Iraqi Perceptions of the War

[Surferbeetle]

At the Jamestown Foundation, Who Speaks for the Shi’a of Iraq? By: Rachel Schneller

Iraq’s Shi’a Arabs, the demographic majority with an estimated 60-70% of the population, wield the most political influence in Iraq. But the Shi’a of Iraq are a diverse group, with major regional differences between the Shi’a of Basra and the deep South and the Shi’a of the north-central region. Iraq’s Shi’a hold divergent views on the appropriate role of religion in government. Other areas of internal division among Shi’a parties exist, such as a common position on cooperation with the United States, but these are secondary in their influence on Shi’a voters.

Iraq’s Shi’a political parties have fought battles with each other that at times were as bloody as the sectarian war between Sunnis and Shi’a in 2006-2008. From 2005-2008, the Badr Corps of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and Sadrists fought militia battles in the streets of Basra. In 2009, the two groups reconciled and formed a coalition for the March 2010 elections. How could two groups bent on eliminating each other become allies only two years later? Why did Da’awa—the compromise party supported by both ISCI and Sadrists in 2006 for the Prime Ministership—break from the coalition in 2009?

One of the trends to watch in the Shi’a political landscape will be the “migration” of Shi’a politics southward. In the January 2009 provincial elections, Da’awa came to power in the Basra provincial council. The Fadillah governor was replaced with a Da’awa member. Subsequently, Da’awa began moving away from its strongly centrist position and toward greater regional resource sharing, as reflected in the 2010 budget that accords the Basra provincial government a dollar per barrel of oil produced, a move that puts Da’awa more at odds with centralists but is more representative of the interests of Shi’a in Basra. [6] If Da’awa can maintain a strong power base in Basra, it may not need to ally with the “nationalist” INA to maintain primacy among the religious Shi’a parties. [7]

Sadrists

ISCI/SCIRI

Fadhila

Da'wa

Iraqiya/Iraqi National Accord

Ahrar

[Surferbeetle]

Tales of the Tyrant by Mark Bowden at the Atlantic

In what sense does Saddam see himself as a great man? Saad al-Bazzaz, who defected in 1992, has thought a lot about this question, during his time as a newspaper editor and TV producer in Baghdad, and in the years since, as the publisher of an Arabic newspaper in London.

"I need a piece of paper and a pen," he told me recently in the lobby of Claridge's Hotel. He flattened the paper out on a coffee table and tested the pen. Then he drew a line down the center. "You must understand, the daily behavior is just the result of the mentality," he explained. "Most people would say that the main conflict in Iraqi society is sectarian, between the Sunni and the Shia Muslims. But the big gap has nothing to do with religion. It is between the mentality of the villages and the mentality of the cities."

"Okay. Here is a village." On the right half of the page al-Bazzaz wrote a V and beneath it he drew a collection of separate small squares. "These are houses or tents," he said. "Notice there are spaces between them. This is because in the villages each family has its own house, and each house is sometimes several miles from the next one. They are self-contained. They grow their own food and make their own clothes. Those who grow up in the villages are frightened of everything. There is no real law enforcement or civil society. Each family is frightened of each other, and all of them are frightened of outsiders. This is the tribal mind. The only loyalty they know is to their own family, or to their own village. Each of the families is ruled by a patriarch, and the village is ruled by the strongest of them. This loyalty to tribe comes before everything. There are no values beyond power. You can lie, cheat, steal, even kill, and it is okay so long as you are a loyal son of the village or the tribe. Politics for these people is a bloody game, and it is all about getting or holding power."

Al-Bazzaz wrote the word "city" atop the left half of the page. Beneath it he drew a line of adjacent squares. Below that he drew another line, and another. "In the city the old tribal ties are left behind. Everyone lives close together. The state is a big part of everyone's life. They work at jobs and buy their food and clothing at markets and in stores. There are laws, police, courts, and schools. People in the city lose their fear of outsiders, and take an interest in foreign things. Life in the city depends on cooperation, on sophisticated social networks. Mutual self-interest defines public policy. You can't get anything done without cooperating with others, so politics in the city becomes the art of compromise and partnership. The highest goal of politics becomes cooperation, community, and keeping the peace. By definition, politics in the city becomes nonviolent. The backbone of urban politics isn't blood, it's law."

