Who are the great generals?

[John T. Fishel]

that true open order fighting with large units really did not take place until late in WWI with the introduction by the Germans of infiltration tactics as a means around trench warfare. The reason this did not ake place sooner, IMO, was the inability to control troops who were dispersed all over the battlefield. The problem was field comms. Even in WWI, a commander had no way of tactically controlling his troops that did not exist at the time when Alexander the Great was a corporal!. Yes, there was the field telephone but it was pretty useless when the troops went over the top or if its wire was cut by an artillery barrage during a defense. So, massed troops were needed because of C2 requirements. The German infitration tactics innovation worked because the German infantryman was rather well educated compared to his 19th century predecessors and was trusted to think on his feet. WWII made it all easier with tactical radios coupled with the German WWI innovation.

[Bob's World]

To Fuchs, and alll, I assure you, no animosity toward anyone was intended by my comments, to paraphrase a classic line from a classic move, I may be guilty "of bringing a gun to a knife fight."

I stand on my points, but definitely intended it as a friendly, if a bit darkly, humorous retort. All humor in warfare has a dark side to it that I believe it best we don't forget as we debate the topic.

The point I think most poignantly overlooked by Europeans about the Amercian Civil War is also the point about the American Civil War overlooked by most Americans as well. I don't think it's about tactics, god knows the tactics were criminally outdated. It is not about the many technologies that served to outdate the tactics. For me, the main point is about Strategy. and it goes back to one of the many reasons I am such a fan of General Grant.

The relationship between Western Governments and their populaces were significantly altered by the American and French revolutions. (Ok, ours was actually a separatist insurgency, but I quibble). Napoleon understood and maximized this new merging of populace and governent as one to mobilize the entire French populace to wage warfare on all around him. The strength of a nation was no longer measured by the size of its army or navy, or even its King's treasury. It was measured by the will of the populace to resist invaders or to assert itself against others as well.

General Grant understood this. He shifted the focus from the destruction of the other's Army, or the capture of his capital (though he understood both were still essential supporting tasks that he supervised personally as he shadowed General Meade's campaign (Meade really should get more credit) to achieve those two tasks; but sent his two most trusted Lieutenants on missions to break the will of the Southern populace and to destroy their ability to support the military. The birth of "the American Way of War" as it has been tagged, but Grant grasped this, and sent Sherman and Sheridan out to make it happen.

Everyone focuses on tactics and toys and flags. Grant shifted the focus, he understood you had to crush the populace's will to continue, and that killing soldiers is a damn poor way to do that. I think the European military went into WWI still fully bent on killing soldiers and capturing flags to win the day. I think that day had passed, and they arrogantly missed the lesson that could have spared a generation of soldiers, but would have made WWI much harder on the popualces of Europe. It could well have prevented WWII though.

Sorry Fuchs, I am guilty of being an American. Bomb my harbor, destroy my buildings; and I come back with bigger response. It;s in the DNA I guess.

[Firn]

To Fuchs, and alll, I assure you, no animosity toward anyone was intended by my comments, to paraphrase a classic line from a classic move, I may be guilty "of bringing a gun to a knife fight."

I stand on my points, but definitely intended it as a friendly, if a bit darkly, humorous retort. All humor in warfare has a dark side to it that I believe it best we don't forget as we debate the topic.

Perfectly fine. I'm pretty sure that every any living human being has near or (very) distant ancestors or relatives who suffered from violence in warfare. Dark humour is also part of our nature.

The point I think most poignantly overlooked by Europeans about the Amercian Civil War is also the point about the American Civil War overlooked by most Americans as well. I don't think it's about tactics, god knows the tactics were criminally outdated. It is not about the many technologies that served to outdate the tactics. For me, the main point is about Strategy. and it goes back to one of the many reasons I am such a fan of General Grant.

The relationship between Western Governments and their populaces were significantly altered by the American and French revolutions. (Ok, ours was actually a separatist insurgency, but I quibble). Napoleon understood and maximized this new merging of populace and governent as one to mobilize the entire French populace to wage warfare on all around him. The strength of a nation was no longer measured by the size of its army or navy, or even its King's treasury. It was measured by the will of the populace to resist invaders or to assert itself against others as well.

This reasoning seems to be a bit idealistic in parts, so to speak. The populance of Vanatu or a tribe from the Andaman islands might have a titanic will to resist invasion, but good luck with that considering their numbers and their navy and army.

