Who are the great generals?

[Bob's World]

Cowpens was the tactical masterpiece of the American Revolution.

I don't know if Morgan should be considered a great general or not because I don't know if he was a great strategist. But he was certainly a master tactician.

Morgan was a fighter who sought to match his strength against the enemy's weakness, and didn't care a damn what the enemy thought of his "professionalism."

Washington, with his chip on his shoulder over being rejected by the British Regular Army, coupled with his constant pursuit of striving to be like his idol Frederick, was constantly matching our weakness against enemy strengths. I think in large part he wanted to prove to the British that he was indeed worthy of being an officer in there Army by defeating them "correctly."

This is the strength of the American warfighting Army historically. The Regulars are small in number, steeped in doctrine, and set out the fight the last war. The volunteers and draftees come in in large numbers knowing little of doctrine and fight the war they're in. The large standing army required for the Cold War has in large part nullified what I see as one of our greatest historic strengths. This is why I think Generals like Casey will never be discussed in forums like this, because they are products of a system crippled by the Cold War necessities, and are dedicated to preserving the Army they needed for the last war, rather than pragmatically reducing the standing army to what is really needed (and when we stop using the Army to force a failed family of policy to work, we will be able to bring 2-300,000 guys home); and designing a flexible, adaptive force and doctrine for wars that are likely to emerge. Quit being jealous of and seeing the Guard as a competitor for scarce resources you need to fulfill your obsolete vision of "correctness," and instead embrace the Guard for what it is: America's historic warfighting, war-winning, force. Just an observation.

Add "blinded by Cold War experience" to "senior rater profile" and "CTC evaluation focus" for why we are limited today in our ability to produce great generals, but produce a hell of a lot of great, dull, efficient, managers.

[Culpeper]

Lots of good generals. As for American:


Longstreet
Bradley
Patton
Erskine
O.P. Smith
Mattis, James

Just to name a few, of course.

[Schmedlap]

Add "blinded by Cold War experience" to "senior rater profile" and "CTC evaluation focus" for why we are limited today in our ability to produce great generals, but produce a hell of a lot of great, dull, efficient, managers.

Oh man. CTC evaluation focus. No ####, there I was. In Bosnia, prior to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, we had one large operation during our deployment (the rest of the deployment was just squad/platoon patrols). The operation was incredibly dicked up, largely because my CO couldn't make a decision, give clear guidance, or do anything without his commander telling him every move to make. Realizing that things were dicked up, he remarked, in all seriousness, "this isn't unfolding very well, but I think it's a good rehearsal for our training exercise next week." He was referring to a multinational training exercise that we were slotted to participate in, largely as a dog and pony show.

I am so glad that I did not need to follow that man into combat when the real wars kicked off. Even on a real-world operation, he was stuck in the mindset of training for a CTC evaluation. Funny thing is, even with his inexplicable focus on training evals, he performed horribly at CTC prior to deployment. By "horribly" I mean that our unit was slotted to take on the most sensitive mission, farthest from headquarters, but after that CTC rotation the BN CO lost so much confidence in him that the mission shifted to another unit and we spent the first month doing base camp security.

[Xenophon67]

Sure Hannibal had forgone the besieging of Rome, yet for three years in a row (218-216 BCE) Hannibal earned his rank as one of the Great Captains of History (T.A. Dodge).

218 November - Battle of Ticinus River - Brilliant cavalry engagement which gave Scipio his bloody nose and allowed Hannibal to gain the initiative despite having emerged from the Alps, basically in tatters.

218 December - Battle of Trebia River - After recruiting thousands of Gauls he managed to lure Sempronius across the freezing Trebia in a ill-conceived hasty crossing only to emerge being surprised in his flank and rear losing around 30,000 men.

217 April - Battle of Lake Trasimene - Absolutely brilliant ambush anticipating Sun Tzu's maxim "know your enemy and know yourself.." - Hot-tempered Flaminius threw caution to the wind driving his men forward into a narrow defile under steep cliffs. Hannibal took advantage of the terrain, climate, and his opponent's disposition to deliver a devastating blow. The resulting (needless) slaughter saw some 30,000 Roman dead as well as Flaminius.

216 August - The Battle of Cannae - Tactical Perfection - the epitome of shaping the battlespace - and the blueprint for every battle thereafter.

"A nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its warriors will have its laws made by cowards and its wars fought by fools."
— Thucydides

[William F. Owen]

Sure Hannibal had forgone the besieging of Rome, yet for three years in a row (218-216 BCE) Hannibal earned his rank as one of the Great Captains of History (T.A. Dodge).

