"Non Cents"

[marct]

Hi Steve,

I really couldn't let this one pass .

There are people within the AF who do understand COIN and would like to see the AF make a distinct contribution to the effort. That said, the institution as embodied in its senior leadership tends to respond in a "burn the heretic" manner any time such discussions surface. We see that reaction in Dunlap's piece, as well as some others that have been discussed before. It's a semi-religious response to any discussion, and it does them no favors.

Yup. Sounds like some Anthropologists I could name .

You have to remember that the early foundation of the AF (strategic bombing) was a myth; one that later grew into "airpower can win any war." The danger of dealing with any institution that is founded on a myth is that parts of the organization can easily slide into this sort of response when they sense a "threat" (real or imagined) to their foundation myth. There are some good ideas in the AF, and much that they could and should contribute to COIN efforts. But until they outgrow this myth-centered reaction to discussion I'm afraid that most of their good ideas will die a slow death in the Air University files of student papers.

Okay, I really do have to make an observation here - all institutions are founded on myths. The real trick is to "tweak" or "re-interpret" the foundation myth to meet current operational needs. For an historical example, think about the Battleship debate in the navy vs carriers (or COIN vs "real combat" in the Army). In many ways, it's too bad that the USAF doesn't have the "Knights of the Air" myth as strongly as other air forces which fought more heavily in WW I (Top Gun aside). That would let them use a cavalry anology rather that the elephant-esque analogies that seem to dominate the Strategic Bombing myth (i.e. we can stomp anything).

Marc

[Jimbo]

Sergeant,

Once again I stick with no!!!. I have dealt with the AF at the tactical and operational levels. NO, NO, NO. We can talk about AF Security Police serving as MiTT's to Iraqi Base Defense Units (Base defense is a core competency fro AFSP's, good fit in theory nightmare execution complete with phrases like Title 10 USC states). The Army accepts volunteers from the AF and Navy these days, and have nothing wrong with volunteers, but to pull from them (which implies involuntary) no the cultures between the two are too different.

[Steve Blair]

Okay, I really do have to make an observation here - all institutions are founded on myths. The real trick is to "tweak" or "re-interpret" the foundation myth to meet current operational needs. For an historical example, think about the Battleship debate in the navy vs carriers (or COIN vs "real combat" in the Army). In many ways, it's too bad that the USAF doesn't have the "Knights of the Air" myth as strongly as other air forces which fought more heavily in WW I (Top Gun aside). That would let them use a cavalry anology rather that the elephant-esque analogies that seem to dominate the Strategic Bombing myth (i.e. we can stomp anything).

Marc

I understand that all institutions are founded on myth, but in the case of the AF they appear all too often to allow those myths to clog their perception of what's really going on. I tend to compare them to the Army during Vietnam in that sense (the Army as an institution, not individual segments that adapted well).

Another factor with the AF is the legacy of both the breakaway from the Army and the dominance of Curtis LeMay and SAC for many years within their own organizational structure. This left them wedded (at least in terms of presentation) to high tech and certain mantras (if you will). I'm not sure why they have proven so unable to tweak their own myths (as the navy managed to do with steam power, the carrier, and so on), unless it's part of their short history as an organization and limited leadership "generations" that they can draw from, but it's really going to end up doing them more harm than good in the long run.

The call for joint doctrine isn't surprising, either, considering that there are segments within the AF who are convinced that they are the only service that "gets" joint warfare. It will be interesting to see what community ends up dominating their leadership corps once the current fighter generals disappear. That might be what it takes to break their public rhetoric in COIN.

And as an aside to Jimbo's post, I would fall into the NO category here as well. People join the services for different reasons, and each attracts a certain personality type in many cases. Just as some of the folks who join the Army would go nuts in the AF, there are some who join the AF that aren't suited for other work. We have some here who are on the officer track that I wouldn't trust with an M-16 if my life depended on it. And that's not what they join for. So it would be a bad fit all around.

[marct]

Hi Steve,

I understand that all institutions are founded on myth, but in the case of the AF they appear all too often to allow those myths to clog their perception of what's really going on. I tend to compare them to the Army during Vietnam in that sense (the Army as an institution, not individual segments that adapted well).

I think that's a good analogy. What I was trying to get at, in my ham fisted way, was that at some points in time, all institutions founding myths get them in trouble with reality.

Another factor with the AF is the legacy of both the breakaway from the Army and the dominance of Curtis LeMay and SAC for many years within their own organizational structure. This left them wedded (at least in terms of presentation) to high tech and certain mantras (if you will). I'm not sure why they have proven so unable to tweak their own myths (as the navy managed to do with steam power, the carrier, and so on), unless it's part of their short history as an organization and limited leadership "generations" that they can draw from, but it's really going to end up doing them more harm than good in the long run.

Honestly, it may be a result of too few generations. I'd also forgotten that your AF started out as, what was it called, the Army Air Corps? I've noticed the tech mantra as well, which was certainly appropriate during the LeMay Imperium but, I have serious duobts about it's current validity.

On that note, I just finished MG Dunlap's Comment and I feel I have to point out something that he slipped in

and by "airpower" I mean air, space, and cyberspace

Since when is cyberspace part of the USAF Imperium? As we about to see a raft of articles on "The usage of Strategic Bombing (DDOS) in Cyberspace" and new Hollywood / USAF productions such as "Top Mouse"?

The internalization of a Technology mantra should not, to my mind, include an automatic assumption that one technology equals another and that, therefore, cyberspace is part of the USAFs balliwick.

The call for joint doctrine isn't surprising, either, considering that there are segments within the AF who are convinced that they are the only service that "gets" joint warfare. It will be interesting to see what community ends up dominating their leadership corps once the current fighter generals disappear. That might be what it takes to break their public rhetoric in COIN.

I agree.

And as an aside to Jimbo's post, I would fall into the NO category here as well. People join the services for different reasons, and each attracts a certain personality type in many cases. Just as some of the folks who join the Army would go nuts in the AF, there are some who join the AF that aren't suited for other work. We have some here who are on the officer track that I wouldn't trust with an M-16 if my life depended on it. And that's not what they join for. So it would be a bad fit all around.

Me too - one of my brother-in-laws is a 22 year USAF veteran and I would not want to see him running around with an M16 (beer bottles at the Oak island beach are bad enough!).

Marc

[Steve Blair]

Since when is cyberspace part of the USAF Imperium? As we about to see a raft of articles on "The usage of Strategic Bombing (DDOS) in Cyberspace" and new Hollywood / USAF productions such as "Top Mouse"?

The internalization of a Technology mantra should not, to my mind, include an automatic assumption that one technology equals another and that, therefore, cyberspace is part of the USAFs balliwick.
Marc

They latched onto this a few years ago, though I don't think anyone else has really conceded that it's USAF property.

[marct]

They latched onto this a few years ago, though I don't think anyone else has really conceded that it's USAF property.

Maybe they just aren't running their recruitment campaigns well enough. Hmmm, they could always "nationalize" Geek Squad .

On a more serious note, have they actually done anything in this area directly related to the current conflicts, or are they just saying "come to me my precious...."?

Marc

[Steve Blair]

Maybe they just aren't running their recruitment campaigns well enough. Hmmm, they could always "nationalize" Geek Squad .

On a more serious note, have they actually done anything in this area directly related to the current conflicts, or are they just saying "come to me my precious...."?

Marc

Aside from jacking up their own internal networks in the name of security, I don't think they've done much. Of course, I'm not an IM-type or anything close to that, but from what I've heard and seen their efforts are more related to security (albeit their own version of same) and not really IO or any sort of active cyber-operations.

My vantage point is pretty narrow, though. There may be others who've seen more and have opinions informed by more experience.

[LawVol]

I appreciate the attempts at locating a copy of the Dunlap article. I'm pursuing other avenues as well.

I agree with Gen Dunlap on one point I took from his rebuttal. I do not think we'll be in any extended COIN campaigns in the near future although I am unwilling to put a time frame on it like he did. We can't even keep 125k (give or take) on the ground for four years without an uproar. Do you really think Congress and the American public would go for a 12 year campaign like Iraq? I would imagine we'd take casualties exceeding 10k over that period of time. Maybe some of you with more experience can extrapolate a better casualty number based on past COIN episodes (although given technology I'd assume we'd be higher now).

Another point I see some AF trying to make (and one in which I agree) is the danger in focusing too much on COIN. If we cast aside our big war, technological advantage in favor of what wins in COIN are we dooming ourselves to fighting the last war again in the future? I'm all for doing what it takes to win this one and have written on how airpower can help, however, we need to be aware of, and be ready for, all potential threats not just the ones we want to face. I don't propse to speak for Gen Dunlap (although I have spoken with him), but maybe that's a point he's trying to make.

