The Strategic Corporal vs. The Strategic Cameraman

[SWJED]

From the SWJ Blog - The Strategic Corporal vs. The Strategic Cameraman by Josh Manchester.

Consider for a moment the differences in informational-warfare responsbilities of junior leaders in the Marine Corps -- corporals -- and the propagandists in insurgent and terror cells -- cameramen.

Infantry squad leaders -- often, corporals -- know (or should) that the behavior of their Marines sends signals to those always watching them in an insurgency: the people and the insurgents. When the Marines are comfortable with their weapons; seemingly unafraid to interact with the locals; understanding of native customs and mores; and treat the populace with dignity and respect, then the sum of all of these attitudes conveys a certain perception to both the people and terrorists who watch them: it hastens cooperation from the populace and hard-targets them from insurgent attacks. This is the basic informational component of a strategic corporal in Iraq.

Consider now a strategic cameraman. Numerous attacks in Iraq and elsewhere are filmed for propaganda purposes. The classic case is that of the IED or VBIED. Numerous IED videos circulate throughout cyberspace for recruiting or fundraising purposes.

From an informational standpoint, the area immediately affected by a corporal with a squad of Marines is local and physically located. The area immediately affected by a cameraman posting attack videos online is global and virtual.

If our enemies can manage to squeeze virtual and global effects out of tactical and local actions, why can't we?...

[Cori]

This is a terrific piece, and could as easily (perhaps more appropriately) have been filed under Media and Info Ops as Triggerpuller. The recognition that the vision of the "Strategic Cpl" is a negative one, ie, make a mistake even at the squad level and you can have a strategic impact given today's media, is, I think, an accurate one. But so too is the recognition that it doesn't have to be only a negative impact.

Other folks have noted here the idea (captured in the piece) that it makes sense for troops to make sure that even down to the platoon level there are always cameras present, but that the change in thinking that needs to take place is that those cameras need to be used to document all the things that the troops accuse the media of not documenting -- school openings, wells being dug, hospitals being rebuilt, and just simple day-to-day interactions between people and troops.

That essentially inverts the way the enemy uses his "strategic cameraman," producing footage that is of propaganda value for us because it is positive, not negative. What it does, in effect, is to turn our Strategic Cpl. into a Strategic Cameraman -- for our side.

And the architecture, as the piece mentions, with outlets such as YouTube (and now the MNF-I channel there), and Liveleak, is already in place. Good video goes viral very quickly. This is all besides the fact that once the troops are in the habit of filming everything, the footage will also be available, as a natural side benefit, to counter false propaganda claims. Nothing answers a claim better than visual evidence, and nothing answers visual claims better than other visual evidence.

There have been several instances in which propaganda claims have lingered, have not been dealt with in such a way that all doubts were removed, because there was, for whatever reason, a reluctance to release official visual product. (For example, in one case because it was believed that it was more important to protect the security of Predator video, to preserve doubts regarding how good those cameras were, than it was to end debate over whether we had killed innocent Afghans without cause.) But if the cameras were privately held off-the-shelf videocameras owned by individual soldiers, it will be far easier to release the footage immediately, as soon as false claims are released to the press.

The irony is that during the combat phase, while certainly the entire battlefield was not being visually documented, more of it was being filmed than any in history (proportionally, I'd bet.) If this challenge is taken up, between our cameras and theirs, the same may be true again, except that since none of the cameras will be operated by professional (ostensibly "objective") photojournalists, there will be questions about the authenticity and trustworthiness of every bit of footage.

More irony: I bet the very networks which have been seamlessly integrating insurgent-provided footage for four years will only take soldier/marine provided footage with every possible visual and verbal cue imaginable.

[goesh]

I think its about impossible to squeeze global and virtual affects from the local and tactical actions for several reasons: first is the fact that many civilians don't easily identify with COIN. There is a serious civilian disconnect between the need of understanding enemies and their culture and killing them. We are a task and goal driven people and there should be some limited blood trails and dead jihadis shown to Mom and Pop back home. Civilians are not immune to violent death nor unable to deal with it and come to grips with it. Surely to God the Pentagon doesn't think civilians would be shocked and traumatized by the sight of dead bodies, do they? they need to get out on the interstate more and stroll the tough neighborhoods from time to time and visit some of the many thousands of funeral homes in full operation. From the over-kill exposure of Viet Nam, it's gone to the other extreme of no-kill exposure in Iraq. Remember that picture of the soldier carrying that wounded little girl in his arms? Who do you think that picture resonnated the most with - the military or civilians? Point specific on the picture is that everyone can identify with rescuing a hurt child but many can't identify with killing the enemies that had no compunction about having that child in the line of fire. Your job, from the civilian perspective, is to kill the extremists that were willing to sacrifice that child. Bloodshed is one dimensional because the other side blames us for having put that child in danger in the first place and their take on that picture is one of guilt and shame on the part of the trooper carrying her out of the fire fight, not heroism and compassion. Maybe your focus should not be so much on selling COIN to Mom and Pop back home but rather exposing the forces for what they are that oppose COIN. Your extreme sacrifice is expected and demanded but at least you are accorded trust and full faith that no elected politician can ever have.

