Lebanon (all aspects)

[SWJED]

15 July Associated Press - Israel: Iran Aided Hezbollah Ship Attack.

A missile fired by Hezbollah, not an unmanned drone laden with explosives, damaged an Israeli warship off Lebanon, the army said Saturday. Elite Iranian troops helped fire the missile, a senior Israeli intelligence official said.

One sailor was killed and three were missing.

The intelligence official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitive nature of the information, said about 100 Iranian soldiers are in Lebanon and helped fire the Iranian-made, radar-guided C-102 at the ship late Friday.

The official added that the troops involved in firing the missile are from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, an elite corps of more than 200,000 fighters that is independent of the regular armed forces and controlled directly by supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Initial information indicated the guerrillas had used a drone for the first time to attack Israeli forces. But the army's investigation showed that Hezbollah had fired an Iranian-made missile at the vessel from the shores of Lebanon, said Brig. Gen. Ido Nehushtan.

"We can confirm that it was hit by an Iranian-made missile launched by Hezbollah. We see this as very profound fingerprint of Iranian involvement in Hezbollah," Nehushtan said in an interview with The Associated Press.

Another Hezbollah missile also hit and sank a nearby merchant ship at around the same time, Nehushtan said. He said that ship apparently was Egyptian, but had no other information...

[SWJED]

20 July Washington Times - Israeli Arms Overpower Hezbollah by Rowan Scarborough.

The ongoing exchange of armaments between Israel and Hezbollah is a mismatch in terms of firepower. Israeli pilots are using precision satellite guidance to unleash 500-pound munitions, while the Lebanese terrorist group relies on less accurate rockets, most with smaller warheads.

Israel dominates the airspace over Lebanon, and uses satellite and spy drone imagery to locate targets. Hezbollah is without an air force and owns only a few drones. Hezbollah rocketeers simply calibrate the distance to Israeli cities and then launch in hopes of hitting a populated neighborhood.

Lebanon yesterday pegged the death toll from Israeli air strikes at 310; Israel says 28 of its citizens have been killed by rocket attacks. It says it has destroyed 50 percent of the enemy's military structure.

Robert Maginnis, a former Army artillery officer, said Hezbollah's rockets, if launched successfully, usually can hit a target within a one-mile diameter.

"They aren't accurate enough to hit a building, but you fire them at a small town or village and they are probably going to hit something inside that small town or village. They could go after a police station or hospital, and they might hit one or the other."

Hezbollah is estimated to have a rocket force of more than 13,000, from which it periodically has fired on northern Israeli towns during the past 20 years. This time, the attacks come in waves, with nearly 1,000 launched since July 12.

Hezbollah's arsenal features a hodgepodge of old and newer surface-to-surface rockets, most made in Iran and Syria, with ranges from 10 miles to as far as 200 miles. They include the family of Soviet-designed Katyushas; the Fajr-3 and -5 based on the Katyusha; the Zelzal-2, which can carry up to 300 pounds of explosives and travel more than 100 miles; and the Shahin, which can fly various distances.

They launch them from vehicles, and this shoot-and-run tactic makes it more difficult to track the launch site with counter-battery radars.

"The rocket damage is more psychological," Mr. Maginnis said. "You've seen the damage that has been done. Occasionally, they hit a building. They have killed some people. They want to instill fear."

Mr. Maginnis doubts Israel can destroy Hezbollah's military from the air. He recalled the examination of the Kosovo battlefield after the U.S.-led air war against Serbian army troops. It showed that NATO's claims of knocking out hundreds of weapons were not substantiated.

In Lebanon, Hezbollah can hide its rocket, mortar and small-arms arsenal in residential areas that are not on the Israeli air force target list....

[Jedburgh]

From HRW: Lebanon: Hezbollah Rocket Attacks on Haifa Designed to Kill Civilians

Hezbollah's attacks in Israel on Sunday and Monday were at best indiscriminate attacks in civilian areas, at worst the deliberate targeting of civilians. Either way, they were serious violations of international humanitarian law and probable war crimes, Human Rights Watch said today.

In addition, the warheads used suggest a desire to maximize harm to civilians. Some of the rockets launched against Haifa over the past two days contained hundreds of metal ball bearings that are of limited use against military targets but cause great harm to civilians and civilian property. The ball bearings lodge in the body and cause serious harm...

Israel Must Provide Safe Passage to Relief Convoys

According to news reports, eyewitnesses and official Lebanese sources, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have struck several supply trucks entering Lebanon over the last two days.

In one incident on Monday, Israeli missiles struck a convoy of trucks from the United Arab Emirates near the town of Zahleh as it approached Beirut from Syria, damaging or destroying three of the trucks, as well as four passenger vehicles. Washington Post and Agence France-Press reporters at the scene wrote that the trucks contained supplies of medicines, vegetable oil, sugar and rice. The Red Crescent Society of the United Arab Emirates (UAE RC) said in a statement that the convoy contained medical supplies and medicines, as well as several ambulances...

