Who are the great generals?

[wm]

I think if you’re adding US Air Force generals to the list then Vandenberg, Spaatz, or Arnold would be better choices rather than either LeMay and Doolittle. Or better yet General Buck Turgidson and Brigadier General Jack D. Ripper!

No list of great AF generals would be complete without General Dreedle!

[Gian P Gentile]

No list of great AF generals would be complete without General Dreedle!

WM; to be honest I actually forgot who Dreedle was, then I googled the name and realized of course the classic character in "Catch 22." Good call although for movie generals my vote still goes to old Buck. You know, when you mentioned Dreedle my first silly thought was one of Frank Zappa's kids; Moon Unit, Dweezil, and "General Dreedle."

Seriously I do think LeMay was one of the greatest operational Generals the American military has produced, at the level of a Patton or even Sherman. I think you can make the tentative comparison of LeMay's brilliant decision to shift from high-altitude precision bombing of the Japanese home islands in early 45 to low level fire bombing to General Patraeus's very recent decision to co-opt and arm our former enemy the non-alqueda sunni insurgents; although this comparison is still immature and tentative without the insights and wisdom of history on our side for the latter.

gian

[tequila]

COL Gentile, can you be more specific about this? I'm not a huge student of the air war in the Pacific, but I find it hard to characterize any change in '45 as constituting anything near the strategic shift that occurred with the embracing of the Sunni tribal/insurgent alliance, which has truly altered the dynamics on the ground. Japan's naval power had already been gutted by then and it had no hope of strategic victory on any level.

[Gian P Gentile]

COL Gentile, can you be more specific about this? I'm not a huge student of the air war in the Pacific, but I find it hard to characterize any change in '45 as constituting anything near the strategic shift that occurred with the embracing of the Sunni tribal/insurgent alliance, which has truly altered the dynamics on the ground. Japan's naval power had already been gutted by then and it had no hope of strategic victory on any level.

Hey Tequila:

Sure, a good book to read on American strategic bombing in the Pacific in World War II is Con Crane's classic "Bombs, Cities and Civilians." Crane highlights the operational shift that LeMay brought about. Prior to his taking command the Army Air Forces had stuck with their method of daylight, high-altitude precision bombing that had worked pretty well in the European theater. MG Haywood Hansell had tried in late 44 and early 45 to apply that same method against the Japanese home islands. For many reasons and conditions it was not having the desired effect. LeMay enters the picture and takes command, assesses the situation, and decides to change the operational method from high altitude precision bombing to low level fire bombing of Japanese cities. This was not an easy decision for LeMay to make; to so quickly discard an operational method that the army air force had based its existence on; it was dangerous institutionally for the airmen and tactically for the airmen flying the missions. But LeMay made it and at least operationally in terms of effects on Japanese war production it worked. I am leaving aside here many issues of course. So it is in this regard that I make the comparison to General Patraeus and his bold decision to arm and co-opt our former enemy the non-alqueda sunni insurgent. It is the decision and vision of the operational commander in which I make this comparison albeit tempered with the qualification that we still do not have the temporal distance and wisdom of history on our side for the latter.

Hope this clarifies.

gian

[tequila]

Hope this clarifies.

It certainly did, and thanks for the book recommendation. I've always had the cartoon image of LeMay the Mad Bomber in my mind whenever I thought of him, so it'll be good to see another side.

[Gian P Gentile]

It certainly did, and thanks for the book recommendation. I've always had the cartoon image of LeMay the Mad Bomber in my mind whenever I thought of him, so it'll be good to see another side.

Right; LeMay has become known from his later years as AF Chief of Staff during the early years of Vietnam when he made the notorious statement "Bomb them back into the Stoneage" and for his run as VP candidate under Wallace in 68. LeMay's later years obscure the reality that he was a superb tactical and operational air general in World War II.

thanks

gian

[Jayhawker]

I could not have explained it any better. LeMay is an interesting guy, what with the WWII innovation contrasted with his 1960s complete inability to understand the nature of the conflict in SE Asia.

The US Air Force Academy has a program that each class will chose its "Exemplar." Someone from the Air Force or Army Air Force history that is an example for that class to follow. Rumor has it that LeMay is not an allowed choice, due to his campaign platform and his statements about race and segregation.

