kudos on it.

[Rex Brynen]

Rex, I have three questions, which I couldn't find answers to on the website, though I may have just missed the correct links.

1. Are the students more likely to reach agreement under lots of pressure, or if someone comes in and relieves the pressure?
   
2. Are they more likely to come to agreement if there's no fighting, or if they've bloodied each other a little?
   
3. What can we learn from these experiments? (Feel free to point me to someone's thesis. There's no reason you should do all the work.)

The military part of the simulation is designed to be a hurting stalemate from the start, with no one actor able to achieve an easy victory on the battlefield. Usually it takes a day or two before they fully realize this, though--and it is not unusual to get hardliner vs softliner splits emerging early on within the government and the various insurgent groups. It is rare that an agreement is reached without some fighting during simulation week, and poorly-framed agreements usually break down anyway.

It is, of course, not intended to be a military simulation (I have lots of experience with those on the hobby side, but this is really about other issues). I sometimes have to restrain the passions of students with military experience who want me to draw up detailed tactical maps of a country that doesn't exist.

After a few days of jockeying, the government often tries to negotiate a partial peace with one of the main combatants, to allow them to concentrate on the others. It is a useful lesson in the fact that peace negotiations and agreements can be as much about gaining operational or strategic advantage as gaining peace.

On the rebel side, meanwhile, they're often trying to hold an anti-government coalition together while fundamentally mistrusting each other. It can go in very different directions at this point.

The simulation is in a vaguely African setting overall, as evident from the weak economy and military, the poor transportation system, conflict diamonds, and the limited levels of international engagement. It is not considered a US vital interest, so the Marine BLT potentially available to the US team (if it does anything at all) is usually limited to evacuations of foreign nationals or offshore backstopping of a UN or other multilateral PKO. One of the things I really have to do in the class is highlight that, in the real world, only limited numbers of forces are ever likely to be available for peace operations, only under certain conditions, and that external actors have much less leverage over civil wars than is commonly thought. They all seem to think you service guys are omnipotent

On a side note, I've run the SIM some years when the US team is all Americans, and the French team is all from France. That can be fun, as I know Tom and Stan can attest from their real adventures in central Africa!

As for broader lessons, it is largely a teaching device, intended to demonstrate things I've lectured on in the classroom during the previous 10 weeks. Usually students manage to reproduce (without any interference from me) all sort of real life problems of coordination, unintended consequences, fog of war/peace, UN Security Council paralysis, national rivalries, military vs UN vs NGO worldviews, etc.

To give one of my favourite examples: one year the UNICEF team did a ton of research, and put together a technically outstanding maternal/child health care project, complete with a family planning component. It was great work, and they managed to get enough donor funds to launch the project in several districts. They did a needs assessment, and decided to launch the project in the areas of greatest need, in the south. It all seemed routine enough, so they didn't consult very closely with the UN SRSG, who in any case was tied up in sensitive negotiations.

The main ethnic rebel group then learned that UNICEF was introducing family planning only in the south--that is, the home base of their "Zaharian" ethnic group. In a civil war that is in large parts about demographics, this was seen as highly threatening--and so the rebels started kidnapping UN staff in response to what they termed the "UN eugenics program." Of course, cynically, the fact that they had found an issue to beat the SRSG over the head with was far from inconsequential. The net result was a severely distraught UNICEF player, and a UN mediator that had to bend over backwards to calm supposed Zaharian fury.

As Rob suggests, they do after action reports/debriefs/lessons learned post-SIM. We may play around this year with embedding a social psychology experiment in part of the SIM--but I can't provide details lest I prewarn my web-browsing students

[bongotastic]

Hi, I've been putting together a site with links to a range of topics on modern wargaming and wargame design. The assymetric and red teaming are two things that I'd like to expand on. Feel free to check it out and suggest new source of information that isn't there.

Cheers,

http://sites.google.com/site/bongotastic/

bongotastic

[BayonetBrant]

another list
http://grognews.blogspot.com/p/coin-wargaming.html

and more to be found over at PaxSims

[John]

I am currently in CGSC and a SAMS selectee. Deployment experience and now the word of academics has led me to believe the Army no longer has a viable model for wargaming for stabilization / counter-insurgent operations. The linear process is no longer feasible given the number of variables, threats, competitors, etc. (i.e. action, reaction, counteraction is a thing of the past).

I am beginning my thesis research in this area of wargaming. Specifically looking at a model that provides an idea of what questions should be looked at. Honestly, I am not convinced that wargaming is feasible given the complexity of influences along a given LOE.

Thoughts and perspective would be appreciated.

