Who are the great generals?

[Rob Thornton]

One of the great criticisms of many generals has been their inability to see beyond land. Certainly its a criticism of many German generals. The inability to consider the joint realm as it is named today would indicate an inclination toward personal constraints.

Rare is the flag who can employ air, land and sea-power in a complimentary and synchronous manner to achieve an end.

In today's arena we see COCOMs that are not land generals, but AF generals and Navy admirals. I see no reason why we should limit our list to generals who have employed land forces, rather I propose we expand it to those flags who have commanded land and/or sea and air forces to achieve an end. There is no reason why we should constrain ourselves

Regards, Rob

[Ken White]

Hi Rob;

Flags count, question is, should they?

Generalship has a definition; "Military skill in a high commander"

M-W says about military:
1 a : of or relating to soldiers, arms, or war b : of or relating to armed forces; especially : of or relating to ground or sometimes ground and air forces (*) as opposed to naval forces

Admiralship does not have a definition. While I've known more smart Admirals (my old man was a Squid) than I have smart Generals and I certainly acknowledge that strategic vision and political acumen are the requirements for any good FlagO of any service but mlitary skill and naval warfare skill differ.

I'm not trying to be tedious or petty here; there's a point. That point is the American way of war and peace (problematic at times but I wouldn't change it for another); civilian control of the military (imperative IMO); and Goldwater Nichols.

The American way of war and peace says any FlagO from any service can be a joint commander (or the CJCS) and, we being good guys, tend to rotate these jobs so everyone gets a share of the pie.

In my view that's dumb. The Geograhic commands need a lot of tweaking IMO and which service commands isn't all that critical -- PROVIDED that CinC leaves his subordiantes alone (and I'll give the Navy credit for doing tha better then the other services will). That 'provided' is, though, a critical factor. If that cinC is going to meddle, he should be of the service that is the largest component or the opertational lead in the region.

Since G-N took the Chiefs of Staff out of the advisory loop and that responsibility is now vested solely in the CJCS; Houston, we have a problem.

Look at the workup to Iraq. The Commander in Chief (Note 1 - ex aviator, no land warfare experience), The SecDef (Note 1 again) and the CJCS (Note 1 again) could not spell ground combat. The CincCent was an Artillerist -- good folks but not maneuver oriented and the first pick to pacify Iraq was a Tanker noted for excessive attention to force protection and micromangament.

I submit that the system did not put the best people for the job in the right places. An Admiral in the mix may not have done any more harm -- and at CJCS level might have done some good, particularly if he was a surface guy and not a bubble head or an airedale

(No attacks, please; my Father in law was a bubble head and my best friend is an aviator with gold wings -- the objection is practical based on experience and thought patterns in organizing for combat. I wouldn't recommend a balck shoe guy for an air war...)

Which is a long, long way of saying collegiality has its weak points and while I don't really disagree with you on FlagOs, the question asked was Generals and I think there are some differences....

(*) I'd even disagree with Air...(See Myers. R )

Regards,
Ken

[wm]

Since Rob and Ken have already argued for an expanded list, my proposal for a very high ranking "fly boy" addition to the list is:

"Smiling" Albert Kesselring

Another German defensive specialist would be:

Gotthard Heinrici from the Russian Front. (Anyone who was unfortunate enough to have to take command of an Army Group previously led by Himmler gets special points. The fact that he was successful in leading it too during the 1945 campaigns gives him many positives strokes in my book.)

And his Russian counterpoint:

Vasili Chuikov, defender of Stalingrad and captor of Berlin.

Many names offered up fit into the category of great captains (I particularly like Ken's list), but I think many of those names are much more tactical hot shots than grand leaders at the operational/strategic level--Rommel being a prime example. BTW, a close reading of his descriptions in Infantry Attacksshows that he was at his best leading from the front in a small group operation.

As requested in the original post, I have added a few "older" leaders for consideration:

Frederick the Great of Prussia
Prince Eugene of Savoy (His co-leader, Marlborough, was already noted.)
Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden
Saladin/Salah al-Din from the Crusades/Horns of Hattin/Capture of Jerusalem fame
Zenobia, Queen of Palmyra
Marcus Aurelius
Deborah/Barak (tough to tell from the literature who was really in charge)
Joshua

The fact of the matter is that many "great" generals/leaders are so only because of the great set of advisors and planners that they have/have had working for them. Too bad a lot of those folks get swallowed up in the archives because they do not have good press agents.