On another related note discussed above, Catch-22 is still widely assigned for the cadets to read--glad to say.

[wm]

Hey Tequila:

Sure, a good book to read on American strategic bombing in the Pacific in World War II is Con Crane's classic "Bombs, Cities and Civilians." Crane highlights the operational shift that LeMay brought about. Prior to his taking command the Army Air Forces had stuck with their method of daylight, high-altitude precision bombing that had worked pretty well in the European theater. MG Haywood Hansell had tried in late 44 and early 45 to apply that same method against the Japanese home islands. For many reasons and conditions it was not having the desired effect. LeMay enters the picture and takes command, assesses the situation, and decides to change the operational method from high altitude precision bombing to low level fire bombing of Japanese cities. This was not an easy decision for LeMay to make; to so quickly discard an operational method that the army air force had based its existence on; it was dangerous institutionally for the airmen and tactically for the airmen flying the missions. But LeMay made it and at least operationally in terms of effects on Japanese war production it worked. I am leaving aside here many issues of course. So it is in this regard that I make the comparison to General Patraeus and his bold decision to arm and co-opt our former enemy the non-alqueda sunni insurgent. It is the decision and vision of the operational commander in which I make this comparison albeit tempered with the qualification that we still do not have the temporal distance and wisdom of history on our side for the latter.

Hope this clarifies.

gian

I may be misspeaking since I haven't looked at much on conventional bombing campaigns in the Pacific in over 30 years, but perhaps you are giving LeMay a little too much credit for the innovation. I think that earlier in the Pacific War, using the low-level tactics would have been well nigh impossible due to range restrictions on the availalble aircraft. The B-24, which was designed as a high altitude bomber and which was a notably difficult aircraft to fly had a range of 2100NM, the B-17's was about 1700. The medium, low altitiude bombers like the B25 came in around 1200NM or less. The B-29, with its 2800NM range, was the first aircraft to attack the Japanese "mainland" after the Doolittle raid and that did not happen until mid 1944 IIRC. The attack was staged from China.

Just to give you some distance references, Tokyo to Guam is about 1450 NM and Tokyo to Iwo Jima is about 700 NM.

[Gian P Gentile]

WM:

I thought you would have jumped on my Catch 22-General Dreedle, Frank Zappa thing from a previous and recent post on this thread.

But back to LeMay the innovation was his in early 1945 shortly after he took command from Hawyood Hansell of the 21st Bomber Command based out of the Marianas. Hansell (and a great air power thinker and innovator in his own right) had pushed the method of daylight, high altitude precision bombing from from the Marianas but in Arnold's and other high ranking airmen's eyes did not produce results and effects against the Japanese. When LeMay took command in early January 1945 from Hansell he did innovate and substantially altered method by shifting to low level attacks by B29s using fire-bombs against Japanese cities. It is in this conext that i refer to LeMay as innovative.

gian

[wm]

WM:

I thought you would have jumped on my Catch 22-General Dreedle, Frank Zappa thing from a previous and recent post on this thread.

But back to LeMay the innovation was his in early 1945 shortly after he took command from Hawyood Hansell of the 21st Bomber Command based out of the Marianas. Hansell (and a great air power thinker and innovator in his own right) had pushed the method of daylight, high altitude precision bombing from from the Marianas but in Arnold's and other high ranking airmen's eyes did not produce results and effects against the Japanese. When LeMay took command in early January 1945 from Hansell he did innovate and substantially altered method by shifting to low level attacks by B29s using fire-bombs against Japanese cities. It is in this conext that i refer to LeMay as innovative.

gian

Gian,

I passed on the Dreedle /Zappa commentary initially because I had a bad case of "deflicted eyes" from having an eskimo named Nanook rub some deadly yellow snow crystals into them. I was also sidetracked by a sudden desire to hear Captain Beefheart crooning on Zappa's Hot Rats song "Willy the Pimp."

We've agreed as to the oustanding quality of "Strangelove" in the movie genre. I submit that Catch-22 occupies a similar place in writing. Too bad that Mike Nichols and Buck Henry destroyed it in the screen version. However, casting Orson Wells as Dreedle was a good choice--the only other persons I might have chosen would have been Ernest Borgnine, based on his performance as General Worden in The Dirty Dozen or Carol O'Connor based on his performance as MG Colt in Kelly's Heroes.