Cheers
John

[jcustis]

You've probably already seen his posts if you conducted any degree of forum searches, but I recommend that you might want to talk with member Nichols first and foremost.

[Rex Brynen]

I am beginning my thesis research in this area of wargaming. Specifically looking at a model that provides an idea of what questions should be looked at. Honestly, I am not convinced that wargaming is feasible given the complexity of influences along a given LOE.

Thoughts and perspective would be appreciated.

I think, as a first step, one needs to think about what one is wargaming, and why.

Is it for purposes of training? In that case, a well designed wargame can highlight operational complexities, and identify the sorts of questions, issues, and challenges that COIN and stability operations present. (On the other hand, if it implies to much clarity about this, I think it sends all the wrong signals.)

Is it for the purpose of operations planning? Here I'm much more dubious, although one can imagine wargame designs that help to identify possible responses by insurgents and others.

[William F. Owen]

I am currently in CGSC and a SAMS selectee. Deployment experience and now the word of academics has led me to believe the Army no longer has a viable model for wargaming for stabilization / counter-insurgent operations. The linear process is no longer feasible given the number of variables, threats, competitors, etc. (i.e. action, reaction, counteraction is a thing of the past).

Warfare has never been linear, and the number of variable is quantifiable. This is just irregular warfare as opposed to regular warfare. You merely have to replicate the Ends, Ways and Means in a form that delivers the product you want. FIGHTING Irregulars is not very different from Fighting Regulars. War gaming really only works at the tactical level, so I suggest that is the limit of your enquiry.

I am beginning my thesis research in this area of wargaming. Specifically looking at a model that provides an idea of what questions should be looked at. Honestly, I am not convinced that wargaming is feasible given the complexity of influences along a given LOE.

Do you mean "gaming" or simulation? What is the exam question? ( see REX ) Warfare today is no more complex than it was 3,000 years ago. If you assume it is, you've just backed yourself into a corner.
Killing bad folks = gets points. Killing civilians = loosing points.
Irregular warfare generally requires greater discrimination in order to support the Policy = do not kill civilians.

Actually there are at least two PC based simulations that already account for this, - and do it pretty well.

[Bill Moore]

John,

Sounds like an interesting project, but perhaps being too long in the tooth I remain a skeptic of any attempt to seriously replicate a stability operation. However, I still think a game could be useful in introducing multiple variables that a commander/leader will have to consider ranging from security to economic development to developing peace arrangements between different warring factions.

Ideally any game developed would allow the integration of key players from the interagency, NGOs, PVOs, multi-national partners; and portray a complicated/complex environment such as Bosnia, Somalia, etc. At the same time following Wilf's focus at the tactical level, we should be able to scale it down to the tactical level by focusing on particular military missions such a security operations, providing humanitarian assistance, etc. I don't think the tactical piece of the game is that hard. We actually played games like this during the 90's focused on Peace Operations that are a form of Stability Operation, so you don't have to reinvent the wheel.

I agree with Wilf that war isn't more complicated now than it was in WWI or during the Vietnam conflict, but simply that the environmental variables have changed. We're not worried so much about conducting operations that may cross the red line anymore resulting in superpowers slinging nukes at one another. Now we're more concerned about misstepping, thus allowing or causing pockets of instability to expand and destabilize entire regions. This is a strategic level consideration that will define your limitations at the tactical level. For the gamers at the tactical level you're given a mission, your limitations, an environment, and then you play the game and see what ideas it generates.

[Duckhunter]

Warfare has never been linear, and the number of variable is quantifiable. This is just irregular warfare as opposed to regular warfare. You merely have to replicate the Ends, Ways and Means in a form that delivers the product you want. FIGHTING Irregulars is not very different from Fighting Regulars. War gaming really only works at the tactical level, so I suggest that is the limit of your enquiry.

Do you mean "gaming" or simulation? What is the exam question? ( see REX ) Warfare today is no more complex than it was 3,000 years ago. If you assume it is, you've just backed yourself into a corner. Killing bad folks = gets points. Killing civilians = loosing points.
Irregular warfare generally requires greater discrimination in order to support the Policy = do not kill civilians.

I admit that I am new to this blog; however, I would like to respectfully disagree with Mr. Owen. I will start by saying that I am a current Army field-grade officer and CGSC student. Also, I have read many posts by Mr. Owen, and I find his comments to be largely lucid, intelligent, and well-said. Nonetheless, I feel obligated to disagree on many points in his post.

At first glance, there is nothing shocking (or shockingly wrong) with Mr. Owen's comments. However, as I read them more deeply, I think those comments are made without an appreciation for the complexity of a counter-insurgency.

First of all, he contends that

Warfare has never been linear.

