"Non Cents"

[Steve Blair]

The MS-standardized desktop was pushed out last year if memory serves, and applies mostly to things like web browsers and anything that might be remotely open source. Since most of the AF computers we see here are made by HP (except for some ThinkPad laptops) they come loaded with all the junk HP normally puts on their machines (Roxio, AoL links, etc.). Luckily I get to use a University-issued Dell and can run pretty much whatever software I like (which means OpenOffice, Firefox, etc.).

[John T. Fishel]

Marc, forgive an old guy who hasn't progressed much beyond late 20th Century technology I readily concede that there is a whole raft of new media that could be delivered by Commando Solo or from a much greater distance by other means. I would also argue that small wars thinking - as most of us would - goes way beyond info war. As in all war, we still have to put steel on target at the same time as we win hearts and minds and disrupt C4I++++.

Some of this obviously means thinking outside the proverbial box (although we better not forget what is inside the box in our newfound enthusiasm). Two of the most innovative strategic thinkers whose work is emminently adaptable to small wars are Air Force - Boyd with his OODA Loop and John Warden with his "inside out warfare" and 5 strategic rings. One can, of course, use these ideas in a purely conventional sense or apply them to small wars in innovative ways - as, indeed, one can with Clausewitz.

Although this story comes from Desert Storm, I think it is applicable to this discussion. My good friend, the late AF Col., Ben Harvey worked for Warden in Checkmate. Ben told me that in planning for the air campaign, they had come up with a bombing approach to taking down the Baghdad power grid that would be only temporary and it could have been restored in a very short time. Had it been employed (it obviously was rejected) a significant amount of civilian hardship could have been avoided. The short term psychological impact would have been enormous but think of the possible long term effects given the current civil war and insurgency in Iraq.

[LawVol]

I just read Dunlap's article ("We Have a Serious COIN Shortage") and I believe Hoffman's critique is off base. Hoffman centers his objections to the article on the future use of FM 3-24 and concedes Dunlap's point regarding its utility in Iraq. However, Dunlap specifically states that the manual "will surely prove invaluable in many future situations." Thus, his point concerns the application of the manual to Iraq, not the future.

The point of Dunlap's article is that the doctrine set forth in the manual will not work in Iraq given the present situation, both there and at home. He argues that we do not currently have the type of COIN skills needed in our military (e.g. experience building civil institutions and commercial enterprises) and are not likely to get them any time soon. He does use this point to take a swipe at the Army's recent lowering of recruitment standards, but I've seen plenty Army-types take this stance as well.

He further argues that the minset of Iraq does not allow for a successful hearts and minds campaign since "the mindset of entire generations of Iraqis is already poisoned by, among other things, Abu Ghraib and related scandals, not to mention Islamic extremism's innate antagonism to people and ideas from the West." He then cites a poll indicating that 61 percent of Iraqis approve of attacks on US troops.

While the length of his piece does not permit details (something he says is to be addressed shortly), he argues that we need innovation that "calls for devising techniques that avoid exposing thousands of young Americans to the hazards of combat." How could anyone oppose this idea? He also calls for "out-of-the-box solutions beyond merely adding troops."

So contrary to popular belief, the article is not merely a sales pitch to Capitol Hill, but a call for dialogue on today's war. I would think that Hoffman and other COIN advocates would welcome this dialogue. After all, no one has a monopoly on solutions to Iraq. Just five years ago, the Army essentially ignored COIN and looked to the big war, now it is a COIN expert?? The AF is routinely lambasted for what some perceive as an attempt to exert complete control of a function of war (the UAV argument comes to mind), but Hoffman's piece is more of the same. Many are predisposed to think that the AF will automatically seek a kinetic solution to the problem (as Hoffman does), but that is not what Dunlap said.

It's a long and costly process fighting these things. If we can truly find a way to avoid COIN situations, why wouldn't we do so? Or is this attempt to suppress an AF contribution to the dialogue simply more parochialism?

