Who are the great generals?

[Rob Thornton]

Congress receive these days other then the CJCS? With all the Think Tank guys, paid military affairs correspondents on the media and opinions on the blog-sphere that float/filter up through staffers, how much influence does one single guy have these days?

How much influence does a COCOM have given the media, the personality of a president, the experience and comfort zone of a SEC DEF and their bias, the crisis at hand?

I'm not sure there are too many other ways to do it. I mean the President could pick his or her CJCS without worrying about which Joint Flavor of the month it is, but that too has its ills. He/She cold delegate it to the SEC DEF, but again, personal bias may enter in. I'm sure as it is, politics plays a role in the nomination, which at the level is probably some what natural - given the convergence of policy and strategy.

I guess there is also the JFK solution, but we may already have something akin to that with think tanks anyways

We've lost the ability to trust one another (I blame the personnel system but that's another thread another day. )

I'd say parochialism spawned by the acquisition system (The "whose rice bowl is it anyways" game show) typified by the debates such as the one on UAS/UAVs, and the professional lobbyers on the Hill- a necessary ill these days for sure in order to justify why we need this or that to fulfill our missions.

You know, I don't think I saw Marshall on anybody's list. It may go to our fascination with the tactical - where men die, things are blown up, and celluloid records. I think when you consider the scope of his role, the various personalities involved, and the manner in which he kept himself from becoming politicized, it is humbling. If not one of our greatest generals, he is certainly one of our greatest citizens.

Regards all, Rob

[Ken White]

"I wonder how much military advice a President and the Congress receive these days other then the CJCS? With all the Think Tank guys, paid military affairs correspondents on the media and opinions on the blog-sphere that float/filter up through staffers, how much influence does one single guy have these days?

Probably way too much from elsewhere and the President with little or no military experience is going to listen to the think tank punditocracy because the military guys either irritate or intimidate him. That, to me is why the choice of SecDef is critical. That's a hard job to fill. Few businessmen have done well as have few of the old guard of governmental high rollers. I think Schlesinger and Laird were probably the best in my lifetime -- and I served under most and knew of all of them to date; I missed only Forrestal up front and Cohen and Rumsfeld (v 2.0) on this end...

"How much influence does a COCOM have given the media, the personality of a president, the experience and comfort zone of a SEC DEF and their bias, the crisis at hand?"

Probably not much unless he's charismatic and the rather banal news types take a liking to him. That's, IMO, as it should be. I'm more worried about what he does or doesn't do downstream as opposed to media or upward influence.

"I'm not sure there are too many other ways to do it. I mean the President could pick his or her CJCS without worrying about which Joint Flavor of the month it is, but that too has its ills. He/She cold delegate it to the SEC DEF, but again, personal bias may enter in. I'm sure as it is, politics plays a role in the nomination, which at the level is probably some what natural - given the convergence of policy and strategy."

Nah, the system works almost in spite of itself -- the bureaucracy in the building is hard for any one guy to affect -- my issue is that we do not need to have the parochial battles and repeats of Eagle Claw and Urgent Fury where each service has a piece of the action but the combined advice of all the Chiefs is likely to be a better deal for the decision makers than is one guy who may or may not accurately report the group view. Theoretically, the SecDef and the CJCS go in the Tank and a position is reached and the two play honest brokers with the Prez and I'm sure that happens mostly

But do recall, I'm an cynical old Dude...
. . .

"You know, I don't think I saw Marshall on anybody's list. It may go to our fascination with the tactical - where men die, things are blown up, and celluloid records. I think when you consider the scope of his role, the various personalities involved, and the manner in which he kept himself from becoming politicized, it is humbling. If not one of our greatest generals, he is certainly one of our greatest citizens."

Regards all, Rob

Agree on that. Awesome personality and a great person. Any General that could manipulate Georgey Patton had to be a great one...

[Smitten Eagle]

Since we're talking about generalship, why limit ourselves to the actual historical figures? We can learn as much about generalship from history as from fiction, poetry, etc...

So, to the running list of great generals I would add...

Sam Damon (of Once an Eagle fame)

Also,
Epaminondas,
Henry V
The Dead Germans (Rommel, Guderian, von Mellenthin, and Kesselring)
Sherman (the only guy who predicted the nature of the coming Civil War)
MacArthur
Arminius (defeated the Romans at the battle of Teutoburg Forest, holding the Romans at bay for centuries. As opposed to the exalted Boudica, who lost to Rome and left only ruin).