Many historians argue that linear warfare was the norm until 1939, when the German blitzkrieg defeated Poland and essentially altered the nature of combat. This strategy (coined "third generation warfare" by the United States in 1989) focused on maneuver, speed, surprise, and synchronization to overwhelm the enemy. So, historically speaking, warfare was ENTIRELY linear before 1939.

When Mr. Owen states that

"Killing bad folks = gets points. Killing civilians = lossing [sic] points

I can't help but cringe a little. Clearly, killing civilians on a regular basis is not going to win any friends among the local population. However, "killing bad folks" is an oversimplification that borders on intellectual arrogance. First of all, how does one define "bad?" While this seems like an absurd question, there are countless levels of "bad," and not all of them should be solved with lethal fire. In many cases, it is actually preferrable to leverage lower-level criminals, insurgents, etc., as a way to glean more information about the higher-tier individuals. This is a fairly common practice in poorly-acted crime shows, but the fact is that it works on the ground in places like Vietnam, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. So, no..."killing bad folks" does not necessarily get points. In some cases, the losses grotesquely outweigh the gains.

Finally, I take issue with the claim that

Warfare today is no more complex than it was 3,000 years ago. If you assume it is, you've just backed yourself into a corner.

I'm certain that every generation of veterans believe -and justifiably so, in my opinion- that they are fighting a different kind of war. But at no other time in history have the lines between tactical, operational, and strategic warfare been so blurred. The actions of a few Soldiers on the ground can produce second and third-order effects that immediately impact upon national strategy. A good, albeit overused example, is the Abu Graib scandal. The level of complexity that young men and women deal with while deployed is significant, as are the repurcussions of their actions. The slightest mistake is leveraged in the information age by insugents looking to capitalize from the fog of war. As the first conflict since the explosion of the Internet, the War on Terror makes headlines, across the globe, within minutes. That burden is heaped on the shoulders of young officers, NCOs, and enlisted personel. I think, in response to Mr. Owen's claims, that if you assume warfare today is the same as it was for the Doughboys of WWI, then you have, in fact, backed yourself into a corner.

I apologize for rambling. Again, I respect 99% of what Mr. Owen says. However, I did feel the need to voice a different opinion on this one post. Thank you for listening.

[William F. Owen]

Nonetheless, I feel obligated to disagree on many points in his post.

...and you are obligated. T'is why you are here!

First of all, he contends that Many historians argue that linear warfare was the norm until 1939, when the German blitzkrieg defeated Poland and essentially altered the nature of combat. This strategy (coined "third generation warfare" by the United States in 1989) focused on maneuver, speed, surprise, and synchronization to overwhelm the enemy. So, historically speaking, warfare was ENTIRELY linear before 1939.

Which historians? So the Greek Persian Wars were linear? Hannibal's campaign against Rome was linear? Wellington's campaign in Spain? The Spanish conquest of South America? The English Civil War? The US Civil War? ...and what does "linear" mean anyway? The first common and enduring use of the phrase "Front lines" - in Theatre terms - appears in WW1. It was never used in the same context before that.
There never was anything called "Blitzkrieg". It's baby talk, and the Germans never used the word. German operations in 1939 were based on tactical doctrine written in 1922/3 and that in turn developed from the Artillery Tactics of WW1 - often wrongly coined "Stormtrooper."

However, "killing bad folks" is an oversimplification that borders on intellectual arrogance. First of all, how does one define "bad?" While this seems like an absurd question, there are countless levels of "bad," and not all of them should be solved with lethal fire.

Killing the folks who oppose your policy is why you fight. "Bad" means exactly that. Warfare is about the breaking of will, via violence. All else is diplomacy.
Warfare requires killing. Killing is instrumental, so must be applied against the right people for the right reasons. Who you need to kill is why you have intelligence. FIND, FIX, STRIKE, and EXPLOIT works in all warfare, regardless of the enemy or the policy - and even Galula could not avoid that fact - he just couldn't admit it!

But at no other time in history have the lines between tactical, operational, and strategic warfare been so blurred.

Why are they blurred? What do you not understand?
a.) There is not an "operational level of war." There is tactics and strategy.
b.) Operations are those things an army does to ensure tactical action occurs in the time and place best suited to the political aims required.

The actions of a few Soldiers on the ground can produce second and third-order effects that immediately impact upon national strategy.

I submit winning the Battle of Waterloo (tactical action of a "few soldiers") had strategic effect!
300 Spartans did the same (in myth anyway).
5-10 Bombs dropped by 5-10 men, won the Battle of Midway.
One U-boat captain sinking the Lusitania provided the US with a pretext for War.

A good, albeit overused example, is the Abu Graib scandal.

Explain the actual strategic out come of Abu Graib? Give me facts. What did it actually change?

The level of complexity that young men and women deal with while deployed is significant, as are the repurcussions of their actions. The slightest mistake is leveraged in the information age by insugents looking to capitalize from the fog of war.

How is this new? WW1 was started by one assassination. What about a mistake by Nuke Boat driver in the Cold War?

As the first conflict since the explosion of the Internet, the War on Terror makes headlines, across the globe, within minutes. That burden is heaped on the shoulders of young officers, NCOs, and enlisted personel.

No it isn't. This is a myth. - and the internet and conflict existed well before 2001! War on terror? War on an abstract noun? It may be more complicated because Presidents do no understand the instrumental nature of strategy.

I apologize for rambling. Again, I respect 99% of what Mr. Owen says. However, I did feel the need to voice a different opinion on this one post. Thank you for listening.

No apology required. First call me Wilf and second, voice away.
-Point is, you seem to have brought into all the comforting myths of modern warfare that forgives folks not studying military history both in breadth and in depth. It is incredibly arrogant of the modern generation to assume they have it tougher or more complex.
It is simply without evidence. Confusion born of ignorance (no offence intended) does not mean "complex." Warfare has always been about the most complex human affair on the planet.
Loosing on Iwo Jima or Okinawa would almost certainly have had far greater strategic consequences than defeat/withdrawal in both Iraq or Afghanistan.
Washington loosing his entire Army in one administrative river crossing at Trenton would have had similar effect.

[marct]

Hi Duckhunter,

Welcome aboard. If you get a chance, you should intrioduce yourself a bit more over here.

At first glance, there is nothing shocking (or shockingly wrong) with Mr. Owen's comments. However, as I read them more deeply, I think those comments are made without an appreciation for the complexity of a counter-insurgency.

First of all, he contends that Many historians argue that linear warfare was the norm until 1939, when the German blitzkrieg defeated Poland and essentially altered the nature of combat. This strategy (coined "third generation warfare" by the United States in 1989) focused on maneuver, speed, surprise, and synchronization to overwhelm the enemy. So, historically speaking, warfare was ENTIRELY linear before 1939.

Well, Wilf and I have had our go arounds, but I have to agree with him on this point. Let me just raise three examples that demolish the silly idea that maneuver warfare is something "new":

• the M'aryanni explosion in ~1850 bce
• the Barracks Emperors period (3rd century) in Rome
• the Mongol wars of Gengis

In the first example, we have a volkeswanderung that started around 2100 bce or so, went over the caucuses and resettled in the lake Van area. After a couple of hundred years of hiring out as mercenaries ("sutu" in the terms of the time), they decided to take over pretty much everything from what is now Iraq to Egypt - and succeeded. Why? Simple; six spoked, light chariots with bow and spear. They could, and did, annihilate every "conventional" military they went up against.

In the second example, a lot of the "revolts" were semi-spontaneous expressions of what we would now (inaccurately) call "nationalism" (e.g. Palmyra under Zenobia). What we actually have, at least from what we can get out of the archaeology and the records, is an ongoing, multi-sided civil war with spontaneous tribal insurgencies breaking out for about 80 years. Totally freakin' messy, and driven, in part, by the development of some fairly sophisticated cultural engineering technology in the 1st century ce which made it easier for local generals and leaders to revolt. All in all, and incredibly "fluid" situation which makes Iraq and Afghanistan look like a model of "stability" and predictability.

The third example, the Mongols under Gengis, is pretty well know. I would have to say that, given the technology available in the 12th century, being able to co-ordinate the movements of 100k+ men over a 200+ mile front, moving upwards of 60 miles a day over a wide variety of terrain just isn't "linear warfare".

When Mr. Owen states that I can't help but cringe a little. Clearly, killing civilians on a regular basis is not going to win any friends among the local population. However, "killing bad folks" is an oversimplification that borders on intellectual arrogance. First of all, how does one define "bad?" While this seems like an absurd question, there are countless levels of "bad," and not all of them should be solved with lethal fire. In many cases, it is actually preferrable to leverage lower-level criminals, insurgents, etc., as a way to glean more information about the higher-tier individuals. This is a fairly common practice in poorly-acted crime shows, but the fact is that it works on the ground in places like Vietnam, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. So, no..."killing bad folks" does not necessarily get points. In some cases, the losses grotesquely outweigh the gains.

That is a point, but it also highlights one of the problems with ongoing discussions. Everyone, and this does seem to be a species "habit", tends to create verbal shorthands, and Wilfs "bad folks" is one such.