Here's how Gen Moseley put it: http://aimpoints.hq.af.mil/display.cfm?id=18841

Oh, and one last point in reference to USAF Insurgent's post. To argue that an AF guy can't offer a critique of FM 3-24 because AF leadership chose not to perticipate is disingenuous. First, they didn't ask me to participate. Second, of those they did ask to participate, how was this presented? Was it truly full participation or we they simply checking a box? I don't know.

[wm]

Since when is cyberspace part of the USAF Imperium? As we about to see a raft of articles on "The usage of Strategic Bombing (DDOS) in Cyberspace" and new Hollywood / USAF productions such as "Top Mouse"?

Within the last year or so, USAF redfefined its mission to include the cyberspacw piece you reacted to. I'm not sure it is statutory or reflrcted in any JCS/DoD literature however.

A somewhat different take related to the same subject--A mission for USAF assets:
The USAF used to have this wonderful IO weapons system named Compass Call. It would make a wonderful platform and could turn the tables with a "voice from on high" proclaiming the "safety and security" that would then be guaranteed by the friendly ground forces in the Compass Call's mission orbit/footprint--sort of a hi-tech version of leaflet dropping. If the Air force wants cyberspace warfare, then let them execute the cyberspace piece of the IO campaign

[John T. Fishel]

WM, as an old Psyoper I thought that you were referring to Commando Solo rather than Compass Call. I Googled and found 3 versions of the EC-130 platform.
1. The EC-130 ABCCC
2. The EC-130 Compass Call for electronic countermeasures against enemy C2
3. The EC-130 Commando Solo, airborne radio and TV station that can deliver its PSYOP message from on high.

It is a great AF COIN mission but its low density - one unit - and location - the Pennsylvania Air National Guard - as part of the Air Force Special Operations Command gives an idea of USAF priorities. Even more than the Army, the USAF doesn't see PSYOP, let alone the rest of AFSOC, as part of the real Air Force

Cheers

John

[John T. Fishel]

I was particularly struck by Frank Hoffmann's statement on the dearth of COIN doctrine in his blog piece. "It
fills a 25 to 30 year void in our doctrinal library thanks to the Vietnam Syndrome and the Pentagon’s insistence on only preparing for wars we would like to fight instead of those our enemies are prepared to wage."

This is simply incorrect. The Army published FM 100-20 Low Intensity Conflict which focused primarily on COIN in 1981. In 1990 it published a revised and better version of FM 100-20 (with the USAF under General Larry Welch who had created with his Army counterpart the Army/Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict) called Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict which retained the cOIN emphasis. In the interest of full disclosure, I worked on that document from the USSOUTHCOM Small Wars Operations Research Directorate (SWORD) which, along with the CLIC had significant input to the document drafted at Leavenworth by the cell headed by LTC Jerry Thompson.
This version of COIN doctrine was incorporated into both FM 100-5 Operations of 1993 and Joint Pub 3-07 Military Operations Other Than War.
There was nothing wrong with our COIN doctrine except that few military people read it. Certainly, even fewer civilians read the doctrine.

What makes FM 3-24 important is that it is being read and discussed both within and outside the military.

[Tom Odom]

I was particularly struck by Frank Hoffmann's statement on the dearth of COIN doctrine in his blog piece. "It
fills a 25 to 30 year void in our doctrinal library thanks to the Vietnam Syndrome and the Pentagon’s insistence on only preparing for wars we would like to fight instead of those our enemies are prepared to wage."

This is simply incorrect. The Army published FM 100-20 Low Intensity Conflict which focused primarily on COIN in 1981. In 1990 it published a revised and better version of FM 100-20 (with the USAF under General Larry Welch who had created with his Army counterpart the Army/Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict) called Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict which retained the cOIN emphasis. In the interest of full disclosure, I worked on that document from the USSOUTHCOM Small Wars Operations Research Directorate (SWORD) which, along with the CLIC had significant input to the document drafted at Leavenworth by the cell headed by LTC Jerry Thompson.
This version of COIN doctrine was incorporated into both FM 100-5 Operations of 1993 and Joint Pub 3-07 Military Operations Other Than War.
There was nothing wrong with our COIN doctrine except that few military people read it. Certainly, even fewer civilians read the doctrine.

What makes FM 3-24 important is that it is being read and discussed both within and outside the military.