[Surferbeetle]

Dr. Reidar Visser on Iraq and Gulf Analysis, Secret Election Manifesto, 25 Feb 2010

In line with predictions, the Iraqi National Alliance seems determined to keep the de-Baathification issue on the agenda all the way down to the wire. They keep prodding their allies in the governorates to push the issue, thereby perpetuating a climate of fear where few civil servants may feel safe about their positions. Just today, it was announced that 10 professors at the University of Karbala had been singled out for exclusion in the name of de-Baathification. Earlier, it was reported that the all-important South Oil Company – the keystone of Iraq’s oil-based economy – had similarly been targeted for additional de-Baathification. Large numbers of competent professionals that are vital to maintaining decent output levels in Iraq’s struggling oil industry are at risk because of the insistence of the Iraqi National Alliance to push a fear-oriented agenda that was hatched in exile in Iran and is now being rolled out across Iraq.

In sum, the parties behind this proposal wanted to strengthen religious law in Iraq, keep Baghdad weak, and perpetuate the Bremerian model of government of oversized governments of national unity and strong presidential vetoes at least until 2015. Today, when everyone talks about “unity” and being a “nationalist”, the draft for a revised constitution may serve as a more faithful manifesto of where parties like the Kurdistan alliance, the Iraqi National Alliance and Tawafuq really want to go. The interesting thing is the position of two of the minority parties on the constitutional committee that are today considered among the strongest candidates for providing the next premier of Iraq: Daawa and Iraqiyya. In terms of getting the political debate back on track, perhaps issues like these could be a useful vantage point for Iraqiyya, which traditionally has had a firm nationalist position on constitutional issues. And what about the Daawa, whose centralism and resistance to power-sharing has sometimes put them at odds with fellow Shiite Islamists? Recent reports from Iraq say that the accountability and justice board is now attacking high-level security officials that have ties to Maliki, possibly with the aim of marginalising him as a future premier; is this the point where Maliki might finally wake up and reverse his position on the de-Baathification disaster?

Dr. March Lynch on Foreign Policy, Chalabi and Lami ain't done yet, February 24, 2010

So you thought that Ahmed Chalabi and Ali al-Lami's Accountability and Justice (De-Ba'athification) Committee had done all they could to wreck Iraq's elections and advance their political agendas? Not even. Yesterday, in what al-Hayat calls a surprise move, Lami announced that the AJC had named 376 military, police and intelligence officers for de-Ba'athification. The list includes a number of important people in senior positions.

The political calculations here are transparent. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has the Constitutional right to except individuals from de-Ba'athification in the national interest, but presumably he won't out of fear of being portrayed as "soft on the Ba'ath" in the last days of the election campaign. Lami's move will likely further inflame the situation, demonstrating the degradation and politicization of Iraqi state institutions and further antagonizing many Sunnis (Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi said today that the Iraqi government had "failed" at national reconciliation, though a return of civil war remains unlikely, while Ayad Allawi is on the defensive over his visit to Saudi Arabia to launch his election campaign). That polarization will strengthen the electoral hand of the more sectarian parties, including of course the one for which Lami is personally a candidate.

Estimated size of Iraqi Oil Reserves from EIA: 115.00 billion barrels

Estimated size of Iranian Oil Reserves from EIA: 136.27 billion barrels

Estimated size of Saudi Oil Reserves from EIA: 262.30 billion barrels

Watani List aka National Iraqi Alliance aka United Iraqi Alliance

Tawafuq aka Iraqi Accord Front

Kurdistan List

Politics is a process by which groups of people make collective decisions. The term is generally applied to behavior within civil governments, but politics has been observed in other group interactions, including corporate, academic and religious institutions. It consists of "social relations involving authority or power"[1] and refers to the regulation of a political unit,[2] and to the methods and tactics used to formulate and apply policy.[3]

[OfTheTroops]

De baathification is one of the worst ideas ever. 30 years of skill and experience stripped from any position of authority on a "survivor" pledge to the Baath. I thought they had a grand "reconciliation" back in 2007. Things are not going to go well.

[Surferbeetle]

Throwing out the technocrat's who ran things via De-Ba'athification, privatizing SOE's (unemployment rates went through the roof), and disbanding the Army (trained and unemployed soldiers with unlimited access to weapons) had very significant consequences to stability in the region.

It's interesting to think about the why's behind some of those decisions:

• Perhaps sending a noteworthy and long lasting message to the region was part of the decision making process. There are historical examples to consider such as The Morgenthau Plan.

• Perhaps Democracy Peace Theory was part of the decision making process.

• Perhaps the history of the military and the Ba'ath Party in Iraq was part of the decision making process.

Chronology of Iraqi Coup's

1941

The 1941 Iraqi coup d'état, also known as the Rashid Ali Al-Gaylani coup or the Golden Square coup was a military coup in Iraq on April 1, 1941[1] that overthrew the regime of Regent 'Abd al-Ilah and installed Rashid Ali as Prime Minister. It was led by four Iraqi nationalist army generals, known as "the Golden Square." The Golden Square intended to use the war to press for full Iraqi independence following the limited independence granted in 1932. To that end, they worked with German intelligence and accepted military assistance from Germany. The change in government led to a British invasion of Iraq and subsequent occupation until 1947.