[Steve Blair]

Hopefully Dunlap will take up the SWJ offer to publish at least part of his thoughts on the subject (at least it sure looked like an offer on the blog comments). I'm very curious to see what he's come up with. I must admit to some skepticism, though. And I wouldn't consider being skeptical an attempt to suppress AF dialog. What I do want to see is what exactly this approach is based on, not word counts or bullet point titles. I'd expect the same thing from anyone who says he has a solution or possible technique for COIN.

I wouldn't consider the Army in general a COIN expert. There are some within it who undoubtedly are, but as an institution they are not. They are, however, attempting to make strides in that direction. I'm very familiar with the Army's performance in Vietnam (the good and the bad), as well as its change of focus immediately after 1971. They do not appear to be repeating that trend now, although it is too early to tell for sure.

I should also point out that I believe that the only way the US can avoid a COIN situation is to almost totally disengage from the developing world. We have become such a whipping boy for the majority of the world's ills (real and perceived) that anytime we become involved we risk being painted as a "greedy imperialist power," no matter the reality of the situation. Half-assing COIN is, as we've seen historically, almost always a disaster. So I'll be very curious to see what Dunlap has in mind.

[marct]

Hi John,

Marc, forgive an old guy who hasn't progressed much beyond late 20th Century technology I readily concede that there is a whole raft of new media that could be delivered by Commando Solo or from a much greater distance by other means. I would also argue that small wars thinking - as most of us would - goes way beyond info war. As in all war, we still have to put steel on target at the same time as we win hearts and minds and disrupt C4I++++.

<visual of a 17th century court bow made> Of course! Especially if you will forgive me for constantly using an internal cavalry analogy for AF tactics - it's a habit I picked up from a couple of my great uncle's WW I fighter pilot buddies when I was a kid .

A lot of my sense of, hmm, what's the right word - "frustration"? incredulity? about halfway between I think - stems from the reliance on using technology (very broadly construed to include things like cavalry vs. machine guns) that is outdated. Just as an example, why load a radio station on a plane when it could be miniaturized (or bought via Circuit City) and sent in on the ground for a fraction of the cost? I'll grant you that TV transmitters would be more expensive, but they could still be mobile and cheaper than on a large air platform. I keep thinking about the old Sheridan tank - it wasn't the best by any stretch of the imagination, but it worked well enough and there were a lot of them. If here is only a handful of Command Silo platforms, then I'll let the fate of the King Tiger make my point...

In a lot of ways, my thinking about cyberwarfare has been influenced by discussions with Rob Thornton and the way he has thought out its place in his latest SWJ article. If we can achieve a better effect by using cell phones, laptops and blackberries, let's use them.

On putting the steel on target, Absolutely! I think that the AF has some really good roles to play in that as they have already done.

Some of this obviously means thinking outside the proverbial box (although we better not forget what is inside the box in our newfound enthusiasm).

A really good point, John. And, I have say that I agree with a number of the comments about the USAF needing new equipment - just because we are currently involved in COIN operations doesn't mean that we won't be involved in other, non-COIN ones in the future (this, BTW, is one of my pet peeves about the RCAF - our equipment is so outdated that we are lossing pilots to metal fatigue).

Although this story comes from Desert Storm, I think it is applicable to this discussion. My good friend, the late AF Col., Ben Harvey worked for Warden in Checkmate. Ben told me that in planning for the air campaign, they had come up with a bombing approach to taking down the Baghdad power grid that would be only temporary and it could have been restored in a very short time. Had it been employed (it obviously was rejected) a significant amount of civilian hardship could have been avoided. The short term psychological impact would have been enormous but think of the possible long term effects given the current civil war and insurgency in Iraq.

Which is really too bad - that is the type of application thinking that would have been really great at the start of OIF - I wish it had been implemented.

