Results 1 to 20 of 38

Thread: Battlefield Ethics

Hybrid View

Previous Post Previous Post   Next Post Next Post
  1. #1
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Mar 2007
    Location
    Norfolk VA
    Posts
    77

    Default

    I've given the report itself a quick look. its interesting how the focus has been on some of the specific answers to questions and not the overall findings of the report.
    From what I saw of the central findings, longer tours and more combat equalled, on average, more mental health problems. I believe that there also seemed to be a connection between the same characteristics of combat/tour length and increased the propensity for ethics violations.
    I think that this report highlights an operational dilemma for COIN and other similar operations. There is always a refrain that forces need to be engaged longer in these types of operations so that they can really learn and understand the culture, environment, etc. This argues for lengthening unit deployments. The flip side, however, seems to be that longer commitment has the downside of greater "moral fatigue" and thus threatens to undercut the very advantages of prolonged engagement--which argues for shorter deployments. There's probably a sweet spot in there and its probably different based on the duties associated.
    COIN is naturally morally degrading to the force. Outside of just the torture argument, without strong leadership attention, a force that is continually engaged in COIN is likely to slip down to the level of the foe wrt consideration of civilian casualties, etc.
    One of the interesting findings is that transition team personnel tend to fair relatively better than their brigade combat team counterparts. I wonder if that's due to the level and character of their engagement with Iraqis--they are apt to develop a greater, less sterotyped regard for the people (people as in the Iraqi population) that they are fighting for.
    The classic "men in combat" discussions emphasize that the troops really fight for one another, not for the stated national causes. In COIN, if taken to an extreme, this can be counterproductive to the mission itself. The bond of brotherhood can become more important than protecting, or considering, civilian lives. I would venture that the closer a unit operates within the community and with Iraqi forces, the more chance that those elements (population and allies) will be considered closer to the scope of the brotherhood to be treated with a similar emotional bond.

  2. #2
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Feb 2007
    Posts
    74

    Default

    Phil,

    Great post. Your analysis/thoughts about how our advisors respond to lengthy deployments is interesting and, although I don't have statistical data to back it, makes perfect sense to me. Most advisors have a much greater sense of accomplishment, close relations with Iraqis and can most likely grasp the mission better than your average Soldier or Marine that spends the better part of his deployment (be this 7 months or a year or now 15 months) commuting to work, especially over the past few years.

    Here's the major problem I see with all the findings and conclusions drawn from the survey: for the better part of 3-4 years, our forces had almost zero relationship with the Iraqi people and, although it's tough to admit, spent their deployments in survival mode. By this I mean, lived in a FOB outside of town, patrolled into the town, generally in vehicles, sometimes getting hit by IEDs, and then returned to their fortress FOB later in the day, leaving most concerns WRT Iraqis until tomorrow or a few days later (I know there were exceptions). Because we operated in this manner at the tactical level, in a way, it's understandable, although unfortunate, that many Marines/Soldiers don't have a strong bond or sense of partnership with the Iraqis.

    Further, for the first few years of this war COIN wasn't part of most of our formal school POIs and Marines/Soldiers weren't forced to expand the way they think about and understand the culture of their environment. We've gotten so much better in these areas in the past year alone.

    Although we can't go back in time, so much of me thinks the results of the survey would have been very different had we been executing the new strategy since 2003.
    Last edited by Maximus; 05-08-2007 at 05:29 AM.

  3. #3
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Jan 2007
    Posts
    1,188

    Default Wide Latitude....No Longitude?

    I would agree with the previous post that a COIN mentality would generate a much different data set given the cultural exchange that is occuring. I doubt there will be any follow up/longitudinal studies, however it would behoove some enterprising staffer of General P. to conduct this survey specifically in units that have some proven COIN time under their belts - a couple hundred randomly assigned, identical surveys, with manila envelopes that could be sealed and put in a collection box anonymously should do the trick nicely to show a distinct pattern, worthy of further pursuit. If my hunch as a civilian is correct, that there is some friction between traditionalists and COIN, this could be a nice feather in the cap, or ammo in the pouch perhaps, for the COIN side of things.

