Who are the great generals?

[Bob's World]

The 'backward offensive' thing was actually proposed by Manstein as part of an accusation directed at WW1 generals in his memoirs.
The greatest problem with it was likely that even such an offensive would have bogged down eventually jsut as it happened in 1914 and 1918 when offensives came to a halt.

But I am comfortable with the company!

I was just always taught that the frontal assault was the least favored form of maneuver (though that also, for the lead sqaud, every form of maneuver is a frontal assault).

So if you can go around, over, or under; I guess that leaves the "rearward envelopment" prior to resorting to just putting your shoulder down and pushing.

You'd be absolutely crucified if you tried it and failed though; but if you try a frontal assault for the umpteenth time and fail you get a promotion. Same kind of reward system we use at our training centers. Follow doctrine to the letter, use the "two up, one back" and get thrashed by the OPFOR and you are a "go." Get creative and win, and you "got lucky." Get creative and lose, and you "get fired." Just one more way, along with the senior rater profile, to breed the creative genius out of the officer corps.

[William F. Owen]

The 'backward offensive' thing was actually proposed by Manstein as part of an accusation directed at WW1 generals in his memoirs.
The greatest problem with it was likely that even such an offensive would have bogged down eventually jsut as it happened in 1914 and 1918 when offensives came to a halt.

I think Von Manstein was missing a trick. The Germans held very few troops in the forward defensive zone, at least by 1916 - about a 1/4 of what the Allies did. The whole point was to have reserves massed for counter attack. - a backwards offensive is just that, without the screen in the place.

I just do not see any competent general walking into what is obviously a well laid ambush - and I think history supports that contention.

[William F. Owen]

You'd be absolutely crucified if you tried it and failed though; but if you try a frontal assault for the umpteenth time and fail you get a promotion. Same kind of reward system we use at our training centers. Follow doctrine to the letter, use the "two up, one back" and get thrashed by the OPFOR and you are a "go." Get creative and win, and you "got lucky." Get creative and lose, and you "get fired." Just one more way, along with the senior rater profile, to breed the creative genius out of the officer corps.

Well this is conundrum of military practice versus theory. The problem is that very few armies capture best practice and teach it. Simple works better than anything else in war, yet "risk is the coin of war." What often adds to the confusion is folks doing stupid things badly, being seen as "What armies taught." Simple does not mean stupid. Simple plans work best. Simple required deep understanding.

All my great generals were not very imaginative men (a bit like me!). They just didn't do stupid stuff (unlike me!). They did what obviously worked and skewed the odds in their favour using better logistics, intelligence and staff work.

[Fuchs]

The battles of WW1 were rarely deeper than the technical range of artillery.
Artillery had to relocate its batteries to stay in range (or to survive), but there were few offensives that left the known and fully registered battlefield to really unhinge the stalemate.

That's one difference among others between a tactical elastic defence and an operational mobile defence.

The German Generals of WW1 were right to postpone most offensives in the West in 1915-1917 (Verdun being an experimental exception) in order to win on less problematic fronts first, though. The attacks with limited objectives of that period helped to understand the battlefield as much as did large offensives.


It's remarkable how Luddendorff won Tannenberg with good operational art against the odds, but had no better offensive idea than an almost full width advance in 1918.

[Firn]

But I am comfortable with the company!

I was just always taught that the frontal assault was the least favored form of maneuver (though that also, for the lead sqaud, every form of maneuver is a frontal assault).

I guess there is a reason why you were taught that way.


A general observation leaning a bit on CvC. If the only intrinsic advantage of the attack is surprise it seems logical that the defender wants to lessen it's impact. From using the high ground and building wallls like the citiziens of old to mines&IED, wire, ditches and multiple lines and covert and silent points for an effective defense in depth, it all has to do with reducing the effects of surprise, lenghtening the available reaction time and increasing the defensive redundancy.

This also seems to be one of the reasons why ambushes tend to work very well on a small scale and hardly on a large scale. Small ambushes are far easier to prepare and hide and the action is strongly compressed in time and space. If pulled of well the enemy has no to little time to respond and may lack the redundancy offered by units which aren't pinned down or annihilated. If you and practically all of your men are down or helpless after the first seconds the idea of a counter-attack becomes a moot point.