I submit that while he could win battles, he did so with a flawed strategic aim - or even no strategy at all. Today people agonise over "strategy" pointing out how the US "can win battles" but "looses wars." Vietnam? - Well welcome to the cult of Hannibal!!

4 big victories never hurt Rome's ability to force generate.

Yes, Hannibal was better on the day, but he constantly failed to exploit his victories. He just "mowed the lawn." It may well be that 75% of tactical action in Afghanistan is irrelevant for the same reasons.

Napoleon falls into the same bucket, - as not only a tactician, but also a strategist.

[Fuchs]

I submit that while he could win battles, he did so with a flawed strategic aim - or even no strategy at all. Today people agonise over "strategy" pointing out how the US "can win battles" but "looses wars." Vietnam? - Well welcome to the cult of Hannibal!!

4 big victories never hurt Rome's ability to force generate.

Yes, Hannibal was better on the day, but he constantly failed to exploit his victories. He just "mowed the lawn." It may well be that 75% of tactical action in Afghanistan is irrelevant for the same reasons.

Napoleon falls into the same bucket, - as not only a tactician, but also a strategist.

Another example is Rommel, who bled white OP Barbarossa with his log truck & fast troops demands for Lybia.


I still think that you judge Hannibal too harshly. He never got significant reinforcements from Carthago. Instead, he managed to keep a war effort going against the great power Rome in its backyard with the little resources that some allies (former Roman allies) were able to offer.
That required a great strategic and political effort. It didn't suffice for besieging & taking Rome, the odds (especially the robustness of Rome's Republic and alliance system) were too tough.
It's furthermore questionable whether he ever had the resources for besieging Rome. The logistical problems of such an undertaking were certainly huge - and he had little reason to be confident about a success after a breach of the walls. Even a small relief army would have been able to mess the whole siege up.

I wouldn't be able to name a single general who would have done better in the specific situation other than maybe Alexander the Great.

[marct]

It's furthermore questionable whether he ever had the resources for besieging Rome. The logistical problems of such an undertaking were certainly huge - and he had little reason to be confident about a success after a breach of the walls. Even a small relief army would have been able to mess the whole siege up.

I wouldn't be able to name a single general who would have done better in the specific situation other than maybe Alexander the Great.

Good points, Fuchs. I'm not sure Alexander could have done it, either, without his engineers, and Hannibal just didn't have an engineer corps equal to Alexanders.

The other thing to remember about Hannibal and the 2nd Punic War is that the Carthaginians had a real problem with their fleet, especially after the initial naval encounter at Lilybaeum when they were defeated by a smaller Roman fleet! Without having control of the seas, which they didn't have, Hannibals' logistics were quite problematic. Trying to besiege Rome in, say, 217 or 216, would have been strategically insane since

1. the city could have held out easily for at least a year if not longer;
2. Rome had fairly large forces, including naval transport, outside the city, and
3. Fabius would have pushed for and "insurgent crunch" with the fortifications acting as the anvil and the interrupted logistics and sniping raids acting as the hammer.

[William F. Owen]

Trying to besiege Rome in, say, 217 or 216, would have been strategically insane since

1. the city could have held out easily for at least a year if not longer;
2. Rome had fairly large forces, including naval transport, outside the city, and
3. Fabius would have pushed for and "insurgent crunch" with the fortifications acting as the anvil and the interrupted logistics and sniping raids acting as the hammer.

I do not want to play, "what if history" but why not use force to set the conditions where besieging Rome might have worked?

I'm only harsh on Hannibal to demonstrate the futility of a strategy based on something which was not tactically feasible. - that - relegates him from "great general" to "good general." Yes he did incredibly well with very little. He gets an "A" for good effort, but he died and Rome went on.

[William F. Owen]

I wouldn't be able to name a single general who would have done better in the specific situation other than maybe Alexander the Great.

....any General that won the war he set out to win? Setting out to to do well with little is not the acme of skill if it doesn't get you what you want!

[Ken White]

This is the strength of the American warfighting Army historically. The Regulars are small in number, steeped in doctrine, and set out the fight the last war.

Not always, though I acknowledge it's true as often as not. There are a lot of things that can be said of all components. Saying them often does more harm than good.

... dedicated to preserving the Army they needed for the last war, rather than pragmatically reducing the standing army to what is really needed (and when we stop using the Army to force a failed family of policy to work, we will be able to bring 2-300,000 guys home)

Those are both your opinions and you're entitled to them and to state them in an open forum. I'm just as entitled to say you need to stop smoking that stuff..