I agree Frank overstates that point in his post. I remember Jerry Thompson at Leavenworth and the work he did, I would say what makes this latest effort in COIN doctrine so remarkable was its high profile both inside the military and in the general media--almost like we went up the mountain and a burning bush said "write this down if you want to win in Iraq."

The problem as you state it remains--see John Nagl's comment last week on getting commercial prints of the FM. And I am already hearing very familiar phrases such as "this COIN stuff" hurts our real mission--just as we have heard so many times before. That is where MG Dunlap's rebuttal is ludicrous at best; he infers that the COIN manual was a marketing effort to get the size of the Army and Marine Corps increased. Hardly and in all probability 180 degrees off azimuth because them that want "this COIN stuff" to go away, want a bigger force, and one tied to FCS (and "real Army" stuff).

Best

Tom

[wm]

WM, as an old Psyoper I thought that you were referring to Commando Solo rather than Compass Call. I Googled and found 3 versions of the EC-130 platform.
1. The EC-130 ABCCC
2. The EC-130 Compass Call for electronic countermeasures against enemy C2
3. The EC-130 Commando Solo, airborne radio and TV station that can deliver its PSYOP message from on high.

It is a great AF COIN mission but its low density - one unit - and location - the Pennsylvania Air National Guard - as part of the Air Force Special Operations Command gives an idea of USAF priorities. Even more than the Army, the USAF doesn't see PSYOP, let alone the rest of AFSOC, as part of the real Air Force

Cheers



John

John,
Thanks for refreshing my failing memory. As an old EW guy, I knew the Compass Call variant and knew it also came in a Psyop version, but I could not remember the name of the Psyop variant. I was thinking that a well-run Commando Solo effort might provide an interesting counterpoint to Al-Jazeera, et. al.
I know what you mean about prioritizing mission capabilities. I think the "new" Air Force mission statement was largely an attempt to justify efforts to snap up more dollars in the POM process--insert snappy buzzwords to be able to ask for more money for systems that support precision strategic strike targeting / C2, not for systems that support a full spectrum joint warfighting capability.

[Ironhorse]

Commando Solo, great piece of gear that it is, is at the end of the day a delivery platform for a message. You still need to have the message to deliver. Tightly integrated with the whole operation. So maybe it's one aerial platform, but it is not an aerial op.

John,
Thanks for refreshing my failing memory. As an old EW guy, I knew the Compass Call variant and knew it also came in a Psyop version, but I could not remember the name of the Psyop variant. I was thinking that a well-run Commando Solo effort might provide an interesting counterpoint to Al-Jazeera, et. al.

[Rob Thornton]

Does his (MG Dunlap's) view show service culture or service parochialism? I think picking up something Marc's comment hit on is worthwhile:

The real trick is to "tweak" or "re-interpret" the foundation myth to meet current operational needs. For an historical example, think about the Battleship debate in the navy vs. carriers (or COIN vs. "real combat" in the Army).

Why is the AF not looking at their changing role and making bold adjustments, one could argue that the other services are also having a tough time, but necessity being the mother of re-invention..... Are we (in my case the Army) doing enough re-evaluation of the role of land power and making changes fast enough to provide advantages? If not, why? Is rapid change always possible; if so is it always wise?

I think MG Dunlap's comments are just the latest (amplified) version of public cultural bias we see in some leaders (military and political - active or retired). We all have it - sometimes its a good thing (since I believe it grows out of experience as much as environment).

What could be bad though would be a senior leader who is unaware of the impacts of his bias, or worse does not care. It takes us back to LTC Yingling's article and the focus of our leadership - what matters to them most? Is it solutions or distractions?

It may not be sexy to discuss the lift requirements or the number of sorties flown in support as much as kinetic targeting, but its certainly relevant. The USAF plays a large role in our ability to conduct COIN in a given location for a protracted period of time. In addition to actively flying men and materials (how'd all that stuff get over there anyway?), bombing (includes the AC 130 kinetics), shows of force, reconnaissance, they (and the navy) also provide deterrence in the region, and keep open the LOCs for projected forces. Their is some significant overhead associated with those missions. Its also worth mentioning their growing contribution to specialty jobs on the ground - lots of BOS guys out there from other services - filling OGA and backfilling DA jobs.

If part of our current strategy is one of employing limited means in limited wars to a political end, then certainly the USAF plays a vital role in that, two important questions are: do they understand it, and are they willing to accept it?