Iraq Isn't Like Vietnam -- Except When It Is

[aktarian]

He forgot to make one last point about Vietnam. I'll make it for Mr. Dallek. The loss in Vietnam also resulted in the millions of innocent people losing their lives and in decades of misery for more millions. Since the point of his article is how things apply to Iraq, I think this thing applies most directly of all.

However it didn't result in domino theory spread of communism through Asia. So any prediction about what will happen to Iraq after US leaves (Aq gaining secure base, Iraq becoming new Taliban's Afghanistan and such) has to take that into account.

[Old Eagle]

Not ALL the dominoes fell.

Laos didn't go communist
Cambodia didn't go communist
Burma didn't go communist

oops

One of the most eloquent defenses of the Vietnam war I heard was one of the other SEAsian leaders explaining that the time from 1965-75 allowed the ASEAN countries enough time and outside resources to build strong enough institutions/economies to ward off communism. And, as I posted elsewhere, we are still going to win the war in Vietnam.

Now, it seems to me, the parallel question is, who in the middle east is making the reforms that Thailand, Malaysia, etc made in SAE? I just don't see it. Every once in a while there's a glimmer of hope here or there, but no bright shining lights.

That said, I do like the economic and social changes shown by Dubai. Politically, it's still 7th century, but that may change too.

What think?

[aktarian]

Not ALL the dominoes fell.

Laos didn't go communist
Cambodia didn't go communist
Burma didn't go communist

oops

What about others? Thailand, Philippines etc etc.

One of the most eloquent defenses of the Vietnam war I heard was one of the other SEAsian leaders explaining that the time from 1965-75 allowed the ASEAN countries enough time and outside resources to build strong enough institutions/economies to ward off communism. And, as I posted elsewhere, we are still going to win the war in Vietnam.

Good point.

Now, it seems to me, the parallel question is, who in the middle east is making the reforms that Thailand, Malaysia, etc made in SAE? I just don't see it. Every once in a while there's a glimmer of hope here or there, but no bright shining lights.

That said, I do like the economic and social changes shown by Dubai. Politically, it's still 7th century, but that may change too.

What think?

Well "reforms" can go in two ways. One is democratic other is secular autoritarism. Neither are perfect, in former you can get islamists in power (something that happens every time these countries have anything resembling democratic elections) later only supresses them and doesn't really solve them.

[Steve Blair]

The biggest issue I see with Congress getting involved at this stage in the way that they have (much like they did in Vietnam) is that there is no accountability for them. Popular memory (not necessarily history) remembers Watergate, not Kennedy making political hay out of the casualties at Dong Ap Bai (Hamburger Hill). It also remembers the photos of the last helicopters out of Saigon, not the lackluster political decisions made by Congress that led up to that moment.

Bush has certainly made mistakes with Iraq, and they will be remembered as his. But within the anonymity of "consensus" and "voting blocks" Congress may once again be able to evade theirs. To borrow some of Nagl's framework, this certainly does NOT make Congress a "learning institution," and perhaps teaches them a dangerous lesson: They can act (or fail to act) with near impunity because of their sheer size and lack of political accountability. Elections certainly are not accountability in this case, especially when one considers the Senate. Kennedy has never been held accountable for his poor decisions in the late 1960s, and he seems to have failed to learn from them. The same could be said for many of his colleagues.

[Sargent]

The biggest issue I see with Congress getting involved at this stage in the way that they have (much like they did in Vietnam) is that there is no accountability for them. Popular memory (not necessarily history) remembers Watergate, not Kennedy making political hay out of the casualties at Dong Ap Bai (Hamburger Hill). It also remembers the photos of the last helicopters out of Saigon, not the lackluster political decisions made by Congress that led up to that moment.

Bush has certainly made mistakes with Iraq, and they will be remembered as his. But within the anonymity of "consensus" and "voting blocks" Congress may once again be able to evade theirs. To borrow some of Nagl's framework, this certainly does NOT make Congress a "learning institution," and perhaps teaches them a dangerous lesson: They can act (or fail to act) with near impunity because of their sheer size and lack of political accountability. Elections certainly are not accountability in this case, especially when one considers the Senate. Kennedy has never been held accountable for his poor decisions in the late 1960s, and he seems to have failed to learn from them. The same could be said for many of his colleagues.

Neither am I particularly keen on putting them in charge of running a war, and I agree that their track record doesn't bode well for them getting much right. Several hundred people as CINC? Ugh. But in cases where they have stepped in to muck things up, the action was in response to a backlash from the public, and it was, in each of the cases of Vietnam and Gulf 2, after giving the Executive Branch several years to pursue its policy. In Vietnam, the American public was pretty supportive -- until Tet put the lie to the Light at the End of the Tunnel. I would submit that the American public gave this administration's policy a fair shake -- given the various lines that were coming out of the administration -- before losing patience.

That's what any administration needs to remember about the American public -- you have to be mostly on target on the level of commitment and how long it will take, and certainly don't give them false hope, because the people get very impatient when that is dashed. FDR never promised anything about WWII -- it was "for the duration," and nobody thought the duration was just about to end at any point. Possibly that's why the collective memory of the war is so positive -- given the enormity of the conflict, for the Americans it probably ended sooner than expected.

