The Strategic Corporal vs. The Strategic Cameraman

[SWJED]

From the SWJ Blog - The Strategic Corporal vs. The Strategic Cameraman by Josh Manchester.

Consider for a moment the differences in informational-warfare responsbilities of junior leaders in the Marine Corps -- corporals -- and the propagandists in insurgent and terror cells -- cameramen.

Infantry squad leaders -- often, corporals -- know (or should) that the behavior of their Marines sends signals to those always watching them in an insurgency: the people and the insurgents. When the Marines are comfortable with their weapons; seemingly unafraid to interact with the locals; understanding of native customs and mores; and treat the populace with dignity and respect, then the sum of all of these attitudes conveys a certain perception to both the people and terrorists who watch them: it hastens cooperation from the populace and hard-targets them from insurgent attacks. This is the basic informational component of a strategic corporal in Iraq.

Consider now a strategic cameraman. Numerous attacks in Iraq and elsewhere are filmed for propaganda purposes. The classic case is that of the IED or VBIED. Numerous IED videos circulate throughout cyberspace for recruiting or fundraising purposes.

From an informational standpoint, the area immediately affected by a corporal with a squad of Marines is local and physically located. The area immediately affected by a cameraman posting attack videos online is global and virtual.

If our enemies can manage to squeeze virtual and global effects out of tactical and local actions, why can't we?...

[Cori]

This is a terrific piece, and could as easily (perhaps more appropriately) have been filed under Media and Info Ops as Triggerpuller. The recognition that the vision of the "Strategic Cpl" is a negative one, ie, make a mistake even at the squad level and you can have a strategic impact given today's media, is, I think, an accurate one. But so too is the recognition that it doesn't have to be only a negative impact.

Other folks have noted here the idea (captured in the piece) that it makes sense for troops to make sure that even down to the platoon level there are always cameras present, but that the change in thinking that needs to take place is that those cameras need to be used to document all the things that the troops accuse the media of not documenting -- school openings, wells being dug, hospitals being rebuilt, and just simple day-to-day interactions between people and troops.

That essentially inverts the way the enemy uses his "strategic cameraman," producing footage that is of propaganda value for us because it is positive, not negative. What it does, in effect, is to turn our Strategic Cpl. into a Strategic Cameraman -- for our side.

And the architecture, as the piece mentions, with outlets such as YouTube (and now the MNF-I channel there), and Liveleak, is already in place. Good video goes viral very quickly. This is all besides the fact that once the troops are in the habit of filming everything, the footage will also be available, as a natural side benefit, to counter false propaganda claims. Nothing answers a claim better than visual evidence, and nothing answers visual claims better than other visual evidence.

There have been several instances in which propaganda claims have lingered, have not been dealt with in such a way that all doubts were removed, because there was, for whatever reason, a reluctance to release official visual product. (For example, in one case because it was believed that it was more important to protect the security of Predator video, to preserve doubts regarding how good those cameras were, than it was to end debate over whether we had killed innocent Afghans without cause.) But if the cameras were privately held off-the-shelf videocameras owned by individual soldiers, it will be far easier to release the footage immediately, as soon as false claims are released to the press.

The irony is that during the combat phase, while certainly the entire battlefield was not being visually documented, more of it was being filmed than any in history (proportionally, I'd bet.) If this challenge is taken up, between our cameras and theirs, the same may be true again, except that since none of the cameras will be operated by professional (ostensibly "objective") photojournalists, there will be questions about the authenticity and trustworthiness of every bit of footage.

More irony: I bet the very networks which have been seamlessly integrating insurgent-provided footage for four years will only take soldier/marine provided footage with every possible visual and verbal cue imaginable.

[goesh]

I think its about impossible to squeeze global and virtual affects from the local and tactical actions for several reasons: first is the fact that many civilians don't easily identify with COIN. There is a serious civilian disconnect between the need of understanding enemies and their culture and killing them. We are a task and goal driven people and there should be some limited blood trails and dead jihadis shown to Mom and Pop back home. Civilians are not immune to violent death nor unable to deal with it and come to grips with it. Surely to God the Pentagon doesn't think civilians would be shocked and traumatized by the sight of dead bodies, do they? they need to get out on the interstate more and stroll the tough neighborhoods from time to time and visit some of the many thousands of funeral homes in full operation. From the over-kill exposure of Viet Nam, it's gone to the other extreme of no-kill exposure in Iraq. Remember that picture of the soldier carrying that wounded little girl in his arms? Who do you think that picture resonnated the most with - the military or civilians? Point specific on the picture is that everyone can identify with rescuing a hurt child but many can't identify with killing the enemies that had no compunction about having that child in the line of fire. Your job, from the civilian perspective, is to kill the extremists that were willing to sacrifice that child. Bloodshed is one dimensional because the other side blames us for having put that child in danger in the first place and their take on that picture is one of guilt and shame on the part of the trooper carrying her out of the fire fight, not heroism and compassion. Maybe your focus should not be so much on selling COIN to Mom and Pop back home but rather exposing the forces for what they are that oppose COIN. Your extreme sacrifice is expected and demanded but at least you are accorded trust and full faith that no elected politician can ever have.

