Who are the great generals?

[John T. Fishel]

Like Bob's World, I have long been a fan of Grant. Although he was pilloried as a "butcher" (of his own troops) an examination of his record on casualties shows that his losses were either comparable or less than those of his contemporaries on both sides. So, Grant clearly meets my criteria for greatness.

The Lee and Sherman quotes are fantastic! Sherman also shows the importance of competence among subordinates that was pointed out by Ken when talking of MacArthur. A Sherman, Sheridan, Krueger, (possibly an Odierno) can make a Grant, MacArthur (or Petraeus). A Willoughby or an Charles Lee can cost his principal - MacArthur or Washington - a battle, campaign, or war.

I like Libertairian soldier's comprehensive list although I might add or subtract a few names.

Cheers

JohnT

[Fuchs]

I've always been astonished by the focus of Americans on their Civil War whenever the topic moves to military history. Even really smart Americans seem to treat that one few-year civil war as a kind of inexhaustible reservoir for military history insights.
I've yet to meet a British, French or Russian who's comparably fixated on the Crimean War, for example.

I understand the the choice of national military history isn't very rich for Americans - but shouldn't that motivate a broader look at military history?


It's certainly unnecessary and kind of rude, but I'd like to remind you all that the U.S.Civil War wasn't nearly as modern as it's often believed to be. Yes, there were telegraphs, railroads and rifles. Mobilization included industrial output and millions of men. The navy had some naval mines and iron-plated/steam-powered ships in use.

Nevertheless, the ground war equipment was quite obsolete in comparison with Europe (Prussia had introduced a breech-loading firing pin rifle in the late 40's and stomped the Minié-rifle equipped Austrians with it at about the same time as the civil war + the U.S. Civil War saw few if any breech-loaded guns and modern shells).

The tactical skill was mostly amateurish - as it was to be expected with such a rapid and extreme army expansion. Corps commanders were comparable in skill to Prussian wartime Majors in my opinion (and Lincoln's issues with officers reflect the competence problem).

The operational skill was marginal except for deep raids. Compare the Battle of Sedan or the (way to the) Battle of Königgratz with any USCW battle for comparison.

The USCW is a war like many others to me, without particularly valuable lessons. In fact, it seems to be have been the beginning of an American habit to simply overcome inadequacies by throwing superior quantities of resources at a problem. That's the opposite of skill (except if you look at logistics only, of course).

The (rare) episodes of U.S. warfare with inferior resources (such as guerrilla warfare on Mindanao, opening weeks of Korean War, Defence of Bastogne) are much more of interest and much more inspiring in my opinion.

Nobody suggested an officer of the 101st at Bastogne so far, but we've had mentions of a long list of USCW characters already.

[JarodParker]

I might catch some flak for this but I’d have George Washington on my Top 10 list. Even though some of his engagements turned out to be disastrous, he also had his share of daring victories which I find that much more impressive when considering the fact that most of his subordinate officers and troops were learning how to soldier on the fly.
He was adept at managing IO and military intelligence. He also had one quality that no great general can go without... luck.

But above all else what I find most admirable about GW is that, as ambitious as he was, he was willing to relinquish power when the time came instead of crowning himself Caesar (or Napoleon).

[John T. Fishel]

a year after the American Civil war ended. As for breechloaders and repeating rifles, they played a role in the Civil War. In one of the great delaying actions of all time, IMO, BG John Buford, commanding a cavalry brigade on 1 July 1863 at Gettysburg PA, using seven shot Henry and Spencer repeating carbines fought a dismounted delay of the Confederate advance from the West (led by Heth's division) until Reynolds brought First Corps up. If you wish to discuss strategy, there was nothing in Europe (other than the invasions of Russia in 1812 and 1941) that was anywhere near so vast as the theaters of the American Civil War. The Western campaigns being fought at the same time as those in the east dwarf anything in Europe in the 19th Century. When both theaters are addressed at the same time the Crimea, the wars of German unification ending with the Franco Prussian War become minor skirmishes. The fighting around Richmond in 1865 very much foreshadows the trench warfare of WWI. One last element of technology was the introduction of the rapid fire gun in the form of the Gatling gun whose principles are still used in modern weapons. Oh, I forgot, the USS Monitor (and her successor monitors) introduced an entirely new principle of naval shipbuilding/gun platform - the rotating turret which reached its epitome with Dreadnought type battleships. but it had not been seen prior to 1862 in Monitor's class with CSS Virginia. Between 1815 and 1914 the only major war between peer competitors was fought in North America between two American militaries - the USA and the CSA.

