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Thread: Plan B? Let’s Give Plan A Some Time First

  1. #41
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    USIP, 11 Sep 07: Seven Months Into the Surge: What Does it Mean for Iraqis?
    The military surge underway since February 2007 was prompted by the rationale that reducing sectarian violence in and around Baghdad and curtailing insurgency and terrorist attacks would, together, create a breathing space for political and social groups to engage in national reconciliation and agree on common principles and policies. In other words, there is the anticipation of a direct relationship between military achievement and political achievement, and of building a positive synergy that would lead to stable conditions and permit U.S. troop reduction. Does this relationship hold true? Has the expanded military presence and its new operating strategies increased security, reduced sectarian killing and sectarian purges, and controlled insurgent and terrorist attacks? If violence has decreased, has this provided a respite to government and political forces, and have they, as a result, engaged in the necessary trustbuilding measures and dialogue towards reconciliation?

    This report shows that the security and political situations in Iraq in the summer of 2007 were tentatively and marginally improved in Baghdad but in a state of flux, and that the political process was far behind the military effort. The report is based on conversations held in July 2007 with a large number of Iraqi political leaders and senior government officials, members of parliament from the major parliamentary groups, as well as a wide range of Iraqi citizens from Baghdad and the provinces. Its principal policy recommendations are that: a) international mediation is required to help Iraqi leaders build a new national compact; b) Iraqi leaders need to be encouraged to develop national political agendas and policies, and reduce reliance upon identity politics and narrow factional patronage; and c) that the central and provincial governments each require assistance to improve their capacity for constitutional governance.....

  2. #42
    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    The Shi’a accuse the Sunnis of being intransigent and of deliberately hampering political progress, and they blame Iraq’s neighbors and the U.S. for aiding and abetting the Sunnis. In ranking the causes of problems in Iraq, the Shi’a place the meddling of Arab states at the top. The prime culprits are Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Syria, and Jordan. They believe that these countries are relentlessly hostile to Shi’a rule in Iraq and will go a long way to thwart it.
    Given our focus on Iranian interference in Iraq, this is an interesting counterpart from the Iraqi Shia. It is not surprising and I dare say, the Shia are correct about the Arab states. It is also interesting that the Shia include Syria--under a Shia minority rule via Asad--in the meddler camp with the Saudis and the Jordanians.

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    Tom

  3. #43
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    Quote Originally Posted by Tom Odom View Post
    Given our focus on Iranian interference in Iraq, this is an interesting counterpart from the Iraqi Shia. It is not surprising and I dare say, the Shia are correct about the Arab states. It is also interesting that the Shia include Syria--under a Shia minority rule via Asad--in the meddler camp with the Saudis and the Jordanians....
    Its important to remember that the Alawi ruling elite in Syria are not considered true Shi'a by the Shi'a in Iraq or in Iran. Many, especially Sunnis, do not even regard Alawis as being Muslim. And although the ruling elites in Syria are certainly from the Alawite clans, the regime is a secular dictatorship. The Alawi faith actually tends to foster a secular outlook.

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    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Jedburgh View Post
    Its important to remember that the Alawi ruling elite in Syria are not considered true Shi'a by the Shi'a in Iraq or in Iran. Many, especially Sunnis, do not even regard Alawis as being Muslim. And although the ruling elites in Syria are certainly from the Alawite clans, the regime is a secular dictatorship. The Alawi faith actually tends to foster a secular outlook.
    Correct in its past secular focus but that has been changing over the past decade. The Islamist "camel's nose" is well under the Syrian regime's tent. Daddy Asad leveled Hama over the Sunni Muslim Brethren uprising. Son Bashir has been much more inclusive of Islamist themes. Alawite domination inside Syria's power structure continues regardless of its secularist tendencies.

    Alawis are indeed looked on as less than mainstream; however, recent Syrian regime rapprochement with Iran, especially when it comes to Lebanon, have certainly been cultivated by the Shia to Shia connection. In the past Amal was Syria's Shia mpovement in Lebanon and it was defintely more secular than the later devloping Hisballah as a client of Iran. Syria has since shifted much of its support to Hizballah, or at least made it easier for Iran to maintain its support.

    All of that aside, the pint remains that Iraqi Shia see the surrounding Arab states as meddlers in Iraq against Shia interests when Syria has of late been more in synch with Iranian interests in the region, albeiit with a greater focus on the Arab-Israeli dispute than the sectarian struggle inside Iraq.

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    Tom

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