Who are the great generals?

[Tom Odom]

It's my understanding that the effectiveness of the bombing campaign over Germany had more to do with target selection than effort. When we shifted our priorities to ball bearings and fuel production, it really did cripple the German war effort. Concentrating on rail yards, bridges etc, (which could be rapidly repaired) and dispersed industries didn't accomplish a whole lot.

The same could be said of the air campaign over North Vietnam.

On WWII yes and no

The effort to strike the ball bearing manufacturing centers (Schwienfurt) was extremely costly and did have an effect--it got the germans attention about centralized production and lead Speer to spread the industrial effort out. That helped in survivability but also has severe costs in efficiency. Fuel same thing; you hit targets and the bad guys get the message. It does not mean hitting them was a wasted effort. And after the Schwienfurt raids we shifted more toward area targets inside Germany. Changes to that occurred as we built to the invasion, when Ike forced the issue on shifting targets towards isolating France as well as finishing the German air force so it would not threaten the invasion fleet or the beachhead.

As for Vietnam, until we started Linebacker II there simply was no comparison. The air war against Vietnam was a tactical fight executed again and again and again using tactical aircraft in a so called strategic role.

Best

Tom

[Granite_State]

It's my understanding that the effectiveness of the bombing campaign over Germany had more to do with target selection than effort. When we shifted our priorities to ball bearings and fuel production, it really did cripple the German war effort. Concentrating on rail yards, bridges etc, (which could be rapidly repaired) and dispersed industries didn't accomplish a whole lot.

The same could be said of the air campaign over North Vietnam.

My understanding is that targeting the Ploesti oil fields in Romania, a vital spot, couldn't happen until we had bases closer to the them.

As for Vietnam, actually just read a great paper on the subject today, Coercive Air Power in the Vietnam War, by Robert A. Pape, Jr. He argues, persuasively to me, that the problem wasn't really overcentralization (LBJ approving targets), inadequate efforts, or vacillation. The issue, as with the whole war, was the nature of the conflict, pre and post-Tet.

When fighting the VC insurgency, the amount of supplies the guerillas needed to stay in the field was negligible. The 250,000 or so VC in the South needed an estimated 380 tons a day of food, ammunition, medicine, and oil, gas, etc. A single U.S. division at the time needed 750-2,000 tons a day. All the Air Force's bombs couldn't damage the North's economy or infrastructure enough to stop that trickle from getting through. I've heard someone else on here, think it was Sargent, say that the Air Force was actually running out of strategic targets to bomb in the North.

Once the VC was largely defeated and the North switched to a conventional strategy, American airpower could and did do tremendous damage and interdiction to the NVA, in the 1972 Easter Offensive and thereafter.

[Rob Thornton]

Changes to that occurred as we built to the invasion, when Ike forced the issue on shifting targets towards isolating France as well as finishing the German air force so it would not threaten the invasion fleet or the beachhead.

Whatever else the strategic bombing of German mil/industrial complex did, it brought the Luftwaffe up where it could be destroyed providing an operational advantage for D-Day and throughout the remainder of the war. Ike's tacit understanding of the advantages and limitations of air power, land power and sea power is part of what made him a great operational artist.

His understanding of the primacy of policy in building strategy, his ability to organize well and his ability to work with diverse Coalition and Joint personalities during and after the war is what made him one of our greatest generals - the right man at the right place at the right time. His leadership as the Supreme Allied CDR in the European theater (remember the written statement about where blame would lay if Overlord failed) during WWII, (in my opinion) makes him a candidate for one of History's Great Generals above so many many of his incredible peers.

Best Regards, Rob

[slapout9]

I would have to add another member of the Airborne Trinity(mafia) that is Maxwell Taylor. Why as far as I can tell he is the one who taught the Army what Strategy is. The expression Ends,Ways and Means belongs to Max Taylor according to Arthur Lykke,Jr from his Army War College article. Except that Max 's original quote was "Objectives,Ways and Means." Some how it was changed to Ends??? Why or how this happened doesn't matter it should be changed back to the original Objectives.