[Tom Odom]

Taking a page from Smitten Eagle,

I would also suggest we not limit this to land comanders:

Nimitz as the best of the US Naval commanders

George Kenney as one of the most adaptive air generals

Hugh Dowding as the right Air Marshall at the critical time for the RAF

Bomber Harris as the juggernaut behind RAF Bomber Command and really the model for LeMay, especially when the latter went to the Pacific

Doenitz because he was the only German naval commander who really grasped the war at sea and nearly won it despite Hitler

And back to ground commanders, one that will undoubtedly draw screams.....Montgomery at the particular place and time of his emergence as a leading commander in North Africa as an offset to Churchill's near constant involvement in all military affairs (much good, much bad). It took an ego as large as Montgomery's to offset Churchill.

Tom

[Uboat509]

I am going to throw COLs Aaron Bank and Bull Simmons out there also. We just don't have a lot of Generals in our community but those two are definitely at the top of our hierarchy. They might as well be Generals for the influence that they have had on our community.

SFC W

[MattC86]

So, to the running list of great generals I would add...

Sam Damon (of Once an Eagle fame)

Also,
Epaminondas,
Henry V

I remember hearing so much about Sam Damon and Once an Eagle, and I thought, "Isn't it a bit dangerous for an entire profession to be trying to base themselves on a character who never existed, and, in many ways, never could?"

Then I read it and realized what the fuss was all about. Heartily agree to put "Sad Sam" up at the top of the list.

As far as Epaminondas, did you read Victor Davis Hanson's Soul of Battle? Marvelous book about Epaminondas, Sherman, and Patton.

I feel like commanders need to be divided into groups. Great tacticians, great strategists, and great cases of leadership. I put the least weight on tacticians, because the other two are far rarer. Also there were many excellent tacticians who were not generals.

Tacticians:
Patton, Lee, Jackson, Rommel, von Manstein, Spruance, Caesar, Scipio, Alexander

Strategists:
George C. Marshall (as Rob mentioned, both an officer and a citizen of the highest caliber. America is lucky to have had him), Nimitz, Sherman, Napoleon, Mahmet (Turk who conquered Constantinople)

Leaders:
Ridgway (Korea and the 8th Army still IMO the best example of the impact one leader can have on a war in history), Farragut, George Thomas, Gustavus Adolphus, Epaminondas

Of course there are many, many others. I feel it will take the judgment of history to categorize today's generals, but Zinni, Mattis, Petraeus, and McKiernan seem the best of the last few years. Many of you would know better than I, however.

Matt

[Kreker]

von Steuben
Buford
Grant
Pershing
Patton
Marshall
Bradley
Gavin
Abrams
Gavin
Zinni

[kit]

W.T. Sherman. He understood that war is unrefined brutality and he set out to make Georgia howl, which he did. His objective was to make war so unpalatable to them that they wouldn't resort to it again for 100 years. Well, it's been 140 and they still haven't, so I'd say he succeeded.

[Mark O'Neill]

von Steuben
Buford
Grant
Pershing
Patton
Marshall
Bradley
Gavin
Abrams
Gavin
Zinni

What an amazingly American (and 20th Century ) centric list, especially after a few millenia of civilisations waging war aginst each other.

I wonder whether people will know these names in a few millenia, like we can cite the generals of antiquity today? Hold on, I think I know the answer to that already....

I wonder if lists like this are actually representative of the problem that people have conceptualising why things are not working out like they thought that they would.

There is a big world out there, and American hegemony notwithstanding, a lot has happened militarily, and will probably continue to happen, with little or no American input.

I don't mean to offend and I am not offering any value judgement or criticism of American engagement, military prowess or history here - far from it. Just an observation that cultural hubris not only damages perspective, but can also hinder vision and understanding.

[Rob Thornton]

I don't mean to offend and I am not offering any value judgment or criticism of American engagement, military prowess or history here - far from it. Just an observation that cultural hubris not only damages perspective, but can also hinder vision and understanding.

Mark, you don't offend - as always you make us think - which is good

-Let's add another qualifier to the combined lists for separating the world's "greatest" from great generals: they are tied to some event which clearly shaped the world

Can you tie a general/flag to military history which has, or will endure in such away that his legacy will be both enduring and recognizable beyond each of our own lists? I think this will be hard to a certain degree because it asks the question, why do we know more about certain generals (across the world) then others?

I wonder if lists like this are actually representative of the problem that people have conceptualizing why things are not working out like they thought that they would.