[goesh]

Hamas is even reaching out via Mickey Mouse:

http://video.msn.com/v/us/v.htm?g=47...s&fg=&GT1=9951

[Cori]

Uh, what?

I'm sorry, but I can't tell if you're arguing that attempts at persuasion are intrinsically besides the pt with the American public (and if that is your argument I would point you to any of a half dozen recent opinion polls by way of answering that someone needs to start making some damn arguments here) or is it you're position that the types of videos I'm suggesting won't work. If the latter, please be specific: is it your position that what's needed at home is a visual record of American forces killing jihadis? or is it your position that we need to stop shying away from such images? In either case, I'm not sure that we need to be producing material that would work to support the propaganda positions of the enemy (that this is a war on Islam, for ex.) and much of such material would come very, very close to crossing that line -- it might be far too easy for the other side to coopt it for their own message. Indeed, I'm already a little uneasy about some of what shows up on Liveleak, given the way that it's edited, the music that gets chosen, etc.

[goesh]

I think some visual record of enemy KIAs is needed, proof of the pudding so to speak. I've heard more than one person ask, " are they even fighting over there?" That's a valid question coming from civilians given our war history.Sad to say, there is the perception, though not by far prevailing, that our forces are just crusing around getting hit. You gave us Dresden and Hiroshima and 50K of our own killed at home in a couple of days at Gettysburg, never forget that. Shying away, as you phrase it, is nothing but a political trend, best theory practice currently in vogue since Viet Nam. COIN footage as I call it is not going to find an overly receptive audience on the homefront because for every clip of chatting it up with the locals all it takes is one media report of an IED or market bomb taking out X number of civians and the issue of a failed mission rears its ugly head again. Secondly, there are significant elements within our society that do not want to understand Iraqi culture and see no need for it and that feeling projects and transfers to a certain extent onto our military forces. It's the classic damned if you do, damned if you don't dilemma but as far as IO goes, if from the Gulf War on and amidst the hundreds of attacks against Western interests there has been no major step forward on the IO front, there simply isn't going to be. Best minds have been at it for how many years now? I further contend that the best IO possible is not going to diminish the prevalent American aggressor image in the Muslim world and the real need lies in convincing the homefront and the politicians of the worthiness of the war. You have to ask yourself, do the likes of Obama, Reid, Pelosi, H. Clinton, Murtha, etc. care one iota about COIN? I think not. A reasonably stable Iraq in 7-9 years is the only IO option there is for this war. Stand your ground and let the politicians know where you stand.

[jcustis]

Cori,

I think anything put out there by our side can and will be co-opted by the other side. This is because we are already so far behind in this endeavour, there will be mis-steps, fumbles, and the single message that just comes out dead wrong or misinterpreted.

I look at the furor over OPSEC and blogging, and cringe to think that the business of pushing video could turn into a smothering blanket. When troops pull into the COC for a debrief in the future, I can predict the reply when the IO officer (who is continuously pressed for good "message" material) takes the PL to task for a lack of digital media..."Well sir, I was kind of busy with that whole firefight thing. The camera went down anyway..."

[marct]

Hi JC,

I think anything put out there by our side can and will be co-opted by the other side. This is because we are already so far behind in this endeavour, there will be mis-steps, fumbles, and the single message that just comes out dead wrong or misinterpreted.

It probably will but, honestly, I have have to recast this logic in another form: anything we do will be made to look bad therefore we should do nothing. Um, is that really a position that you would want to take? I think it's far better to start in on this type of strategic cameraman operation, live out the learning curve, and then beat them. If they can use our stuff, we can use theirs as well.

I look at the furor over OPSEC and blogging, and cringe to think that the business of pushing video could turn into a smothering blanket. When troops pull into the COC for a debrief in the future, I can predict the reply when the IO officer (who is continuously pressed for good "message" material) takes the PL to task for a lack of digital media..."Well sir, I was kind of busy with that whole firefight thing. The camera went down anyway..."

That is certainly a possibility but again, I think it has to be put in a larger perspective.

Marc

[tequila]

Slightly on topic: an interesting off-the-cuff interview of an embedded repoter and MAJ Chris Norrie, a MITT team leader in Baghdad. A story written by said reporter.

Regarding videos recorded by troops - to be serious, I doubt these really have much impact. Online video is still a very nascent media form and only breaks through to widespread distro in the American public when it shows something really out of the ordinary. Ordinary on-the-street positive interactions between Iraqis and Americans is not "newsworthy." Interesting combat footage, on the other hand, will get broadcast and watched on both the internet and wider media - a soldier playing with a kid will not.