At least for a few years until I get it changed to Motives,Methods and Opportunities

[MattC86]

His understanding of the primacy of policy in building strategy, his ability to organize well and his ability to work with diverse Coalition and Joint personalities during and after the war is what made him one of our greatest generals - the right man at the right place at the right time. His leadership as the Supreme Allied CDR in the European theater (remember the written statement about where blame would lay if Overlord failed) during WWII, (in my opinion) makes him a candidate for one of History's Great Generals above so many many of his incredible peers.

Best Regards, Rob

I think in our rush to ordain the "great captains" we forget just how much of a team game it really is.

Consider WWII in Europe, for example. George Marshall was a strategist of the first order, as was Ike, who proved his ability to manage a tenuous coalition, among other things. Under them they had George S. Patton, one of the more remarkable tactical presences of all time.

Without any link in that chain, the Army in Europe has major, major problems. Without Marshall and his peacetime draft policies and remarkable work expanding and creating a citizen army, that Army takes two additional years to get up to snuff. Without Eisenhower, it is not employed in an unbeatable coalition, it is not properly supported logistically, it does not have the right leaders, and has an overall lesser man leading it. Without Patton that Army does not have the personal leadership, determination, and tactical genius to defeat the Wehrmacht at the front.

Any successful military force (the US Navy in World War II would be a similar example: King - Nimitz - Halsey/Spruance/Kinckaid/Mitscher etc.) I believe has to have a similar team of winners at its head.

Matt

[Rob Thornton]

Another great story and one that ties in with our "why study History" thread - In 1944 Eisenhower told Patton to go to Bastogne, after describing the general situation Patton responded with a Civil War analogy - I think it may have been from the Siege of Petersburg (Battle of Five Forks). What is interesting to me is that because both men had studied the same military history, they shared a common understanding between higher and lower echelons that conveyed intent - no lengthy deliberation, just a simple analogy that sent the message "Hey Ike, I got this one in the bag!" (Again - thanks to DR Mike Matheny for teaching me that!)

Best Regards, Rob

[wm]

I find the discussion of the "great " leaders of WWII instructive as much for who is left out as for those who are included. In another thread, folks are discussing the apparent infatuation with technology that has produced a force woefully understrength for its missions. The names folks are tossing around on this thread happen to be associated with the "technology rich" batttlefields of WWII. Patton and the folks of Bradley's 12st Army Group tended to be loaded with the best in our technical arsenal--upgunned Sherman "Firefly" tanks, CAS support from the latest airframes, cutting edge SP artillery, etc, etc.

The WWII names that haven't gotten a mention happened to be doing yeoman service in the southern part of France, with the more traditional weapons of war--the largely all infrantry forces in Jacob Devers' 6th Army Group. like Patch's 7th Army and Lucian Truscott, Jr's VI Corps divisions (3rd ID, 36th ID, 45th ID), as well as the justly famous 442 RCT. These guys did something no other army in history had ever done before--mounted a successful offensive through the Vosges. I will only note the lack of discussion of actions on the Italian Peninsula by admitting that we had some really poor leadership in that theater that more than overbalanced the good guys like Truscott.

Maybe if we chose a different set of icons for our WWII heroes, we might find a better set of solutions for the current morass in which we find ourselves enmired.

[kit]

I find the discussion of the "great " leaaders of WWII instructive as much for who is left out as for those who are included. In another thread, folks are discussing the apparent infatuation with technology that has produced a force woefully understrength for its missions. The names folks are tossing around on this thread happen to be associated with the "technology rich" batttlefields of WWII. Patton and the folks of Bradley's 12st Army Group tended to be loaded with the best in our technical arsenal--upgunned Sherman "Firefly" tanks, CAS support from the latest airframes, cutting edge SP artillery, etc, etc.

The WWII names that haven't gotten a mention happened to be doing yeoman service in the southern part of France, with the more traditional weapons of war--the largely all infrantry forces in Jacob Devers' 6th Army Group. like Patch's 7th Army and Lucian Truscott, Jr's VI Corps divisions (3rd ID, 36th ID, 45th ID), as well as the justly famous 442 RCT. These guys did something no other army in history had ever done before--mounted a successful offensive through the Vosges. I will only note the lack of discussion of actions on the Italian Peninsula by admitting that we had some really poor leadership in that theater that more than overbalanced the good guys like Truscott.

