Studying a Wrist Watch: the U.S. Military and COIN

[Tom Odom]

Although some may say that reviewing an already widely acclaimed book is a waste of time, I decided to do just that. Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl's book Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam is a work of inspiration and despair. The inspiration is easiest to accept and digest because it seeps through this work at many levels. Nagl as a serving officer and a scholar is inspiring because this book pulls no punches. His examination of the British experience in Malaya inspires simply because he shows a military can indeed learn and adapt to meet and defeat an equally adaptive threat if its leaders allow it to do so.

So why do I offer despair as a companion to Nagl's inspiration? Well to begin with I lived the Army that came out Vietnam; my leaders in rebuilding that Army all were Vietnam veterans. I remember well General DePuy's role as commander of Training and Doctrine Command; a comrade of mine, Paul Herbert, wrote a great monograph on that subject . I also vividly recall a parody of a debate between Colonel (ret) Harry Summers and Major Andrew Krepinevich over what happened in Vietnam, what could have happened in Vietnam, and what should have happened in Vietnam. As a stage hog, Harry Summers won by overwhelming Andy Krepinevich's scholarly delivery with bluster and bravado. Neither Summers nor Summers' admirers did cared a whit about the message Krepinevich offered; they cared about preserving the Army's capacity to wage Jomini's battle of annihilation. They were seemingly validated in 1991 and again in March 2003. The big battalion Army marched on.

It did so with blinders worn proudly. But some in the Army of the 80s and the 90s lived in another world. I was one of those as a Foreign Area Officer for the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. I served in Turkey, Sudan, Lebanon, Israel, Egypt, Zaire, and Rwanda. Those experiences put me on the ground in two wars and a genocide. But as a staff college classmate in 1988 remarked to me, I as a FAO "was not in the real Army." The same classmate also stated that he could not imagine the U.S. ever getting involved in another counter insurgency war like Vietnam. When I asked him what he thought we were doing at that very moment in central America, he looked at me like the proverbial pig studying a wrist watch. Seven years later, I greeted him in Goma, Zaire with the rebuttal of "welcome to my world," meaning the mega-Death of the Rwandan Civil War. He was still mesmerized by the wristwatch.

And there is where John Nagl prompts despair. Reading his chapters on Vietnam provides a stark backdrop to Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling's recent article on generalship. Nagl is especially brilliant in allowing the key leaders of the Vietnam era to demonstrate their own incapacity to see anything but what they wanted to see. Our efforts to date in OIF and OEF suggest we still have the same problem. Yingling seemingly confirms it.

My hope in writing this somewhat redundant review of John Nagl's book is to inspire, prod, and push those of you who have not read it to do so. If you have read FM 3-24 Counter Insurgency but have not read Nagl's book, you have not truly read FM 3-24.

Best

Tom

[John T. Fishel]

Hi Tom and Marct and John Nagl (if you are following this) and anyone else who is interested--

John's book is not only about COIN but also about organizational learning. He pays his respects there to the work of Rich Downie, Learning From Conflict, Praeger. Part of Rich's argument was that the army is a learning organization, an argument I tended to agree with until OIF. But it was not always so, any more than it really is now. In my article, "Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, 'The Gap,' and Things That Go Bump in the Night," LIC&LE 1995, I offered what I thought was part of an explanation for why we go about reinventing the COIN wheel every time we run into an insurgency. My explanation clearly was not adequate.

So, I'm posing the question here: What do all you guys think is the reason we not merely ignore our very good doctrine but actively disparage it? Is there any way we can convince current and future generations of leaders to actually learn the lessons and to institutionalize them in our governmental and military organizations?

With that, I'll go cook dinner.

Cheers

John

[MASON]

Dear Mr Odom and Fischel

I do not have the back ground you gentlemen do but the point of organizational adaptiveness and learning is painfully evident with in my own subspeacialty both in theatre and OCONUS.

Reviewing historical experience as far as WWI to present my group is on an 8 yr republish cycle of the same mistakes/"new situations" The internet is helping but essentially we read everything as though it is new when it is far from it.