Marc

[J Wolfsberger]

SERVICES AGREE TO WRITE JOINT DOCTRINE FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY OPS


http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/...NTAGON-23-21-1

[Steve Blair]

SERVICES AGREE TO WRITE JOINT DOCTRINE FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY OPS


http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/...NTAGON-23-21-1

The link is password/subscription protected...just so folks know.

Here's the clip from their frontpage:

Six months after the Army and Marine Corps published a manual for ground troops on how to conduct counterinsurgency operations -- and following four years of battling insurgents, militias and sectarian killers in Iraq -- all four U.S. military services agreed this week to publish their first joint doctrine for this challenging but indispensable brand of irregular warfare. The Army will lead the pan-service effort, according to military officials.

Front page with article link

[marct]

SERVICES AGREE TO WRITE JOINT DOCTRINE FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY OPS


http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/...NTAGON-23-21-1

Too bad I can't get in .

Marc

[Rob Thornton]

Hey LawVol,

"calls for devising techniques that avoid exposing thousands of young Americans to the hazards of combat." How could anyone oppose this idea?

I think the danger here is that of people (be they the public, the policy makers, or the administration) buying into the fallacy that technology solves all, and that wars can somehow be reduced to the application of technology. Fundamentally, wars are bloody affairs, or as Sherman put it, "they are cruel."

While perhaps future Americans might be spared the horrors of combat, many non-American civilians would not. From the ground - I can assure you bombs (even PGM/LGB types) do not always hit where they are promised. Technology will always have some PE - but where you are talking "bombs" or 'missiles" you raise the stakes of the consequences. Unless you are willing to take on a separate and equally detrimental set of unintended consequences for the application of using air power to solve every problem in war and conflict, and unless you are willing to kill enough people (I believe many will be innocents) indiscriminately to get your message across, then I'd say you have to inject people/soldiers on the ground.

Since I'm a knuckle draggin "bog -togz" as was mentioned in MG Dunlap's AFJ article, I profess an inclination to live on the ground - the only wings I have are from falling out of an airplane. However I believe the capacity or the use of Air Power is far from realized in COIN, but its greatest unrealized potential in COIN lies outside the 500lb-200lb range. I also think MG's article was not aimed at engaging sister services about COIN, its generally accepted that calling somebody names gets you off on the wrong foot. I think his article was partly aimed at impassioning his on service of the rightness of a parochial view that a hammer is always the tool of choice, and partly aimed at politician purse string holders. I would no more listen to an Army or Marine GO who said they had all the answers, and resorted to calling the others names, war is serious business and not one for playground antics.

I think that if we are going to use war to achieve political ends, then we must be cognizant of the need to win the peace that follows. Sometimes unrestrained use of airpower has been, and probably will be required (certainly in a conventional, force on force) - we certainly have the best outfit to do that. An insurgency though is about people, and involves one(or more) group(s) of insurgents trying to coerce a government and its public to adapt their views or solutions through the use of force - since the insurgent srtategy ivolves the pubic, its likely that the two will be inter-mingled - the insurgent must be with the people to convince them as they few resources. This makes it very confusing and often difficult to kill the right people, the further away you are from the context of the situation the harder it is to get it right.

This is not about servicing targets - even at the tactical level. MG Dunlap points to the killing of Zarquawi as the highpoint of success in an otherwise dismal performance. While I like killing bad guys who kill Americans, it only gets you so far. did we disrupt AQIZ operations, maybe some - but how do you qualify it? To me MG Dunlap's statement shows he does not understand how COIN is different, you can't just finish your problems by killing a leader. AQ and other organizations thoroughly understand the military culture predominant in the US armed forces- the desire and the amount of effort we will expend to kill one person to "show" results knows few bounds. Consequently they have decentralized, and developed a regenerative capability. COIN is about changing the environment in which the insurgent or terrorist lives in - call it ideology if you like, call it "basic human needs", or call it something else. Since killing insurgent leaders has limited utility, you have to change the rules to make the real long term difference. COIN is about changing the rules of the environment, not destroying critical pieces of it.