Those 'failed policies' are your opinion -- and I suspect I'd agree on some, probably not on others. In any event, that's not going to happen.

...designing a flexible, adaptive force and doctrine for wars that are likely to emerge.

Couldn't agree more; you're absolutely correct. That's not gonna happen either due to politics and a fear of a truly effective Army; Congress does not want that. Pretty effective or effective enough, yes -- but not truly effective. They'd be dangerous.

Quit being jealous of and seeing the Guard as a competitor for scarce resources you need to fulfill your obsolete vision of "correctness," and instead embrace the Guard for what it is: America's historic warfighting, war-winning, force. Just an observation.

As one who had a Guard serial number before you were born, one that was used in three States, allow me to point out that the Army Reserve also was a part of that war winning force until you guys got their combat units dissolved with your superior Congressional clout. So was the Regular Army, so were the Marines. What did not help in any of those wars was parochial B.S. Nor does it help today.

I'll also point out that the Guard, as a war winning force in two World wars got so diluted with Regulars and Reservists during those wars due to senior officer lack of competence plus reservists and draftees added for the duration that they were not really Guard units, they were AUS units. The Guard also was for various dumb political reasons not a big factor in either Korea or Viet Nam. It has been used lately to good effect and the ARMY has benefited from that. So has SOCOM. There have also been some downsides. To both...

Add "blinded by Cold War experience" to "senior rater profile" and "CTC evaluation focus" for why we are limited today in our ability to produce great generals, but produce a hell of a lot of great, dull, efficient, managers.

You can also add political correctness, diversity, 'One Army' and several other things to the limits. Do not forget the Congress that protects programs that are of marginal total benefit to the defense of the nation but are politically popular. I can think of several such programs...

DOPMA and its followers being beautiful examples.

Parochial B.S. is not beneficial to any component. That Congress which protects the Guard (and to a lesser extent, the USAR) as a counterpoint to the AC is not truly beneficial to any of those components. We're supposed to all be in this thing together...

[Entropy]

Ken,

I've been in the Guard for a couple of years now after serving in the Reserve and on Active duty. I think you're totally correct about the Guard. Hounding me to join NGAUS and the state organization has gotten pretty old along with the "good old boys" network which does negatively affect operations IMO.

[Bob's World]

Oh, no question the Guard is perhaps the most powerful political lobby in America. My point being that is the Regulars would recognize that clout and work with it to the common advantage, the common defense, we would be far better off than with the adversarial model of today.

I've seen the Good, the Bad and the Ugly in the Guard, but in the end walked away with a keen appreciation that it is, with all of its flaws, one of America's national treasures and greatest institutions. Just as the rights of Free Press and to bear arms keeps the three branches of government in check (what I like to think of as "Home"plate); the Guard is a great check of the military ever getting out of line as well. Seems far feteched today, but looking around the world and through history, and these things can change. We have a lot of warts and problems, but their is a genius of balance in our sytem that runs far deeper than what we were taught in 8th grade civics class.

(And yes Ken, absolutely as to every aspect of draftee, reservist and guardsman that combines to create the great american "citizen soldier." Also yes, when one is a one man band, sometimes you have to abuse the playlist until the tunes catch on!)

Finally, for the sake of historical accuracy, while Morgan gets all of the credit for the battleplan at Cowpens, I have it on good authority he actually discovered it scratched out in the dirt where a young drummer boy by the name of Ken White had been sitting during a rest break on a road march. (All rumors that this same Kenius Whitius was the S-3 for Hanibal are purely speculative)!

[Schmedlap]

... it is, with all of its flaws, one of America's national treasures and greatest institutions.

In addition to what you cite, I would add that the ARNG was about the only gov't entity during the Katrina flood that did not have its collective heads tucked up its collective ass.

[Ken White]

Entropy: The boys can go a little overboard...

Bob's World: Was never a drummer, no sense of rhythm a-tall. And that was J3, not S3...

SdhmedlapWrong. I was there shortly afterward. Everyone in DoD did well, the Navy Airedales from Corpus and Pensacola, the Air Farce from Hurlburt and Eglin and the Coast Guard all did well. Coasties did great, in fact. The Navy moved the USS Bataan up the river on the tail of the hurricane. The Guard did do a good job but most of the government aside from FEMA did well also -- and much Federal Aid was delayed due to Governor Blanco initially wanting to do it with no Federal assistance (just as had FL governor Chiles during Hurricane Andrew. Politics can screw up anything...).

Interesting thing about the Guard was that there were more Guardsmen from other States than from LA -- due to the LA Bde being in Iraq and in process of returning when the storm hit, IIRC