[Jedburgh]

CSIS, 15 July: Iran's Support of the Hezbollah in Lebanon

...AP says that an Israeli intelligence official (Brig. Gen. Ido Nehushtan?)said that about 100 Iranian soldiers are in Lebanon and helped fire the Iranianmade, radar-guided C-802 at the Israeli ship late Friday, and that the Iranian forces were from the IRGC, a force controlled by supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Nehushtan is quoted as saying that "We can confirm that it was hit by an Iranian-made missile launched by Hezbollah. We see this as very profound fingerprint of Iranian involvement in Hezbollah." The strike is also important because the Israeli ship is one of Israel's most modern missile ships. It carries Harpoon and Gabriel missiles, and has one of Israel's most advanced systems for detecting and electronically jamming attacking missiles. Israel states, however, that the ship's missile detection and deflection system was not operating, apparently because the sailors did not anticipate such an attack...

[Stu-6]

I am no expert in navel systems but shouldn’t that missile have done a lot more damage? If that was a C-802 it was very big warhead on a small frigate. It seems like it would have be a near catastrophic hit.

[SWJED]

21 July Washington Times - Inside the Ring by Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough.

...We asked a former Navy combat pilot to assess the Israeli air force's war against Hezbollah. He told us:

"I'm reminded of the 1982 war with Syria. I was sitting off the coast of Lebanon on the USS Independence. Every day there would be headlines about how the Syrians had shot down another Israeli aircraft. A close look at the news clips showed that they had actually shot down a UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle]/drone — not an Israeli aircraft. This was, in fact, an Israeli tactic. They knew how many SAMs [surface-to-air missiles] Syria had and were counting down the attrition rate. They denied Syria any Soviet resupply of those SAM assets. When Israel had determined that Syria had expended their inventory of SAMs, they launched a tremendous air strike against Syria, which resulted in a victory within about 48 hours.

"So, today, I think the war of attrition is still the plan. Israel really wants the current government of Lebanon to succeed, but know they don't have the wherewithal to accomplish it without getting rid of Hezbollah and ensuring that Hezbollah cannot be resupplied by Iran or Syria.

"Ergo, the bombing/cratering of the runways at Beirut international airport — these Israelis are not dumb — a careful review of their bombing will show you that they carefully, with precision, cratered the runways at intersections so that no runways could be used. The road to Damascus was cratered so that no supplies could be brought in.

"Israel knows within a dozen or so how many Katyushka missiles Hezbollah has [and their inaccuracy] and how many other Iran-supplied longer range missiles that could hit Tel Aviv. I suspect they're waiting this attrition out and will then make an effort to destroy Hezbollah. I also won't be surprised when Israel air forces pass unmolested through Iraq airspace [controlled by the U.S.] on their way to and from Iran." ...

[Jones_RE]

This articles makes the usual (and understandable) error of assuming that national policy is driven by a single coherent rationale, with a single coherent goal.

In fact, Israeli policy (like any nation) is drawn up by a contentious procedure of consensus, consultation, backstabbing and suspicion (the same mix that drives every country).

Different actors within the Israeli government (and in Israeli society more generally) have different goals for military action and therefore advocate slightly different actions.

Presently, there is a rare moment of convergence in which most Israelis support fighting Hezbollah. However, it's ludicrous to think that they all support the same kind of fighting for the same reasons. No doubt some Israeli policy makers want to see a reoccupation of Southern Lebanon (even if they don't think the public will support it), others might be backing airstrikes on the understanding (tacit or explicit) that they are a mere prelude to negotiations with Hezbollah. Some may even believe that the current campaign will actually result in Hezbollah's destruction, or the erosion of their morale. Not all of these actors are military men. Even the ones who are may not be particularly good strategists. There's plenty of room for mistakes, misperceptions, personal ambition and wishful thinking in every government.

I think that far too often strategy is something we apply after the fact. Whoever happened to be advocating the right one in his memos is deemed a military genius by the historians and everyone else is sort of ignored or derided. In fact, it would appear that strategy is a process of trial and error (especially error) wherein one side or the other actually wins.

Personally, I believe the Israelis are conducting their strategy based around an appraisal (accurate or not) of the political limits surrounding their use of force. The government's blitzlike attacks in Gaza and Lebanon would seem to indicate a fear that a ceasefire will occur before they can inflict militarily significant damage on their opponents. Given muted Arab criticism (and outright, although unacknowledged, US approval), Israeli decision makers may have re-appraised the true extent to which they may conduct military action. That being the case, they're revising their plans on the fly.

[Jones_RE]

Military operations of any size call for massive, intense planning in order to line up intelligence, forces and supplies in a coordinated fashion. This planning usually takes quite a long time to accomplish (on the scale of weeks). Israeli planners have probably drawn up several plans for use against Hezbollah. Top decision makers probably chose the one that best fit their limitations and resources rather than deliberately crafting their strategy for this exact moment. This whole operation probably combines off the cuff improvisation, an old plan, and the most recent intelligence updates into a strategic mish mash that suits most of the participants. Even then, there will be mistakes in the execution of this plan. Finally, Hezbollah has a seat at this table and can (through its actions) dictate Israeli operations to a degree. As such, speculation about the exact motivation for any given target, bombing or whatever is completely pointless without full access to the records of both sides and a thorough analysis only available after the fact.