  4. #4
    Council Member marct's Avatar
    Join Date
    Aug 2006
    Location
    Ottawa, Canada
    Posts
    3,682

    Default

    Hi Goesh,

    Quote Originally Posted by goesh View Post
    I would agree with the previous post that a COIN mentality would generate a much different data set given the cultural exchange that is occuring. I doubt there will be any follow up/longitudinal studies, however it would behoove some enterprising staffer of General P. to conduct this survey specifically in units that have some proven COIN time under their belts - a couple hundred randomly assigned, identical surveys, with manila envelopes that could be sealed and put in a collection box anonymously should do the trick nicely to show a distinct pattern, worthy of further pursuit. If my hunch as a civilian is correct, that there is some friction between traditionalists and COIN, this could be a nice feather in the cap, or ammo in the pouch perhaps, for the COIN side of things.
    I suspect you are right about the differences, and a follow up study would be worthwhile. Personally, I'm hoping that the raw data set will be released.

    On another note, I find it fascination that the discussion of "ethics" is based solely on behaviour that can be counted. On my, admittedly surface, skimming of the report, nowhere do I see any solid process linkages between the behavioural rules, the processes behind the rules and mental health.

    I see a lot of emphasis on reactive strategies to mental health situations (e.g. anger management training) but no linking of that to ethical processes either. I'll admit I am unfamiliar with the specifics of these particular training sessions, so maybe that is included in them - maybe someone who is familiar could comment?

    Having said that, I should also note that I do have a fair bit of experience with counselling over the past 20 years (both career counselling and "pastoral" counselling). My experience has been that any successful counselling always involves placing behaviour into a general ethical and psychological context - i.e. a set of "operational rules of reality". It has also been my experience that counselling based on behavioural rules only tends to fall flat on its face the first time there is any confusion over the application of the behavioural rules comes up.

    Marc
    Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
    Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
    Senior Research Fellow,
    The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
    Carleton University
    http://marctyrrell.com/

  5. #5
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Sep 2006
    Location
    The Land of The Morning Calm
    Posts
    177

    Default

    Well,

    Hasn't Insurgency/Counter-Insurgency been described as nasty dirty wars in the past? Soldiers and Marines have varying defintions of mistreatment and serious injuries. Marc, you are not going to see the raw data on this.

  6. #6
    Council Member Dr Jack's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2006
    Posts
    86

    Default MHAT-IV Briefing Slides

    The MHAT-IV briefing slides to the Commandant of the Marine Corps can be found at the following sites:

    http://www.militarytimes.com/static/...tiv18apr07.pdf

    http://www.iava.org/documents/MHATIV...Commandant.ppt

    Interesting data...

  7. #7
    Council Member marct's Avatar
    Join Date
    Aug 2006
    Location
    Ottawa, Canada
    Posts
    3,682

    Default

    Hi Jimbo,

    Quote Originally Posted by Jimbo View Post
    Hasn't Insurgency/Counter-Insurgency been described as nasty dirty wars in the past? Soldiers and Marines have varying defintions of mistreatment and serious injuries. Marc, you are not going to see the raw data on this.
    I know . Let's just say I would be a lot more confident about their findings if I could get a look at the raw data. And, also, my comments about their definition of "ethics" still stand .

    Quote Originally Posted by Dr Jack View Post
    The MHAT-IV briefing slides to the Commandant of the Marine Corps can be found at the following sites:

    http://www.militarytimes.com/static/...tiv18apr07.pdf

    http://www.iava.org/documents/MHATIV...Commandant.ppt

    Interesting data...
    Somewhat, but most of it is in the main report. I certainly didn't see anything in the briefing about the role of chaplains, and I would have liked to. Then again, this is one of the limitations of the type of research they are doing - you can't really probe things or find out something you didn't already think about. For example, while there is some good data on "ethics" and NCOs, I didn't see anything that actually dug into this - only surface numbers. Why is there a difference? What are the characteristics of the NCOs that are limiting ethical breaches? How can those characteristics be translated into training programs? That sort of stuff.

    Marc
    Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
    Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
    Senior Research Fellow,
    The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
    Carleton University
    http://marctyrrell.com/

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •