Who are the great generals?

[tequila]

I think Santa Anna decision was the much bigger mistake and it wound up costing him the war, since the Texas Army under Sam Houston was able to get into a position to ultimately defeat him while he was pummeling a fortress he could have easily by passed. Patton would not have made that mistake. Travis' effort bought time that Santa Anna could not afford.

Arguably Patton did make a similar error with his fixation with taking Metz in 1944.

[Norfolk]

Hey send me that! Or post a link. Good stuff on RPA tactics is hard to find. It should not surprise anyone on here that it is often quite difficult to break through sterotypes of military incompetence (which are appropriate in many cases) when exceptions like the RPA emerge. I can only say as I did in my book that when Stan and I first crossed into Rwanda from Zaire and ran into RPA checkpoints, the differences with the FAZ were startling in a refreshing way.

Best

Tom

PS

email address sent via PM

Tom and all, here's the link (but the original illustrations are missing on Free Republic, and the Infantry School took the Infantry Journal off-line (except on DIN, and I don't have DIN access) years ago:

http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a397a16354784.htm

The Tutsi's still used a '2 up, 1 back' fomration, but that was on an isolated Hutu squad, so it made perfect tactical sense in that situation.

[Norfolk]

On a personal note, I am delighted to see your reply. I was a bit taken aback by not having seen his name mentioned earlier; rather surprised. One of the great satisfactions of my life will always be the fact I had the good fortune to serve under him, not once, but twice. The first time as a brand-spanking new infantry 2LT when he was the CO of the 1/30 BG in Germany and he stopped an entire excercise to show me the proper way to assault an enemy position-- his way (... and quite different from what I had just been taught at Fort Benning!!!). The second time was when he placed me in charge of a company in Vietnam. When he was the CG of the 1st Infantry Division, the whole atmosphere was like a re-union. It seemed every officer and senior NCO I ran into there, I had served with in the 30th, from George Joulwan down to squad leaders.

Best wishes and thanks for the agreement,
Fred.

PS-- Tom Odom: if you have not read his work, you are in for some enjoyment when you do. I read the stuff even today, and his small unit movements and formations worked brilliantly. I do not know what's taught today at Benning, but if DePuy's stuff is not, that is a big mistake to me.
FCW

Fred, once I saw both von Manstein and DePuy mentioned together, I just knew we scored the jackpot with a new member! (I'm a new member too, but I didn't exactly come with a pot of gold under my arm, and I couldn't find the end of a rainbow even if I were an Irish leprechaun, but I'm not; I'm English, but I am a Catholic).

It's great that's another person here who actually worked with DePuy himself; I think Tom did at one time or other, I know he's certainly written a lot on DePuy. There may be a few others. I've just read about him. Glad you're here Fred!

[wm]

Arguably Patton did make a similar error with his fixation with taking Metz in 1944.

I suspect Patton and Metz is very different than Santa Ana at the Alamo. I think Patton's sense of history got the best of his tactical /operational judgment. He was following in both French and German footsteps from 1870 and 1914 by viewing Metz as key to Germany/Alsace-Lorraine. I think Santa Ana viewed the reduction of the Alamo as a way of striking a winning blow in the IO war--it would demonstrate his willingness and ability to overcome any rebellious force in his path and seem, thereby, invincible to the people under his rule. Both of these actions seem to reflect a form of megalomania I suppose, but the two men were megalomaniacs with different agendas.

[Fred III]

Norfolk--

Thank you. Those are kind words and very much appreciated. I find this site a bit humbling for I see names I should know something about, but have never even heard of. It really does allow one to re-set his compass. I am also impressed with and pleased by the lack of acrimony. That says a lot about your membership and your moderator. I have friends who have been driven from interesting discussions because of the distasteful repartee and the name-calling.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[Culpeper]

Culpeper - Apologies if my post looked like a slam on you - it was not meant as such, as I think you meant that sentiment for Custer himself. I only intended to add that many troopers died quite unnecessary deaths because of his failings. IMO the romanticization of such blunders often serves primarily not the memories of the dead soldiers (who are most often anonymized and forgotten into one martyred mass) but rather acts as camouflage for the incompetence of the strategy or the uncomfortable nature of the political/military situation.