1958

Inspired by Nasser, officers from the Nineteenth Brigade known as "The Four Colonials", under the leadership of Brigadier Abd al-Karīm Qāsim (known as "az-Za`īm", 'the leader') and Colonel Abdul Salam Arif overthrew the Hashimite monarchy on 14 July 1958. The new government proclaimed Iraq to be a republic and rejected the idea of a union with Jordan. Iraq's activity in the Baghdad Pact ceased.

February 1963

The February 1963 Iraqi coup d'état was a February 8, 1963 armed military coup which overthrew the regime of the Prime Minister in Iraq, Brigadier General Abdul-Karim Qassem. Revolutionary leaders and supporters of the coup referred to it as a movement, rather than a coup. Some time after the Homeland Officers' Organization, or "Al-Ahrar" ("The Free") succeeded in toppling the monarchy and transforming the Iraqi regime into a republic in 1958, signs of differences between political parties and forces and the Homeland Officers' Organization began when Pan-Arab nationalist forces led by Abdul Salam Arif and the Baath Party called for immediate unification with the United Arab Republic.

Another view of the February 1963 coup

Qasim’s removal took place on February 8 1963, the 14th day of Ramadan and therefore called the 14 Ramadan Coup. The coup had been in its planning stages since 1962, and several attempts had been planned, only to be abandoned for fear of discovery. The coup had been initially planned for January 18, but was moved to January 25, then February 8, after Qasim gained knowledge of the proposed attempt and arrested some of the plotters.
The coup began in the early morning of February 8 1963, when the Communist air force chief, Jalal al-Awqati was assassinated and tank units occupied the Abu Ghrayb radio station. A bitter two day struggle unfolded with heavy fighting between the Ba’athist conspirators and pro-Qasim forces. Qasim took refuge in the Ministry of Defence, where fighting became particularly heavy. Communist sympathisers took to the streets to resist the coup adding to the high casualties. On February 9, Qasim eventually offered his surrender in return for safe passage out of the country. His request was refused, and on the afternoon of the 9th, Qasim was executed on the orders of the newly formed National Council of the Revolutionary Command (NCRC)[73]. His successor was his fellow July 14 conspirator, Arif.

1968

In 1968, Abdul Rahman Arif was overthrown by the Arab Socialist Baath Party.

Back to De-Ba'athification:

Joel Wing at Musings on Iraq, Timeline of Iraq’s De-Baathification Campaign

[Surferbeetle]

International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Uncertain Future: Elections and Beyond, Middle East Report N°94 25 February 2010

As a rule, Iraq’s post-Saddam elections have tended to magnify pre-existing negative trends. The parliamentary polls to be held on 7 March are no exception. The focus on electoral politics is good, no doubt, but the run-up has highlighted deep-seated problems that threaten the fragile recovery: recurring election-related violence; ethnic tensions over Kirkuk; the re-emergence of sectarianism; and blatant political manipulation of state institutions. The most egregious development was the decision to disqualify over 500 candidates, a dangerous, arbitrary step lacking due process, yet endorsed by the Shiite ruling parties. Under normal circumstances, that alone might have sufficed to discredit the elections. But these are not normal circumstances, and for the sake of Iraq’s stability, the elections must go on. At a minimum, however, the international community should ramp up its electoral monitoring and define clear red lines that need to be respected if the results are to be considered legitimate. And it should press the next government to seriously tackle the issue – long-neglected yet never more critical – of national reconciliation.

That leaves what happens after the elections, assuming they pass this threshold. The question then will be whether the incoming government is able and willing to address the country’s numerous political deficiencies, from sectarianism to politicised institutions and much in between. Serious work toward national reconciliation is long overdue. This time, forming a coalition government and holding it up as an example of national unity will not suffice. There will have to be meaningful progress on opening up political space, increasing cross-sectarian participation and improving transparency and accountability.

Rachel Schneller at CFR, Avoiding Elections at Any Cost in Iraq, December 3, 2009

The new election law expands the seats of the governing council from 275 to 323, but Iraqi Kurds and Sunnis dispute the allocation of the forty-eight new seats, saying Shias are overrepresented.