Finally, I take issue with the claim that I'm certain that every generation of veterans believe -and justifiably so, in my opinion- that they are fighting a different kind of war.

Different in specifics, maybe, but hardly different in its nature. I don't know if you ever talked with anyone who fought in both WW I and WW II, but the ones I have talked with would talk about both the similarities and the differences.

But at no other time in history have the lines between tactical, operational, and strategic warfare been so blurred. The actions of a few Soldiers on the ground can produce second and third-order effects that immediately impact upon national strategy.

Exactly the same thing happened, albeit with a lower speed of propagation, in the Barracks Emperors period, in the 5th century resettlement of the Goths (which lead to Adrianople; another great maneuver warfare example), and in the Wars of the Roses in England.

A good, albeit overused example, is the Abu Graib scandal. The level of complexity that young men and women deal with while deployed is significant, as are the repurcussions of their actions. The slightest mistake is leveraged in the information age by insugents looking to capitalize from the fog of war. As the first conflict since the explosion of the Internet, the War on Terror makes headlines, across the globe, within minutes. That burden is heaped on the shoulders of young officers, NCOs, and enlisted personel.

What the 'net changed was the velocity and volume of information that can be spread. It also shifted the dominant mode of communications from a centralized, state-supporting, broadcast technology model to an interactive analog technology model (cf, by way of example, The Soft Edge by Paul Levinson). This was a change in "rate", not "kind" similar to the shift brought about by moving from an 8 spoked chariot to a 6 spoked chariot. What is "different" about the spread of the 'net is that the information war, as an area of operations, is now highly interactive and capable of supporting major combat operations without relying on a major infrastructural investment. This change is piggy-backed on to the previous state from Vietnam where you still have a fairly widespread, broadcast capability that can be manipulated. If you want some of the precursors to this, look at the Great Bauermkrieg in the 16th century with the spread of inexpensive printing presses coupled with the development of the Thurn und Taxis mail system (originally Imperial couriers, then a post system).

I think, in response to Mr. Owen's claims, that if you assume warfare today is the same as it was for the Doughboys of WWI, then you have, in fact, backed yourself into a corner.

Well, I've never talked with any of the Doughboys, just some of the folks who were in it from the start (and do you know why they were called Doughboys ?).

Leaving that aside, you could, and I have, talked with people who were in WW I from different regiments, and the war wasn't "the same" for them. You are getting caught up in a logical fallacy that says if the experience was different then the "nature" of the event must be different. The problem with that, however, is that experience is individual while "nature" is a group property surround an entire event-space. this means that in order to get a better handle on the "nature" of an event-space interaction, you need to look at the structural factors that limit and condition that event-space.

Certainly there will be differences, and a lot of those differences are "caused" (don't get me started on why that is in quotes ) by changes in the socio-cultural technology available and in use.

I apologize for rambling. Again, I respect 99% of what Mr. Owen says. However, I did feel the need to voice a different opinion on this one post. Thank you for listening.

No need to apologize !

There are a couple of rather neat cultural memes that operates here: "attack the message, not the messenger" and "agree to disagree". This can definitely lead to "lively" discussions!

Cheers,

Marc

ps. apologies for the tight focus on changing technology; I'm in the process of prepping a course on the interaction of technology and warfare, so my brain is more than a little focused that way at the moment.

[BayonetBrant]

First things first, go find Dr James Sterrett on the sims team down in the basement of the L&C bldg, and have a long conversation with him. He's the wargaming guru down there, and has a great wealth of experience that can (at least) help point you toward some great resources. While you're there, ask him what the difference is between a "game" and a "sim" and see how long it takes him to ask "did Brant put you up to this?"

Second, and more to you direct area of interest - you need to ask what the point of the wargame is within the context you're observing. Part of what comes out of the MDMP wargame is the identification of key decision points, and the CCIRs that drive those DPs. Regardless of "linear" or not, that output is still relevant, significant, and useful.

MDMP wargaming for COIN is still branches, sequels, and FRAGOs, just much more divergent than before, and may require more nebulous descriptors than we've had in the past - especially at higher echelons where you increase the involvement of participants not under military control (DoS, USAID, etc). You're branches and sequels are no longer "what if they attack the flank" but now "what if they start bombing day-care centers".


However, let me also say that you can NOT throw out the 'conventional' type of MCMP wargaming any more than you can throw out the 'conventional' maneuver plan or 'conventional' combat doctrine of the US military. No other gov't agency in the US 'owns' warfare the way DoD does. Lots of people have a stake in COIN/nation-building, like DoS, DoJ, USDA, CIA, USAID, etc. Only one owns conventional warfighting, and if we don't do it, there's no backup plan.