Agreed. I once watched a documentary using battlefield forensics at Little Big Horn. The more I watched the angrier I became when it became evident the slaughter that took place there and the only person to blame would be Custer himself. He even got members of his own family killed. I wasn't offended by your post so need for an apology. I thought about adding more to that post using the same light you shed but opted out.

[Culpeper]

Here is another one--and as a native Texan I will have to remain in hiding in the swamps of Acadia--William Barrett Travis and his decision to "hold" the Alamo.

best

Tom

Yeah, I'm a native Texan as well. It never occurred to me to blame Travis for holding the Alamo.

You should be ashamed of yourself!

[Tom Odom]

Yeah, I'm a native Texan as well. It never occurred to me to blame Travis for holding the Alamo.

You should be ashamed of yourself!

Did so against orders at that...

[Fred III]

I once watched a documentary using battlefield forensics at Little Big Horn. The more I watched the angrier I became when it became evident the slaughter that took place there and the only person to blame would be Custer himself.

Culpeper-- Be careful here. Your conclusion is correct, Custer bears the blame, but this event is not the most widely studied, most hotly debated, most widely written about military battle in American history without reason. There are more sides to the blame issue than fingers on your hands. There is more controversy and dissension about more issues in that 5- or 6- hour event than any other event I can think of. And to make it even worse, the controversy extends back to days before the battle and involves people who were not even there. If I am not mistaken, there is or was an instructor at C&GS or the War College who conducts or conducted yearly or programmed treks-- on horseback just to get the proper feel-- to the battlefield, constantly going over the tactics and issues involved. What Custer did that day must be studied-- not for condemnation or approval-- but for the psychological and physiological actions of so many individuals.

Television programs are great for general knowledge, but they are sort of like driving along the access road in the battlefield park. Cursory. Even the placement of the markers there are wrong and overstated and anyone interested in military battles could be led to incorrect conclusions just by looking at them. I would venture to say we know with more certainly what the Romans did at Masada than we know about Custer's last 2 hours at the Little Big Horn.

All I ask of you is please do not draw conclusions based on what you see on TV. For every "fact" you are handed I could probably give you 2 that head to different conclusions. It is a fascinating study.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[Culpeper]

Culpeper-- Be careful here.
All I ask of you is please do not draw conclusions based on what you see on TV. For every "fact" you are handed I could probably give you 2 that head to different conclusions. It is a fascinating study.

Best wishes,
Fred.

You can ask all the questions you want here. I think I read everything I could on Little Big Horn many years ago. The documentary (Discovery Channel 2002) was counting bullets and casings and documenting where they were found. It was a forensic and scientific experiment that came to certain conclusions but didn't tell the whole story. For example, they used ballistics to track where a weapon was during the battle. They found some casings and bullets that were in several places and what direction the weapon traveled and so forth. It was based soley on what was found and where it was found as well as documented history. One skirmish line for example tells a story. The bottom line: Custer made the decision to attack the village. Other factors were involved. But he was ranking commander. It's his fault. It was a rout. The Indians had repeating rifles bearing down on overwhelmed troops with single shot carbines to state the least. The evidence lies on the battlefield.

I had almost forgot that I liked the documentary so much that I purchased the video. I still have it. Now, I want to watch it again.

Custer's Last Stand. Battlefield archaeologists use crime-scene forensics to discover the real story (Discovery Channel's Unsolved History).

http://www.veriscopepictures.com/

[Culpeper]

Did so against orders at that...

I was taught in my Texas history class that Houston gave some sort of order but it wasn't approved by the Governor so Travis may have not been ordered to raze the garrison and leave. Unless, you're referring to something else.