The battles of WW1 were rarely deeper than the technical range of artillery.

If I remember correctely there were considerable efforts to make it possible to push firepower on all levels forward. The tank was part of the range of solutions, just like the submachinegun and tasked grenadiers for the infantry.


Firn

[Bob's World]

What we are talking is not the ability to spring a large ambush, but rather the ability to convince an arrogant and over-confident foe that he has you on the run, prompting him to drop his own caution and charge into your trap to exploit his "success."

Certainly a favorite trick of the Souix indians that Crazy Horse used many times on small patrols; and then there is Custer's little mis-judgement...

Or Leftenant Colonel Tarleton at Cowpens in 1781 at the hands of Brigadier Daniel Morgan.

I suspect the real historians out there can come up with dozen larger examples over the ages of recorded military history.

[marct]

I suspect the real historians out there can come up with dozen larger examples over the ages of recorded military history.

Hastings in 1066 springs to mind .

[Firn]

What we are talking is not the ability to spring a large ambush, but rather the ability to convince an arrogant and over-confident foe that he has you on the run, prompting him to drop his own caution and charge into your trap to exploit his "success."

Certainly a favorite trick of the Souix indians that Crazy Horse used many times on small patrols; and then there is Custer's little mis-judgement...

Or Leftenant Colonel Tarleton at Cowpens in 1781 at the hands of Brigadier Daniel Morgan.

I suspect the real historians out there can come up with dozen larger examples over the ages of recorded military history.

One can find examples of some very neat ambushes here, there and once again there (the famous COIN operation gone wrong).

In this cases the very difficult terrain was the key to success. In the first two cases the action was very concentrated in time and space. The last one was a more protracted affair, with ever present harassing and frequent ambushes. All of them necessitated the kind cooperation of the enemy.

While I confess that I'm not that well informed about Eastern Warfare, Subotai and his forces certainly rank very high when it comes to mobile warfare and almost effortless shifts between feigned flights and dispersion and rapid concentration of force and fierce counter-attacks. They made the galloping ambush into a high form of (brutal) art.

Manstein's famous counter-attack against Kharkov comes to my mind , as well as his plan for the French campaign, although I'm not sure how far-reaching his intent was. The major difficulty with such actions is always that the enemy must oblige your operational or strategic intent to quite some extent.

Firn

[marct]

You can also see excellent examples of the same type of pseudo-ambush tactics by Belisarius and other Byzantine generals.

[William F. Owen]

What we are talking is not the ability to spring a large ambush, but rather the ability to convince an arrogant and over-confident foe that he has you on the run, prompting him to drop his own caution and charge into your trap to exploit his "success."

Sure, something you could do in a "battle", but not something you could do in huge continuous multi-army engagement! Why one army falls back, while the others remain in place, - and re-position their reserves - would have been a very tough bluff to pull, without actually hanging your neck out.

[Rifleman]

Or Leftenant Colonel Tarleton at Cowpens in 1781 at the hands of Brigadier Daniel Morgan.

Cowpens was the tactical masterpiece of the American Revolution.

I don't know if Morgan should be considered a great general or not because I don't know if he was a great strategist. But he was certainly a master tactician.

[Bob's World]

Cowpens was the tactical masterpiece of the American Revolution.

I don't know if Morgan should be considered a great general or not because I don't know if he was a great strategist. But he was certainly a master tactician.

Morgan was a fighter who sought to match his strength against the enemy's weakness, and didn't care a damn what the enemy thought of his "professionalism."

Washington, with his chip on his shoulder over being rejected by the British Regular Army, coupled with his constant pursuit of striving to be like his idol Frederick, was constantly matching our weakness against enemy strengths. I think in large part he wanted to prove to the British that he was indeed worthy of being an officer in there Army by defeating them "correctly."