I have a question I would appreciate your input on. What is your assessment of the impact of high rotation rates of personel during protracted conflicts? (with particular focus on overall campaign success)

Mason

[marct]

Hi John,

So, I'm posing the question here: What do all you guys think is the reason we not merely ignore our very good doctrine but actively disparage it? Is there any way we can convince current and future generations of leaders to actually learn the lessons and to institutionalize them in our governmental and military organizations?

I think I can come up with an explanation of why it has happened, but I'm not sure of how to change it. So, having said that, let me lay out what ight be the start of an explanatory model. BTW, I'm trying to work this into a paper / monograph, so comments, criticism, etc. are mos welcome .

Let me start with some definitions.

I tend to define the term "institution" following Malinowski's Theory of Culture (a short form available here). Unlike Malinowski, I tend to view institutions as primarily symbolic and inter-subjective entities that operate in hierarchical semantic taxonomies. So, the "military" would include the USMC and help to define the social and cultural "meaning" of the USMC. Essentially, I consider institutions to be the symbolic and inter-subjective components that bind certain types of organizations together.

Organizations, on the other hand, I view as part of the "potential" inherent within an institution, made "real". The mental analogy I use comes from quantum mechanical theory via Mark Peterson's work on organizational cultures where the institution is the "potential" and the organization is the "actual".

As with Andrew Abbott, I view organizations (and institutions) to be centered around particular "tasks" (Malinowski's needs responses). These tasks, in turn, generate their own operational logics depending on a whole host of factors such as the operating environment, types of technology, other task groups (aka "professions"), etc.

For Abbott, there is a constant "negotiation" over social control of tasks and the social "right" (read "legitimacy") for a particular group to perform them. A military example of this would be the rapid shifting over the past 40 years or so of mercenaries (including "contractors").

The goal of all of this professional maneuvering is to gain a monopoly within a society over performing particular tasks. But, in order to do this, the "right" of a particular group to hat monopoly has to be "sold" to the general society, and this gets us back to your original question about COIN.

Think of it in terms of home front sales - it is much easier to "sell" a conventional war than a COIN war. Indeed, COIN has been a stink in the nostrils of the US public for quite a while, especially since it goes against all of the popular mythos of what a "war" is.

Anyway, just some rough thoughts for now.

Marc

[Old Eagle]

John --

I know that you, I and several others lived through the "transition" after Vietnam. I am not an expert on organizational behavior, so I can't really say why the Army as an organization disparaged its COIN doctrine coming out of the war.

However, I would submit that the wholesale move from any semblance of a balanced doctrine to heavy forces Airland battle was the result of the confluence of a number of only loosely related factors. I have focused on the human factor because I don't particularly believe that organizations or governments can act.
(I also have a conspiracy theory about the 11th ACR Black Horse Association taking over the mental faculties of the senior Army leadership, but that's another story )

1. There were many senior officers and their trusted advisors who just never "got" the COIN fight. They yearned for the return to what they felt comfortable with.

2. The Army as a whole wanted to move from the pain and agony associated with "losing the war". We embraced the "no more Vietnams" slogan with almost as much gusto as the liberals who coined it.

3. I am convinced that the post-war RIFs wiped out some of our true COIN experts and advocates. Yes, they were "only" captains, but I knew many COIN wizards who would have served us well.

4. The other Services were NOT going to press for an extension of the COIN experience. Frankly, I think that the Army itself hoped that the USMC would just absorb the entire mission.

5. Big weapons systems, like those for ALB were politically popular. Light, culturally adept Infantry have no constituancy.

No single factor could have driven the Army so far away from COIN, but taken together, they proved to be an insurmountable force.

Many years later I actually heard of a think tank proposal to "give" the 82d and 101st to USMC for use in "small wars", then ramp up the remaining Army to armor/mech in order to "fight and win" the nation's (real?) wars. Hmmm.

All that said, the Army that DePuy/Starry and others built was a great organization and a fun place to be. We could focus on a fairly well defined set of METL tasks and get really, really good at them. Especially when coupled with Max Thurman's "all recruited" force.