As hard as it is to swallow it, people are required to do that. I'm not asking MG Dunlap to put on ACUs or run a patrol, the USAF has plenty of great things to do that only they can do. I would like their help in a constructive dialogue in how to employ their service's assets in a manner that both help us win the war and the peace.
Regards, Rob

[wm]

I think the danger here is that of people (be they the public, the policy makers, or the administration) buying into the fallacy that technology solves all, and that wars can somehow be reduced to the application of technology. Fundamentally, wars are bloody affairs, or as Sherman put it, "they are cruel."

While perhaps future Americans might be spared the horrors of combat, many non-American civilians would not. From the ground - I can assure you bombs (even PGM/LGB types) do not always hit where they are promised. Technology will always have some PE - but where you are talking "bombs" or 'missiles" you raise the stakes of the consequences. Unless you are willing to take on a separate and equally detrimental set of unintended consequences for the application of using air power to solve every problem in war and conflict, and unless you are willing to kill enough people (I believe many will be innocents) indiscriminately to get your message across, then I'd say you have to inject people/soldiers on the ground.
. . .
[Y]ou can't just finish your problems by killing a leader. . . . COIN is about changing the environment in which the insurgent or terrorist lives in - call it ideology if you like, call it "basic human needs", or call it something else. Since killing insurgent leaders has limited utility, you have to change the rules to make the real long term difference. COIN is about changing the rules of the environment, not destroying critical pieces of it.

As hard as it is to swallow it, people are required to do that.

Well stated. I would only add that you can "kill" a leader without ever firing a shot. Leaders need people to lead. A good COIN op would induce those folks who are the current or potential followers of the insurgent leader to give up their allegiance to that leader. I doubt that misplaced air-delivered ordnance, or badly aimed ground fire for that matter, does much to convince the victims of it to change their opinions about whom they will follow.

[LawVol]

Rob: Please do not take this as flippant, but I'm not sure we read the same article. My read of the 'COIN Shortage' article indicates an openess on the part of Dunlap to explore all techniques and solutions, not just bombs on target. As you would expect, he alludes to the use of airpower (I think we'd expect anyone to go to their experience first) but I don't think he's limiting it to its kinetic effect.

but where you are talking "bombs" or 'missiles" you raise the stakes of the consequences.

Your argument appears to be based on the assumption that airpower generates more collateral damages than ground forces. This is an assumption I'm not willing to concede until I see concrete evidence. Sure, airpower will kill those it does not intend to, but so too does ground power. We see this nearly nightly on the evening news. Images of Haditha, hamnadiyah (sp?) and other places get extended coverage. Airpower's collateral damages gets mentioned but rarely to the extent that ground power's does. Perhaps it has something to do with the personal level with which ground power is applied, I don' know. Additionally, Abu Ghraib cannot happen with airpower. So the collateral damage argument is, at best, a wash.

but its greatest unrealized potential in COIN lies outside the 500lb-200lb range. I also think MG's article was not aimed at engaging sister services about COIN, its generally accepted that calling somebody names gets you off on the wrong foot. I think his article was partly aimed at impassioning his on service of the rightness of a parochial view that a hammer is always the tool of choice

I agree that airpower is used more effectively in COIN in non-lethal ways. And just because a number of AF people default to the kinetic use of airpower doesn't mean you or I have to as well. Someone mentioned Darfur earlier and I think this is a great example. With limited ground-troops (perhaps our own security forces), the AF could use its airlift and BEAR base capabilities (creates a base from nothing) to help alleviate that situation. Add in some medical teams and you're a long way toward making a real impact. However, in Iraq, as Dunlap argues, we are beyond that point. He argues that we can't win their hearts and minds.

