Iraq Isn't Like Vietnam -- Except When It Is

[carl]

Let's see, where do we start with Mr. Dallek's article.

First the "surge" isn't a fundamental change in the way the war is prosecuted, it is just a simple increase in the number of troops. Okay....

The ARVN couldn't and wouldn't fight. Didn't they provide all the ground combat forces that stopped the Easter Offensive in 1972?

The TET offensive showed VC strength. Well, yes it did. He doesn't mention that it also shattered that strength never to recover.

Ending the war in Vietnam enhanced the international credibility of the US. That is a bit inconsistant with my sad memories of the late 70's.

He forgot to make one last point about Vietnam. I'll make it for Mr. Dallek. The loss in Vietnam also resulted in the millions of innocent people losing their lives and in decades of misery for more millions. Since the point of his article is how things apply to Iraq, I think this thing applies most directly of all.

[Culpeper]

Carl:

My first gut reaction to the Iraq-Vietnam compare and contrast was much the same. But we are looking at the platform used to prosecute both conflicts. Not the size and magnitude differences.

The similarities between Iraq and Vietnam are not necessarily on the ground, but in the response of some of our institutions to those situations.

Yes, it is easy to state that the mere casualty rates and the intensity of fighting alone are so much lighter than Vietnam. I have stated the same thing more than once on these forums. Nevertheless, the similarities are the shortcomings that are currently costing lives whether we consider the casualty rate light or not. In that respect, the same mistakes are being made. And it is coming with an opportunity cost.

From an historical perspective, during the Civil War tens-of-thousands of lives in one day was not unusual. During WWI high casualties to achieve a worthless effort was considered acceptable just to find out if an planned offensive was worthwhile or not. During WWII thousands of casualties to take an island that was strategical useful for a short period was considered acceptable. During the Korean Conflict hundreds of casualties were acceptable to take a hill. Just to take the hill with no strategic value. In Vietnam, we ran into conventional warfare as well as counterinsurgency warfare. Nearly 60,000 KIA was not acceptable to America for a "police action". Iraq has turned into a police action counterinsurgency war. Today, the loss of two lives in a forward outpost platoon can be serious because we have, in the past, already lost too many American lives due to police action tactics that didn't work at one time. Overall, the problem is we are not looking that far back in time except for historic statistical purposes. So, today the loss of light casualties are having the same effect on moral as lets say, Hamburger Hill during that particular conflict. It is not because the troops are less aggressive or brave. It is just in this war there are not going to be any Hamburger Hills.

A tax auditor will have a hard time completing an application for a manufacturing tax credit because it is in the nature of the auditor to look for a liability against the taxpayer, when the purpose of the application is to enhance manufacturing in his area. A high ranking commander in Iraq may have a hard time with COIN decisions because it is in his nature to seek out and destroy the enemy with acceptable losses on three fronts; his troops, the enemy, and the population, which will have a negative impact when the actual goal is to enhance our image with the population. We can't do this with acceptable losses of troops and the general population. This is where some are missing the picture on Vietnam as I have in the past. In some places during the Vietnam Conflict the same mistakes are being made in Iraq overall. Not seeing the trees because of the forest. It takes a while to get over it.

[aktarian]

He forgot to make one last point about Vietnam. I'll make it for Mr. Dallek. The loss in Vietnam also resulted in the millions of innocent people losing their lives and in decades of misery for more millions. Since the point of his article is how things apply to Iraq, I think this thing applies most directly of all.

However it didn't result in domino theory spread of communism through Asia. So any prediction about what will happen to Iraq after US leaves (Aq gaining secure base, Iraq becoming new Taliban's Afghanistan and such) has to take that into account.

[Old Eagle]

Not ALL the dominoes fell.

Laos didn't go communist
Cambodia didn't go communist
Burma didn't go communist

oops

One of the most eloquent defenses of the Vietnam war I heard was one of the other SEAsian leaders explaining that the time from 1965-75 allowed the ASEAN countries enough time and outside resources to build strong enough institutions/economies to ward off communism. And, as I posted elsewhere, we are still going to win the war in Vietnam.

Now, it seems to me, the parallel question is, who in the middle east is making the reforms that Thailand, Malaysia, etc made in SAE? I just don't see it. Every once in a while there's a glimmer of hope here or there, but no bright shining lights.

That said, I do like the economic and social changes shown by Dubai. Politically, it's still 7th century, but that may change too.

What think?

[aktarian]

Not ALL the dominoes fell.

Laos didn't go communist
Cambodia didn't go communist
Burma didn't go communist

oops

What about others? Thailand, Philippines etc etc.

One of the most eloquent defenses of the Vietnam war I heard was one of the other SEAsian leaders explaining that the time from 1965-75 allowed the ASEAN countries enough time and outside resources to build strong enough institutions/economies to ward off communism. And, as I posted elsewhere, we are still going to win the war in Vietnam.

Good point.

Now, it seems to me, the parallel question is, who in the middle east is making the reforms that Thailand, Malaysia, etc made in SAE? I just don't see it. Every once in a while there's a glimmer of hope here or there, but no bright shining lights.

That said, I do like the economic and social changes shown by Dubai. Politically, it's still 7th century, but that may change too.

What think?

Well "reforms" can go in two ways. One is democratic other is secular autoritarism. Neither are perfect, in former you can get islamists in power (something that happens every time these countries have anything resembling democratic elections) later only supresses them and doesn't really solve them.