The bottom line is that managing public perception and support is a significant piece of the strategic picture in the American case. And as tempting as it is to use optimism as a means of building the right image of the policy and maintaining positive feelings towards it, it's a very risky way to go about things, because of the problems associated with dashed expectations. And in the American system, if there is not the option to dump the administration when the public loses patience with the policy or the handling thereof, the second recourse is to the Congress. Hence my strong sense of executive responsibility in such cases -- because that second option is sub-optimal.

[Steve Blair]

Neither am I particularly keen on putting them in charge of running a war, and I agree that their track record doesn't bode well for them getting much right. Several hundred people as CINC? Ugh. But in cases where they have stepped in to muck things up, the action was in response to a backlash from the public, and it was, in each of the cases of Vietnam and Gulf 2, after giving the Executive Branch several years to pursue its policy. In Vietnam, the American public was pretty supportive -- until Tet put the lie to the Light at the End of the Tunnel. I would submit that the American public gave this administration's policy a fair shake -- given the various lines that were coming out of the administration -- before losing patience.

That's what any administration needs to remember about the American public -- you have to be mostly on target on the level of commitment and how long it will take, and certainly don't give them false hope, because the people get very impatient when that is dashed. FDR never promised anything about WWII -- it was "for the duration," and nobody thought the duration was just about to end at any point. Possibly that's why the collective memory of the war is so positive -- given the enormity of the conflict, for the Americans it probably ended sooner than expected.

The bottom line is that managing public perception and support is a significant piece of the strategic picture in the American case. And as tempting as it is to use optimism as a means of building the right image of the policy and maintaining positive feelings towards it, it's a very risky way to go about things, because of the problems associated with dashed expectations. And in the American system, if there is not the option to dump the administration when the public loses patience with the policy or the handling thereof, the second recourse is to the Congress. Hence my strong sense of executive responsibility in such cases -- because that second option is sub-optimal.

True to a degree, but this still does not answer the question of the accountability of Congress. Who took them to task for selling South Vietnam down the drain? That's really my basic thrust with this. Once Congress steps in, any possibility of accountability disappears. I agree completely with executive responsibility, but I don't see much of a balance in Congress with a "get out of jail free" card. This is especially true with the Senate, which often has years between elections to cover their tracks.

With Word War II, one thing most people don't remember is that FDR flew in the face of public opinion by putting Europe first. One reason he didn't declare war on Germany initially is that there was little real public or Congressional support for it. It took Pearl Harbor, and Hitler's ill-advised declaration of war on the US, to give him that window.

Tet is an interesting case, and one that will be debated for many years yet. I tend to fall into the camp that feels that Tet was really a military victory for the US and SVN, even though it obviously ended up a political loss of major proportions. Tet exposed much of the VC infrastructure, and saw it destroyed in the bargain. That may not matter in the historical long run, but it's an interesting balancing factor.

[Sargent]

True to a degree, but this still does not answer the question of the accountability of Congress. Who took them to task for selling South Vietnam down the drain? That's really my basic thrust with this. Once Congress steps in, any possibility of accountability disappears. I agree completely with executive responsibility, but I don't see much of a balance in Congress with a "get out of jail free" card. This is especially true with the Senate, which often has years between elections to cover their tracks.

With Word War II, one thing most people don't remember is that FDR flew in the face of public opinion by putting Europe first. One reason he didn't declare war on Germany initially is that there was little real public or Congressional support for it. It took Pearl Harbor, and Hitler's ill-advised declaration of war on the US, to give him that window.

Tet is an interesting case, and one that will be debated for many years yet. I tend to fall into the camp that feels that Tet was really a military victory for the US and SVN, even though it obviously ended up a political loss of major proportions. Tet exposed much of the VC infrastructure, and saw it destroyed in the bargain. That may not matter in the historical long run, but it's an interesting balancing factor.

I don't disagree with your points on Congress -- I don't know how to solve the problem either.

Yes, FDR did have a problem putting Europe first -- both before and after Pearl Harbor. In the end, although that was the official strategy, the Allies ended up fighting both theatres simultaneously. And, to a degree, the Pacific theatre was the one in which the Allies could begin the substantive fight more effectively first.

As for Tet, there is an intermediate picture that is often missed between the we won the military fight/lost the strategic battle. If you look at Truong Nhu Tang's memoir (_A Viet Cong Memoir_), the dedicated South Vietnamese nationalist/communist fighters were not particularly interested in uniting all of Vietnam under the North's regime. The North was aware of this. So, to an extent, by defeating the VC/NLF during Tet, we solved a problem for Hanoi. We made certain that if we did exit precipitously or before the matter was settled that Hanoi would have an easier time over-running the South and uniting the entire country under its regime. (We also probably had a hand in radicalizing that regime, but that's another matter entirely.) This was the NLF's great disappointment in 1975.

This seems to be something that certain segments of the Iraqi resistance have come to understand in the current fight. Isn't this what the Shia Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq party was aiming at in dropping the "Revolution" from their name? To distance themselves from Iran?

One thing that I've come to believe about the Vietnam War is that there were two wars going on -- one fought by the North, one fought by the South Vietnamese nationalist insurgents. The latter war was the one the US missed. It was also the one we probably didn't need to fight.