My take-a-way from his article (and he can correct me if he reads this) is not that the new COIN manual is an exercise in futility when it comes to future operations, but that is unworkable in the current situation. He may have somethng there. Of course, I think he is also exploring the idea of avoiding insurgencies when possible. This is somehting I'm contemplating as well. For example, suppose we intervene in Darfur. Does it necessarily have to be a large-scale, ten-year operation? Or can we do something to avoid that situation? Or look at Iran, do you really think the American public is going to let us do an OIF I redux in Iran? I don't think so, so we have to come up with something else and, yes, it will involve airpower.

Our discussions tend to presuppose a COIN-type conflict, but it doesn't have to be that way. Just as we look at international relations and agree that military force is typically a tool of last resort, shouldn't we also look at entering a COIN environment as a last resort since it is, as you say and I agree, "cruel?"

[Tom Odom]

My take-a-way from his article (and he can correct me if he reads this) is not that the new COIN manual is an exercise in futility when it comes to future operations, but that is unworkable in the current situation. He may have somethng there. Of course, I think he is also exploring the idea of avoiding insurgencies when possible. This is somehting I'm contemplating as well. For example, suppose we intervene in Darfur. Does it necessarily have to be a large-scale, ten-year operation? Or can we do something to avoid that situation? Or look at Iran, do you really think the American public is going to let us do an OIF I redux in Iran? I don't think so, so we have to come up with something else and, yes, it will involve airpower.

Counter insurgency as defined by avoiding insurgency? Come on, mate. The general's title was COIN shortage, targeted on what he calls a shortage of COIN doctrine.

As for the collateral damage being a wash, again come on. If you mean a J-DAM versus a 155mm round, maybe so. If you mean collateral damage in a COIN operation like a sweep or search where ROE controls fire there is no "wash" because there simply is no comparison. All of that aside, as we use airpower in COIN it is controlled from the ground by boots on the ground.

That means ultimately the responsibilty for the casualties are the guys on the ground. That makes the reference to Abu Gharaib and airpower was specious at best.

Tom

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Law Vol,
No, your not being flippant, some of it is how I read it, read the other articles that MG Dunlap had authored, then re-read it. But, perspective does influence what you take away.

As for Bombs - well, I'd say ground fires certainly figure in - particularly large caliber stuff - MLRS, tube artillery, mortars, even 40mm MK-19s. The SDZ for a .50 cal is 6500 meters and over penetration is a concern. Now, like airpower, there is a difference between indiscriminant use and use of the required force. Nobody wants to tie the hand of the war fighter.

My point is that "unconstrained" application of big stuff equates to more damage so people on the ground are in the best position to weigh the consequence of the increase in force - how much scrutiny is a pilot going to be able to apply once he's wings level and cleared hot? These days our use of airpower in the cities in Iraq is pretty judicious, as is the use of artillery - but if the situation requires it, thankfully its there. So our only option for use of force was to back up and let the ETACs (or FSO) bring in the hammer, I think you'd see allot more collateral damage.

Or look at Iran, do you really think the American public is going to let us do an OIF I redux in Iran? I don't think so, so we have to come up with something else and, yes, it will involve airpower.

This one here is interesting - how soon do you think before our passions override historical sense of things. Why is it we are just now writing a COIN manual - shouldn't we have had standing doctrine after 1975? The problem with us is we seldom convince ourselves we will get sucked into a similar predicament as before - everybody hoped that when the president stood on the deck, that'd it be done. It was the proponents of shock and awe and some wishful thinking that led us on more then a 3 hour tour. Will OIF redux happen again somewhere, I'd say undoubtedly as long as our national interests require it - the question is will we have to reinvent the wheel because we looked for a more comfortable way out and declared that what we learned the hard way was not applicable. I don't think it matters which party is in charge, the world will come up with its own set of circumstances - or has been said - you may not have an interest in war, but war has an interest in you.

Our discussions tend to presuppose a COIN-type conflict, but it doesn't have to be that way. Just as we look at international relations and agree that military force is typically a tool of last resort, shouldn't we also look at entering a COIN environment as a last resort since it is, as you say and I agree, "cruel?"

