"Non Cents"

[SWJED]

22 May Small Wars Journal Blog - "Non Cents" by Frank Hoffman.

Air Force Major General Charles Dunlap, a respected but frequently provocative author, has critiqued the Army/Marine counterinsurgency manual in a commentary titled “We have a COIN shortage” in the May Naval Institute Proceedings. I would have normally dismissed General Dunlap’s observations as a rare but poor example of discourse, as I have a lot of respect for him personally. But this commentary reflected more than just an inadequate grasp of irregular warfare. Having recently returned from a counterinsurgency symposium at Maxwell Air Force Base, it is clear that a broader misunderstanding exists about the nature of irregular conflict and FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 that needs to be cleared up...

As always, appreciate comments on the blog as well as here - thanks!

Dave

[Sargent]

Great commentary. I loved the "the people live on the ground" line. Made me laugh out loud.

I would say this: USAF, as an institution, is not interested to see airpower operate as a support element. I worked USAF QDR in 2001, and I remember getting the stink-eye when, in a brain-storming session of things we could suggest to them as pieces for their report, I suggested various ways that extant platforms could be used to support the ground element. (Note, I didn't _mean_ to work the air side, it just happened that that was the project I got put on -- distinctly difficult for this ground-centric, airpower as a great supporting element gal.) I remember putting together a slide (from open source materials) that showed the air elements over Afghanistan once OEF kicked off -- it was insane what it took to put together that effort. And all I could think was, gee, look at all those targets. Try it one day, but be prepared for head spinning insanity.

Another thing that bothers me is this notion that we can depopulate the battlespace of our people and fight wars without loss. The enemy won't allow it. If our troops aren't there, then they will just come here to get them -- or the civilians. You can't fight -- let alone win -- a war without putting people at risk. It's the sad reality of war.

[TROUFION]

I was listening to a NPR report yesterday of Airmen training in infantry squad tactics at McQuire AFB NJ. The commentator made an interesting final comment: paraphrased-the pentagon sees 350k airmen as a pool of trained personel in uniform capable of supplementing the ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The commentator had no military background, he was stating what appeared to be an obvious conclusion. I see articles like the one by MGen Dunlap as a direct reaction to this type of thought in the general US (and particularly Congress) population. It is an unfortunate byproduct of the war that the AF is relegated to a supporting role. The USAF is great, they can destroy just about anything anywhere and they want the lead in all things warlike and budgetary. But you can't shake hands and drink chai with a Mayor or Sheik from 30k ft. Maybe you could air deliver a VTC set and a generator, it could even be self deploying and unmanned, if done right it could have an automatic coffee maker and cigarette dispenser until then ya gotta be proud to support the guy on the ground in Small Wars. -T

[Sargent]

I was listening to a NPR report yesterday of Airmen training in infantry squad tactics at McQuire AFB NJ. The commentator made an interesting final comment: paraphrased-the pentagon sees 350k airmen as a pool of trained personel in uniform capable of supplementing the ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The commentator had no military background, he was stating what appeared to be an obvious conclusion. I see articles like the one by MGen Dunlap as a direct reaction to this type of thought in the general US (and particularly Congress) population. It is an unfortunate byproduct of the war that the AF is relegated to a supporting role. The USAF is great, they can destroy just about anything anywhere and they want the lead in all things warlike and budgetary. But you can't shake hands and drink chai with a Mayor or Sheik from 30k ft. Maybe you could air deliver a VTC set and a generator, it could even be self deploying and unmanned, if done right it could have an automatic coffee maker and cigarette dispenser until then ya gotta be proud to support the guy on the ground in Small Wars. -T

I've actually thought that, at least as an interim solution, the Army could "draft" folks who had enlisted in the AF. But I don't mean having USAF folks TAD to the Army, I mean make them soldiers. They signed up, after all, and there is an element of "you'll go where we need you" included in that. They're taking individual augments from the Navy and putting them on the ground in a number of functions.

It's crazy -- back in the summer of 01 they thought they were going to own the world. The opening phase of OEF was a tease, but Tora Bora was the first nail in the coffin. Even "shock and awe" was... not. Another Marine (then LtCol Phillip Ridderhof) wrote this piece, which was quite good.

http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrow...5Usw&user=&pw=

It's been downhill ever since.

[Jimbo]

sergeant,

Uh, NO!!!!! I have plenty of time working with airmen in ground tours, beyond the usual ETAC types, and no way. It is kind of like teaching a first time shooter. It is better to deal with raw material than those who have already developed "bad habits". I have worked with some great airmen and such, but I would rather deal raw recruits from the street than and airman that was mandatorially reclssed into the Army.

[Sargent]

sargent,

Uh, NO!!!!! I have plenty of time working with airmen in ground tours, beyond the usual ETAC types, and no way. It is kind of like teaching a first time shooter. It is better to deal with raw material than those who have already developed "bad habits". I have worked with some great airmen and such, but I would rather deal raw recruits from the street than and airman that was mandatorially reclssed into the Army.

You wouldn't even be able to break them down in recruit training? Alternatively, you could just take every other person who enlists and just divert them. Akin to how the Marine Corps would take "volunteers" out of the Army draftees.

In any case, it's not a long term solution, and it's mostly a comment on the USAF role in OIF. But wouldn't it be better reduce the tension on the Army now with an emergency stop gap rather than continuing to grind it down? Is it better to get recruits via a reduction in the enlistment standards? Where are you going to get a large mass of people fast? A tactical retreat is often difficult to swallow, but sometimes it's the thing you need to do to get some breathing room to regroup and organize for an effective counter-assault. So yes, it's a suboptimal solution, but the Army is in a suboptimal situation.