[Steve Blair]

The biggest issue I see with Congress getting involved at this stage in the way that they have (much like they did in Vietnam) is that there is no accountability for them. Popular memory (not necessarily history) remembers Watergate, not Kennedy making political hay out of the casualties at Dong Ap Bai (Hamburger Hill). It also remembers the photos of the last helicopters out of Saigon, not the lackluster political decisions made by Congress that led up to that moment.

Bush has certainly made mistakes with Iraq, and they will be remembered as his. But within the anonymity of "consensus" and "voting blocks" Congress may once again be able to evade theirs. To borrow some of Nagl's framework, this certainly does NOT make Congress a "learning institution," and perhaps teaches them a dangerous lesson: They can act (or fail to act) with near impunity because of their sheer size and lack of political accountability. Elections certainly are not accountability in this case, especially when one considers the Senate. Kennedy has never been held accountable for his poor decisions in the late 1960s, and he seems to have failed to learn from them. The same could be said for many of his colleagues.

[Sargent]

The biggest issue I see with Congress getting involved at this stage in the way that they have (much like they did in Vietnam) is that there is no accountability for them. Popular memory (not necessarily history) remembers Watergate, not Kennedy making political hay out of the casualties at Dong Ap Bai (Hamburger Hill). It also remembers the photos of the last helicopters out of Saigon, not the lackluster political decisions made by Congress that led up to that moment.

Bush has certainly made mistakes with Iraq, and they will be remembered as his. But within the anonymity of "consensus" and "voting blocks" Congress may once again be able to evade theirs. To borrow some of Nagl's framework, this certainly does NOT make Congress a "learning institution," and perhaps teaches them a dangerous lesson: They can act (or fail to act) with near impunity because of their sheer size and lack of political accountability. Elections certainly are not accountability in this case, especially when one considers the Senate. Kennedy has never been held accountable for his poor decisions in the late 1960s, and he seems to have failed to learn from them. The same could be said for many of his colleagues.

Neither am I particularly keen on putting them in charge of running a war, and I agree that their track record doesn't bode well for them getting much right. Several hundred people as CINC? Ugh. But in cases where they have stepped in to muck things up, the action was in response to a backlash from the public, and it was, in each of the cases of Vietnam and Gulf 2, after giving the Executive Branch several years to pursue its policy. In Vietnam, the American public was pretty supportive -- until Tet put the lie to the Light at the End of the Tunnel. I would submit that the American public gave this administration's policy a fair shake -- given the various lines that were coming out of the administration -- before losing patience.

That's what any administration needs to remember about the American public -- you have to be mostly on target on the level of commitment and how long it will take, and certainly don't give them false hope, because the people get very impatient when that is dashed. FDR never promised anything about WWII -- it was "for the duration," and nobody thought the duration was just about to end at any point. Possibly that's why the collective memory of the war is so positive -- given the enormity of the conflict, for the Americans it probably ended sooner than expected.

The bottom line is that managing public perception and support is a significant piece of the strategic picture in the American case. And as tempting as it is to use optimism as a means of building the right image of the policy and maintaining positive feelings towards it, it's a very risky way to go about things, because of the problems associated with dashed expectations. And in the American system, if there is not the option to dump the administration when the public loses patience with the policy or the handling thereof, the second recourse is to the Congress. Hence my strong sense of executive responsibility in such cases -- because that second option is sub-optimal.

[Steve Blair]

Neither am I particularly keen on putting them in charge of running a war, and I agree that their track record doesn't bode well for them getting much right. Several hundred people as CINC? Ugh. But in cases where they have stepped in to muck things up, the action was in response to a backlash from the public, and it was, in each of the cases of Vietnam and Gulf 2, after giving the Executive Branch several years to pursue its policy. In Vietnam, the American public was pretty supportive -- until Tet put the lie to the Light at the End of the Tunnel. I would submit that the American public gave this administration's policy a fair shake -- given the various lines that were coming out of the administration -- before losing patience.

That's what any administration needs to remember about the American public -- you have to be mostly on target on the level of commitment and how long it will take, and certainly don't give them false hope, because the people get very impatient when that is dashed. FDR never promised anything about WWII -- it was "for the duration," and nobody thought the duration was just about to end at any point. Possibly that's why the collective memory of the war is so positive -- given the enormity of the conflict, for the Americans it probably ended sooner than expected.

The bottom line is that managing public perception and support is a significant piece of the strategic picture in the American case. And as tempting as it is to use optimism as a means of building the right image of the policy and maintaining positive feelings towards it, it's a very risky way to go about things, because of the problems associated with dashed expectations. And in the American system, if there is not the option to dump the administration when the public loses patience with the policy or the handling thereof, the second recourse is to the Congress. Hence my strong sense of executive responsibility in such cases -- because that second option is sub-optimal.

True to a degree, but this still does not answer the question of the accountability of Congress. Who took them to task for selling South Vietnam down the drain? That's really my basic thrust with this. Once Congress steps in, any possibility of accountability disappears. I agree completely with executive responsibility, but I don't see much of a balance in Congress with a "get out of jail free" card. This is especially true with the Senate, which often has years between elections to cover their tracks.

With Word War II, one thing most people don't remember is that FDR flew in the face of public opinion by putting Europe first. One reason he didn't declare war on Germany initially is that there was little real public or Congressional support for it. It took Pearl Harbor, and Hitler's ill-advised declaration of war on the US, to give him that window.

Tet is an interesting case, and one that will be debated for many years yet. I tend to fall into the camp that feels that Tet was really a military victory for the US and SVN, even though it obviously ended up a political loss of major proportions. Tet exposed much of the VC infrastructure, and saw it destroyed in the bargain. That may not matter in the historical long run, but it's an interesting balancing factor.