$0.02

[slapout9]

Tom, Jeffery Record made some type of proposal to convert the 82nd to the 1st Marine Airborne Force or something like that. There are papers online to that effect some where. I worked heavily with them (USMC) 72-75 in the annual joint operations known as "Exotic Dancer" I was on 3,4,5 if remember right.

[Mark O'Neill]

Hi John,



Unlike Malinowski, I tend to view institutions as primarily symbolic and inter-subjective entities that operate in hierarchical semantic taxonomies.
Marc

Hi Marc,

Is the English language no longer used in your University? Orwell would roll in his grave...


Cheers

Mark

[John T. Fishel]

Hi Mason--

I think that the general rule Marct wrote in his SWJ article for anthropological field work is a good start for troops in COIN. It takes about 9 months of living in a culture to know it reasonably well. So, any rotation less than 9 months is handicapped. The rule of thumb among Vietnam veterans was that the first 6 months of a tour were spent learning the ropes, the next 3 months doing the job, and the last 3 trying to stay alive to get home. Tours that are too long or multiple rotations with too brief an interval of relief have a tendency to harden attitudes in ways that are counterproductive. Finally, the Foreign Service used to plan for 2 years in a foreign post and 2 years in Washington. My guess is that is about right for COIN but on this one my guess is as good as yours.

Cheers

John

[John T. Fishel]

Hi Old Eagle--

Your conspiracy theory made me Google my old boss at Leavenworth, Don Holder. I breathed a sigh of relief when I found that it was the 2nd ACR he commanded in DS/DS.

I think your comments about the post-Vietnam army are spot on. I worked with a guy at the AWC at Carlisle who would not have been averse to giving the whole light mission to the USMC - he was an engineer and a bright guy.

The only problem with your theory - as a general explanation - is that the phenomenon predates Vietnam by about 350 years. It all started in Jamestown VA in 1607 when CPT John Smith's militia began fighting Powhatan's warriors in the first of America's many small wars. By the French and Indian War militia officers like G. Washington were seeking glory in the big battles. The point is that from the beginning, the American officer corps wanted to fight conventional wars even though it spent most of its time fighting small wars. But every generation got its big war - Revolution, 1812, Mexico, Civil War, Spanish-Am, WWI, WWII, Korea ... and forgot about its small wars experience. The Marines, at least wrote it down as doctrine but they wrote the Small Wars Manual at the same time they were gearing up for amphibious ops in WWII, so its effect was marginal. The other positive thing is that we did appear to learn something and effectively applied our COIN doctrine in El Salvador and then wrote its lessons into the doctrine in FM 100-20 of 1990. Those lessons were effectively transferred into Joint Pub 3-07. So, I was encouraged that, perhaps, we had internalized the lessons of the past. Then came OIF,"transformation," and the revision of SASO doctrine necessitating and interim COIN manual that evolved into FM 3-24. In other words, we reinvented the wheel once again!

My theory was somewhat like yours but with a longer historical perspective. My problem is that I don't think that our explanations get at as much of the reason for this process of ignoring our past and, moreover, rejecting it as I previously thought. Hence, my - what Marct calls - dissertation question.

Cheers (I think)

John

[slapout9]

Hi All, if somebody wants to try to find a link to this paper online it is about converting the 82nd to the USMC. I only have a hard copy and I am not sure where I got it. Title- "An Alternative Marine Corps" by Major Jon K. Rider-June 1978

[Tom Odom]

Mason,

The answer to your question on rotations was answered quite well above: yes rollover tours at 1 one year (or 15 months) or 6-7 months for the Marines hurt operations because it takes some time to develop situational understanding in an environment like Iraq or Afghanistan. The trade off is taking care of families and soldiers because our cultural expectations have changed dramatically since WWII when Johnny went to war until the war was over. That was of course a different conflict on a greater scale that allowed for mass mobilization.