This is the strength of the American warfighting Army historically. The Regulars are small in number, steeped in doctrine, and set out the fight the last war. The volunteers and draftees come in in large numbers knowing little of doctrine and fight the war they're in. The large standing army required for the Cold War has in large part nullified what I see as one of our greatest historic strengths. This is why I think Generals like Casey will never be discussed in forums like this, because they are products of a system crippled by the Cold War necessities, and are dedicated to preserving the Army they needed for the last war, rather than pragmatically reducing the standing army to what is really needed (and when we stop using the Army to force a failed family of policy to work, we will be able to bring 2-300,000 guys home); and designing a flexible, adaptive force and doctrine for wars that are likely to emerge. Quit being jealous of and seeing the Guard as a competitor for scarce resources you need to fulfill your obsolete vision of "correctness," and instead embrace the Guard for what it is: America's historic warfighting, war-winning, force. Just an observation.

Add "blinded by Cold War experience" to "senior rater profile" and "CTC evaluation focus" for why we are limited today in our ability to produce great generals, but produce a hell of a lot of great, dull, efficient, managers.

[Culpeper]

Lots of good generals. As for American:


Longstreet
Bradley
Patton
Erskine
O.P. Smith
Mattis, James

Just to name a few, of course.

[Schmedlap]

Add "blinded by Cold War experience" to "senior rater profile" and "CTC evaluation focus" for why we are limited today in our ability to produce great generals, but produce a hell of a lot of great, dull, efficient, managers.

Oh man. CTC evaluation focus. No ####, there I was. In Bosnia, prior to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, we had one large operation during our deployment (the rest of the deployment was just squad/platoon patrols). The operation was incredibly dicked up, largely because my CO couldn't make a decision, give clear guidance, or do anything without his commander telling him every move to make. Realizing that things were dicked up, he remarked, in all seriousness, "this isn't unfolding very well, but I think it's a good rehearsal for our training exercise next week." He was referring to a multinational training exercise that we were slotted to participate in, largely as a dog and pony show.

I am so glad that I did not need to follow that man into combat when the real wars kicked off. Even on a real-world operation, he was stuck in the mindset of training for a CTC evaluation. Funny thing is, even with his inexplicable focus on training evals, he performed horribly at CTC prior to deployment. By "horribly" I mean that our unit was slotted to take on the most sensitive mission, farthest from headquarters, but after that CTC rotation the BN CO lost so much confidence in him that the mission shifted to another unit and we spent the first month doing base camp security.

[Xenophon67]

Sure Hannibal had forgone the besieging of Rome, yet for three years in a row (218-216 BCE) Hannibal earned his rank as one of the Great Captains of History (T.A. Dodge).

218 November - Battle of Ticinus River - Brilliant cavalry engagement which gave Scipio his bloody nose and allowed Hannibal to gain the initiative despite having emerged from the Alps, basically in tatters.

218 December - Battle of Trebia River - After recruiting thousands of Gauls he managed to lure Sempronius across the freezing Trebia in a ill-conceived hasty crossing only to emerge being surprised in his flank and rear losing around 30,000 men.

217 April - Battle of Lake Trasimene - Absolutely brilliant ambush anticipating Sun Tzu's maxim "know your enemy and know yourself.." - Hot-tempered Flaminius threw caution to the wind driving his men forward into a narrow defile under steep cliffs. Hannibal took advantage of the terrain, climate, and his opponent's disposition to deliver a devastating blow. The resulting (needless) slaughter saw some 30,000 Roman dead as well as Flaminius.

216 August - The Battle of Cannae - Tactical Perfection - the epitome of shaping the battlespace - and the blueprint for every battle thereafter.

"A nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its warriors will have its laws made by cowards and its wars fought by fools."
— Thucydides

[Ken White]

This is the strength of the American warfighting Army historically. The Regulars are small in number, steeped in doctrine, and set out the fight the last war.

Not always, though I acknowledge it's true as often as not. There are a lot of things that can be said of all components. Saying them often does more harm than good.

... dedicated to preserving the Army they needed for the last war, rather than pragmatically reducing the standing army to what is really needed (and when we stop using the Army to force a failed family of policy to work, we will be able to bring 2-300,000 guys home)

Those are both your opinions and you're entitled to them and to state them in an open forum. I'm just as entitled to say you need to stop smoking that stuff..

Those 'failed policies' are your opinion -- and I suspect I'd agree on some, probably not on others. In any event, that's not going to happen.

...designing a flexible, adaptive force and doctrine for wars that are likely to emerge.