[Schmedlap]

I've always been astonished by the focus of Americans on their Civil War whenever the topic moves to military history. Even really smart Americans seem to treat that one few-year civil war as a kind of inexhaustible reservoir for military history insights.
I've yet to meet a British, French or Russian who's comparably fixated on the Crimean War, for example.

I think it's due to the social impact, rather than the military prowess. Southerners still identify partly as "rebels" and re-enactments are performed on the grounds that they were fought on, which tend to be on the outskirts of current towns. It is really quite a spectacle to behold, seeing drunken southerners throwing beer bottles at the triumphant union reenacters, shouting, "you cheated!" I'm guessing that most Brits and Frenchmen don't identify strongly with the side that they fought on in the Crimean War.

There is also the fact that the loss of life was crazy at places like Antietam and Gettysburg and there's the dynamic of friends, cousins, and even brothers fighting against one another (rather than nationalities). It is also noteworthy that this war was not about a great game or access to ports or resources. It was about the survival of our nation and it nearly destroyed us. And then there's the whole freeing the slaves thing.

Deep down, we're an idealistic bunch of folks and stuff fought over ideals really resonates with us, which goes a long way in explaining how the recent adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan were sold to us.

Slightly on topic: I would also like to nominate a worst General. My nomination is General Tso. As someone who lived on General Tso's Chicken t-rations for a year, I will curse that name until the day I die.

[Dayuhan]

it seems to be have been the beginning of an American habit to simply overcome inadequacies by throwing superior quantities of resources at a problem. That's the opposite of skill (except if you look at logistics only, of course).

Americans use superior resources for the same reason that dogs lick their own genitals: because they can. I don't see why knowing your advantage and exploiting it to the fullest should be regarded as a sign of inferior skill.

[Pete]

I've always been astonished by the focus of Americans on their Civil War whenever the topic moves to military history. Even really smart Americans seem to treat that one few-year civil war as a kind of inexhaustible reservoir for military history insights. I've yet to meet a British, French or Russian who's comparably fixated on the Crimean War, for example.

For a discussion of the influence of the American Civil War on European military officers I recommend the book The Military Legacy of the American Civil War: The European Inheritance, 1959 and reprinted in 1988, by the late Jay Luvaas. The career of Dr. Luvaas included being an instructor at the U.S. Military Academy and a professor at the U.S. Army War College. His book contains a chapter on German observations and analyses of the the war. The author concedes that the war had a negligible impact on German military thinking because of the preoccupation of Bismarck and the German states on unification during the 1860s. However, British army officers studied the campaigns of "Stonewall" Jackson at staff college during the first half of the last century.

Colonel G.F.R. Henderson (1854-1903), a York and Lancaster veteran of Tel el-Kebir, wrote the book The Fredericksburg Campaign in 1886, which brought him to the attention of then-General Garnet Wolseley and led to his appointment as an instructor at Sandhurst in 1890. In 1898 he published Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War, the book for which he is best known. Henderson was appointed chief of intelligence in South Africa in 1900 but he caught malaria and was invalided home, where he died in 1903. Regular British officers serving in the First and Second World Wars would have studied Lee and Jackson's campaigns at staff college, which became part of the curriculum when Colonel Henderson was a staff college instructor.

[Fuchs]

For a discussion of the influence of the American Civil War on European military officers I recommend the book The Military Legacy of the American Civil War: The European Inheritance, 1959 and reprinted in 1988, by the late Jay Luvaas. The career of Dr. Luvaas included being an instructor at the U.S. Military Academy and a professor at the U.S. Army War College. His book contains a chapter on German observations and analyses of the the war. The author concedes that the war had a negligible impact on German military thinking because of the preoccupation of Bismarck and the German states on unification during the 1860s.

Bismarck was no officer, but a statesman.

Moltke the Elder was the military leader of Prussia at that time and probably busy with the railroad logistics, telegraph, artillery & general staff innovations, three wars in short succession and his own Cannae fixation. Later on he had the reorganize the army for a united empire, but that was after '71.

[William F. Owen]

Regular British officers serving in the First and Second World Wars would have studied Lee and Jackson's campaigns at staff college, which became part of the curriculum when Colonel Henderson was a staff college instructor.

Pre- WW1 Regular Officers alone would have studied Lee and Jackson because Hamley's Operations of War (6 editions between 1867-1909) was the required Staff Collage text prior to 1898.I strongly suspect Henderson would have taught using Hamley's text.

BTW, I have the 1909 edition. It makes current US/UK writing on campaign planning and operations, look like a child's finger painting in comparison.