[goesh]

Hamas is even reaching out via Mickey Mouse:

http://video.msn.com/v/us/v.htm?g=47...s&fg=&GT1=9951

[Cori]

Uh, what?

I'm sorry, but I can't tell if you're arguing that attempts at persuasion are intrinsically besides the pt with the American public (and if that is your argument I would point you to any of a half dozen recent opinion polls by way of answering that someone needs to start making some damn arguments here) or is it you're position that the types of videos I'm suggesting won't work. If the latter, please be specific: is it your position that what's needed at home is a visual record of American forces killing jihadis? or is it your position that we need to stop shying away from such images? In either case, I'm not sure that we need to be producing material that would work to support the propaganda positions of the enemy (that this is a war on Islam, for ex.) and much of such material would come very, very close to crossing that line -- it might be far too easy for the other side to coopt it for their own message. Indeed, I'm already a little uneasy about some of what shows up on Liveleak, given the way that it's edited, the music that gets chosen, etc.

[goesh]

I think some visual record of enemy KIAs is needed, proof of the pudding so to speak. I've heard more than one person ask, " are they even fighting over there?" That's a valid question coming from civilians given our war history.Sad to say, there is the perception, though not by far prevailing, that our forces are just crusing around getting hit. You gave us Dresden and Hiroshima and 50K of our own killed at home in a couple of days at Gettysburg, never forget that. Shying away, as you phrase it, is nothing but a political trend, best theory practice currently in vogue since Viet Nam. COIN footage as I call it is not going to find an overly receptive audience on the homefront because for every clip of chatting it up with the locals all it takes is one media report of an IED or market bomb taking out X number of civians and the issue of a failed mission rears its ugly head again. Secondly, there are significant elements within our society that do not want to understand Iraqi culture and see no need for it and that feeling projects and transfers to a certain extent onto our military forces. It's the classic damned if you do, damned if you don't dilemma but as far as IO goes, if from the Gulf War on and amidst the hundreds of attacks against Western interests there has been no major step forward on the IO front, there simply isn't going to be. Best minds have been at it for how many years now? I further contend that the best IO possible is not going to diminish the prevalent American aggressor image in the Muslim world and the real need lies in convincing the homefront and the politicians of the worthiness of the war. You have to ask yourself, do the likes of Obama, Reid, Pelosi, H. Clinton, Murtha, etc. care one iota about COIN? I think not. A reasonably stable Iraq in 7-9 years is the only IO option there is for this war. Stand your ground and let the politicians know where you stand.

[jcustis]

Cori,

I think anything put out there by our side can and will be co-opted by the other side. This is because we are already so far behind in this endeavour, there will be mis-steps, fumbles, and the single message that just comes out dead wrong or misinterpreted.

I look at the furor over OPSEC and blogging, and cringe to think that the business of pushing video could turn into a smothering blanket. When troops pull into the COC for a debrief in the future, I can predict the reply when the IO officer (who is continuously pressed for good "message" material) takes the PL to task for a lack of digital media..."Well sir, I was kind of busy with that whole firefight thing. The camera went down anyway..."

[marct]

Hi JC,

I think anything put out there by our side can and will be co-opted by the other side. This is because we are already so far behind in this endeavour, there will be mis-steps, fumbles, and the single message that just comes out dead wrong or misinterpreted.

It probably will but, honestly, I have have to recast this logic in another form: anything we do will be made to look bad therefore we should do nothing. Um, is that really a position that you would want to take? I think it's far better to start in on this type of strategic cameraman operation, live out the learning curve, and then beat them. If they can use our stuff, we can use theirs as well.