I think there is more economics involved then philosophy. While Sherman had the character right, I think he said it with the sarcasm only a warrior could. The use of last resort is clearly subjective. What you and I see as a travesty does not bother a good many folks in the world, for them violence is handy tool and the road to last resort is awfully short. On the other hand, those with the most to lose are often those most shrewd in its use - particularly if there are more available tools with less consequence. Those with little to lose - have few qualms about the costs others may incur for their actions. That what makes non-state actors stirring up trouble in dirt poor, have not states such a problem for us - they see themselves as having little to lose and much to gain - life is cheap on their side of the tracks.

I think a big part of our problem is forming a unified strategy on what all this means. Even if we find common ground between the USAF and ground services, we have a long way to go with the OGAs.
Regards, Rob

[LawVol]

Tom: I took the "COIN shortage" to mean one of two things and probably both. First, the shortage is in the approach to COIN that the manual uses. He argues that its approach of simply adding more troops isn't the answer. While it may be the answer for future operations, we're past that point in Iraq now (this is his argument, I'm leaning his way, but need to think it through a bit more). Second, that there may be more of a "shortage" of future COIN operations than ground power proponents think.

Your dismissal of my "wash" statement presupposes a strict adherence to ROE, something that isn't a given (on the ground or in the air). I stand by my statement. I'm a lawyer, bring me facts and I'll rethink the issue.

Rob: define "unconstrained." The attack on Zarqawi was not unconstrained. If you mean carpet bombing, yes I agree. But we don't do that anymore; we still can however . We're pretty accurate and are working to increase that accuracy if given the proper funding (shameless plug right? ).

[Steve Blair]

Your argument appears to be based on the assumption that airpower generates more collateral damages than ground forces. This is an assumption I'm not willing to concede until I see concrete evidence. Sure, airpower will kill those it does not intend to, but so too does ground power. We see this nearly nightly on the evening news. Images of Haditha, hamnadiyah (sp?) and other places get extended coverage. Airpower's collateral damages gets mentioned but rarely to the extent that ground power's does. Perhaps it has something to do with the personal level with which ground power is applied, I don' know. Additionally, Abu Ghraib cannot happen with airpower. So the collateral damage argument is, at best, a wash.

There could be a number of reasons for this, the first being that airpower simply isn't being used currently as much as other forms of fire support. I also seem to recall a fair amount of press coverage about the IAF's collateral damage in Lebanon, as well as some friendly fire incidents in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Not trying to be snide here, just pointing out that there is collateral damage from airpower and that it does have an impact on operations. And to the local whose house is destroyed by a smart bomb (or an artillery shell), that's an unacceptable level of collateral damage.

Abu Ghraib may not be possible with air power, but mistakes in targeting and the planting of other bodies in bomb craters certainly is. We shouldn't forget that an important VC/NVA tactic was to fire on patrols from villages then pull back and wait for the inevitable airstrike so that they could may some hay from the resulting damage. I would submit that air power's collateral damage lies more in the fact that many fires are not directly observed (artillery fire is similar, so it's not just an airpower issue) and thus much more open to hostile IO manipulation. The only precision weapon in COIN is a sniper with his rifle. Anything else has a margin of error that can prove unacceptable in certain circumstances.

[Rob Thornton]

LawVol -

Rob: define "unconstrained." The attack on Zarqawi was not unconstrained. If you mean carpet bombing, yes I agree. But we don't do that anymore; we still can however.

Concur, the general use of Air Power in OIF right now seems about right and is being used IAW with the discretion of the ground CDR, or in the case of HPTs like Zarqawi where the shots are called higher up measures are taken to mitigate risk. I'm not talking about carpet bombing, I am talking about the notion that COIN can be reduced to an air campaign, or that an air campaign can replace COIN operations regardless of the conditions. Are there times that an air campaign with minimal use of U.S. boots on the ground might be a good call - sure, within the last 10 years we've seen some great ones - many non-kinetic.