Maybe if we chose a different set of icons for our WWII heroes, we might find a better set of solutions for the current morass in which we find ourselves enmired.

Good point.

And, nobody has mentioned Troy Middleton who's almost universally accepted as the best US division commander in WWII. And he commanded the 45th Infantry (OKNG), which was a pure foot Infantry unit!

[marct]

In no particular order and trying not to duplicate

GEN Arthur Currie
Heraclius
Basil II
George Maniaches
Alp Arslan
Alexios I Komnenos
Khosrau I
Phillip of Macedon
Vo Nguyen Giap

[wm]

As an addendum to my earlier point, those who live by technology also die by it. Remember what happened to John Frost's British paras at Arnhem when the technology heavy armored relief force from Horrocks' XXX Corps couldn't get through because of such "low tech" things as the blowing of the Son Bridge and a delay in delivery of the assault boats (which showed up without paddles) needed to capture the Grave Bridge.

"Vertical" envelopment operations, like Market Garden, are a by-product of technology. I cannot think of one truly successful operation of this type.
(And, yes, I am a "leg.")

[Mark O'Neill]

"Vertical" envelopment operations, like Market Garden, are a by-product of technology. I cannot think of one truly successful operation of this type.
(And, yes, I am a "leg.")

I can think of a few successful ones off the top of my head:

1. Fort Eban Emael, Belgium , 1940 (Germans).
2. Markham Valley / Lae / Nazab, New Guinea, 1943 (US 503rd Inf Regt, Aust Artillery and Engineers).
3. Normandy , 1944, (vertical envelopment of the English Channel); and
4. Cassinga, Angola, 1978 (South African Airborne Brigade and Recces).

Interesting point that all have in common (apart from audacity) is that the tactical objectives once the troops were on the ground were not excessively unrealistic / ambitious (unlike Market Garden).

Cheers,

Mark

[Tom Odom]

"Vertical" envelopment operations, like Market Garden, are a by-product of technology. I cannot think of one truly successful operation of this type. (And, yes, I am a "leg.")

Despite the tragedy of drops like Sicily and again Normandy, airborne operations did work-and worked in those cases. Market Garden airborne operations worked to a point; they failed because senior leaders--airborne and heavy--ignored avaliable intelligence on what was at Arnhem and the surrounding area. They also failed because the tail wagged the dog--the worst air general of the war, Brereton had Peter Principled himself to command the airlift and airlift concerns set the DZs for 1st Para. Urqhart--himself a leg--did not truly grasp the implications of having DZs six miles from the objective. Gavin and Taylor did and listened with crossed fingers. Johnny Frost and 2d Battalion paid the price along with the rest of 1st Para.

The Soviets also employed airborne operations successfully. As did the Germans. Airborne operations in the Congo in 1964 succeded and again in 1978. Grenada despite hiccups succeeded. Panama succeeded. All of this of course does not even touch the issue of air assault using rotary wing aircraft which of course is vertical envelopment.

Best

Tom

[slapout9]

Let's see:

1-The rescue of Mussolini from a hilltop in Italy by the German Airborne. This was truly incredible if you have ever read the story.

2-The Raid on the Los Banos prison camp in the pacific campaign. Rod Serling of "The Twilight Zone" was part of this. A Book about this was released shortly after the Iranian Hostage incident. Rescue raids were done several times in WW2 and one suggestion of the book was that we have forgotten how to do them.

3-Although not a battle when the USMC was retreating from Chosin their escape route was cut off when a critical bridge was blown up. An entire bridge!! was parachuted in to them, so they could finish their withdrawal.

4-The second Normandy invasion in the south of France often called "The Champagne Campaign" had successful drops. General Gavin himself suggested that the exploits of the little known 17th Airborne division were text book models of how to do it right.

There is a similar situation in LE that I have written about in other posts, in that the more successful a technique is the more likely it is that it will "not" become well known. It appears this also happens in military history as well. If there are not a lot of causalities and blunders it doesn't get much press. So success often remains hidden.

[Steve Blair]

I tend to consider airborne operations as a more tactical/operational device, due more to limitations in what can be delivered and realistically supplied. In this role it can be outstanding and at times decisive. However, it does require a strong follow-on force if it's intended to have more than a tactical impact (unless of course it's a special or limited operation like some of those slapout mentioned).