Couldn't agree more; you're absolutely correct. That's not gonna happen either due to politics and a fear of a truly effective Army; Congress does not want that. Pretty effective or effective enough, yes -- but not truly effective. They'd be dangerous.

Quit being jealous of and seeing the Guard as a competitor for scarce resources you need to fulfill your obsolete vision of "correctness," and instead embrace the Guard for what it is: America's historic warfighting, war-winning, force. Just an observation.

As one who had a Guard serial number before you were born, one that was used in three States, allow me to point out that the Army Reserve also was a part of that war winning force until you guys got their combat units dissolved with your superior Congressional clout. So was the Regular Army, so were the Marines. What did not help in any of those wars was parochial B.S. Nor does it help today.

I'll also point out that the Guard, as a war winning force in two World wars got so diluted with Regulars and Reservists during those wars due to senior officer lack of competence plus reservists and draftees added for the duration that they were not really Guard units, they were AUS units. The Guard also was for various dumb political reasons not a big factor in either Korea or Viet Nam. It has been used lately to good effect and the ARMY has benefited from that. So has SOCOM. There have also been some downsides. To both...

Add "blinded by Cold War experience" to "senior rater profile" and "CTC evaluation focus" for why we are limited today in our ability to produce great generals, but produce a hell of a lot of great, dull, efficient, managers.

You can also add political correctness, diversity, 'One Army' and several other things to the limits. Do not forget the Congress that protects programs that are of marginal total benefit to the defense of the nation but are politically popular. I can think of several such programs...

DOPMA and its followers being beautiful examples.

Parochial B.S. is not beneficial to any component. That Congress which protects the Guard (and to a lesser extent, the USAR) as a counterpoint to the AC is not truly beneficial to any of those components. We're supposed to all be in this thing together...

[Entropy]

Ken,

I've been in the Guard for a couple of years now after serving in the Reserve and on Active duty. I think you're totally correct about the Guard. Hounding me to join NGAUS and the state organization has gotten pretty old along with the "good old boys" network which does negatively affect operations IMO.

[Bob's World]

Oh, no question the Guard is perhaps the most powerful political lobby in America. My point being that is the Regulars would recognize that clout and work with it to the common advantage, the common defense, we would be far better off than with the adversarial model of today.

I've seen the Good, the Bad and the Ugly in the Guard, but in the end walked away with a keen appreciation that it is, with all of its flaws, one of America's national treasures and greatest institutions. Just as the rights of Free Press and to bear arms keeps the three branches of government in check (what I like to think of as "Home"plate); the Guard is a great check of the military ever getting out of line as well. Seems far feteched today, but looking around the world and through history, and these things can change. We have a lot of warts and problems, but their is a genius of balance in our sytem that runs far deeper than what we were taught in 8th grade civics class.

(And yes Ken, absolutely as to every aspect of draftee, reservist and guardsman that combines to create the great american "citizen soldier." Also yes, when one is a one man band, sometimes you have to abuse the playlist until the tunes catch on!)

Finally, for the sake of historical accuracy, while Morgan gets all of the credit for the battleplan at Cowpens, I have it on good authority he actually discovered it scratched out in the dirt where a young drummer boy by the name of Ken White had been sitting during a rest break on a road march. (All rumors that this same Kenius Whitius was the S-3 for Hanibal are purely speculative)!

[Schmedlap]

... it is, with all of its flaws, one of America's national treasures and greatest institutions.

In addition to what you cite, I would add that the ARNG was about the only gov't entity during the Katrina flood that did not have its collective heads tucked up its collective ass.

[William F. Owen]

Sure Hannibal had forgone the besieging of Rome, yet for three years in a row (218-216 BCE) Hannibal earned his rank as one of the Great Captains of History (T.A. Dodge).

I submit that while he could win battles, he did so with a flawed strategic aim - or even no strategy at all. Today people agonise over "strategy" pointing out how the US "can win battles" but "looses wars." Vietnam? - Well welcome to the cult of Hannibal!!

4 big victories never hurt Rome's ability to force generate.

Yes, Hannibal was better on the day, but he constantly failed to exploit his victories. He just "mowed the lawn." It may well be that 75% of tactical action in Afghanistan is irrelevant for the same reasons.

Napoleon falls into the same bucket, - as not only a tactician, but also a strategist.