We're not pushing COIN because we think its the end all be all, we are pushing COIN and COIN like thinking because we see it as a growing core competency due to world situation (lots under that umbrella because it leads to the conditions for an insurgency, but lump in global terrorism, humanitarian and disaster relief, FID, problems caused by global warming, resource wars etc). Remember for us, doctrine is descriptive and not prescriptive. There are lots of other doctrinal manuals in the Joint and Army library.

We're pretty accurate and are working to increase that accuracy if given the proper funding (shameless plug right? )

This brings up a good point. I heard this argument today - remember the Chinese Embassy hit? Why did so many say it had to be intentional? The argument was that we'd built unrealistic expectations about our technological capabilities through our own IO that people determined it had to be a deliberate action. Diplomatic SNAFU? There have been other instances where a glitch in the system - timing, data in-data out, bad linkage for data, etc. caused an unexpected result. Industry will promise you that if you throw enough $$$ at a problem you can overcome it - its our national culture. Some things though are not problems to be overcome, they are just conditions in which other problems exist.

I really think we should up our taxes and/or spend a greater amount of money on defense. It is not just the Air Force that needs the Air Force to refit its planes and equipment, and maintain pursuit of our technological edge; the other services require the AF to maintain superiority - we prefer to fight away games. Likewise, the ground services are going to require more money then anybody probably really is able to forecast inorder to achieve the role policy has crafted for it. We have not even broached the subject of the USN and OGAs.

My personal view is that you either invest more, or shrink your expectations. However, that does not seem to be the view of our elected officials who cannot afford to have my simplistic view and must balance domestic and foreign affairs, maintain a strong economy and deal with a host of other issues while providing the means to defend the United States. We (the people) will not be willing to bear the additional burden of a significant, permanent increase in military spending until you can present a public argument that is simple and straight forward - but its a complicated world - not much is simple anymore. I listened to the President explaining the Immigration Bill, and I recognized that every issue that gets to the congress and the President is complicated - else it would get resolved at the local or state level.

To a degree I can empathize with MG Dunlap even wile disagreeing with his argument and method. Its tough to look around and see what you believe in hanging in the balance. His thoughts have the very positive reaction of stimulating debate on the proper roles of the services under a number of scenarios. We have the various services because we have decided we need them, we have adjusted them likewise, but without discourse the decision process would be flawed.

Regards, Rob

[LawVol]

I'm going to find some time to look into this issue of ground power v. airpower vis-a-vis collateral damage. I'm sure someone has done a study.

Don't put me in the same camp with those who believe airpower can be used in place of COIN. I've read alot of stuff on the old British theory of air control and agree that it can't work. However, airpower might assist in preventing COIN, especially when used in conjunction with a small ground force in a punitive expedition (I've discussed this in other posts so won't go into it here).

I agree that COIN is a necessary skill set and it may very well solve the Iraq problem (it is certainly a topic I am interested in learning about). I'm just open to Dunlap's argument that it might not. Maybe there is a better way; I'm open to suggestions and willing to hear just about anyone out.

[slapout9]

Some of this obviously means thinking outside the proverbial box (although we better not forget what is inside the box in our newfound enthusiasm). Two of the most innovative strategic thinkers whose work is emminently adaptable to small wars are Air Force - Boyd with his OODA Loop and John Warden with his "inside out warfare" and 5 strategic rings. One can, of course, use these ideas in a purely conventional sense or apply them to small wars in innovative ways - as, indeed, one can with Clausewitz.