And as an aside to WM's post, the Firefly was a British modification to the Sherman. It didn't feature in Patton's units.

[wm]

Mark, Tom, and Slapout:

There are airborne operations and then there are AIRBORNE operations. As noted, Mark's successes are not at all like Market Garden. They had limited objectives and were generally susceptible to quick link up with ground forces. BTW, had the Germans stopped the amphibous landings on the Normandy beaches, the Normandy airborne operation would have had results more disastrous than Market Garden. Crete is the only operation that I know of comparable to Market Garden. Its success was largely a Pyrhhic victory and was due to quick reinforcement with airlanded conventional forces. The Soviet airlandings in Afghanistan were largely unopposed and were made in support of an ostensible ally. Grenada and Panama operations were similarly largely unopposed--air landings rather than air assualts--against a grossly inferior opposing force. Slapout's listed successes are also very limited scope events.

I acknowledge that tactical vertical envelopment has a place in our bag of tricks. I do not hold the same belief for such events at the operational and strategic level. My belief is based on my doubt of an the ability to sustain such a force long enough and well enough to keep it from turning into a "speed bump" to a determined counterattack.

Regarding my point about technical infatuation and vertical envelopment, here's an interesting quotation to ponder:

In view of the present state of technical development, I place a considerably higher estimate on the opportunities for airborne operations in a war between military powers than does the principal author. The latter considers that the essential conditions for the successful use of airborne operations-even on a large scale-exist only in close cooperation with the operations of ground troops.

Assuming that there are sufficiently strong air forces and air transport facilities, I believe that in the future airborne landings by large bodies of troops (several divisions under unified command) can also be used for independent missions, that is, for such military operations as are not closely related in place and time with other ground actions, but are only bound to the latter by the general connections existing between all military operations in the theater of war. It is precisely along these lines that I envisage the future development of airborne warfare. I am convinced that with the proper preparation and present-day technical facilities it is possible to form new military bases by means of large-scale airborne landings far in the enemy's hinterland, in areas where he expects no threat from ground troops and from which independent military operations of large scope can be undertaken. To supply by air such large-scale airheads for the necessary time is essentially a technical problem which can be solved. The independent commitment of large airborne forces seems to offer a present-day high command an effective means for suddenly and decisively confusing the enemy's system of warfare.

It was made by Gen. Franz Halder, Chief of Staff of the German Army, 1938-42 in a foreward to "Airborne Operations, A German Appraisal," a study that was written for the Historical Division, EUCOM, by a committee of former German officers. You can read it here

[Tom Odom]

There are airborne operations and then there are AIRBORNE operations. As noted, Mark's successes are not at all like Market Garden. They had limited objectives and were generally susceptible to quick link up with ground forces. BTW, had the Germans stopped the amphibous landings on the Normandy beaches, the Normandy airborne operation would have had results more disastrous than Market Garden. Crete is the only operation that I know of comparable to Market Garden. Its success was largely a Pyrhhic victory and was due to quick reinforcement with airlanded conventional forces. The Soviet airlandings in Afghanistan were largely unopposed and were made in support of an ostensible ally. Grenada and Panama operations were similarly largely unopposed--air landings rather than air assualts--against a grossly inferior opposing force. Slapout's listed successes are also very limited scope events.

You are redefining as you go along. Your comparison with Normany says that if the Germans had won the war, our losses would have been real disasters. The Soviets used airborne operations well before Afghanistan. Grenada was not pure airland and neither was Panama. And in the latter I had friends taking rounds. Crete was Pyrhhic no doubt; it still achieved the objective.

As for the speed bump analogy and counterattacks, Normandy was in that regard a success. No one in the airborne community then or now advocates use of airborne operations at the operational level of war without a link up. In any case, the parachute or the helicopter are delivery means, not means of fighting. Once the force is in, it does not matter how it got there. Bastogne was by truck and it was a defensive deployment to retain a crossroads using light infantry. The speed bump held.

