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Thread: Studying a Wrist Watch: the U.S. Military and COIN

  1. #21
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    Default Of cabbages and kings

    Old Eagle, and I emphasize the "old" (although I bet you're not as old as me & I know neither of us is as old as Max), I suspect that Max was likely at Carlisle having just begun the study that Max Thurman commissioned and that has carried us lo these many years. It was, however, a near thing. John Waghelstein comments that the small wars material at Leavenworth in the early 80s was down to 8 hours total. If it hadn't been for El Sal, Wag would have left the army as a LTC and his MILGP grads wouldn't have carried the small wars ball for so long.

    Rob, you are right that it is not a branch thing. Among the best small warriors I know are tankers, infantryment, and MI guys (like Steve Fee). One of the very best was GEN Jack Galvin who brought Major Dave Petraeus to SOUTHCOM from West Point the summer of 86. My boss in SOUTHCOM's Small Wars Operations Research Dirctorate, COL Bob Herrick was a visionary in this field although I could never sell him on the utility of horse mounted infantry for El Salvador My point about SOF - and I would extend it to FAO - is that here, more than in the "conventional" branches, thinking about COIN is likely to be rewarded rather than disparaged. The culture (sub-cultures) in these areas is conducive to small wars thinking. But one has to caution that there are some who still believe that the Son Tay raid was the height of SF operations.

  2. #22
    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Default The "Soup" Was Excellent

    John,

    My pleasure was in reading your book. I kept getting to the next point and saying, "damn that sounds familiar," In resonating that way it offered hope. By that I mean that if someone reads it with an open mind they can start to see where we get so locked into dogmatic phrases that the phrases lose all meaning, Rather those phrases become the intellectual box that we always say we need to be able to think beyond.

    As for the FM, well we read it and teach it here. My hope --there is that word again--is that enough will be exposed to it that when they become senior officers they remember it. And I fully recognize there are a number of officers like McMasters and Petraeus who do think and do listen. I have always found that the greatest clue to someone with a brain is that they can ask a question and then listen to the answer before speaking. But as you know there are those who see this "COIN business" as a diversion from the "real mission." Our real mission is whatever comes to face us and the mssion does not come with an ala carte menu; we get what is served.

    In any case, thanks for posting and please continue when you have the time. And I look forward to your next book.

    Best regards,

    Tom

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    1) How do you ensure you promote from talent outside of a narrow Branch definition of what equals "promote me" in order to ensure you get the most capable leaders in positions where they can make a difference? let me include that you have to prepare them for the technical requirements of whatever job you line them up for if outside of their basic understanding. Keep in mind rice bowls and panic.

    To be a bit cycnical, it doesn't matter because at the JO level everyone is getting promoted. To be a bit more idealistic - the BCT Commander should have the authority to promote officers from 2LT to 1LT and from 1LT to CPT. This gives him the flexibility to assign his personnel the way he wants to instead of relying on HRC to keep the flow and ebb consistent. And the only way to do this is to institue a Regimental system where officers grow up to the rank of Major. The opposing view will state that a bad BCT commander might make poor choices in assigning personnel, but in reality, can it be any worse than what HRC/PERSCOM already does?

    2) Second, it may be a matter of increasing the pool of talent (retention, recruitment). When was the last time you heard a SEC or Big 10 star saying, you know what I really want to do is play "Arena" football.

    I'd say the first issue is identifying the talent, identify what their motivations are, and then reward them with jobs with more responsibility or additional schools, etc...but at the end of the day, a lot (if not most) people are going to be ragged out after a 3rd or 4th tour, especially if they are married. What if you have a company commander who is a flat out stud, but he's on his third tour in four years, and his request is go teach ROTC for two years back in CONUS someplace? Is that the right thing to do for retention purposes, or is it giving him a second command somewhere in order to maximize his immediate talents? A BCT Commander might be able to make that choice as he would have a relationship with him, but dealing with an assignments officer that you know by voice only wouldn't be able to make that distinction.

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    Council Member Mark O'Neill's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by marct View Post
    Hi Mark,



    It's he pernicious influence of all those German and Polish theoreticians . 'sides that, how often do you hear academics talking in plain English anyway .

    Marc
    Not all that often ...my mob all speak Australian ... struth, blown whatever chance I had at credibility now...

    That said, I think that although 'service' writing has its limitations, we should resist, wherever possible, throwing out the clarity most of us have been trained to employ in written communication for the sake of being bitten by the post modern academic writing bug. One of the reasons (amongst many) that John's book has done so well, is that the prose is simple , clear and elegant. This in turn makes it accessible and 'easy' - even for Infantrymen....

    I am going to stop now , for fear of hijacking this thread any further,

    Cheers

    Mark

    PS Sarah's Intro to the hardcopy FM, combined with the $ to the worthy service charity, makes it a great buy. As we say over here in the land of the neverending long weekend - do yourself a favour, buy one.

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    Default Thanks Tom and Mark

    Aw shucks, guys, the praise is going to my head

  6. #26
    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Hi Mark,

    Quote Originally Posted by Mark O'Neill View Post
    Not all that often ...my mob all speak Australian ... struth, blown whatever chance I had at credibility now...
    Yup . I've been working for years with some colleagues at UTS and we always have to restrict our collaborations to email.

    Quote Originally Posted by Mark O'Neill View Post
    That said, I think that although 'service' writing has its limitations, we should resist, wherever possible, throwing out the clarity most of us have been trained to employ in written communication for the sake of being bitten by the post modern academic writing bug. One of the reasons (amongst many) that John's book has done so well, is that the prose is simple , clear and elegant. This in turn makes it accessible and 'easy' - even for Infantrymen....
    Part of the problem with "clarity" is that it assumes a common ground of experience. When I'm wearing my consultant hat, I find that my collaborator "translates" nice, clear technically accurate descriptions of observations into something that is as clear as mud but vaguely comprehensible by business clients.

    It's really a problem of specialization <sigh>. John made a point earlier that's worth looking at:
    It took me - a trained social scientist - 2 full readings to make head or tails of your jargon. That said, even though I'll have to read it again, I think you may be on to something.
    Part of the problem, as I see it, is that while social scientists have a fair amount of commonality in concepts, i.e. we can all "speak" statistics and probably have at least a passing familiarity with the same general theoretical positions, the specialty areas really just don't cross over that well.

    I fully suspect that most social scientists will recognize some of the theoretical positions I draw on (say, the Phenomenology of Schutz and Luckmann, e.g. Structures of the LifeWorld, vols. 1 & 2), but the work of Malinowski or Victor Turners' work on rites of passage and symbology? Unlikely in the extreme. So, as a start, I'm attaching a copy of a "cheat sheet" on Malinowski - I'm afraid I don't have one for Turner . As a note, Malinowski's work on "institutions" is starting to be picked up by the management and organizational culture crowd.

    Marc
    Attached Files Attached Files
    Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
    Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
    Senior Research Fellow,
    The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
    Carleton University
    http://marctyrrell.com/

  7. #27
    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Default Apology

    Hi Folks,

    Sorry if that last post sounded a bit pi%%y - I'm trying to swot out a preliminary report for a client who just doesn't seem to understand even plain English. I'm afraid I let my frustrations come through <sigh>.

    Marc

    Ps Mark - I really do mean plain English
    Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
    Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
    Senior Research Fellow,
    The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
    Carleton University
    http://marctyrrell.com/

  8. #28
    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    From Ski,

    To be a bit cynical, it doesn't matter because at the JO level everyone is getting promoted. To be a bit more idealistic - the BCT Commander should have the authority to promote officers from 2LT to 1LT and from 1LT to CPT. This gives him the flexibility to assign his personnel the way he wants to instead of relying on HRC to keep the flow and ebb consistent. And the only way to do this is to institute a Regimental system where officers grow up to the rank of Major.
    Yep, the numbers are - well, got a pulse? And by now most of the AD Army has seen the email from HRC on the shortage &#37;s. I would say that given the requirements - some of the Goldwater Nichols stuff and some of the new Joint, etc. - we could wind up creating new problems - who gets let go and who gets traded to the minors (perceived).

    I'd also say that we often place square pegs in round holes outside of the BCT, and because of the impact these positions have, they are often critical enablers (or we could say lubricant) to making things work smoothly - i.e., its not all command, or even MTO&E staff. We have guys filling roles that are even outside the "green suit" environment - because we are the only ones who can or will.

    also from Ski,

    I'd say the first issue is identifying the talent, identify what their motivations are, and then reward them with jobs with more responsibility or additional schools, etc...but at the end of the day, a lot (if not most) people are going to be ragged out after a 3rd or 4th tour, especially if they are married. What if you have a company commander who is a flat out stud, but he's on his third tour in four years, and his request is go teach ROTC for two years back in CONUS someplace?
    As much fun as command is, and as important as the responsibility of a command is, it may not be the best place to place all your talent, all of the time - there is plenty of good use outside of command for talented folks along with the opportunity for them to make a large impact. I'd also say that if you want to grow generals capable of "doing only what generals can do" in today's challenges, then you are going to have to expose them to things outside of command, and give them a chance to reflect and internalize what they learned. Take ROTC for example and consider the returns you get from that investment by placing a talented individual in a position to influence future leaders - its exponential. We have to sell our "influencers / mentors/ Senior Raters" that it is often in the best interest of both the individual and the big Army to consider these other jobs / opportunities - the path should not necessarilly be CMD / CTC OC / Resident ILE / S3 /XO / BDE S3 / BN CDR / BDE DCG / War College / BDE CDR. We limit / restrict ourselves then reap what we sew. There is strength and opportunity in diversity.All Ops and no "other" can make Jack a dull blade.