There is a big world out there, and American hegemony notwithstanding, a lot has happened militarily, and will probably continue to happen, with little or no American input.

I think this is a keen observation. Mark I think it was the Australian PM who said -and I'm a bad parahraser "America's challenge is to carry out the responsibilities of hegemon without acting like one". Does anyone remember the articles a few years back where Zinni and the other COCOMs were the subject of a piece in the Washington Post (or was it the Times) - "Rise of the Proconsuls" I think it was? A very well done article. That is probably a good subject for another thread though.

Best Regards, Rob

[Old Eagle]

How 'bout General Electric and General Dynamics? General Motors was once great, but is assigned at least temporarily to the trash heap of history due to total mismanagement of the great American automobile cash cow.

The reason for my nominations is simple. Ultimately, it is American indirect power that will determine our posistion in the world. Not just the economic forces I've addressed metaphorically, but all the other DIME elements.

[Ski]

My 2 quatloos on great generals:

The Ancients
Genghis Khan
Alexander the Great
Scipio Africanus
Fabius Maximus
Cyrus the Great
Hannibal

Belisaurius
Khalid ibn al-Walid
Tamerlane
Saladin

Middle Ages through the 19th Century
Gustavus Adolphus
John Sobieski
Scharnhorst
Clausewitz
Charles Martel
Moltke the Elder
Duke of Wellington
Napoleon

20th Century
Montgomery
Marshall
Patton
Zhukov
Von Seeckt
Chuikov
Eisenhower
Von Manstein
Balck
Puller

Admirality
Jacky Fisher
Ernest King
Nimitz
Nelson
Decatur
Rickover - for his scientific work
Mahan

Air Marshals and the like
Billy Mitchell
Doolittle
Wolfram von Richtofen
Kesselring - was also an Army officer
LeMay - a savage, but since he as on our side it's ok
Hans Ulrich Rudel (although he may not have been a General - don't know)
Bomber Harris
Douhet - he's been too influential, and that's why he's on the list

[Granite_State]

Hugh Dowding as the right Air Marshall at the critical time for the RAF

Bomber Harris as the juggernaut behind RAF Bomber Command and really the model for LeMay, especially when the latter went to the Pacific

Tom

I'm no expert on the RAF, but my understanding is that Harris nearly broke his force in 1943, hurling vulnerable bombers against Germany in daylight raids until Bomber Command was decimated, with marginal effects on German war production. Not to mention the whole question of whether strategic bombing in WWII was an efficient use of resources in the first place.

Agree on Dowding though.

[Tom Odom]

I'm no expert on the RAF, but my understanding is that Harris nearly broke his force in 1943, hurling vulnerable bombers against Germany in daylight raids until Bomber Command was decimated, with marginal effects on German war production. Not to mention the whole question of whether strategic bombing in WWII was an efficient use of resources in the first place.

Agree on Dowding though.

That would be the USAAF 8th Air force which nearly broke in 1943 in the daylight raids. Bomber Harris was RAF Bomber Command and they went with night bombing very early on, especially as the Halifax and then the Lancaster came on line as the main RAF heavy bombers. Bomber Harris mounted the first 100 plane raid against Cologne in 1942 as a marker of what was to come. It was Harris who pushed to draw the USAAF into the night bombing effort when the 8th had such a rough go in 1943. Churchill nearly pushed for the same thing but liked the idea (and ring) of the phrase bombing around the clock.

As for the debate on whether strategic bombing was a waste of resources, Such bombing did not win the war but it certainly contributed to the victory.

Tom

[Granite_State]

That would be the USAAF 8th Air force which nearly broke in 1943 in the daylight raids. Bomber Harris was RAF Bomber Command and they went with night bombing very early on, especially as the Halifax and then the Lancaster came on line as the main RAF heavy bombers. Bomber Harris mounted the first 100 plane raid against Cologne in 1942 as a marker of what was to come. It was Harris who pushed to draw the USAAF into the night bombing effort when the 8th had such a rough go in 1943. Churchill nearly pushed for the same thing but liked the idea (and ring) of the phrase bombing around the clock.

As for the debate on whether strategic bombing was a waste of resources, Such bombing did not win the war but it certainly contributed to the victory.

Tom

I was thinking of this:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Berlin_%28air%29

But you're right, night bombing.

