The military surge underway since February 2007 was prompted by the rationale that reducing sectarian violence in and around Baghdad and curtailing insurgency and terrorist attacks would, together, create a breathing space for political and social groups to engage in national reconciliation and agree on common principles and policies. In other words, there is the anticipation of a direct relationship between military achievement and political achievement, and of building a positive synergy that would lead to stable conditions and permit U.S. troop reduction. Does this relationship hold true? Has the expanded military presence and its new operating strategies increased security, reduced sectarian killing and sectarian purges, and controlled insurgent and terrorist attacks? If violence has decreased, has this provided a respite to government and political forces, and have they, as a result, engaged in the necessary trustbuilding measures and dialogue towards reconciliation?
This report shows that the security and political situations in Iraq in the summer of 2007 were tentatively and marginally improved in Baghdad but in a state of flux, and that the political process was far behind the military effort. The report is based on conversations held in July 2007 with a large number of Iraqi political leaders and senior government officials, members of parliament from the major parliamentary groups, as well as a wide range of Iraqi citizens from Baghdad and the provinces. Its principal policy recommendations are that: a) international mediation is required to help Iraqi leaders build a new national compact; b) Iraqi leaders need to be encouraged to develop national political agendas and policies, and reduce reliance upon identity politics and narrow factional patronage; and c) that the central and provincial governments each require assistance to improve their capacity for constitutional governance.....
Bookmarks