Iraqi Perceptions of the War

[Steve the Planner]

Right. That was an echo back to Phebe Marr's explanation of Coup vs. Coup in the 50s.

I scratch my head sometimes about this rumour vs opinion stuff.

I guess I am just being ideosyncratic but my first reaction to the recent survey on Afghanistan (they love us, and expect a wonderful future) was: either the poll was done before recent events, or they have a very overly optimistic view of the President's message and intent.

Something doesn't sound quite as sustainable as it should unless big things change quickly.

My guess is that Springtime will be no picnic in Kabul.

Steve

[Surferbeetle]

The Council of Ministers of Iraq

Iraqi Presidential Divan

United States Ambassadors to Iraq

United Kingdom Ambassadors to Iraq

German Ambassadors to Iraq
Paul Freiherr von Maltzahn

Chinese Ambassadors to Iraq
Zhang Weiqiu

Turkish Ambassadors to Iraq
Unal Cevikoz

Syrian Ambassadors to Iraq
Nawaf Fares

Jordanian Ambassadors to Iraq
Nayef Zeidan

Saudi Arabian Ambassadors to Iraq

Iranian Ambassadors to Iraq
Hassan Kazemi-Qomi

Aswat al Iraq website

[Surferbeetle]

Iraqi Politics and Zombies Posted By Marc Lynch at FP, Friday, January 15, 2010 - 7:07 AM

The story, of course, is the Committee's surprising decision to disqualify some 500 politicians, including the Sunni leader Saleh al-Mutlak and the current Minister of Defense Abdul-Qadir Jassem al-Obeidi, from contesting the upcoming Parliamentary elections on the grounds of alleged Baathist ties. The Higher Election Commission disappointed many observers by accepting the recommendation; the issue now goes to appeal. Mutlak's list -- which includes such figures as former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and current Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi -- is talking about boycotting the election, which many fear could have a major negative impact on the elections and on longer-term prospects for Iraqi political accommodation. Not bad work for a zombie!

Musings On Iraq a blog by Joel Wing

Alsumaria Iraqi Satellite TV Network website

Niqash a blog concerned with briefings from inside and across Iraq

Mosaic: World News from the Middle East, Link TV

[Surferbeetle]

At FP The Iraqi DeBaath Fiasco Continues, Posted By Marc Lynch Monday, January 18, 2010 - 9:12 AM

As the disqualification of some 500 leading Iraqi politicians on the grounds of alleged ties to the Baath Party is continuing to roil Iraqi politics, Arab papers today report that both U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill and Vice President Joseph Biden have been intervening with Iraqi officials in an attempt to find a way to walk back the disastrous decision -- perhaps by postponing the implementation of the committee's decisions until after the election. The commission in turn is complaining about foreign interference, while Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki broke his silence by calling to "not politicize" the process (a bit late for that, no?) and some Iraqi outlets are screaming about alleged American threats. There is still a chance that the appeals process could provide an exit strategy, but this doesn't seem hugely likely at this point; the final list of those disqualified is set to be released tomorrow.

Iraqi politicians, especially those associated with Mutlak's bloc such as Ayad Allawi and Tareq al-Hashemi, have been loudly complaining about alleged conflict of interest and abuse of power behind the moves. The indefatigable Norwegian researcher Reider Visser deserves credit for unearthing that Ali Faysal al-Lami, who spent about a year in a U.S.-run prison on charges of complicity with attacks by Shia militias and runs the Parliamentary committee responsible for the disqualifications, is actually standing for election on Ahmed Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress list. Visser, like a number of Iraqi analysts, argue that they are using their official positions to stack the deck in their own favor: "It is they who effectively control the vetting process for the entire elections process. They enjoy full support in this from Iran; meanwhile their leaders are being feted in Washington, where Adil Abd al-Mahdi has just been visiting." The committee's defenders claim that it is simply enforcing the law. Finally, the editor of the Saudi al-Sharq al-Awsat complains that Iran's allies in Iraq are using their control of the mechanisms of Iraqi democracy to seize power for themselves on behalf of Iran -- and the similarity between the DeBaath "vetting" of candidates and Iran's Guardians Council's vettting of candidates has been noted.

NYT link (U.S. Will Release More Members of an Iraqi Militia By Rod Nordland and Sam Dagher
Published: August 17, 2009 ) mentioning Ali Faysal al-Lami. I would add that Iraqi politics have many layers and, for me at least, it's difficult to gain a balanced understanding...things may or may not be what they appear to be.

Reidar Visser's January 17 2010 post The Bloc That Has No De-Baathification Worries at the blog Iraq and Gulf Analysis

How can the Watani list be so confident and go ahead with the publication of its candidate lists even before the IHEC has formally approved them? The explanation is very simple, and is contained in the Watani lists themselves: Its candidate number twenty-four in Baghdad is named Ali Faysal al-Lami and belongs to the Iraqi National Congress headed by Ahmed Chalabi. Sounds familiar? Yes, that’s right, Lami is the director of the accountability and justice board that recently moved to bar several hundred candidates from taking part in the elections. No resistance was offered, and today no one in Iraq seems to be making a big point of the fact that he himself is a candidate in the elections! Little wonder, then, that the Watani leaders seem confident about proceeding with the release of their list: It is they who effectively control the vetting process for the entire elections process. They enjoy full support in this from Iran; meanwhile their leaders are being feted in Washington, where Adil Abd al-Mahdi has just been visiting.