The United States would do well to back away from the policy of elections at any cost. Elections in Iraq do not signify stability. In Iraq, the sequence of events is more important than the chronology of them. That is, the order of constitutional reform, oil law reform, and election law reform is more important than ensuring they occur according to schedule. In this light, the current delays on Iraq's election law are a good sign, because it appears Iraq's Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds are seriously trying to work out a power-sharing arrangement acceptable to all.
Iraq's constitution requires a new government to be in place before existing mandates expire in March 2010, but Iraq's current government is certainly capable of finding a way to legalize a further delay on elections if needed. It is more important to ensure that elections, when they do happen, have the buy-in of all Iraqis, rather than being bound to a timetable that appears, from within the country, to be arbitrary and imposed from the outside. An election that does not have the confidence of all three groups could result in a boycott by one of them, as the Sunnis did in 2005, or in protracted disputes after the election regarding acceptable power-sharing arrangements, which also occurred after the 2005 elections.

Steven Lee Myers at NYT, Vote Seen as Pivotal Test for Both Iraq and Maliki, Published: February 28, 2010

A few months ago, building on genuine if not universal popularity, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki appeared poised to win a second term as Iraq’s prime minister. Now, as Iraqis prepare to vote in parliamentary elections on March 7, his path to another four years in office has become increasingly uncertain, his campaign erratic and, to some, deeply troubling.

Mr. Maliki, who turns 60 in June, could yet prevail. According to politicians and polls conducted by parties and American officials, though not released publicly, Mr. Maliki’s coalition will very likely win the largest plurality of the new Parliament’s 325 seats. But it is unlikely to be anywhere near a majority.

[Surferbeetle]

Liz Sly, at the LA Times, Maliki's hold on power uncertain, 2 March 2010

The unified Shiite bloc that swept the vote in the last election has split into two camps: Maliki's State of Law coalition, which has attempted to portray itself as nonsectarian, and the more religiously inclined Iraqi National Alliance.

The Iraqiya bloc headed by secular Shiite Iyad Allawi, who was the U.S.'s choice to lead the first postoccupation Iraqi government, is the favorite to pick up the Sunni Arab and secularist vote, but it will face competition from the Sunni religious Iraqi Accordance and the Iraq Unity Alliance, a new coalition headed by Shiite Interior Minister Jawad Bolani and Sunni Awakening leader Ahmed abu Risha. Even the main Kurdish Alliance that emerged as the kingmaker in the last parliament is confronting a challenge from the breakaway Kurdish Goran, or Change Party.

Perhaps the only issue on which these disparate groups agree is their desire to replace Maliki as prime minister, said Mowaffak Rubaie, Maliki's former national security advisor who is running as a candidate with the rival Shiite alliance.

"Anti-Maliki-ism will unite us," he said of the various parties, all likely to win seats. "There is a lot of strong opposition to Maliki personally."

"He's paranoid about plots and it's not a delusion, because everyone is trying to get rid of him," said a Western diplomat in Baghdad who spoke on condition of anonymity. "It contributes to an atmosphere where you don't trust others and therefore it's hard to build relationships of trust."

If not Maliki, then who? That's something no one seems prepared to predict. Potential candidates include Adel Abdul Mehdi, a longtime American favorite from the Shiite alliance; former Prime Minister Allawi; and even perhaps Ahmad Chalabi, the mercurial onetime Pentagon protege who hopes to emerge as a compromise candidate.

Given the fierce political rivalries, it is possible the factions will settle on a complete unknown -- in the same way Maliki was plucked from relative obscurity to head the last government after the chosen Shiite nominee from his party, former Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafari, was essentially vetoed by the Kurds and U.S.

Steven Lee Myers, at the NYT, Iraq’s Top Cleric Refuses to Influence Elections, 2 March 2010

In Najaf, the world’s most venerable seat of Shiite scholarship, clerics say Ayatollah Sistani, a pivotal figure ever since the American overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003, hopes to create for Iraq a model that is starkly different from the clerical rule that has governed Iran, which also has a Shiite majority.

The “quietist” Najaf school of Shiite thought, with Ayatollah Sistani in the lead, has long insisted that clerics play no direct role in government, and its proponents have opposed Iran’s model out of fear it could tar clerical authority and prestige.

If this approach outlasts him, which is not a given, since he is 79 and said to be ill, the impact on Iraq could be profound.

Some in Iraq view Ayatollah Sistani’s stance skeptically, arguing that he remains by definition a sectarian figure, concerned above all with ensuring Shiite political control. But by not insisting on a unified Shiite coalition, he has given Sunni parties the opportunity to compete.

“The supreme religious authority does not endorse any of the parties standing in the elections and maintains that voters should choose those lists that best serve Iraq’s current and future interests and that are most capable of bringing the people the stability and development they desire so much,” he said when the campaign began.