[goesh]

Let's not forget Shaka Zulu, Crazy Horse, Tecumseh, Chief Joseph and Geronimo and I suppose we could throw in Cornstalk, Little Turtle, Red Cloud, Dull Knife and Sitting Bull too.

[Stan]

Let's not forget Shaka Zulu, Crazy Horse, Tecumseh, Chief Joseph and Geronimo and I suppose we could throw in Cornstalk, Little Turtle, Red Cloud, Dull Knife and Sitting Bull too.

Hey Goesh,

We are still talking about military leaders, correct ? I'll admit, Cornstalk got me searching Dogpile...albeit only briefly

Coincidently, a famous E6 known only as GT6 was deep-sixed (once again) ! Years from now, he'll also be in Wiki along with Cornstalk.

[Rank amateur]

There should probably be some Vietnamese generals on the list.

I think Ike deserves some recognition for being the first to really lead a coalition of nations, while deploying air, land and sea assets.

I read somewhere that Lee was educated with every one of the Union generals he initially confronted (they may've all been classmates at West Point, but I'm not sure about that) and Grant was the first Union general that Lee didn't know personally. An interesting example of "Know your enemy, know your self."

[Rob Thornton]

Hi RA,
I was under the impression that Lee and Grant did not know each other either, however, Grant states in his memoirs that he had met Lee in Mexico- to paraphrase it goes something like this, "I had met Lee in Mexico and knew that he was human". This plays out in the Wilderness campaign up at Saunder's Field when the Army of Potomac's lead elements make contact with the Army of Northern Virginia and shows some hesitation - they were afraid that Lee was going show up in their rear if they committed. Grant tells his subordinates to quit worrying about Lee somersaulting into their rear and to start worrying about what they were going to do to Lee's army (again a paraphrase). So I think it more along the lines of how well the knew each other (however, your point is well taken

After Grant ordered the 2nd attack at Cold Harbor just NE of Richmond, McClellan wrote to his wife and said that he thought Grant now understood that Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia were a higher caliber then those he'd (Grant) faced down in the West. However, I think that while Grant was willing to enter into a war of exhaustion where he lost 2 for every 1 of Lees as long as it provided him an operational advantage, he was not keen on throwing them away for nothing - it was at Cold Harbor (3 Jun 1864) he was labeled as a butcher. Its worth keeping in mind public expectations were high since Grant was near Richmond, and that there was still a political timetable present.

Although the two generals were matching each other closely through out the Wilderness Campaign, and I believe had the sense of how urgent things were and where they were headed, they also fell victim to some mirror imaging. Grant was convinced Lee was near the breaking point after the Army of Northern Virginia had failed to exploit an opportunity while fighting over good ground at the North Anna (23-26 May 1864) - consequently he got in a hurry and it cost him.

In the end he had to slide South and West forcing Lee to extend his lines to match - around Petersburg. When Grant built up the Log base at City Point then seized Five forks and cut the RRs which provided LOCs with the South, it was pretty much over. Soon Lee would send word to Davis that he could no longer be responsible for Richmond - Lee was just over extended. Grant even had the foresight to take steps to prevent Lee from breaking out to go South and link up with the confederate forces in the western theater.

Another thing I think is relevant when discussing "who are the greats" is acknowledging that its rare to have a perfect record. Clausewitz comes in handy here, because fog, friction and chance always play a role and keep it more like a game of cards then a chess match (another shameless paraphrase). I think you have to consider the whole cloth of the General in question.

[stanleywinthrop]

Rare is the flag who can employ air, land and sea-power in a complimentary and synchronous manner to achieve an end.

I'm going to go out on a limb here--when I read this sentence one name came to mind-Douglas MacArthur.

When you look at his breadth of his Pacific Campaign, I see a general who fills the above description to a T. After the slugfest at Buna, MacArthur embarked on a campaign that minimized direct engagements all the way up the New Guinea coast and on to the Phillipines, when taken in the whole his entire 3 year campaign had fewer casualties than the Battle of the Buldge.

However, many (perhaps rightly) will not be able to see past MacArthur's extreme egotism. He was, according to one biographer, a "thundering paradox" of a man. He often refered to the Air Force and Navy under his command as "his Air Force, and his Navy" all the while skillfully employing each. The one real blight on his military career was his despondance at the inital Japanese invasion of the Phillipines, once he got engaged, we was able to skillfully maneuver his army intact to Bataan, but his delay to order this withdrawl ensured that not enough supplies would be transported as well, therefore dooming his command.