I look at the furor over OPSEC and blogging, and cringe to think that the business of pushing video could turn into a smothering blanket. When troops pull into the COC for a debrief in the future, I can predict the reply when the IO officer (who is continuously pressed for good "message" material) takes the PL to task for a lack of digital media..."Well sir, I was kind of busy with that whole firefight thing. The camera went down anyway..."

That is certainly a possibility but again, I think it has to be put in a larger perspective.

Marc

[tequila]

Slightly on topic: an interesting off-the-cuff interview of an embedded repoter and MAJ Chris Norrie, a MITT team leader in Baghdad. A story written by said reporter.

Regarding videos recorded by troops - to be serious, I doubt these really have much impact. Online video is still a very nascent media form and only breaks through to widespread distro in the American public when it shows something really out of the ordinary. Ordinary on-the-street positive interactions between Iraqis and Americans is not "newsworthy." Interesting combat footage, on the other hand, will get broadcast and watched on both the internet and wider media - a soldier playing with a kid will not.

[Cori]

Sorry, still haven't figured out how to make that "quote" function do what I want it to do. I want to reply to the issue you raise that there is a concern or a perception, "are we even fighting?" I couldn't agree more, and in work I've done over the last few years I've made the exact same argument: the nature of the press coverage gives the impression that our troops are in a completely passive posture, at best that they spend their time driving from one end of Iraq to the other, waiting to be blown up by IEDs.

I argue that what causes that is in large part the narrative-free presentation of casualty figures, night after night after night, this sense that there's just this drip, drip, drip of casualties, (particularly since on nights where the networks don't focus on Iraq -- and there are many such nights -- they feel the one thing they must report is the casualties), where all that gets reported is, number of deaths, Army or Marines, perhaps the province where the troops died, and sometimes the type of weapon that caused their deaths ("roadside bomb," "IED attack," "RPG attack," and almost never, "firefight.")

Now, to be clear, this is not entirely the fault of the press. The military has made two choices that contribute to this. The first is to avoid, almost always, reporting on enemy casualties. That, to be sure, is to avoid a "damned if you do, damned if you don't" phenomena -- the desire to avoid all the heat that comes along with the perception that they are using "body counts" as the metric for success. Fair enough, but the result is that there's also a perception created that it's only our side that's taking the hits, and only their side that's taking an active stance. The second choice is to release as little information regarding battlefield casualties as possible.

As I understand it, one reason for this is because information provided immediately afterwards also provides the enemy something they can't get otherwise: BDA. Fair enough, but as I've argued here in other contexts, understand that isn't a cost-free choice. Perhaps there's a way to balance that, to reduce the risk of providing useful information while giving something, something that suggests what it was our troops were doing when they fell. It is a myth, the research makes clear, that the American public will not accept battlefield casualties, but what they will not accept is casualties they do not believe were justified. (See the work of my colleagues at the tri-university research consortium down here on this point:
http://www.amazon.com/Choosing-Your-...8753977&sr=8-3

But if there is no narrative, no explanation, then by definition there is no justification, yes?

The other reason the military hesitates in giving out information is because, given the high risk early reports will be incorrect, there is a fear that later corrections will be misinterpreted or misunderstood. I understand that but, again, withholding all information is not a cost-free choice. Surely there is a middle road, such as waiting several days and then releasing some information.

Now, Goesh's suggestion is that one possible answer to all this is to simply show the proof that our troops are active, in the form of visual evidence. I respectfully disagree. That, I believe, would backfire. Think about how rarely you see images of dead bodies on the news (you see foreign dead more often than American dead, but even those are not a regular occurance.) This is a particularly American phenomenon -- the Canadians show a bit more than we do, the Brits a bit more than the Canadians, (I don't know anything about the Aussies), but the rest of the world just doesn't have this sense that viewing the dead is in some way being disrespectful of the dead.

Without babbling on too much longer and boring you any more than I probably already have, some have argued that this is a "sanitization" of war coverage, done for ideological reasons. That's just wrong. Watch the local news in any market in the United States: a staple item will be car accidents, and you just will not see dead bodies, period. You see images that are proxies of death -- shoes by the side of the road, teddy bears by the side of the road, maybe the crumpled car. The thing is, the news outlets make this judgment partially out of their own belief, but partly because they know what reaction they get from their audiences when they cross particular lines. They'll do it for images they think are particularly newsworthy (the Mogadishu pictures, for ex) but they'd better be damn newsworthy.

The kind of images you're talking about will not be well received, at all. In fact most people will have a violent negative reaction to them, and given that you're talking about a work-around to the mainstream media, a la YouTube, I just don't think it will work.