    Consider ACS in a mostly civilian institution where we bring some ideas in from outside the pack. It gets backto investing in people. Lots of options here - but ideally you have a good bench, eqally talented to rotate through so we don't burn out and we don't compromise.

    I guess what I'm saying is we'd have to consider decentralizing promotions further then just a regimental system, while ensuring that folks are not getting promoted just because they are great guys or gals, or the boss is a softie - it means a system with checks and balances that keep pace with what we really need and want out of leaders, minimizes and discourages abuse, and consistently places round pegs in round holes. While I've seen BN and BDE CDRs who can get it right most of the time (some times you just have to play the hand your dealt), I believe that higher then the BDE HR is largely a matter of luck of the draw because its like a mixture of the card games "go fish" and "war".

    The first step I'd say is deciding in a communicable description that minimizes subjectivity about what type of leaders we are trying to develop. To do that I think we have to decide what types are required to win this long war. After we do that we can proceed with what its going to take to recruit and retain them, and how we take bias and nepotism (unintentional or intentional) out of the equation.
    Last edited by Rob Thornton; 05-20-2007 at 07:35 PM.

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    Rob

    Your first point - yeah, there is a need to differentiate what positions are considered critical and what aren't. I've been out of the Operational Army for almost 7 years now, working as a 50A and a 59A. Was the best choice I ever made, even as a Guard officer. I;ve learned more about how the Army runs, why it runs, and why certain decisions are made in these past 7 years than a lot of operational track guys ever will.

    Second point - round pegs and round holes. Up until the Major rank, the vast majority of positions are operational or training related. So the Army forces the individual to be at least semi-competent until that point. But as a Major, and especially with those who enter a Functional Area, the individual is now exposed to a world that is much different than the tactical and operational Army. I remember my first day at work as a 50A inside the Beltway and being floored by the amount of Army civilians within the Force Management world. I had no idea this sort of thing even existed. As to what type of leaders that should be produced...that's one of those questions that doesn't have a single answer. In one aspect, the generalist approach to growing leaders is very good - it offers a broad amount of knowledge to one person, but that knowledge is often veneer deep. It's worked for the last 100 years or so, right, so it can't be all bad? But I've been wondering if we are trying to develop something that really doesn't exist, with rare exceptions...we are being force to change how we fight (pre-9/11) into this COIN/4GW morass. So the leaders that may have been great tankers may not be the best COIN leaders, and the best COIN leaders may have been terrible tankers. So there's that paradox to suffer through. The very best will adapt and be good at both, but what percentage will that be? 1&#37;, 5%, 10%? Not many in any case.

    I think trying to identify what kind of leader we want is crucial, and OCS/ROTC/USMA should be used as the proving ground for this. Don Vandergriff's work at Georgetown was excellent, and probably was a good starting point on how to grow these folks. But this is where the first stages of cognitive dissonance come in - Accessions Command says, "we need X amount of 2LT's, so make it happen PMS's." But I think at this stage of the game, quality has to be considered over quantity. As I said in another thread - "No officer is better than a bad officer." But then I come back to that Major rank, and I see all the different jobs that are open outside the individual branches and operational field, and I wonder if there aren't CPT's and even 1LT's who can do these jobs well. But they'll never get the chance until they become MAJ's. So they are pigeonholed into the operational world when they may be great at something else.

    As for the selection and retention of officers, any system will have bias, nepotism and the like. It needs to be limited and curtailed to the greatest extent of course. If the goal of the Army is to continue to grow superb BCT and Division Commanders for a conventional fight, then the current track is probably the way to go. If it's somethjing different, then the system must change.

    I do know one thing - as long as the Army has 90%+ promotion rates to LTC, this is all going to be a wash. As long as one stays in, doesn't committ a crime, makes the pre-requisite schooling, and stays healthy, a 20 year career is a given no matter what system is in place. Because the personnel system is designed around filling spaces with faces, instead of filling spaces with quality (the round peg for the round hole as you put it), it's not going to change. In fact, with the expansion of the Army to 547K, it's going to get much worse for quality versus quantity. Sure, there are ways of identifying talent, but is that talent better suited for new cadre of BCT X or is it better for filling the new cadre at the Infantry OBC? Tough choices, and not a lot of clear answers right now.

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