I still question whether large-scale strategic bombing was worth it. Obviously Douhet was dead wrong, but Germany also increased its war production almost to the end. Granted that's more a sign of inadequate mobilization of national resources for war, but it still calls into question how much the bombers were really doing.

And I've seen many note that RAF crews were composed of some of the smartest and best-educated men in the British armed forces in WWII. A big chunk of that best and brightest went down over Germany.

[Tom Odom]

I was thinking of this:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Berlin_%28air%29

But you're right, night bombing.

I still question whether large-scale strategic bombing was worth it. Obviously Douhet was dead wrong, but Germany also increased its war production almost to the end. Granted that's more a sign of inadequate mobilization of national resources for war, but it still calls into question how much the bombers were really doing.

And I've seen many note that RAF crews were composed of some of the smartest and best-educated men in the British armed forces in WWII. A big chunk of that best and brightest went down over Germany.

There is no doubt that the costs were high. My father-in-law was a waist gunner on a B17; he didn't get into the war until the fall of 44. Still he had his own set of memories and many were horrific.

The question I always in response to the fact that Germany increased production under the intensive boming campaign, is simpy do you think Germany's production would have been less without the strategic effort? Without the bomber streams, German warfightiong industries could have concentrated on greater production of Tiger tanks, rockets, etc without any disruption.

As for the talent issue, one of the greatest selection of talent was in the airborne divisions; again one can ask the question was it worth it and many did during and after the war.

On Douhet--he is alive at Maxwell AFB. He comes in quietly and sings with duets with Elvis during Friday Kareoke. I met him one evening in early August 1990 in Checkmate, the AF targeting cell in the Pentagon. He was advocating a strategic bombing offensive against Iraq while ignoring Iraqi forces in Kuwait.

Best
Tom

[Mark O'Neill]

I think it was the Australian PM who said -and I'm a bad parahraser "America's challenge is to carry out the responsibilities of hegemon without acting like one".

Rob,

man, you are good - I don't know that many Australians who can quote our PM!

That said, I think it is a good quote.

I cannot think of any better hegemon on offer (unless I demonstrate ignorance and no sense of the impossible by suggesting Australia....).

I think the qualification you propose on 'world impact' (or something similar) makes us focus more on the true meaning of the term 'great'. Some of the nominees to date seem to fit more into the categories of 'good blokes' or 'people I would like to be' rather than necessarily 'great'.

Cheers

Mark

[Ski]

Undoubedtly, old chap.

I just finished re-reading "The Generals War" and came to the realization that the entire "effects based operations" that was Checkmate was really the extension of the strategic bombing myth that has been perpetrated on the US military since 1942.

I suspect ol' Douhet is in the witness protection program along with other famous Italians like Jimmy Hoffa!

On Douhet--he is alive at Maxwell AFB. He comes in quietly and sings with duets with Elvis during Friday Kareoke. I met him one evening in early August 1990 in Checkmate, the AF targeting cell in the Pentagon. He was advocating a strategic bombing offensive against Iraq while ignoring Iraqi forces in Kuwait.

Best
Tom

[goesh]

-glad to see Ghengis Khan and Saladin added to the list. There is quite a bunch of talented military leaders listed in this thread. I think the group would be hard pressed to list as many great civilian leaders and that is a reflection of reality more so than bias IMO.

[kit]

There is no doubt that the costs were high. My father-in-law was a waist gunner on a B17; he didn't get into the war until the fall of 44. Still he had his own set of memories and many were horrific.

The question I always in response to the fact that Germany increased production under the intensive boming campaign, is simpy do you think Germany's production would have been less without the strategic effort? Without the bomber streams, German warfightiong industries could have concentrated on greater production of Tiger tanks, rockets, etc without any disruption.

As for the talent issue, one of the greatest selection of talent was in the airborne divisions; again one can ask the question was it worth it and many did during and after the war.

On Douhet--he is alive at Maxwell AFB. He comes in quietly and sings with duets with Elvis during Friday Kareoke. I met him one evening in early August 1990 in Checkmate, the AF targeting cell in the Pentagon. He was advocating a strategic bombing offensive against Iraq while ignoring Iraqi forces in Kuwait.

Best
Tom

It's my understanding that the effectiveness of the bombing campaign over Germany had more to do with target selection than effort. When we shifted our priorities to ball bearings and fuel production, it really did cripple the German war effort. Concentrating on rail yards, bridges etc, (which could be rapidly repaired) and dispersed industries didn't accomplish a whole lot.

The same could be said of the air campaign over North Vietnam.