Let me apologize for the long-windedness of this post, but you raise an important and complicated point. I don't have a good answer (yet), but it's something I've been fussing over (like a loose tooth) for some time. In point of fact it's been annoying the crap out of me that I don't have a good answer to all this, so if anyone has any suggestions, I'd be very grateful.
Cori

[jcustis]

It probably will but, honestly, I have have to recast this logic in another form: anything we do will be made to look bad therefore we should do nothing. Um, is that really a position that you would want to take? I think it's far better to start in on this type of strategic cameraman operation, live out the learning curve, and then beat them. If they can use our stuff, we can use theirs as well.

Excellent point! I nominate marct for IO czar!

[Maximus]

Great discussion, as always.

I've posted in earlier threads about why I think it's important that we get in the IO fight and very much agree with Josh's thoughts.

How much Americans will watch internet videos or read stories containing pictures that generally present a more positive image of what goes on in Iraq remains to be seen. We haven't tried it, so I'm not convinced just yet that it won't have an impact. What troubles me about this whole discussion is that those who have served in Iraq/Afghanistan will tell you that 99% of the time nothing that could be perceived as "negative" happens. In fact, very often just the opposite occurs. Problem is that these stories rarely get out. Is it the "strategic" corporal's job to transmit these stories, or at least to pass them to a platoon, company or battalion IO officer to transmit (part of our problem is that we don't have IO officers at these levels)? I say it depends. If the "strategic" corporal is in the middle of clearing a building or a trench, of course not. On the other hand, if the "strategic" corporal is eating a meal at an Iraqi's house, conducting a patrol with the Iraqi Police, playing in a soccer game, etc. why not participate? After all most Marines will take pictures/video of these types of events anyway and tuck them away for photo albums when they get home. For me, whether Marines use digital or videocameras when on patrol is a non-issue. They've done so for the past 4 years. Further, the new Distributed Ops package has in excess of 180 digital cameras designated for every infantry battalion. For me then, the question is really how do we teach Marines to use the pictures and videos that they take when on patrol to help not only in the intel battle but probably more important is in the IO battle.

Can pictures or videos from the tactical level have an impact at the strategic level? I think so. The enemy's efforts to gain strategic success through tactical IO actions is most definitely working. Consider some of the comments made by those that attempted to attack Fort Dix: these guys clearly stated that they observed videos on the internet showing insurgents' success in attacking us in Iraq/Afghanistan and therefore felt they could do the same. And it's widely known that insurgent videos from Iraq/Afghanistan are used to support the global jihad recruiting effort. I think it would be great if instead of focusing our PAO/IO efforts on preventing bad news from getting out to the public, we instead focused our efforts in taking positive videos/pictures from tactical actions and flooding insurgent websites with them, while at the same time doing our best to transmit them to the American public.

[goesh]

If you want a cultural breach, show me some GIs in a mosque, show some foot washing and barefooted GIs sitting in the back of a masjid and show them sitting barefoot with some Iraqis in that environment - that's about the only IO that can't be easily counter-tuned by the opposition. Show me a school being built and I'll slap an arabic title on some Stills to the affect of 'infidels tear down school in search of weapons' and splatter it all over the Islamic world in a matter of minutes. Show me interaction clips and I'll counter-tune it with still subtitles of sexual propositioning. You can reach and touch Muslims via real cultural breaching but not Mom and Pop on the homefront and that's the kicker here. There's no cake with frosting this time around. I'm not saying stop grinding away with IO energy but the bottom line is for every unit of COIN energy directed at the home front or the world at large is energy taken away from the street and village, the only place where COIN really matters and counts.

[jcustis]

Goesh's post captures some of what I was trying to articulate earlier.

[marct]

Goesh's post captures some of what I was trying to articulate earlier.

True but, I would suggest, irrelevant. We really shouldn't be thinking of this type of IO as a "conventional" operation but, rather, more in COIN terms. Can we win, whatever that means, an IO "war"? Probably not - a draw is most likely, but we most certainly can not win it we don't fight one.

What is to stop us from taking some of the irhabi video and ding exactly the same thing? Or Marine video of the aftermath of a suicide bombing attack - change the voice over and post it, spam it actually, on the irhabi sites or the moderate sites?