[selil]

This thread reminds me of the discussion I've had in classes: "What can we learn about homeland security from bad science fiction"?

1) The problem at hand was either created by a nuclear bomb or can be fixed by one.

2) You can always go faster if you yell at the engineers.

3) Only one pretty girl will survive (usually a blonde).

4) Tampering with nature will only end up bad.

5) Wait for the bad guy to monologue then attack.

[Gian P Gentile]

Gian,

I passed on the Dreedle /Zappa commentary initially because I had a bad case of "deflicted eyes" from having an eskimo named Nanook rub some deadly yellow snow crystals into them. I was also sidetracked by a sudden desire to hear Captain Beefheart crooning on Zappa's Hot Rats song "Willy the Pimp."

We've agreed as to the oustanding quality of "Strangelove" in the movie genre. I submit that Catch-22 occupies a similar place in writing. Too bad that Mike Nichols and Buck Henry destroyed it in the screen version. However, casting Orson Wells as Dreedle was a good choice--the only other persons I might have chosen would have been Ernest Borgnine, based on his performance as General Worden in The Dirty Dozen or Carol O'Connor based on his performance as MG Colt in Kelly's Heroes.

WM:

The breadth and depth of your pop-cultural knowledge are indeed striking. How many of us "old" (with respectful deference of course to Ken White) Cold Warriors know who "Nanook of the north" is? When was the last time you had a urinalysis done?

Agree and defer to your knowledge on literary classics to which Catch 22 is certainly one of them.

too much fun

gian

[Ken White]

What's a urinalysis? Is it something in FM 3-24 which I've only skimmed and don't propose to read? You guys keep inventing new stuff, hard for an old guy to keep up...

[Ron Humphrey]

What's a urinalysis? Is it something in FM 3-24 which I've only skimmed and don't propose to read? You guys keep inventing new stuff, hard for an old guy to keep up...

We'll fill you in on all the details when you have the NEED TO KNOW

[wm]

This thread reminds me of the discussion I've had in classes: "What can we learn about homeland security from bad science fiction"?

1) The problem at hand was either created by a nuclear bomb or can be fixed by one.

2) You can always go faster if you yell at the engineers.

3) Only one pretty girl will survive (usually a blonde).

4) Tampering with nature will only end up bad.

5) Wait for the bad guy to monologue then attack.

And don't forget, the always popular,

6) The new security guy in the red shirt is always the first to die. (Death is usually prounounced by Leonard "Bones" McCoy: "He's dead, Jim.")

[wm]

WM:

How many of us "old" (with respectful deference of course to Ken White) Cold Warriors know who "Nanook of the north" is? When was the last time you had a urinalysis done?

Gian,

Actually, I had one right after finishing my pancake breakfast at Saint Alphonso's. I was concerned about social diseases after visiting Zappa's "200 Motels."

BTW, I thought that kind of test was a weekly mandatory for guys who had attended UC-Berkeley.

[Norfolk]

Unfortunately, I tend to agree. I would, however, like to get one last opinion. The Germans had a field marshal during WWII by the name of Ferdinand Schörner. I am reasonably sure Schörner made his rank by virtue of the fact he was supposed to have been a Nazi stalwart, though I am not positive of that. He rose up in rank with much of the old guard of the Prussian general corps (he was born in 1892, making him a few years younger than some), so he probably wasn't incompetent, but I just wonder how good he really was. Despite his closeness with Hitler, the man ran his own show and on more than one occasion, defied the "great" general/politician/idiot/madman. With v. Manstein's departure, Schörner seemed to be the superstar of the Eastern Front (such as anyone could be in 1944-1945).

So... with that in mind, I wonder how good a general this guy really was. Any opinions... ?

Best wishes,
Fred.

Fred, what I know about Shoerner is scant, although he did have a terrible task to perform when he commanded German and Finnish Mountain troops on the Murmansk Front, and it is not clear that anyone could have done much better. I remember reading about German and Finnish operations on the Kola Pensinsula, and it is almost impossible to think of a worse place to have to fight - countless giant boulders blocking the passage of almost any vehicle without road-construction, which itself bordered on the impossible under the prevailing climatic conditions; no vegetation or natural cover aside from said boulders; inadequate clothing, shelter, and rations, and of course, inability to adapt to the conditions of life in a Polar region, until the Germans learned from the Finns how to wage Arctic Warfare; and finally, being at the wrong end of a grossly overlong supply "route", made Operational-level action effectively impossible. Even Tactical action was difficult in the extreme.