[Fred III]

Culpeper--

Well, I'll tell you this: you bought the right one. That is the Scott-Fox archaeological dig. And you are correct: it was Custer's fault, but if we felt that Waterloo was merely Napoleon's fault and never studied "why," we would be the worse off for it.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[Culpeper]

Culpeper--

Well, I'll tell you this: you bought the right one. That is the Scott-Fox archaeological dig. And you are correct: it was Custer's fault, but if we felt that Waterloo was merely Napoleon's fault and never studied "why," we would be the worse off for it.

Best wishes,
Fred.

Waterloo was Napoleon's fault?

[Steve Blair]

The main reason, IMO, the LBH is so studied (and restudied) is Custer (both George and Libbie). Fetterman lost 80 men in 1866 in what was probably the only real victory the plains tribes had against the government (it resulted in the closing of the Bozeman Trail), but it draws nowhere near as much attention. Why? Because Fetterman didn't have a beautiful, articulate wife who both wrote well and outlived most of the other participants in the engagement. There were a number of officers in the Seventh who had decided not to really talk about the battle until Libbie died...the problem is that she outlived them all.

And I'm still convinced that one of the reasons the Seventh came apart was the death or incapacitation of Custer early in the fight.

[Tom Odom]

I was taught in my Texas history class that Houston gave some sort of order but it wasn't approved by the Governor so Travis may have not been ordered to raze the garrison and leave. Unless, you're referring to something else.

It was Houston and he was in command of Texian military forces, not the governor.

Tom

[Culpeper]

It was Houston and he was in command of Texian military forces, not the governor.

Tom

Uh, you might want to check that out.

[Tom Odom]

Uh, you might want to check that out.

This is going no where. You have your opinions and that's fine.

My source A Time to Stand, The Epic of the Alamo, by Walter Lord,
PP 200-201.

Best

Tom

[Fred III]

And I'm still convinced that one of the reasons the Seventh came apart was the death or incapacitation of Custer early in the fight.

Steve--

I certainly respect your opinion, but the problem with that argument is multifold. First of all, if Custer was incapacitated early in the fight, then why didn't the very experienced senior officers-- Myles Keogh and George Yates-- take the command back the way it had come? There was no pressure from that direction and that was where the remainder of the regiment was. Second, the battle lasted-- probably-- an hour and a half to 2 hours after the place Custer would have most likely been hit. Third, there is plenty of historical, anecdotal, and archaeological evidence that the command continued on in an offensive mode for quite a bit longer and quite a distance farther. Despite Custer's bravado, reputation, and domineering aura, Keogh and Yates were highly competent officers, fully capable of carrying on the mission.

I would, however, like to return to the discussion of the generals, the original intention of this thread.

I would also like to know your opinions on this business about Congress and the resolution regarding Turkish genocide against the Armenians. Would that have to be another thread? If so, where and who would start it?

Best wishes,
Fred.

[Culpeper]

This is going no where. You have your opinions and that's fine.

My source A Time to Stand, The Epic of the Alamo, by Walter Lord,
PP 200-201.

Best

Tom

Don't get mad. Governor Smith didn't approve Houston's order and Travis didn't receive it. It was the order to abandon the garrison and have it razed. Again, unless you are referring to something else.

It's easy to find on the Internet:

"I have ordered the fortifications in the town of Bexar to be demolished, and, if you should think well of it, I will remove all the cannon and other munitions of war to Gonzales and Copano, blow up the Alamo and abandon the place, as it will be impossible to keep up the Station with volunteers, the sooner I can be authorized the better it will be for the country."

Houston may have wanted to raze the Alamo, but he was clearly requesting Smith's consent. Smith did not "think well of it" and refused to authorize Houston' s proposal.

[Tom Odom]

Again, Lord's use of diaries and notes tells a different story. This is a matter of disagreement not anger.

best

Tom