[Tom Odom]

Well if the good MG feels that the FM is too ground centric and not Dr. Strangelove enough, he would really like my article on civilian casualties in COIN. That he would even surface strikes in Somalia as related to COIN shows where he is coming from.

Best

Tom

[PhilR]

Another Marine (then LtCol Phillip Ridderhof) wrote this piece, which was quite good.

...And I thought nobody read those things. Its still LtCol USMC. Heading to MNF-I Strategy and Plans in a month. I've spent the last 3 years on the III MEF staff in Okinawa and I've been in numerous joint and combined exercises. Airpower is great, but the impression I'm getting is that the Air Force considers it a parallel campaign, not an integral part of the overall campaign. In the Tsunami Relief operation of 2005, the JFACC, which remained firmly emplaced in Hawaii, was sure it was in a better positioned to coordinate the helo sorties from a Navy carrier and the daily C-17 flight into the small airfield in Banda Aceh Indonesia--Of course all of the NGOs and other nations with their many types aircraft were doing the daily coordination in a shack at the airfield--it ended up being best run by a South African Air Force BrigGen "on loan" to the UN who wore shorts and flip-flops. Just another case where personal presence and human interaction mattered more than technical capability.
On Dunlap, he wrote a piece with similar sentiments a few months ago in Armed Forces Journal. The key thought that caught my eye was his assertion that the US shouldn't even involve itself in wars that can't be won by precision fires. As if we have the luxury...

[jcustis]

Bravo Zulu to Frank Hoffman. What is the USAF thinking?

[Steve Blair]

They were reacting in their standard fashion. You see this any time the AF senses a "threat" to its traditional positions or roles.

There are people within the AF who do understand COIN and would like to see the AF make a distinct contribution to the effort. That said, the institution as embodied in its senior leadership tends to respond in a "burn the heretic" manner any time such discussions surface. We see that reaction in Dunlap's piece, as well as some others that have been discussed before. It's a semi-religious response to any discussion, and it does them no favors.

You have to remember that the early foundation of the AF (strategic bombing) was a myth; one that later grew into "airpower can win any war." The danger of dealing with any institution that is founded on a myth is that parts of the organization can easily slide into this sort of response when they sense a "threat" (real or imagined) to their foundation myth. There are some good ideas in the AF, and much that they could and should contribute to COIN efforts. But until they outgrow this myth-centered reaction to discussion I'm afraid that most of their good ideas will die a slow death in the Air University files of student papers.

[J Wolfsberger]

What is the USAF thinking?

In fairness, I think the AF is looking at cuts to their procurement programs and thinking "How the hell can we do our job if they won't buy us the tools?"

The problem, for the AF, is that COIN IS "protracted, costly, manpower intensive, and inherently a 'traditional land component solution.' " However much they may hate it, their role will be recon, surveillance, and the occasional strike when the insurgents are obliging enough to concentrate in meaningfull numbers. Unless and until they can develop a precision munition that takes out the insurgent when he's surrounded by women and children, and NOT mess up the civilians hair or disturb their sleep, the AF will be in a support role.

I also hate to have to add this, but we have a similar problem on the ground side of things: the large number of people who persistantly fail to distinguish between MOUT and COIN. But that's for another time and thread...

[Sargent]

...And I thought nobody read those things. Its still LtCol USMC. Heading to MNF-I Strategy and Plans in a month. I've spent the last 3 years on the III MEF staff in Okinawa and I've been in numerous joint and combined exercises. Airpower is great, but the impression I'm getting is that the Air Force considers it a parallel campaign, not an integral part of the overall campaign. In the Tsunami Relief operation of 2005, the JFACC, which remained firmly emplaced in Hawaii, was sure it was in a better positioned to coordinate the helo sorties from a Navy carrier and the daily C-17 flight into the small airfield in Banda Aceh Indonesia--Of course all of the NGOs and other nations with their many types aircraft were doing the daily coordination in a shack at the airfield--it ended up being best run by a South African Air Force BrigGen "on loan" to the UN who wore shorts and flip-flops. Just another case where personal presence and human interaction mattered more than technical capability.
On Dunlap, he wrote a piece with similar sentiments a few months ago in Armed Forces Journal. The key thought that caught my eye was his assertion that the US shouldn't even involve itself in wars that can't be won by precision fires. As if we have the luxury...

Perhaps I'm biased, as an H-Warrior myself, but of course your message was widely read! The piece stuck out in my mind, as it came right back to me when I read the initial article in this thread. Of course, I take a certain perverse pleasure in works that knock at the big airpower myths, so they're easily remembered.

Our paths keep crossing ... I believe that it was with you that I exchanged phone calls back in 01 or 02 while you were at HQMC, about a new-style regimental team the Marine Corps was considering putting together (I think, but it's hard to remember those days as a consultant -- I think too much powerpoint causes the brain to freeze up), and exchanged some emails over Centers of Gravity (H-War) and the CAP. (I only know that because I am mildly obsessive compulsive about keeping emails and happened to notice them in my contacts folder while I was trying to find the Shock not Awe message.)

By the way, you must have passed my husband on his way out of Okinawa -- he left in June of 04. He's made it back to the Fleet -- amazingly, he will spend the majority of his time as a Major in the Fleet -- and is CO of a MiTT in OIF. A vast change from normal O-4 experience.

Anyway, good to run into you again.

Jill R.