Pakistani politics (catch all)

[SWJED]

25 May Washington Post editorial - Pakistan's Peril.

After nearly eight years in power, Pakistani strongman Gen. Pervez Musharraf appears to be weakening. Mass demonstrations broke out against him this month in Punjab, the country's political heartland; tens of thousands at a time are turning out to cheer a Supreme Court judge who tried to investigate human rights abuses and then rejected the general's demand that he resign. Extremist groups, including the Taliban, are steadily strengthening, especially in areas near the Afghan border. Support for the government in the U.S. Congress, which has signed off on more than $10 billion in aid since 2001, is steadily fading amid persistent reports that the Pakistani army is failing to stop, and may even be supporting, Taliban operations against U.S. troops in Afghanistan.

Not only Gen. Musharraf and his dogged supporters in the Bush administration have reason to worry about these developments. One reason the general is unpopular is his alliance with the United States, and the candidates to succeed him and control Pakistan's nuclear arsenal include Islamic fundamentalists and anti-Western generals. Gen. Musharraf appears inclined to use force to bolster his regime -- demonstrators have been attacked by party militias or police in several cities -- and that may seem preferable to the extremist alternatives...

[SWJED]

28 May Washington Post - Teetering Musharraf Buoyed by U.S. Alliance by Griff Witte.

As confidence in Gen. Pervez Musharraf falls at home and abroad amid allegations he is moving away from democracy and becoming increasingly autocratic, the Pakistani president has had at least one unwavering ally: the United States.

Pakistanis -- particularly opposition figures -- are watching for signs that that will change. Any indication of weakening support from the United States, they say, could spell the end of Musharraf's teetering administration. But policymakers and analysts here and in Washington insist that is unlikely because the United States lacks a Plan B in Pakistan and is uncomfortable with alternatives to a man who has been considered a vital ally since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001...

[SWJED]

29 May LA Times - Musharraf's Grip Falters in Pakistan by Laura King.

When President Perez Musharraf survived back-to-back assassination attempts in 2003, he might have thought the worst was behind him. But now, after easily quelling any threat to his power during eight years of military rule, the general appears trapped in a labyrinth of his own making.

His attempt 2 1/2 months ago to sideline Pakistan's independent-minded chief justice touched off nationwide protests that have coalesced into a full-blown pro-democracy movement. Islamic militants have established a firm foothold in the tribal borderlands, and vigilante-style followers of a radical cleric here in the capital have been kidnapping police officers and menacing those they consider to be promoting a licentious lifestyle...

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 6 Jun 07: Pakistan: Emergency Rule or Return to Democracy?

...In 1999, Musharraf declared a state of emergency and dissolved the parliament through a military coup.1 After having himself elected president through a rigged referendum in April 2002 – the referendum was itself an unconstitutional device – he oversaw deeply flawed national elections later that year. The resulting parliament gave Musharraf a vote of confidence and allowed him to retain his post as army chief. That parliament ends its five-year life in October. Musharraf's five-year term as president also ends that month.

Musharraf could opt for one of three choices:

- He could attempt to retain absolute power, as he seems presently inclined, through electoral rigging and constitutional manipulation. As a first step, he would obtain another five-year presidential term by using the present, lame-duck assemblies as the Electoral College, rather than, as the opposition insists, the successor assemblies scheduled to be elected this year....

- Musharraf could opt for a power-sharing agreement with former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and her Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), which would likely win at least a simple majority in a free and fair parliamentary poll....

- Musharraf could step down as army chief and the military could opt for a democratic transition, with free and fair elections as the essential first step....

[tequila]

Pakistan's Musharraf, Rival Discuss Sharing Power - 29 July, Washington Post.

Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, and former prime minister Benazir Bhutto appeared to draw closer to an improbable alliance Saturday, with a top Musharraf adviser confirming that the two had met and pronouncing the exchange "very successful."

The Pakistani news media reported the meeting Friday, but the government denied it at the time. On Saturday, however, federal minister Sheikh Rashid said the usually bitter rivals had held discussions in the United Arab Emirates aimed at creating a power-sharing arrangement. Representatives for Bhutto, who has been living in exile since 1999 and leads the country's largest opposition party, would not confirm the meeting for the record but also would not deny it.


Musharraf has been struggling in recent months with vigorous challenges to his eight-year rule. They have come both from Islamic extremists waging a violent insurgency as well as from moderate forces looking to oust the president and end military rule through upcoming elections.


With his popularity in decline, Musharraf badly needs allies. Bhutto needs a way back into the country without facing criminal charges relating to alleged corruption. She has said she wants to return for a third term as prime minister, even though that is now barred by the Pakistani constitution.


While the two leaders have vastly different visions for Pakistan, both are regarded as moderates. An alliance would probably be welcomed by the United States and other Western powers that are hoping that moderate forces can unite to battle rising militancy in Pakistan.


"The country is in a serious crisis," Rashid said in an interview on Pakistan's Dawn News television station. "So we have to move fast, and we have to move to national consensus."


Negotiations have been reported for months, but a face-to-face meeting indicates they have reached an advanced stage ...

Interesting developments - meetings between Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto now confirmed, as have been rumored for weeks. Interesting to see if a Bhutto-Musharraf alliance will coopt a significant portion of the civilian opposition that is the greatest threat to Musharraf.

[davidbfpo]

I recently attended a seminar in London and the audience were reminded by both official and un-official speakers that the secular parties in Pakistan last had 85% of the popular vote. Interestingly a similar % supported the government's action at the Red Mosque, when polled by a popular, privately owned TV station.

Whether a Bhutto-Musharraf agreement will be finalised, let alone endorsed in an election is a moot point.

dabidbfpo

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 31 Jul 07: Elections, Democracy and Stability in Pakistan

....Influential international actors, particularly the U.S. but also the EU, should rethink the wisdom of relying solely on the military. That policy is largely responsible for growing anti-U.S. sentiment among pro-democracy Pakistanis, who view Washington’s support for Musharraf’s authoritarian regime as hypocritical and unjustifiable. Full restoration of democracy would best serve the interests of both Pakistan and its Western friends. Supporting a deeply unpopular military regime is no way to fight terrorism and neutralise religious extremism. Pakistan’s two most popular national political parties are pragmatic, centrist groupings, whose political interests dictate the diminution of militant forces in the country. They are the international community’s most natural allies.

The choice in this election year is stark: support for a return to genuine democracy and civilian rule, which offers the prospect of containing extremism, or continued facilitation in effect of a slide into military-led, failing-state status prone to domestic unrest and export of Islamic radicalism domestically, regionally and beyond.