Cori raised an excellent point about the presentation of death in Western media and, yes, Canada probably does show dead bodies a little more directly than the US. Regardless... I'll toss out an hypothesis that the desensitization of death in North America can be made to work to our advantage. As a symbol, "dead bodies", as Cori notes, are reserved for highly newsworthy stories. Umm, isn't Iraq important enough? Let's stop the sugar coating and show the home populace exactly what the irhabi are doing.

Now, about the IO Czar job...

Marc

[Steve Blair]

Agreed, Marc. I would also hazard a guess that one reason our programs don't work is that we don't have the patience to stick with them for more than a month or two.

This whole thing strikes me as a good opportunity for positive IO (like jcustis spoke of) as well as a "gray" operation targeting the networks you mentioned with footage of the aftermaths of suicide bombings and so on. Goesh makes a good point about where the main effort of the strategic corporals should be (with the people they're doing COIN with), but there needs to be a parallel operation (gray or black, take your pick) aimed at the irhabi video stuff. SOG did some of this sort of stuff in Vietnam, but was reined back each time they started making serious progress. We have done it in the past, but there seems to be a deep reluctance to try it again. I really don't know why.

[Tom Odom]

Cori raised an excellent point about the presentation of death in Western media and, yes, Canada probably does show dead bodies a little more directly than the US. Regardless... I'll toss out an hypothesis that the desensitization of death in North America can be made to work to our advantage. As a symbol, "dead bodies", as Cori notes, are reserved for highly newsworthy stories. Umm, isn't Iraq important enough? Let's stop the sugar coating and show the home populace exactly what the irhabi are doing.

I agree that we should have done this from the very beginning. FDR and senior leaders in Washington made a crucial decision after Tarawa to do just that when some said such pictures would hurt morale at home. But given the decisions made on this issue earlier and the context of the current debate and political buzzard fight going on, I think such a step would pretty much guarantee a greater clamor for withdrawal.

Best

Tom

[marct]

Hi Tom,

But given the decisions made on this issue earlier and the context of the current debate and political buzzard fight going on, I think such a step would pretty much guarantee a greater clamor for withdrawal.

I suspect you are right - at least as far as Iraq is concerned. Then again, the clamor for withdrawal is pretty load right now anyway. Hmm, maybe I'm just in a vicious mood, but how does the following strike you

[camera pan to bodies and destroyed property littering a local marketplace]Today, the irhabi fighters of Al Quaida sent a message to Iraq. We want the Iraqi people to have another message from the Coalition
[camera pan to school shots, reconstruction work, etc.]
[split camera with destruction on one side and school children on the other]
Iraqs future is up to you
We can stay [screen fade to school children shot]
Or go
[screen fade to image of body lying on ground]
The choice is yours

Marc

[jcustis]

IO czar it is marct...I was saying something along those lines in a PM to Cori

If I had my way, as well as the $$$ to do it, it would come down to a simple matter of airtime. By the spots during primetime, and keep buying them until there is a perceptible change. I'd steer clear of any references to the administration, the Pentagon, or Dept of State.

It would be simple and to the point, much like a campaign ad. the images of civic and humanitarian action are played...the really good stuff of the barefoot children getting shoes, food, and clean water. A school being built and backpacks, pens, and paper distributed. Cut away at the end and have a volunteer servicemember (or maybe even shift through all races and services in the process) make a very clear statement: "The people of Iraq are indeed the future of Iraq. My struggle isn't about bringing victory to the American people, but victory for every citizen of Iraq and freedom from the tyranny that continues. Please help me continue my mission."

It's subtle and implicit, and could avoid the PR landmines that are out there if we just don't try to think too much about it. Call it appealing to the apple pie base if you will, because it is that base that continues to erode every day. Few folks who are on the fence have the time to immerse themselves in the imagery, so we would need to take it to them, then push it to liveleak and youtube, NPR and PBS. Make it something household that people chatter about. That's what I believe happens when a new Marine Corps recruiting commercial comes out. People buzz when the images, background music, and message are important and right.

Has the clamoring for withdrawal reached a crescendo? Perhaps, but I agree with you now that it shouldn't mean we don't try.

[marct]

Has the clamoring for withdrawal reached a crescendo? Perhaps, but I agree with you now that it shouldn't mean we don't try.

I like that phrase - the "apple pie base". That really is who needs to be influenced on the home front. I think the tactic of steering away from anything overtly political is also appropriate, and an appeal to people's inherent desire to help others (usually as long as we don't get killed doing so) is a good way to go - certainly better than the more guilt ridden rhetoric that shows up in a lot of disaster relief advertisements!

Marc