"Non Cents"

[LawVol]

Troufion: I think its a stretch to say the AF has admitted defeat. Even the hardcore airpower folks don't say that. As for your Darfur example, I did not say we wouldn't be involved somewhere, I just said America wouldn't go for an [I]extended[I] COIN campaign. I specifically chose this word to account for what I do see us getting into.

Tom Odom discusses this with his reference to the continuing "long war." Darfur would also be an example. Darfur, however, is more of a humanitarian effort at this point. I wonder what public opinion would be in 3 years (after a withdrawal, substantial or total, from Iraq) if the President proposed overthrowing the Sudanese government to accomplish Darfur relief? That would approach the scale of Iraq.

The continuing "long war" is also different than Iraq because of its scale in individual locations. We don't hear much about HOA or the PI because our forces are small there. Someone (Max Boot,maybe?) recently wrote something about how keeping our engagements small helped maintain public support simply because the public was basically unaware. Maybe there is something to this.

Tom: I wholeheartedly agree with you. We cannot completely toss COIN out the window or attempt to solve it with kinetic solutions. I firmly believe that the AF can offer alot in a COIN environment in non-kinetic ways. We obviously need more focus on this, but by the same token we (i.e. AF) cannot foresake our own mission of air superiority and that requires money, lots of it. Many of my AF bretheren focus on China as a rationale for ignoring COIN and focusing on kinetic solutions. I however, am not so sure that a war with China wouldn't involve conventional-style tactics and COIN-style tactics. Their "total war" concept, combined with recent military buildup and satellite tests, would seem to support this.

[Rob Thornton]

While not directly COIN, I'd say the AF and Navy are going to be in Iraq and the area around Iraq for sometime after we've assisted them (the Iraqis) in attaining internal security.

Somebody is going to have to provide cover for the Iraqi military as it shifts the bulk of its security efforts from defeating threats from inside its borders, to securing its borders from other aggressors in the region. The USAF and the USN will probably continue to do that job - enforcing no fly zones, etc, while the Iraqis restructure to meet those challenges. This will continue to tie up lots of planes and frames, and will go largely unnoticed by the public - along with the advisors, ground units and others who rotate through.

We won't abandon Iraq to the ambitions of its neighbors after the investment we have made. New administrations will try and minimize it, but it will tax our air forces (much like the enforcement of the "No-Fly Zones" in the interim of Desert Storm and OIF 1), and the OPTEMPO of the other services for a long time to come.

Meanwhile, most here agree that small "limited" wars are on the rise and we are not optimally equipped to respond in a compelling manner if the political objective requires it. Our requirements (both real and predicted) for "mass" (not effects, but people) has exceeded the ability of technology to compensate for a lack thereof. This was not brought about by the publication of the COIN manual; it was brought about by an enemy strategy for protracted war. The COIN manual is doctrine to help us deal with the challenges of this war.

MG Dunlap is correct that is not chance that decisions on land power increases coincided roughly with the publication of the FM. There was a strategic epiphany at about the same time across the board as we began to realize the value of people again. To equate the FM as the catalyst for troop increases is bad logic. There is no smoking gun.

Towards funding, I'd say its not just a question of what we need, but what we need right now. The Army just took a big chunk out of its modernization plans to ensure dominance against the 2015 and 2025 time frames. It did so to fund things right now like MRAP, refitting key platforms, and hopefully investing in people! It (the Army) is understanding that it can't do everything it would like to, and as much as we'd like the quick kill and come home, which does not appear to be our lot in life.