Best

Tom

[wm]

You are redefining as you go along. Your comparison with Normany says that if the Germans had won the war, our losses would have been real disasters. The Soviets used airborne operations well before Afghanistan. Grenada was not pure airland and neither was Panama. And in the latter I had friends taking rounds. Crete was Pyrhhic no doubt; it still achieved the objective.

As for the speed bump analogy and counterattacks, Normandy was in that regard a success. No one in the airborne community then or now advocates use of airborne operations at the operational level of war without a link up. In any case, the parachute or the helicopter are delivery means, not means of fighting. Once the force is in, it does not matter how it got there. Bastogne was by truck and it was a defensive deployment to retain a crossroads using light infantry. The speed bump held.

Best

Tom

Tom,
Regarding redefining,let me say "Tu quoque." My original post indicated I was discussing large scale operations.

"Vertical" envelopment operations, like Market Garden, are a by-product of technology. I cannot think of one truly successful operation of this type. (emphasis added)

The 101st at Bastogne was not a vertical envelopment. How you get there does matter--part of the Market Garden problem had to do with failure of aerial resupply. Think how differently things might have gone had 1st Para and the Polish Bde been able to truck in and carry a lot of antitank weaponry with them.

I also didn't say anything about the Germans winning the war. When I said

had the Germans stopped the amphibous landings on the Normandy beaches

I had visions of Anzio in mind.



Regarding the Normandy speed bump, the last time I checked, the only real adversary for the US airborne forces at Normandy was the recently formed 91st Air Landing Division and maybe some rear area elements of the 352d Infantry Division. Any fighting was a battle of near equals, except the Allies had massive air superiority, which was pretty much the case throughout operations in the West. The Germans have much to say about their hatred of the Allied "JaBos" (CAS aircraft) in personal memoirs and such. On 6 June, the German's counter attacked with 2 bns of their 6th Airborne Regiment. Significant German armor was only encountered 7 days later (June 13th) and then the paratroopers were quickly reinforced with CCA, 2nd AD.

Regarding Bastogne, I suspect that had the Germans flung their panzers at the defense in a single coordinated attack rather than in piecemeal efforts, we would have had a different result. BTW, Bastogne was not defended by a pure light infantry force. The 101st was reinforced with remnants of the 9th AD retreating from its initial drubbing along the Ourthe River and by CCA, 10th AD as well. The real battle was the delaying action against 2d Pz Div by 1/506 Inf and 10th AD tanks on 19/20 Dec near Foy. The Bastogne encirclement only lasted for about 3 days. Air support was available on the 23rd and relief from Creighton Abrams' 37th Armor came on the 26th of December.

I had friends taking rounds in Panama too. But, by their description, it was not much worse than the shootout at Waco, TX with David Koresh's folks.

I seem to remember that Soviet airborne ops (if you want to call sliding off the wings of planes into snowbanks airborne ops) against the Finns were a resounding failure. I know of no other efforts by them in the Great Patriotic War.

[Steve Blair]

If memory serves, the Soviets did some battalion+ drops during the 1942 offensive around Kharkov. They did cause some confusion, but failed in the end due to poor planning and the Red Army's general lack of offensive maturity at that phase in the war. They did smaller-scale drops both before and after that campaign as well.

[Tom Odom]

WM,

You changed the reference to Market Garden in your second post to large operations with your disclaimer about airborne operations and AIRBORNE operations. Like others here I saw the reference to Market Garden as a type of operation to mean vertical envelopment .

If you are only talking about an airborne operation involving the lift of three divisions and a brigade in daylight, then there is no comparison because Market Garden is the only one.

The reference to if the Germans won the war takes your what if the Normandy invasion failed to its logical extension. The invasion did not fail and the airborne operations were part of the reasons it succeeded. That the paras had air support was part of the plan.

As for Bastogne, again if you want to get into what if the Germans had operated differently, then things might have gone differently for the 101st. That is more supposition like postulating about a German victory at Normandy.

Dave Glantz wrote an excellent study on the Sovier Airborne Experience you might find enlightening.

Finally the most recent operational level vertical envelopment was again the 101st in Desert Storm. As was the case in WWII, that maneuver assumed link up and worked quite well.

Best

Tom

[slapout9]

I am at my day job so I can not respond properly, I will posts later on tonight. Tom...All The Way Sir.