He and Rommel were competitors, and both were old Gebirgsjaegars; and both won the Pour le Merite in WWI. Schoerner must have had something truly exceptional about him to share in that very rare honour.

But it was under his command on the Eastern Front that the Battle of Targul Frumos was fought by German and Rumanian troops, and the actions of the GD in particular have been studied by NATO for decades now. Whether such studies focusing on Targul Frumos to the detriment of what else was going on on the Eastern Front in the months just before Operation Bagration are useful is admittedly arguable.
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As for great Air Force generals, Lord Dowding for his innovations in Strategic Air Defence (the "Dowding System"), and his performance leading up to and during the Battle of Britain.

[wm]

Fred, what I know about Shoerner is scant, although he did have a terrible task to perform when he commanded German and Finnish Mountain troops on the Murmansk Front, and it is not clear that anyone could have done much better. I remember reading about German and Finnish operations on the Kola Pensinsula, and it is almost impossible to think of a worse place to have to fight - countless giant boulders blocking the passage of almost any vehicle without road-construction, which itself bordered on the impossible under the prevailing climatic conditions; no vegetation or natural cover aside from said boulders; inadequate clothing, shelter, and rations, and of course, inability to adapt to the conditions of life in a Polar region, until the Germans learned from the Finns how to wage Arctic Warfare; and finally, being at the wrong end of a grossly overlong supply "route", made Operational-level action effectively impossible. Even Tactical action was difficult in the extreme.

He and Rommel were competitors, and both were old Gebirgsjaegars; and both won the Pour le Merite in WWI. Schoerner must have had something truly exceptional about him to share in that very rare honour.

But it was under his command on the Eastern Front that the Battle of Targul Frumos was fought by German and Rumanian troops, and the actions of the GD in particular have been studied by NATO for decades now. Whether such studies focusing on Targul Frumos to the detriment of what else was going on on the Eastern Front in the months just before Operation Bagration are useful is admittedly arguable.
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Shoerner commanded Army Group Center in the end days. I believe his failure to commit the AG reserves allowed the Russian to force a penetration south of Heinrici's Army Group Vistula at the Seelow Heights, which in turn force Heinrici to abandon a set of positions from which he had stopped Zhukov cold. Shoerner also had something to do with the Courland defense IIRC, but my memory is very sketchy here. I think he reached his Peter Principle level of comptence at the Regimental or division commander level in Finland. BTW, regarding Targul Frumos--having Hasso von Manteuffel as a division commander could probably have made even George McClellan or Ambrose Burnside look like an operational genius.
Regarding the Blue Max--from my read of Rommel's Infantry Attacks and other WWI German memoir materials, receiving that award would have no correlation with one's ability to perform well as a general officer. The German mountain troops had a "death-defying" aura or charisma about them similar to German aviators, the main winners of the medal. Perhaps that explains the medals more than anything else.

[Gian P Gentile]

What's a urinalysis? Is it something in FM 3-24 which I've only skimmed and don't propose to read? You guys keep inventing new stuff, hard for an old guy to keep up...

Ken:

I heard a rumor ("in the air" hey WM how about that Night Ranger riff; Ken, that is a 80s rock group) that in an earlier draft of FM 3-24 (the one that Ralph Peters read and freaked-out about) there was a 10th Paradox that didnt make the final cut. Rumor has it that it read:

"[Grasshopper] Sometimes the more soup that you eat, the less likely you will come up hot on a urinalysis and the more secure you will be," or something to that effect. Dont really know the underlying meaning to it but i guess if i meditate on it for a while i can figure it out. I did go to UC Berkeley you know; "Not that there is anything wrong with that!"

Pun actually intended here.

gian

[Norfolk]

BTW, regarding Targul Frumos--having Hasso von Manteuffel as a division commander could probably have made even George McClellan or Ambrose Burnside look like an operational genius.

At the very least, it is quite the Ace to have up one's sleeve. Not to mention having certain Formations of the quality of the GD...