But even with a tour length of 2 or 3 years, we --the larger military body including the Air Force and the Navy--have a cultural aversion to "lesser conflicts." We woud rather train to the greater but much less likely threat of high intensity conflict for obvious and less obvious reasons. The most obvious is the greater threat; the argument is that you train to the greater threat and any HIC soldier can adjust to a lesser threat. Nagl is great in pointing out the systemic role of doctrine in the US Army (versus the Brits) in conditioning leaders to think only in HIC terms. The reality in my opinion is that HIC soldiers can be adjusted--the real issue is HIC colonels and generals. Getting them to adjust is much like asking a Baptist preacher to become a Catholic.

Lesser obvious reasons for the HIC fixation fall into what Eisenhower warned about in the military industrial complex; HIC means big dollar systems. COIN is personnel centric. The lastest wrinkle in the military industrial complex is the use of PMCs which turns personnel costs into business with huge returns for those fielding the contracts. On a matter near and dear to me as a FAO--language--we still have the science and industrial community trying to "fix" langauage deficiencies with phrasalators and such when we should be investing the effort in training linguists.

The only way I see solving the institutional resistance to COIN and lesser but more likely conflict in the US military is finding another George Marshall to erssentially relieve any and all GOs who cannot get with the program, just as Marshall did on the eve of WWII.

Best
Tom

[marct]

Hi Mark,

Hi Marc,

Is the English language no longer used in your University? Orwell would roll in his grave...
Cheers

Mark

It's he pernicious influence of all those German and Polish theoreticians . 'sides that, how often do you hear academics talking in plain English anyway .

Marc

[PhilR]

The only way I see solving the institutional resistance to COIN and lesser but more likely conflict in the US military is finding another George Marshall to erssentially relieve any and all GOs who cannot get with the program, just as Marshall did on the eve of WWII.

Linking back to the Yingling article discussion, rather than more congressional oversight on promotions (and more bureaucracy), what we may need is a loosening up--allowing the key commanders the latitude to promote and place officers without as much reference to centralized boards. It may require some sort of breveting to work.
Why shouldn't we have a Van Fleet who came ashore at Normandy as a regimental commander and ended up the war as a corps commander? The key is that you are establishing a form of a good ole boy network based on personal relationships and not just perceived competence (if official records truly reveal competence).
The current system wouldn't give Marshall the chance to do what he did.

[marct]

Hi John,

My theory was somewhat like yours but with a longer historical perspective. My problem is that I don't think that our explanations get at as much of the reason for this process of ignoring our past and, moreover, rejecting it as I previously thought. Hence, my - what Marct calls - dissertation question.

Obviously more once I get your paper <grin>.

Part of the reason why I put up all the "neo-Orwellian" (pace to Mark ) definitions. At an institutional level, specifically related to what Malinowski called the "Charter" of the institution, there is a very interesting situation: the "foundation myth" of the US Army, at least, is based around the archetypal character of the Defensor Hominem, but the myth sequences, at least coming from the Revolution, are closer to the David and Goliath myth.

The "problem", at least as I am seeing it, is that this myth structure doesn't support a COIN mentality, in part, because of the basic foundation myth coming out of the Revolution. Basically, in the "myth" of the Revolution, you have characters, the Hessians, (analogs of the Philistines) who are defined as "evil" - the antithesis of the "Good" (i.e. the Continental army). What "tasks" were the Hessians involved in? COIN.

I'm fully expecting John and Steve to jump in on this . I don't think it is "the answer", but I think it is a part of an answer.

Marc

[Tom Odom]

Linking back to the Yingling article discussion, rather than more congressional oversight on promotions (and more bureaucracy), what we may need is a loosening up--allowing the key commanders the latitude to promote and place officers without as much reference to centralized boards. It may require some sort of breveting to work.
Why shouldn't we have a Van Fleet who came ashore at Normandy as a regimental commander and ended up the war as a corps commander? The key is that you are establishing a form of a good ole boy network based on personal relationships and not just perceived competence (if official records truly reveal competence).
The current system wouldn't give Marshall the chance to do what he did.

Phil,

Flex in the selection process is certainly needed. As for Marshall and today, I believe you are correct in your assessment. I have numerous friends and contacts and many have remarked on the fact that no one in nearly 5 years has been relieved. I am not a "chop their heads off" guy but I find that remarkable.

