Agree on the post conflict recovery versus pre-conflict planning point completely. When we (the US) announced that DoD had lead (and near absolute control) of post-conflict planning for Iraq I was surprised and concerned. That coupled with the go-it-alone stand on coalition buildiing certainly set the conditions for what happened. All of that said, it is not "just history" because it flows into what we are talking about here. How exactly do we organize for this?
And that brings me to your second point, that of how do you build "units" or some hybrid solution? Here I am at once in agreement and in disagreement. I agree we need the capacity. I don't agree that we can begin with existing capacity and just modify it to meet the need. We will probably end up doing that but it will be--once again--a bandaids and bubblegum solution.
Our capacity first has to be mental. We have developed over the years a ying and yang approach to conventional versus unconventional. One was either conventional (meaning "real" Army in my experience) or not. This also goes toward what Paul Yingling was discussing; the capacity to develop adaptive leaders without simply applying labels and continuing as before. You know the method: we are "adaptive" because we say we are.
I am continually amazed at the number of officers I hear discuss GEN Petreaus with either awe or distrust because the man has actually pursued a higher education. I can accept the number of talking heads or politicians who make comments about GEN P's dominant role in formulating COIN doctrine. What I cannot accept is when I hear officers say the same thing because they do not read or study the theory of their profession until it bites them in the butt. This of course goes back to what our council member Goesh refers to as the internecine struggle between COIN and more traditional warfare exponents of the big battalions. I fear the big battalions will win.
Tom
Bookmarks