General Grant understood this. He shifted the focus from the destruction of the other's Army, or the capture of his capital (though he understood both were still essential supporting tasks that he supervised personally as he shadowed General Meade's campaign (Meade really should get more credit) to achieve those two tasks; but sent his two most trusted Lieutenants on missions to break the will of the Southern populace and to destroy their ability to support the military. The birth of "the American Way of War" as it has been tagged, but Grant grasped this, and sent Sherman and Sheridan out to make it happen.

Once again a key argument is that he had the ressources, time and space to send those two Lieutenants burning and looting on a grand scale. In this specific instance it did work, but this aspect of the American way of war, the burning part to be precise, failed also quite some times to achieve the aspired goals. Or

I also fail to understand how this burning and looting thing or strategy, aimed at the populance and the own belly is somehow a new invention. It has certainly been around quite some time in the evolution of mankind. To stay in the same century, it was certainly a staple procedure in the Napoleonic wars.

Everyone focuses on tactics and toys and flags. Grant shifted the focus, he understood you had to crush the populace's will to continue, and that killing soldiers is a damn poor way to do that. I think the European military went into WWI still fully bent on killing soldiers and capturing flags to win the day. I think that day had passed, and they arrogantly missed the lesson that could have spared a generation of soldiers, but would have made WWI much harder on the popualces of Europe. It could well have prevented WWII though.

Once again the intent alone is not enough, and arguably very few even intended WWI as a war of annihilation. Anyway, how could the Italian army for example crush the will of the Austro-Hungarian Empire's populace? How could the British empire make the German populace suffer? How could the German empire target the fighting will of the Russian empire?

The military actions did certainly their part through death and destruction, but they were limited due the specific circumstances. Grant would have found it pretty difficult to initiate a pillaging raid through Central Germany as he did in the South, because the pesky circumstances made such an attempt during the duration of the war impossible.

I will answer my questions myself. While Italy could do very little in this regard other than throwing paper on Vienna, the British fleet blockaded the Central powers and the Germans tried to cut the British lifelines at sea and send Lenin to Russia, from Germany with love.

Sorry Fuchs, I am guilty of being an American. Bomb my harbor, destroy my buildings; and I come back with bigger response. It;s in the DNA I guess.

And in the full trousers, to paraphrase our saying, which make stinking a lot easier.


Firn

[Bob's World]

To say the Sherman and Sheridan went "looting and burning" is to apply an unprofessional eye to their mission. Their acts were not random or wanton, or uncontrolled; and their purpose was not to enrich the Union, the Leaders, or the soldiers.

They were on a specified mission to designed and executed to crush the spirit of the South and to destroy their ability to resource their army and themselves. It was to ensure that the Populace of the South understood on no uncertain terms that they had been defeated when the army surrendured and the capital capitulated. Otherwise they would have likely slid into a long drawn out insurgency with the possiblity of follow-on warfare.

Which leads to the other great strategic lesson from the ACW that was ignored by the Friench and British, even though Wilson was there to remind them: The importance of being gracious in victory in order to secure the peace that your military has worked so hard to produce.

I believe strongly that Hitler is far less to blame for WWII than the French and British delegations at Versaille were.

So:

The importance of the will of the populace in wars between nations (vice Kingdoms); and
The importance of being gracious in victory in order to secure the peace.

Two great strategic lessons from the Amerian Civil War. Grant led the way on both counts; and his President understood and backed his play.

[Fuchs]

Open battle order:

There was a vivid discussion during the 1900's about open battle order tactics for a reason. It was not yet standard for line troops in battle (just as it wasn't standard at Gettysburg to advance with several metres spacing between every soldier).
The Boer Wars inspired the discussion as much as did the new technologies despite the smokeless powder innovation that made closed order + quick firing rifles at least practical in regard to visibility.
An open battle order existed for skirmishers since warfare began and was institutionalized in Velites, Peltasts and other forms of warriors thousands of years ago.
I wrote "(the version of that period)" for a reason.


Strategy and throwing resources at a problem:

Throwing resources at a problem may lead to some kind of victory, but it's not high art.
Strategy is among others about efficiency: How to do the best with given resources (maximization of effect up to the given goal).
To excel with (relatively) few resources is a high art while to come to a painful conclusion after struggling for years is not.

I can build you a home with a billion dollar, but that doesn't make me a great construction project manager and certainly doesn't help me to become a top 100 construction manager of all time. Keep in mind I might take years for what really good construction managers would achieve in months.