Best

Tom

[Steve Blair]

Marshall was good at relieving officers, but he also left us saddled with an officer rotation system that works against systematic learning and troop trust, both of which are critical to COIN, IMO.

Donald Vandergriff has written a fair amount about changes that are needed within our personnel system, and I agree with them. The army that Marshall had to work with had a certain level of officer stability built in. Once the regimental system was destroyed and "career enhancement" and "generalized officers" became the rule of the day, we really lost the ability to grow some of the officers that Marshall had to work with. "Up or out" plays its own nasty role here as well.

And in relation to the "good ol' boy" network...that's exactly what Marshall had. He knew the majority of the pre-war officers because the Army was so small. He knew what wasn't in the official record. These days that's not quite possible.

Brevet systems are subject to their own abuse and confusion. Just take a look at the Army in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War for examples of this.

[John T. Fishel]

OK, I'll do my best. Marc, Mark's got your number. It took me - a trained social scientist - 2 full readings to make head or tails of your jargon. That said, even though I'll have to read it again, I think you may be on to something. Regarding the "founding myth" - the Revolution was both an insurgency and the Brits were the bad guys. The Hessians were ok as individuals especially if they deserted and became good Americans as many did. Worst were the Loyalists (traitors) who went to Canada - good riddance!. But what is most interesting in this light is the insurgent guerrilla fight against the Regulars - viz Lexington & Concord and also parts of Saratoga along with Francis Marion in S. Carolina and the Continental Army as a Regular army as good as the Redcoats and the Hessians.
So, some of Tom's HIC/LIC dichotomy is built into the US Army from its founding as the Continental Army. As is the tension. Tom's point, which I generally agree with, that the big war army is hardwired into the US military perspective is important to understanding and answering my question.
But it occurs to me that, perhaps, I am too pessimistic. Unlike some of our past experiences, we had a group of officers - importantly not all of them SOF - waiting in the wings to address the COIN dilemma in Iraq. These are the Petraeus and Nagls and McMasters - none of whom are SOF guys or FAOs (as far as I know). I certainly expect to find what I am looking for in the SOF world but it is heartening to find it in tankers and mech infantry guys. This also raises the question of why a good FAO like John Abizaid got it wrong - if he did. Was he wrong for the right reasons?

Sorry about the rambling tone of this but I wanted to get caught up.

[Old Eagle]

I am indeed intrigued with where this is going.

In the mid-80s, I was CSA's LIC guy. (I hate the term LIC). Your old running partner, Max Mainwaring and one of his active duty counterparts came up to DC to explain small wars in LA. It wasn't you, but I can't remember who came along.

To his credit, GEN Thurman asked us the question, "What if the central front is a distraction, and the real action is in the developing world? And if it is, are we prepared to meet it?" Well, of course, that's exactly where we thought the action was and we didn't think we were prepared to meet it, although the light 10k divisions were supposed to have some sort of LIC METL.

Even better, we were asked to nominate places for new CSA to visit upon assuming his position. Tradition was to visit our European allies, but we proposed LATAM instead. I believe that GEN Vuono's first overseas visit was Honduras, but I don't know cuz I was fired by that time.

Guess my point is, that there have always been back burner actions to keep COIN in the view of the senior leadership. In fact, we did more in El Sal than folks tend to remember. Those who claim that we forgot/ditched COIN after VN have selective memories.

[Rob Thornton]

From Steve,

Donald Vandergriff has written a fair amount about changes that are needed within our personnel system, and I agree with them. The army that Marshall had to work with had a certain level of officer stability built in. Once the regimental system was destroyed and "career enhancement" and "generalized officers" became the rule of the day, we really lost the ability to grow some of the officers that Marshall had to work with. "Up or out" plays its own nasty role here as well.

And in relation to the "good ol' boy" network...that's exactly what Marshall had. He knew the majority of the pre-war officers because the Army was so small. He knew what wasn't in the official record. These days that's not quite possible.