[Surferbeetle]

From the 18 Jan 2010, NYT, The Rise and Fall of a Sunni in Baghdad By NADA BAKRI

BAGHDAD — Saleh al-Mutlaq has never shied from controversy, sometimes relishing his plunge into the turbulence of Iraqi politics. But even Mr. Mutlaq, a disheveled former agronomist, seems taken aback at landing square center in a growing dispute that threatens to unleash turmoil ahead of Iraq’s parliamentary elections in March.

[Surferbeetle]

Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, December 2009, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252)

As a consequence of the movement of U.S. combat forces out of Iraqi cities on June 30, 2009, the
United States has reduced visibility and ability to verify Iraqi reports. Without a robust U.S. presence,
MNF-I metrics include host nation reports that are not independently verifiable. The overall trends
between Coalition force data and host nation data are very close, but some values may differ. Current
charts show a combination of Coalition and Host-Nation reported data. The combination of these
reports causes baseline numbers to increase, making it difficult to compare these charts with those
from previous publications of this report. Each slide is annotated to indicate the types of reports
included.

[Surferbeetle]

Bolding was added by me and is not in Dr. Lynch's post.

Posted by Marc Lynch on 23 Feb 2010 at FP.com, Iraq contingencies

The drawdown will probably matter considerably less than people expect. With the new SOFA-defined rules of engagement, U.S. forces have already stopped doing many of the things associated with the "surge." The Iraqi response to American efforts on the de-Baathification circus demonstrate painfully clearly that the nearly 100,000 troops still in Iraq gave very little leverage on an issue which the U.S. at least publicly deemed vital -- a point made very effectively by Ambassador Hill at the Council on Foreign Relations last week. The sharp backlash against even the measured criticisms by U.S. officials offers an important lesson: Doing the sorts of assertive things which may please Obama's critics are highly likely to spark a negative reaction among Iraqis, generating more hostility to the U.S. role without actually accomplishing anything. The U.S. is wise to avoid them.

That doesn't mean that things are rosy. The de-Baathification circus has demonstrated the fragility of Iraqi institutions, and helped to reignite sectarian resentments and fears (many Sunnis feel targeted, while many Shia are being treated to an endless barrage of anti-Ba'athist electoral propaganda). There's very much a risk of long, drawn-out coalition talks after the election. It isn't certain how a transition from power will go, should Maliki's list lose, given the prime minister's efforts to centralize power in his office over the last few years. There may well be a spike in violence by frustrated losers in the elections. If there's massive fraud on election day, things could get ugly. The elections, already marred by the de-Baathification fiasco, may well end up producing a new Parliament and government which doesn't really change much. There are big, long-deferred issues to confront after the elections, such as the Article 140 referendum over Kirkuk.

Iraq: The Way Forward–U.S. Ambassador's Assessment

Speaker: Christopher R. Hill, U.S. Ambassador To Iraq
Presider: Karen J. DeYoung, Associate Editor and Senior Diplomatic Correspondent, The Washington Post

February 18, 2010
Council on Foreign Relations

This election -- it's a very important election. It's an important election, not because if we have a successful election we can pull our troops out. It's an important election, because it will really help define what Iraq is in the future. And in so doing, define a relationship that we're going to be able to have in the future. This is, you know, I do think all problems should start by, you know, look at the map. And when you see what Iraq is, it's where the Shi'a world meets the Sunni world; it's where the Kurdish world meets the Arab world. It's in a very important position in the world. And so we want it to be successful and we want to have a long-term relationship.

You know, because of the improvement in the security situation, I've been able to get out to almost all the provinces in Iraq, which was -- you know, could not be done by my predecessors due to security. And it was just -- it's been striking, you know, to go to some of these campuses -- I was at the University of Baghdad a couple of weeks ago and, you know, talking to these students. And, you know, they didn't talk to me about the Sunnis and the Shi'a and, you know, Article 140 of the constitution as the solution for Kirkuk.

They want to know, you know, are the oil companies coming in? Are they going to recognize these engineering degrees from Baghdad? You know, what do they need to do to assure that their degrees are going to be acceptable to international firms? You know, know can we improve our English in how can we improve, you know, relationships with American universities? Can we do more on distance learning? You know, this sort of thing.

It's what these kids are all asking. I mean, they're all very much wanting to be part of sort of global climate -- I mean, a global, you know, interaction and education. I was up in Erbil talking to Saladdin students there -- the same reaction. I mean, it's kind of gratifying that they kind of got it. And I must say one of these kids came up to me and said I just want to talk to some native speaker to really work on my English. And I said, well, I think we've got some various programs. And this kid said, well, you know, can't something be done more quickly?