To answer a question: What's wrong with spending much resources for victory?
Wrong is that really great generals would have won in months, barely after the federal budget office would have noticed the war. Moltke the Elder would have advanced for a few hundred miles, encircled and annihilated an enemy field army and would have pursued/hunted for the enemy till its surrender in 1862. He would have done so by coordinating several corps from a line setup an encirclement by offering the corps enough freedom of action while coordinating on the operational level instead of failing to copy Napoleon as did Lee, Grant and others.

In other words (taking high cost for granted and pointing at the ability to stay afloat with relatively few resources):
Does anyone believe that grant would have survived the Seven Years War as Prussian leader as did Frederick the Great?

[Bob's World]

Open battle order:

There was a vivid discussion during the 1900's about open battle order tactics for a reason. It was not yet standard for line troops in battle (just as it wasn't standard at Gettysburg to advance with several metres spacing between every soldier).
The Boer Wars inspired the discussion as much as did the new technologies despite the smokeless powder innovation that made closed order + quick firing rifles at least practical in regard to visibility.
An open battle order existed for skirmishers since warfare began and was institutionalized in Velites, Peltasts and other forms of warriors thousands of years ago.
I wrote "(the version of that period)" for a reason.


Strategy and throwing resources at a problem:

Throwing resources at a problem may lead to some kind of victory, but it's not high art.
Strategy is among others about efficiency: How to do the best with given resources (maximization of effect up to the given goal).
To excel with (relatively) few resources is a high art while to come to a painful conclusion after struggling for years is not.

I can build you a home with a billion dollar, but that doesn't make me a great construction project manager and certainly doesn't help me to become a top 100 construction manager of all time. Keep in mind I might take years for what really good construction managers would achieve in months.

To answer a question: What's wrong with spending much resources for victory?
Wrong is that really great generals would have won in months, barely after the federal budget office would have noticed the war. Moltke the Elder would have advanced for a few hundred miles, encircled and annihilated an enemy field army and would have pursued/hunted for the enemy till its surrender in 1862. He would have done so by coordinating several corps from a line setup an encirclement by offering the corps enough freedom of action while coordinating on the operational level instead of failing to copy Napoleon as did Lee, Grant and others.

In other words (taking high cost for granted and pointing at the ability to stay afloat with relatively few resources):
Does anyone believe that grant would have survived the Seven Years War as Prussian leader as did Frederick the Great?

George Washington wanted nothing more (other than perhaps to be a regular in the King's Army) than to be like Frederick. His pursuit of building and fighting a regular army ala Frederick against the British nearly cost us the Revolution. We simply lacked the training, experience and resources to fight that type of warfare.

By Grant's era, strategies that drove Frederick's operations were obsolete. I suspect he may well of recgnized that had he been in Grant's shoes, but probably not. He probably would have stuck to the old strategem's like everyone else. Could Grant have gone back in time and applied the lessons he was taught at West Point on how to fight like Frederick? I see nothing to indicate why not. Any good cook can follow the directions in a recipe book. It takes a genius to create something bold and new.

[Fuchs]

You misunderstood me.
I didn't mean tactics; I meant the odds. Frederick fought against overwhelming odds and prevailed for seven years without much ground to trade.

Grant succeeded with overwhelming odds on his side and I think he didn't show anything that could convince me that he had the quality to stand a test at odds as experienced by Frederick.

[Shek]

You misunderstood me.
I didn't mean tactics; I meant the odds. Frederick fought against overwhelming odds and prevailed for seven years without much ground to trade.

Grant succeeded with overwhelming odds on his side and I think he didn't show anything that could convince me that he had the quality to stand a test at odds as experienced by Frederick.

Your comparison is a bit fallacious IMO. Grant had to fight an offensive war completely on enemy territory (and then leave forces behind to administer the occupation) to succeed, and had to do so against a Washington clock. Frederick didn't have to fight on enemy territory and didn't have conduct operations in the context of a domestic political election (which constrained potential options). Also, the scale of the fighting meant that you didn't see the near continuous fighting during the Seven Years' War vice the ACW, which also made strategic approaches different. Given two very different situations, I find it hard to make a valid comparison.

However, I've only done a cursory read on the Seven Years War, and so I'd ask you to go in the opposite direction to help me out, since maybe the two situations are more similar than I believe. Can you argue why Frederick would have been successful in Grant's shoes in the river campaigns in 1862, at Vicksburg in 1863, and finally during the Overland and Petersburg campaigns of 1864-5? Thanks.