Lebanon (all aspects)

[Rex Brynen]

...if you ask me.

The European-led United Nations peacekeeping force in Lebanon known as UNIFIL is proof positive, if any were needed, of why Europe is unlikely to ever be a global superpower.

Despite the somewhat ambiguous content of OP 12 of UNSCR 1701 (2006), no one really thought that UNIFIL + was going to disarm Hizbullah, or stop smuggling across the Syrian border (it is not deployed along most of that border), and it certainly didn't have a mandate or capabilities to somehow stop a potential Lebanese civil war (largely a political issue). Europe also didn't think this was their superpower moment.

The Europeans did think--correctly--that everyone needed a way to climb down from a general war that:

• Hizbullah started by accident (they clearly hadn't expected such an intense level of Israeli retaliation to the abduction of IDF personnel)
  
• Israel escalated without any clear game plan (only FM Livni seems to have even raised the question of an exit strategy)
  
• was causing enormous social, economic, human and political damage to post-civil war Lebanon
  
• was also radicalizing public opinion throughout the Middle East.

It was the Israelis who increasingly insisted that if UNIFIL+ was going to be the way of everyone backing down from the confrontation, it needed to have forces somewhat more robust than Fijians (ie, Europeans). Washington, once it was clear that no IDF knock-out punch was in the cards, also belatedly agreed (and certainly wasn't about to volunteer US troops).

Quietly the Israelis have been saying for some months now that, far from performing below expectations, UNIFIL's deployment has shifted much of the locus of Hizbullah rearmament efforts north of the Litani River (although given Hizbullahs popular support in the south and ability to cover its tracks well, its anyone's guess what it has actually done in the UNIFIL deployment zone.)

There is a lot one can criticize about UN peacekeeping, but UNIFIL+ has, more or less, performed the limited task that the UNSC and contributing states set it (most importantly, providing a mechanism for ending the 2006 war). It is hardly fair to criticize it for not doing things that no one seriously ever thought it would be able to do.

[Tom Odom]

...if you ask me.

Despite the somewhat ambiguous content of OP 12 of UNSCR 1701 (2006), no one really thought that UNIFIL + was going to disarm Hizbullah, or stop smuggling across the Syrian border (it is not deployed along most of that border), and it certainly didn't have a mandate or capabilities to somehow stop a potential Lebanese civil war (largely a political issue). Europe also didn't think this was their superpower moment.

The Europeans did think--correctly--that everyone needed a way to climb down from a general war that:

• Hizbullah started by accident (they clearly hadn't expected such an intense level of Israeli retaliation to the abduction of IDF personnel)
  
• Israel escalated without any clear game plan (only FM Livni seems to have even raised the question of an exit strategy)
  
• was causing enormous social, economic, human and political damage to post-civil war Lebanon
  
• was also radicalizing public opinion throughout the Middle East.

It was the Israelis who increasingly insisted that if UNIFIL+ was going to be the way of everyone backing down from the confrontation, it needed to have forces somewhat more robust than Fijians (ie, Europeans). Washington, once it was clear that no IDF knock-out punch was in the cards, also belatedly agreed (and certainly wasn't about to volunteer US troops).

Quietly the Israelis have been saying for some months now that, far from performing below expectations, UNIFIL's deployment has shifted much of the locus of Hizbullah rearmament efforts north of the Litani River (although given Hizbullahs popular support in the south and ability to cover its tracks well, its anyone's guess what it has actually done in the UNIFIL deployment zone.)

There is a lot one can criticize about UN peacekeeping, but UNIFIL+ has, more or less, performed the limited task that the UNSC and contributing states set it (most importantly, providing a mechanism for ending the 2006 war). It is hardly fair to criticize it for not doing things that no one seriously ever thought it would be able to do.

Agreed but this is just more of the same when it comes to UN peacekeeping and UNIFIL in particular. The one's who cripple the effectiveness--often the U.S.--then criticize the efforts the most. It has happened repeatedly in the case of UNIFIL, an organization that has suffered plenty of casualties over the past 3 decades. The same thing happened in Rwanda with UNAMIR.

In the case of this author, he appears to be a European version of the Pat Robertson crowd, masquerading as a strategic analyst.

best

Tom

[Jedburgh]

An ICG follow-up to the report that started this thread, taking another look at the premise that Lebanon has badly lost its balance and is at risk of new collapse, moving ever closer to explosive Sunni-Shiite polarisation with a divided, debilitated Christian community in between.