[Tom Odom]

I'm going to go out on a limb here--when I read this sentence one name came to mind-Douglas MacArthur.

When you look at his breadth of his Pacific Campaign, I see a general who fills the above description to a T. After the slugfest at Buna, MacArthur embarked on a campaign that minimized direct engagements all the way up the New Guinea coast and on to the Phillipines, when taken in the whole his entire 3 year campaign had fewer casualties than the Battle of the Buldge.

True but when you look at his actions in the PI after Pearl Harbor, the contrast is stunning. The same yin and yang applies to Korea. He ignored any signs the war would start because he said it would not. He exhibited genius in the Inchon operation. And then he again returned to the pre-war mold and ignored the Chinese threat.

I will take a middle of the road, plodder anyday over a guy like Macarthur.

Tom

[Steve Blair]

True but when you look at his actions in the PI after Pearl Harbor, the contrast is stunning. The same yin and yang applies to Korea. He ignored any signs the war would start because he said it would not. He exhibited genius in the Inchon operation. And then he again returned to the pre-war mold and ignored the Chinese threat.

I will take a middle of the road, plodder anyday over a guy like Macarthur.

Tom

..........

[Steve Blair]

Don't forget, either, that one of MacArthur's tactics was to declare regions "secure" and haul out US troops, replacing them with Australian and New Zealand forces. Of course in most Pacific campaigns there were many pockets of resistance that remained after an island was "secure," so losses continued even though press coverage and command attention slipped away. It also held down the number of casualties reported during the initial operation...keeping his totals low.

MacArthur could also have the success he did thanks to the parallel campaign in the Central Pacific conducted by Nimitz and the massive US submarine campaign that practically destroyed the Japanese ability to move troops and supplies. Nimitz' moves kept the Japanese high command constantly guessing as to where a blow might fall, and the submarine campaign crippled their ability to respond to any shift on the part of the allies.

[stanleywinthrop]

Don't forget, either, that one of MacArthur's tactics was to declare regions "secure" and haul out US troops, replacing them with Australian and New Zealand forces. Of course in most Pacific campaigns there were many pockets of resistance that remained after an island was "secure," so losses continued even though press coverage and command attention slipped away. It also held down the number of casualties reported during the initial operation...keeping his totals low.

Yet the casualtiy comparison I made above applies for post-war figures as well. All casualties in his theatre would have been considered under his command, beacause he was the southwest pacific's "supreme" commander, whether those casualties occured on Austrailian or American troops.

MacArthur could also have the success he did thanks to the parallel campaign in the Central Pacific conducted by Nimitz and the massive US submarine campaign that practically destroyed the Japanese ability to move troops and supplies. Nimitz' moves kept the Japanese high command constantly guessing as to where a blow might fall, and the submarine campaign crippled their ability to respond to any shift on the part of the allies.

One could also make the same argument in reverse, that Nimitz was given freedom because of MacArthur's moves in New Guinea and further north. A more balanced review would conclude that the two drives were complimentary (which they were designed to be, by the way) and each derived benefits from the other.

[Steve Blair]

MacArthur still has more downsides than he does upsides. You could use the same combined operations yardstick to rank many of Nimitz' planners (Spruance, Kelly, and so on) in the same league as MacArthur, and they had fewer liabilities (as did Nimitz himself).

[stanleywinthrop]

MacArthur still has more downsides than he does upsides. You could use the same combined operations yardstick to rank many of Nimitz' planners (Spruance, Kelly, and so on) in the same league as MacArthur, and they had fewer liabilities (as did Nimitz himself).

For me, the casualties taken compared to the effect upon the enemy is an important way to examine a commander, and in that category MacAurther outweighed the Central Pacific commanders. I absolutly do not blame you for not overlooking MacArthur's extreme egotism, and his political aspirations were most definatly his fatal achilles heel.

[wm]

For me, the casualties taken compared to the effect upon the enemy is an important way to examine a commander, and in that category MacAurther outweighed the Central Pacific commanders. I absolutly do not blame you for not overlooking MacArthur's extreme egotism, and his political aspirations were most definatly his fatal achilles heel.

Caualties sustained need to be looked at in the context of the stiffness of the defense. I'd be interested in hearing opinions about how the Japanese defense compared in the two parts of the Pacific under discussion. (I have my own opinion on the matter, but it is not as well informed as others in this forum expect.)