That's an interesting line of thought about regimental system - I think there may be something to it in regards to the ability to know the person you are making decisions about promoting, placing or firing. Even when the OER system came out and said it was going to emphasize "whole cloth" assessments (the write up over the blocking) how far can you really take that if: 1) the people making the decisions about the person are removed from those who actually know that person; 2) The persons doing the choosing are filling potholes; 3) if the criteria for what to look for is reduced to buzz words, an ORB and of course a block. Given the way the system is established, should we expect any different outcomes? So what is the result of telling someone who only knows a small percentage of the people's files he is reviewing to pick the best for BZ or whatever - I'd say its probably default - No Context with the Content and what you get is a best guess where what looks right will have to do. To change that in a large organization means decentralizing promotions, and I think that scares the hell out of some folks - Who cares how you look in your DA photo, I see you everyday at work and I know what you have and have not done!

From John,

These are the Petraeus and Nagls and McMasters - none of whom are SOF guys or FAOs (as far as I know).

Its interesting to consider what propels a capable leader to the front. I think by and large its results, but being known for results is also important. Some are just going to stand out, they are exceptional leaders and would be in any endeavor they pursued (lets keep US Grant out of this though ). They are also rare, as they are in any organization. Who would not want one of these guys on their team, and while we're at it order up a dozen more. Unfortunately, its not that simple.

We're building some pretty sharp "COIN" leaders at various echelons, but COIN is grey matter intensive since it involves more then exact execution of TTP, and in fact the grey matter requirement goes up the higher we proceed up the levels of war. Even at the tactical level though it goes beyond battle drills.

also from John

I certainly expect to find what I am looking for in the SOF world but it is heartening to find it in tankers and mech infantry guys.

.

I'd propose that you are just as likely to find good COIN skills in any Branch or service where dealing with people is part of its culture as you are in the SOF. I've met plenty of SOF officers who were far more comfortable with a DA role then a COIN role. Part of this may be the culture created over the last decade - I'm not part of SOF so I could not tell you. I will tell you though that COIN is a thinking man's (or woman's) game, and that I've seen everything from IN, FA, AR, AV, QM, MP, MI, SIG etc. who have good insights and people skills. Many are functioning in roles outside their branch and doing fantastic things as their CDRs re-rolled them to round out his/her needs.

While this creates a larger pool of qualified candidates, they are still competing for promotion not within a "COIN" field. Imagine a fantastic COIN QM guy/gal competing for LTC/BN CMD but while their OER says they were and incredible advisor with off the charts potential, it says little about "expeditionary, just in time LOG guru").

So I'd pose a couple of questions:

1) How do you ensure you promote from talent outside of a narrow Branch definition of what equals "promote me" in order to ensure you get the most capable leaders in positions where they can make a difference? let me include that you have to prepare them for the technical requirements of whatever job you line them up for if outside of their basic understanding. Keep in mind rice bowls and panic.

2) Second, it may be a matter of increasing the pool of talent (retention, recruitment). When was the last time you heard a SEC or Big 10 star saying, you know what I really want to do is play "Arena" football.

[John Nagl]

Tom,

Thanks for your posting. I'm quite humbled by your description of "Soup" as "a work of inspiration and despair"; I would like to think that there is some hope in the book as well. I've certainly found some in the work of leaders like Generals Petraeus and Mattis and Colonels like H.R. McMaster and Sean MacFarland, who have demonstrated that soldiers who understand counterinsurgency can make a real difference on the ground when given the resources they need to do the job.

I am honored by your statement that "If you have read FM 3-24 Counter Insurgency but have not read Nagl's book, you have not truly read FM 3-24." Frankly, my concern is that not enough people have read the Field Manual, partly because it hasn't been readily available in hard copy. The University of Chicago has done the nation a service by producing a print version that will ship in the next few weeks. The Chicago edition includes a spectacular introduction by Sarah Sewall of the Carr Center for Human Rights at Harvard University. I would argue that if you haven't read her introduction, you haven't truly read FM 3-24.

The manual is available at http://www.amazon.com/Marine-Corps-C...608935&sr=1-23 for only ten bucks, and Chicago donates some of the proceeds to the Fisher House charities, which provide free lodging near military hospitals for the families of wounded soldiers.