ICG, 10 Oct 07: Hizbollah and the Lebanese Crisis

....Contradictory signs are emanating from Lebanon. On the one hand, the cycle of destabilising violence and inflammatory rhetoric resumed with the 19 September 2007 assassination of a March 14 member of parliament, Antoine Ghanem. March 14 forces, echoed by Washington and Paris, immediately saw Syria’s hand. The Lebanese majority accused Damascus of seeking to erase its parliamentary advantage through the step-by-step physical elimination of legislators; the French foreign minister cancelled a scheduled meeting with his Syrian counterpart, explaining he was “extremely shocked by this latest assassination”. Saad al-Hariri went further, saying the regime in Syria would never stop its killings, because “it is their way”, and concluding that “the solution is not in getting rid of the regime of Saddam only, but of the regime of Bashar also”. Militias also are rearming at an alarming pace, particularly among the various (and rival) Christian groups.

On the other hand, prospects remain for a deal on the most urgent task, electing a new president. Even after the assassination, voices from both sides express hope that a compromise can be found, while external actors (France, Saudi Arabia and Iran in particular) appear eager to find a way out by focusing on a consensual candidate rather than one that perfectly suits their agenda. The initiative, spearheaded by Nabih Berri – in which the opposition would drop its demand for a national unity government at this stage on condition the parties agree on a consensus candidate by a two-thirds majority – was welcomed by parties across the political spectrum. It also certainly had Syria’s benediction, as it is hard to imagine Berri launching such a high-profile initiative otherwise. Contacts between majority and opposition have redoubled....

[Tom Odom]

Agreed on the premise that Lebanon is on the verge again; this is a much better report in that it looks at the Lebanese. The first report looked on UNIFIL as a European failure to somehow "fix" Lebanon's problems. This one does tie the regional players into the equation as well, putting the need to pull in both Israel and Syria into the discussions.

Somewhat disagree in that the "verge" in Lebanon is always present, given the nature of the country, its historical roots, and the ever present need to balance "confessional" politics.

best

Tom

[Jedburgh]

CEIP, 16 Nov 07: The Presidential Crisis in Lebanon Demands Urgent Attention

Lebanon, an important piece of the precarious Middle East puzzle, is threatening to come undone in the coming few days. With the term of the Lebanese president Emile Lahoud coming to an end on November 24, the parliament has yet to meet, rival groups in the country have not agreed on a new president, and the country risks ending up with two governments and a serious breakdown of security and order. Despite a flurry of diplomatic and political activity, the parties—and their international backers—seem dangerously far apart; if a president is not agreed upon in the next few days, the country’s central institutions might soon collapse and the country might spiral slowly into a state of civil war. A high dose of intense international attention to Lebanon right now can save the country and the region years of open conflict and bloodshed. A number of leaders in Lebanon, the region, and around the world are focusing on bringing about a political resolution to the current crisis, but a redoubled effort from the United States and other major players is needed in these remaining days.....

[Rex Brynen]

Unless the Lebanese Armed Forces are the ones to make the attempt, then it doesn't matter.

Reality is, so far as I can tell...Hezbollah is not even remotely subject to the authority of the de jure government of Lebanon.

Until Hezbollah is brought under Beirut's control, and the whole of Lebanese territory is actively under the sovereignty of the government in Beirut, then the situation won't change much.

With the exception of this summer's fighting at Nahr al-Barid, the LAF has never been used domestically in a substantive way without it fragmenting along sectarian-political lines (as it did in 1976). Moreover, roughly c40% + of the Lebanese population is Shi'ite, as are a similar (or larger) share of the LAF rank-and-file. About half of the overall Lebanese population support the March 8 opposition (Hizbullah, Amal, Aoun). With the probable level of support for Hizallah in the LAF (or, at least, a refusal to use force against it), I can't imagine circumstances under which the LAF would even consider trying to forcibly disarm the party (even assuming it has the military capacity to do so)

The most probable outcome of the current presidential impasse is the formation of a national unity cabinet in which Hizballah is directly or indirectly represented, and in which it enjoys (along with its allies) a veto power over major decisions. In these circumstances, disarmament is even more unlikely, although a "moderating" change in the relationship between its political and military aspects might take place over time (although, for reasons I've already posted, I'm not optimistic this will take place quickly or soon).

[Ron Humphrey]

The most probable outcome of the current presidential impasse is the formation of a national unity cabinet in which Hizballah is directly or indirectly represented, and in which it enjoys (along with its allies) a veto power over major decisions. In these circumstances, disarmament is even more unlikely, although a "moderating" change in the relationship between its political and military aspects might take place over time (although, for reasons I've already posted, I'm not optimistic this will take place quickly or soon).

http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/1647.htm

Not sure how easily thats going to happen either.