John, this is absolutely true EBO of which the 5 rings is just the targeting part works better from a ground perspective than it does from an Air perspective. Example during the fracas between Israel and Hezbillah I saw a guy on TV from the Air Force explain how they bombed just the ends of a bridge to lessen damage and create the effect of usage denial to the enemy. He never understood that he also denied use for his side plus somebody would have to pay for it to be rebuilt. Only!!!ground forces could have created the situation by seizing the bridge that would have denied it to the enemy, plus they could use it for their side and nobody had to pay to repair it. EBO also has a targeting concept that is not talked about much called positive an negative energy. Positive energy to effect a target is good like building a school. The part that the Air Force always wants to talk about is negative energy..taking energy away from a target ie bomb it.




Although this story comes from Desert Storm, I think it is applicable to this discussion. My good friend, the late AF Col., Ben Harvey worked for Warden in Checkmate. Ben told me that in planning for the air campaign, they had come up with a bombing approach to taking down the Baghdad power grid that would be only temporary and it could have been restored in a very short time. Had it been employed (it obviously was rejected) a significant amount of civilian hardship could have been avoided. The short term psychological impact would have been enormous but think of the possible long term effects given the current civil war and insurgency in Iraq.

John, they did do this in a very limited area it was called a carbon graphite bomb or something like that. Tiny fibers shorted out the electrical grid but as soon as they were wiped off the electricity came back on, very labor intensive to fix which was the idea behind it, to turn the power off but not do any real damage.

[Rob Thornton]

LawVol

Don't put me in the same camp with those who believe airpower can be used in place of COIN.

Of course we don't - you've been here a long time and I and many others have benefitted from your posts.

Maybe there is a better way; I'm open to suggestions and willing to hear just about anyone out.

I think that is one of the best things about our military culture - a disbelief in the inability to improve.

Best regards, Rob

[Tom Odom]

Tom: I took the "COIN shortage" to mean one of two things and probably both. First, the shortage is in the approach to COIN that the manual uses. He argues that its approach of simply adding more troops isn't the answer. While it may be the answer for future operations, we're past that point in Iraq now (this is his argument, I'm leaning his way, but need to think it through a bit more). Second, that there may be more of a "shortage" of future COIN operations than ground power proponents think.

Your dismissal of my "wash" statement presupposes a strict adherence to ROE, something that isn't a given (on the ground or in the air). I stand by my statement. I'm a lawyer, bring me facts and I'll rethink the issue.

Rob: define "unconstrained." The attack on Zarqawi was not unconstrained. If you mean carpet bombing, yes I agree. But we don't do that anymore; we still can however . We're pretty accurate and are working to increase that accuracy if given the proper funding (shameless plug right? ).

Law,

If we are discussing OIF and COIN, you maybe correct on the futility of adding troops. The current FM came about after much water had flowed under the proverbial bridge. With regards to future operations, I would caution both you and the general against thinking that insurgency and counter insurgency is not in our future. In discussing future operations as relating to COIN, the examples of recent ops in Somalia and earlier in Kosovo were not COIN-related. In the first example they were largely strike operations in support of a conventional operation to push the Muslim extremists out; that worked, The results afterward are much less clear. As for Kosovo, that again was not COIN. It was peace enforcement using strikes as coercive tool.

You are 100% correct that I presuppose strict adherance to ROE on the ground and in the air. That is the only way to compare risks for varying levels of force on an equal plain. Troops out of control or a fighter jock determined to put steel on target against standing ROE are not the issue here. The issue is levels of force and the secondary effects of using force; In the case of Zarqawi, I believe our interests would have been better served by a precision ground operation. I also agree with Rob that OIF seems to have the airpower balance under the correct guidelines; I am more concerned, however, with use of air in OEF, where aerial fires are used as a substitute for troop density.

Finally I would also say that this is not an Air Force versus Ground pounder issue. Much of the aerial fires on the battlefield come from rotary wing A/C. The debate as I see it is over COIN as a manpower instensive, human centric form of conflict and its conflation with non-COIN, limited strike or even full conventional operations in which technical superiority is crucial. Whe we confuse the two we get "shock and aw s#$@." The latter is what happened to the Israelis in Lebanon last year.

Best

Tom